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1 
Abstract 
 
Imperial powers have employed a range of strategies to establish and then maintain 
control over foreign territories and communities. As deploying military forces from the 
home country is often costly – not to mention logistically stretching when long 
distances are involved – many imperial powers have used indigenous forces to 
extend control or protect influence in overseas territories. This study charts the 
extent to which Britain employed this method in its informal empire among the small 
states of Eastern Arabia: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the seven Trucial States (modern 
day UAE), and Oman before 1971.  
Resolved in the defence of its imperial lines of communication to India and the 
protection of mercantile shipping, Britain first organised and enforced a set of 
maritime truces with the local Arab coastal shaikhs of Eastern Arabia in order to 
maintain peace on the sea. Throughout the first part of the nineteenth century, the 
primary concern in the Gulf for the British, operating through the Government of 
India, was therefore the cessation of piracy and maritime warfare. Later, British 
interests were expanded to suppressing the activities of slave traders and arms 
traffickers. At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth 
century, Britain also sought to exclude foreign powers from gaining a foothold in the 
area. It was during this time that the British government assumed full responsibility 
for the external relations of these shaikhdoms and that Britain conferred the status of 
‘protected state’ upon them. Up to this point, when Britain needed to protect these 
interests or use force to compel local rulers to comply with its wishes, naval power 
usually sufficed.  
By the midpoint of the twentieth century, Britain’s interests in the area had 
swelled and migrated inland – first because of the establishment of air stations 
servicing the imperial route to India, then as a result of oil exploration and 
production. At the same time, growing international opposition to colonialism and a 
steady reduction in Britain’s ability to project military power overseas made it more 
and more difficult for Britain to discharge it security duties in the Gulf. So how did 
Britain bridge this gap? 
Studies of British security policy towards the Gulf have focused almost 
exclusively on Britain’s formal military architecture. Using India Office records and 
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British Government archival documents, this study provides a reinterpretation of the 
means by which Britain sought to maintain order, protect its interests in the region 
and discharge its defence obligations. The records, it will be shown, point to a broad 
British policy before 1971 of enhancing the coercive instruments available to the 
local rulers. Rather than having to revert to using its own military forces, Britain 
wanted the Gulf rulers to acquire a monopoly over the use of force within their 
territories and to be in a stronger position to defend their own domains against cross-
border raiders and covetous neighbours. This policy was not always successful; 
Britain was progressively drawn into the internal security affairs of a number of ITS 
protégés, especially after the Second World War.  
The security forces that emerged – armed police forces, gendarmeries and 
militaries – varied considerably, as did Britain’s involvement in their establishment 
and running. Nevertheless, taken as whole, a trend emerges between 1921 and 
1971 of Britain pushing the Gulf states to take over more and more of the security 
burden. Indeed, at a time when its traditional sources of global power were fading, 
indigenous security forces were an important tool in Britain’s pursuit of its interests 
before its military withdrawal from the Gulf in December 1971. This aspect of 
Britain’s approach to security in the Gulf has largely been overlooked.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
 
 
1.1 Historiography: Perspectives on Britain’s Security Policy in the 
Gulf before 1971 
Once considered an obscure area of the world to study, the Gulf now commands 
global attention in both academic and policy-orientated circles.1 As part of this 
region, the small Arab monarchies of Eastern Arabia (present day Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Qatar, the UAE and Oman2) exhibit a combination of historical and political 
conditions that bind them as a group and set them apart from their neighbours. One 
of the strongest of these conditions is their experience as part of Britain’s informal 
empire on the western flank of the Raj. During the course of the nineteenth century 
the British integrated these states into its imperial system, and in the twentieth 
century set out to modernise them. What little state infrastructure they developed, 
including their fledgling security forces, were organised and run along British lines. 
These twentieth-century efforts to build-up the coercive state instruments were in 
Britain’s interests. Indeed, local security forces were an important component of 
British security policy in the region.  
To date, the literature on the origins and evolution of Britain’s security role in 
the Gulf has concentrated on the formal trappings of power, i.e. the maintenance in 
the area of British fighting units. This is unsurprising, as Britain’s ability to project 
military force underlay its privileged position in the Gulf historically and in the treaty 
system. Apart from a brief experiment to station an Indian Army detachment in 1820-
22, Britain’s coercive strength in the area was exercised through its navies. When 
treaties were not adhered to, British gunboats bombarded coastal forts and 
settlements to deter future recalcitrance. A single strong display of naval power more 
often than not rendered repeated demonstrations unnecessary – at least for a time. 
From the 1920s onwards, however, there was greater need to maintain order in the 
interior of the states that made up its informal empire in the Gulf. The British could 
either increase their own military presence on land or build-up the capabilities of their 
                                            
1 For an exploration of the trends in the literature refer to J.E. Peterson’s paper, ‘The 
Arabian Peninsula in Modern Times: A Historiographical Survey of Recent Publications,’ 
presented at the Gulf/2000 history conference in Sharjah, UAE in 2009. 
2 Oman is referred to as Muscat and Oman before 1970 and before 1956 as Muscat State 
(for the area under Sultanate control) and Oman (for the interior under Imamate control).  
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shaikhly allies. Britain experimented with both options and in the end adopted a 
mixture of the two.  
A number of historians have explained how Britain adapted its formal defence 
architecture to protect its growing interests in the region. In Defending Arabia (1986) 
J.E. Peterson, charts the growing involvement of the Royal Air Force (RAF) in British 
defence plans for the Middle East in the early 1920s. He makes it clear that whilst 
there was no immediate requirement to station a permanent RAF squadron in the 
Gulf, this changed in the 1930s with the establishment of air installations at 
Muharraq Island (Bahrain), Sharjah (Trucial Coast), and Masirah Island (Oman) and 
Salalah (Oman).3 Historian Nicholas Stanley-Price has published a recent 
monograph on the British airfield in Sharjah that, like Peterson’s account, explains 
the reason for this RAF presence in the area – the protection of the imperial air route 
to India.4 A number of studies have charted the wax and wane of Britain’s military 
presence in the region after the Second World War when, due to rapidly expanding 
oil interests, Britain paid greater attention to the security of the area. Philip Darby’s 
book British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947-68 (1973) provided the first full 
account of the evolution of Britain’s military position in the Gulf after Indian 
independence. In The Politics and Security of the Gulf: Anglo-American Hegemony 
and the Shaping of a Region (2010), Jeffrey Macris has provided an up-to-date 
account using a range of archival and secondary sources. He maps Britain’s 
evolving formal defence arrangements and how this interacted with the United States 
increasing involvement (and presence) in the region.5  
These studies tell us that, from 1950s until withdrawal in 1971, Britain 
garrisoned troops in Bahrain and Sharjah and kept, at different times, RAF air 
platforms for reconnaissance, transport and ground attack. This local military 
presence was augmented by ‘out-of-theatre’ forces that could be flown in from Iraq, 
Aden, Kenya, Libya, Cyprus and Britain. From the end of the 1950s to British 
withdrawal in 1971, the raison d’être for this military edifice was for the protection of 
Kuwait. A number of studies have looked at how Britain deterred Iraq from making a 
                                            
3 J.E. Peterson, Defending Arabia (New York, St Martin’s Press, 1986), pp. 18-63.  
4 Nicholas Stanley-Price, Imperial Outpost in the Gulf: The Airfield at Sharjah (UAE), 
1932-1952 (Brighton, UK: The Book Guild, 2013), esp. pp. 13-28 and 65-87.  
5 Jeffrey Macris, The Politics and Security of the Gulf: Anglo-American Hegemony and the 
Shaping of a Region (London: Routledge, 2010). 
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military move against its oil-rich neighbour to the south.6 The British pull out from 
South Arabia in 1967 led to a short-lived expansion of Britain’s military presence in 
the Gulf.  
The formal British military presence is, however, only part of the story; Britain 
pressured, cajoled and encouraged the small states to form centralised security 
forces between 1921 and 1971. These indigenous forces, which came into being at 
different times and took on different shapes, became an important part of Britain’s 
security strategy in the region. That this aspect of British policy has largely been 
neglected in almost all studies of the period is a deficiency that requires rectifying. To 
be sure, some scholars have touched on British involvement in the origins and 
development of some of the individual security forces of the Gulf states, with the 
Omani military receiving most attention.7 J.E. Peterson’s book, Oman’s Insurgencies: 
The Sultanate’s Struggle for Supremacy (2007) is the best example. It includes a 
comprehensive depiction of the evolution of the Omani military and, as a result, the 
role Britain played in its development.8 Peterson also contends in his earlier work, 
Defending Arabia, that: 
 
Without doubt, the major factor in the SAF’s [Sultan’s Armed Forces] 
modernisation was the guidance and manifold assistance provided by 
Britain. Not only had London prodded Sultan Said into taking the first 
steps to move his armed forces into the twentieth century, but it also 
provided financial assistance and arms. Just as importantly, the SAF 
benefited from a considerable number of seconded officers and even 
more contract personnel, both civilian and ex-military.9 
 
The recent resurgence of professional military and scholarly interest in counter-
insurgency has led to several studies of British succour to Sultanate forces during 
the Dhofar Rebellion (1965-75).10 Political scientist Walter C. Ladwig III is one 
                                            
6 Richard A. Mobley, ‘Deterring Iraq: The UK Experience,’ Intelligence and National 
Security, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2001), pp. 55-82.  
7 For a background to the formation of the Omani intelligence services, see: Dale F. 
Eickleman and M.G. Dennison, ‘Arabizing the Omani Intelligence Services: Clash of 
Cultures?,’ International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, Vol. 7, No. 1 
(1994), pp. 1-28. 
8 J.E. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies: The Sultanate’s Struggle for Supremacy (Saqi, 
2007). 
9 Peterson (1986), p. 205. 
10 Geraint Hughes, ‘A ‘Model Campaign’ Reappraised: The Counter-Insurgency War in 
Dhofar, Oman, 1965-1975,’ The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2 (April, 2009), pp. 
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scholar who has also identified British security assistance as the key element in 
Sultan’s ability to confront the rebels in the restive Dhofar province.11  
The only other locally raised force in the Gulf to receive any attention is the 
British-run Trucial Oman Scouts (TOS),12 which operated in Trucial Oman / the 
Trucial States (the present day UAE). As an organisation, the TOS was sui generis, 
inasmuch that, unlike all other local forces in the Gulf, it was under the direct 
authority of the Political Resident (Britain’s most senior representative in the region) 
and was paid for in toto by the British taxpayer. To date, writing on the TOS has not 
moved beyond memoirs of its former British personnel and monographs following in 
the tradition of regimental histories.13 Scant attempt has been made to place the 
TOS within the context of British policy in the Gulf. Immediately outside of the Gulf, 
there are a number of studies of other British-run Arab forces. These reveal that the 
use of local forces in the Gulf by Britain to advance its interests was a wider 
phenomenon.14  
In sum, scholars seeking to understand British security policy in the Gulf 
before 1971 have hitherto not placed sufficient emphasis in exploring why Britain put 
so much time into developing local instruments for internal coercion and defence 
from external enemies. At the time of Britain’s exit from the Gulf in December 1971, 
                                                                                                                                       
271-305; Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘Supporting Allies in Counterinsurgency: Britain and the 
Dhofar Rebellion,’ Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 19, No. 1 (March, 2008), pp. 62-88; 
Ian Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan: A First Hand Account of the Dhofar Insurgency 
(Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword, 2008); John Pimlott, ‘The British Army: The Dhofar 
Campaign, 1970-75,’ in Ian Becket and John Pimlott (eds.), Armed Forces and Modern 
Counter Insurgency (London: Croom Helm, 1986).  
11 See in particular: Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘Security Assistance and Counterinsurgency: 
The British Experience in Oman, 1964-1975,’ in Kendall Gott (ed.), Security Assistance: U.S. 
and International Historical Perspectives (Leavenworth, KS: CSI Press, 2006). 
12 Before 1956 they were called the Trucial Oman Levies. 
13 Michael Mann, The Trucial Oman Scouts: The Story of a Bedouin Force (Norwich: 
Michael Russell, 1994); Peter Clayton, Alpha Two Lima: The First Ten Years of the Trucial 
Oman Levies and Trucial Oman Scouts (London: Janus Publishing, 1999); Anthony Cawston 
and Michael Curtis, Arabian Days: Memoirs of Two Trucial Oman Scouts (Michael Curtis, 
2010); Tom Walcot, ‘The Trucial Oman Scouts, 1955 to 1971: An Overview,’ Asian Affairs, 
Vol. 37, No. 1 (2006), pp. 17-30. 
14 Cliff Lord and David Birtles, The Armed Forces of Aden 1839-1967 (Solihull, UK: 
Helion, 2000); Frank Edwards, The Gaysh: A History of the Aden Protectorate Levies, 1927-
61 and the Federal Regular Army of South Arabia 1963-67 (Solihull, UK: Helion 2004); and 
James Lunt’s chapters on the Iraq Levies, the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force, the Arab Legion, 
the Trucial Oman Scouts, the Sultan’s Armed Forces, Aden Protectorate Levies, and the 
Hadhrami Bedouin Legion in Imperial Sunset: Frontier Soldiering in the 20th Century 
(London: Macdonald Fontura, 1981). 
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all of small Gulf Arab monarchies had built up sizeable security forces with British 
assistance. Yet we know very little, beyond the abovementioned exceptions, about 
Britain’s role in forming, developing and, in many cases, running these forces. If the 
aim of British Gulf security policy in the twentieth century was the maintenance of 
order and the territorial status quo of its protégés, then whether or not Britain used 
local forces as proxies to advance these interests is a question that needs to be 
tackled.   
 
1.2 Theory: Local Security Forces and Imperialism 
At its root, imperialism, as an idea and a process, denotes a relationship of 
dominion. This incursion of one power into the sovereignty of another, however, can 
take on many forms.15 In Charles Reynolds’ telling, the interaction between an 
imperial power and weaker state can be explicit (political sovereignty asserted by 
force over subject peoples) or implicit (a system of control and restraint exercised 
over peoples and territories).16 If imperialism can occur across a spectrum – with 
loose supervision of intermediaries at one end and tight top-down control at the other 
– then it stands to reason that the methods used to establish and maintain this 
subordination will also vary. Indeed, this line of thinking forms the central theme of 
Jane Burbank and Fredrick Cooper’s recent book, Empires in World History: Power 
and the Politics of Difference (2011), in which they argue that different empires have 
employed different repertoires for projecting power.17  
Many scholars have accredited the success of European territorial expansion 
since the late fifteenth century to the harnessing of superior technologies and the 
professionalization of military forces. Yet European powers could probably not have 
made these gains without the use of local manpower.18 When it came to the Raj, for 
                                            
15 Peter Cain and Anthony Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688-
1914 (London: Longman, 1993), p. 3.  
16 Charles Reynolds, Modes of Imperialism (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981), p.1. 
17 Jane Burbank and Fredrick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of 
Difference (NY: Princeton University Press, 2011), esp. pp. 16-17. 
18 On the how the Western European states harnessed new technologies for military 
advantage refer to Daniel R. Headrick, Power over Peoples: Technology, Environments, and 
Western Imperialism, 1400 to the Present (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); 
William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force and Society since a.d. 
1000 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982); and Geoffrey Parker, The Military 
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example, the British could not have taken control over large parts of India without 
local allies. From the beginning, the English East India Company raised its forces 
used for expanding its presence almost entirely by recruiting from India’s traditional 
military labour markets.19 As David Killingray has aptly observed: ‘For reasons of 
cost, and because of the difficulties of employing European soldiers in tropical 
campaigns, most colonial powers sought to recruit ‘native armies’.’20  
Also, because post-conquest subject peoples proved difficult wards, imperial 
powers were required to establish effective means of internal control to suppress 
revolts and deal with unrest. Imperial governments were, however, reluctant to 
commit metropolitan resources to empire; dispatching a fleet or army from the home 
country could be costly and logistically taxing. Those delegated with the authority for 
managing imperial interests in overseas territory usually had few military means at 
their disposal as a result.21 Moreover, the need to call for military resources from the 
imperial government was seen as a failure. 
Throughout history and across geography imperial powers have used subjected 
people to maintain order in newly conquered territory, raising auxiliaries from among 
indigenous populations or utilising existing forces as proxies. Like the Aztecs, who 
maintained their empire with great economy of force, Britain also relied on local 
resources for security and order.22 This strategy had its drawbacks. Although 
                                                                                                                                       
Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995). 
19 Douglas M. Peers, ‘Revolution, Evolution of Devolution: The Military and the Making of 
Colonial India,’ in Wayne E. Lee (ed.) Empires and Indigenes: Intercultural Alliance, Imperial 
Expansion, and Warfare in the Early Modern World (New York, New York University Press, 
2011), pp. 82 and 98-9; Seema Alavi, The Sepoys and the Company: Tradition and 
Transition in Northern India, 1770-1830 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), Chapter 1; 
and T. R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849-1947 
(Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan Press, 1998). 
20 David Killingray, ‘Introduction’ to David Killingray and David Omissi (eds.) Guardians of 
Empire: The Armed Forces of Colonial Powers, c. 1700-1964 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1999), p. 7. See also, Bruce Vandervort, Wars of Imperial Conquest in 
Africa, 1830-1914 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998). 
21 R. Robinson, ‘Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a 
Theory of Collaboration,’ in R. Owen and B. Sutcliffe (eds.), Studies in the Theory of 
Imperialism (London: Longman, 1972), pp. 117-42 reprinted in Wm. Roger Louis (ed.), The 
Robinson and Gallagher Controversy (London: New Viewpoints, 1976), pp. 142-3. 
22 Ross Hassig, Aztec Warfare: Imperial Expansion and Political Control (Oklahoma: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), p. 19. On Britain’s use of local manpower to police the 
empire see in particular David Killingray and David Omissi (1999); and T.R. Moreman, ‘Small 
Wars and Imperial Policing: The British Army and the Theory and Practice of Colonial 
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indigenous recruits were cheaper and healthier, there was always a question mark 
over their reliability. The sepoy revolt of 1857 for instance meant that metropolitan 
troops would be garrisoned in India (until 1947) at a strength whereby they could 
extinguish any future uprising by local soldiery.23  
Imperial powers often took the use of local forces in conquered territory a step 
further, deploying them to fight in other parts of the empire. The Roman Empire, for 
example, recruited conquered people into an auxilia that was organised into cavalry 
or light infantry cohorts. These non-citizen soldiers complemented the traditional 
legionary forces in far-flung parts of the Roman Empire.24 Returning to the British, 
David Omissi has argued that: 
 
The empire could never have depended upon its white soldiers alone [. . .] 
British soldiers cost far more than those raised from the indigenous 
population. The empire therefore obtained much of its military manpower 
from local sources. It was easier and cheaper to dominate the world if 
Asians and Africans could be induced to shoulder much of the white 
man’s burden.25 
 
Indian troops especially were used in the nineteenth century as an imperial ‘fire 
brigade’, dealing, as Killingray notes, ‘with crises from China to Africa.’26 Moreover, 
manpower from India and other colonies was utilised extensively by Britain in the 
campaigns on the Nile (1880s), the South Africa War (1899-1902) and both World 
Wars.27  
Wayne E. Lee concludes in his study of Spanish imperial expansion into the 
Americas: ‘if it was possible to convince, cajole, and coerce indigenous agents to 
harness their own resources in the imperial interest then this was the strategy 
                                                                                                                                       
Warfare in the British Empire, 1919-1939.’ Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 19, Issue 4 
(1996), pp. 105-131. 
23 For a detailed treatment of the British military as a garrisoning force after 1857, refer to 
T.A. Heathcote, The Military in British India, 1600-1947 (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1995). 
24 Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century 
AD to the Third (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), p. 16. 
25 David Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860-1940 (London: 
Macmillan, 1994), pp. 1-2. 
26 David Killingray and David Omissi (1999), p. 4. 
27 David Killingray, ‘The Idea of a British Imperial Africa Army’, Journal of African History, 
Vol. 20 (1979), pp. 421-36. 
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employed.28 Using local proxies where possible suited Britain’s general approach to 
imperialism, which the historians Robinson and Gallagher have categorised as 
‘informal control if possible, formal control if necessary.’29 First posited more than 
forty years ago, Robison’s theory of indigenous collaboration remains the most 
persuasive depiction of how European imperialism worked.30 The type and level of 
control Britain adopted across the empire depended to a large degree on the 
success the British had in attracting local collaborators. The scarcer the imperial 
resources and the less formal the imperial arrangements, the more the British had to 
collaborate with elites in an indigenous society and rely on local means for control.  
Thus in many far-flung places of the world Britain used local intermediaries to extend 
its hegemony where it would have struggled to enter and stay with its own military 
force alone. According to Gulf historian James Onley it was ‘the collaboration and 
mediation of indigenous elites in the invaded countries themselves that provided the 
imperial administrations with their military and administrative muscle.’31 Onley 
believes that this paradigm best represents Britain’s approach to the Gulf.32 Here the 
British succeeded in getting local rulers to collaborate in the pacification of the area 
and, later, in excluding foreign influences that could threaten its position in India.33 
To be sure, the leading chiefs of the Arab coast were willing to collaborate with 
Britain only after it achieved maritime dominance in the nineteenth century. In the 
twentieth century, when Britain required peace and stability in the interior of the Gulf 
Arab states, it preferred to develop local coercive instruments under the existing 
                                            
28 Wayne E. Lee ‘Projecting Power in the Early Modern World: The Spanish Model?’ in 
Ibid (ed.) Empires and Indigenes: Intercultural Alliance, Imperial Expansion, and Warfare in 
the Early Modern World (New York, New York University Press, 2011), p. 2.  
29 Wm. Roger Louis, ‘Introduction: Robinson and Gallagher and Their Critics’, in Ibid. 
(ed.), Imperialism: The Robinson and Gallagher Controversy (New York: New Viewpoints, 
1976), pp. 2-51; and Ronald Robinson, ‘Non-European Foundations of European 
Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration’, in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (eds.), 
Studies in the Theory of Imperialism (London: Longman, 1972), pp. 117-42. 
30 Ibid.  
31 James Onley, ‘Britain’s Native Agents in Arabia and Persia in the Nineteenth Century,’ 
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2004), p. 
130. 
32 James Onley, ‘Britain’s Informal Empire in the Gulf, 1820-1971,’ Journal of Social 
Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 87 (2005), p. 35. See also Mathew Elliot, “Independent Iraq”: The 
Monarchy and British Influence, 1941-58 (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996), Chapter 
5. 
33 James Onley, ‘Britain’s Informal Empire in the Gulf, 1820-1971’, Journal of Social 
Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 87 (2005), p. 42. 
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political structures rather than use its own forces. The thinking here was that efficient 
local forces would reduce the need for Britain to intervene with its own troops.  
There are myriad reasons why outside powers want to avoid direct military 
intervention in support of subordinate governments, making the use of local proxies 
an attractive alternative. Firstly, intervention often degrades the legitimacy of the 
protégé’s government. Secondly, the presence and use of foreign troops might incite 
the local population. Lastly, intervention in a foreign territory can cause controversy 
at home for the outside power.34 It is not too large of a leap to make a connection 
here with the literature surrounding counter-insurgency practice and theory.35 In his 
widely read study comparing British counter-insurgency efforts in Malaya with those 
of the US in Vietnam, John Nagl makes it explicit that building up the capabilities of 
local forces is a sine qua non for achieving a successful outcome.36 The fact that the 
2006 US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual places great store by 
training and mentoring of host nation forces is a further indication that building 
indigenous security capacity continues to be viewed in contemporary strategy as an 
important way of exercising control or influence in a subordinate state.37 By using 
local forces to advance and protect its interests in the Gulf, Britain was employing a 
time-honoured strategy. 
 
 
                                            
34 For a wider discussion on the controversies of foreign deployments, see Robert E. 
Harkovy, Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989). 
35 Yora Gortzak, ‘Using Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations: The French 
in Algeria, 1954-1962,’ Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 32, Issue 2, (2009), pp. 307-333; 
and Richard L. Millett, Searching for Stability: The US Development of Constabulary Forces 
in Latin America and the Philippines (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 
2010) 
36 John Nagl, Learning to East Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from 
Malaya and Vietnam (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2005), pp. xiv-xv and 99-100. See also: Ian 
Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies (New York: Routledge 2001); and 
Thomas Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60 (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1990).  
37 The 2006 US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (The US Army Field 
Manual No. 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5) was first issued in 
December 2006. It was published by the University of Chicago Press as The US Army / 
Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual in 2007. The publication devotes a chapter to 
the developing Host-Nation security forces.   See Chapter 6, pp. 199-236.  For a recent 
treatment of the influence this manual has had on US military doctrine and operations 
towards the War on Terror refer to Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Patraeus and the 
Plot to change the American Way of War (New York: Simon Schuster, 2013).  
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1.3 Epistemology: Sources, Structure and Thematic Threads  
All too often social science studies begin with an elegant theory and then search for 
facts that will confirm it. Another way to conduct analysis is to put the theory after the 
history, because, according to Francis Fukuyama, ‘theories ought to be inferred from 
facts, and not the other way around.’38 Towards that end, this study surveys in detail 
British policy towards security forces by looking in detail at the origins and evolution 
of the security forces of each of the protected states (and Oman). This is the building 
blocks upon which the wider arguments advanced in this dissertation are built upon. 
As so little has been written about the development of the security forces of the Gulf 
states – let alone their place in British policy before 1971 – this study utilises archival 
material in London from the India Office Records in the British Library and released 
British government documents held at the UK National Archives to provide an 
original narrative. Because this study is looking at how British policy developed over 
time and across the whole of its informal empire in the Gulf, the chapters are 
organised chronologically.  
Chapter Two (this introduction being the first chapter) provides a contextual 
examination of the security arrangements before the establishment of local 
professional security forces. It looks at this matter from the British side and from that 
of the local rulers.  
Chapter Three explores the circumstances surrounding the formation of the 
first security forces that emerged in the Gulf in the 1920s.  At this time, the area was 
still under the purview of the British Government of India. It shall draw out the 
reasons why the Raj pressured the Sultan of Muscat and assisted the rulers of 
Bahrain and Kuwait to replace their previous systems of maintaining authority with 
professional coercive instruments established on a British model. The chapter then 
seeks to explain why other parts of Eastern Arabia, namely Qatar and the Trucial 
States, did not establish security forces.  
Chapter Four surveys the increasing importance that local forces played in 
British security policy in the 1950s. After Indian independence, the Foreign Office 
assumed responsibility for the Gulf region and began taking greater interest in the 
internal workings of the Gulf states. At the same time, internal stability took on added 
importance with growing oil exploration and production activities in the Gulf states. 
                                            
38 Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order (London: Profile Books, 2011), p. 24. 
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This chapter charts the formation of the Trucial Oman Levies (called Trucial Oman 
Scouts after 1956), a force the British government established to police the interior of 
Trucial Oman / the Trucial States. Where external danger existed (Saudi Arabia 
towards the Omani interior and Abu Dhabi; Iraq towards Kuwait), Britain helped to 
build up the defensive capabilities of these threatened states.    
Chapter Five reviews the British policy towards local forces between Kuwaiti 
independence in 1961 and Britain’s decision to withdrawal from the Gulf (formerly 
announced in January 1968). Although electing for independence, Kuwait remained 
dependent on Britain for its defence. Yet Britain’s capability and willingness to 
intervene militarily decreased in the 1960s. To bridge this gap, Britain sought to 
assist the Kuwaiti military into becoming a more credible deterrent to Iraq in order to 
reduce the readiness and size of its own forces committed to Kuwait’s defence. In 
Bahrain and Qatar, Britain centred its policy on building up their police forces in order 
to deal with civil unrest, some of which was inspired by Arab Nationalism and anti-
colonialism. In contrast, Britain’s policy in the Trucial States was to discourage the 
rulers from building their own forces, but to look instead to the British-run TOS as the 
best means for policing the area.   
Chapter Six examines the ways in which Britain built up local forces in the 
Gulf as it prepared to withdraw its own forces by the end of 1971. By this time Oman 
was facing a worsening rebellion in its restive southern province of Dhofar. British 
assistance became the critical factor building up the capabilities of the Sultan’s 
Armed Forces. It will also show that Britain saw the Gulf local forces as a means of 
preserving British influence in security affairs after 1971.  
By revealing the place of local forces in British efforts to maintain order in its 
informal empire in the Gulf, this study provides a more complete understanding of 
the nature of Britain’s informal empire in Eastern Arabia. Whilst this has stand-alone 
value, the research findings have a broader application.39 Several sub-themes, 
closely related to the overarching research agenda, are weaved through the 
chapters. The first of these sub-themes is the impact that the creation of security 
institutions had on the development of the Gulf states. After an initial interest in the 
1960s and early 1970s on the role of the security forces in Middle Eastern politics 
                                            
39 The need for broader relevance in historical research is argued persuasively by Marc 
Trachtenberg in The Craft of International History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2006), p. 16. 
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and societies, academic interest in the subject has tapered off.40  Today the Gulf 
states maintain complex security apparatus (per capita they are some of the world’s 
largest spenders on defence equipment), but very little work has gone in to exploring 
how the development of these institutions has affected the societies from which they 
emerged.41 Discussing internal security issues of the Gulf states has long been 
considered an out-of-bounds topic.42 But another reason for the lack of knowledge 
about the part security forces have played in the evolution of the Gulf states and the 
survival strategies of their rulers is because of (a) the dominance of the ‘rentier’ 
model in explanations for the durability of these states,43 and (b) the fact that, as 
Antonio Giustozzi forcefully argues in his recent book, academics tend not to be 
inclined to discuss matters of security or state coercion except in order to criticise 
policymakers.44  
Another theme explored throughout each chapter is the phenomena of 
unofficial British influence (i.e. not derived from the British government) and its 
interaction with official Britain (its representatives, policy, military, etc.). British 
involvement in local Gulf forces was not limited to state-to-state assistance; there 
was a plenitude of Britons privately employed by the local rulers operating outside of 
                                            
40 Eliezer Be’eri, Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society (New York: Praeger, 1970); 
S.N. Fisher, The Military in the Middle East: Problems in Society and Government (Ohio 
State University Press, 1963); George Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle 
East, vols. 1-3 (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1965-1973); J. C. Hurewitz, Middle East 
Politics: The Military Dimension (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1969); Riad N. El-Rayyes and 
Dunia Nahas (eds.) Politics in Uniform: A Study of the Military in the Arab World and Israel 
(An-Nahar Press Series, 1972); Dankwart Rustow, The Military in Middle Eastern Politics 
and Society (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1963). 
41 See Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan, Gulf Military Forces in an Era of 
Asymmetric Wars, Vol. 1 (Westport, US: Praeger International Security, 2007). 
42 Chapter 10, ‘The Military In and Out of Politics,’ Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics 
in the Making of the Modern Middle East, 3rd edn (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 179. Due 
to the proliferation of non-Arab media outlets and the intense international interest in the 
region after September 11 and the invasion of Iraq the dynamics of researching security 
matters in the Gulf may be changing. See: Lori A. Plotkin, Kuwait, 1979-1991: Problems and 
Policies for Internal Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 
43 For indicative examples of this interpretation, see: Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the 
Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990); and F. Gregory Gause III, Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the 
Arab Gulf States (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994).  For fuller 
discussion about the rentier state model in the Arab world see Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo 
Luciani (eds.) The Rentier State (London: Croom Helm, 1987). 
44 The Art of Coercion: The Primitive Accumulation and Management of Coercive Power 
(London: Hurst & Co, 2011), p. viii. 
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British government; sometimes they worked in tandem with British interests, at other 
times they evoked the frustrations of the Political Resident and his staff.  
A final major sub-theme, or question, that this study engages with is that of 
the transition from Britain’s formal defence role that ended in December 1971 to its 
residual influence in the security affairs of its former protégés. Today Britain still 
considers itself to have a special position in the small Gulf monarchies of Eastern 
Arabia, not least in security matters. But how much of this residual role can be traced 
to the actions Britain took and the decisions it made in the lead up to 1971? 
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CHAPTER TWO: METHODS OF CONTROL AND 
PROTECTION BEFORE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL 
FORCES  
 
 
2.1 British-Enforced Maritime Peace, 1820-57  
British interests in the Gulf began with the arrival to the area of the English East India 
Company (established in 1600), which jostled with its Dutch rival and the Portuguese 
to establish exclusive trading rights in the area.45 Between 1622 and 1721, the 
Portuguese were expelled from all Arab and Persian ports in the area, leaving the 
Dutch and newly arrived French to compete with the British.46 Over much of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century, British interests in the Gulf were limited to trade 
and preventing other European powers from establishing a presence. In the late 
1790s, an uptick in piracy, combined with heightened Anglo-French rivalry, gave 
Britain cause to reconsider the level of its involvement in the area.47 
Raiding and enforced tolling by Arab maritime tribes on Anglo-Indian shipping 
reached new heights in the early 1800s.48 In British eyes, the chief perpetrators were 
the Qawasim (singular Qasimi), a maritime power straddling both sides of the lower 
Gulf.49  When in 1808 Qawasim sailors boarded an East India Company cruiser, 
                                            
45 They sought to establish direct maritime trade with the East, circumnavigating the Horn 
of Africa and bypassing the middlemen controlling the profitable overland Silk Road. See R. 
B. Sergeant, The Portuguese off the South Arabian Coast (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1963); C.D. Belgrave, ‘The Portuguese in the Bahrain Islands (1521-1602)’, Journal of 
Central Asian Society, Vol. XXII (1935); and S. Ozbaran, ‘The Ottoman Turks and the 
Portuguese in the Persian Gulf, 1534-1581’, The Journal of Asian History, vol. 6 (1972). 
46 In 1622, the English assisted the Persians in expelling the Portuguese from the Straits 
of Hormuz. Although the Portuguese were the first European power the Gulf experienced, 
‘they left no religious and hardly any cultural imprint, except for their cannons and the ruined 
forts of their garrisons.’ Frauke Head-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates 
(Essex: Longman Group, 1982), p. 271. 
47 This section is indebted to J.B. Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1880 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1968). 
48 In 1805, Qasimi ships seized two merchant vessels owned by the British Resident at 
Basra and attempted, but failed, to capture an East India Company cruiser.  John G. 
Lorimer, Gazetter of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, Part 1: Historical 1A 
(Calcutta: Superintendant of Government Printing, India, 1915; reprinted Farnborough: 
George International Publishers, 1970), pp.181-2. 
49 For accounts on the early development of British involvement in the Gulf, see M.C. 
Peck, The United Arab Emirates (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 22-28; and R. M. Savory, 
 
 
22 
killing many of its crew, the East India Company authorities in Bombay lobbied 
London to deploy the Royal Navy to the Gulf.50  In the meantime, Bombay embarked 
in 1809 on a retributive naval campaign against suspected transgressors.51 Planning 
for the operation, however, moved beyond a simple act of punishment. Historian J.F. 
Standish has shown that a ‘grander design was already forming in the minds of the 
governing council in India.’52 Naval captains taking part were ordered to reconnoitre 
suitable islands for establishing a station to command the entrance to the Gulf, 
providing a base to police piracy and to check French encroachment. Whilst officials 
in India supported this proposal, the British Government in London calculated that, 
after the Royal Navy captured the remaining French base in the Indian Ocean in 
1810, France no longer posed a threat and so a naval base was no longer 
necessary.53   
In the decade that followed, the British Government hemmed and hawed over 
whether to station a naval contingent in Gulf waters. Without a round-the-clock 
presence of British warships, the halt in attacks on British shipping which followed 
the 1809 expedition proved short lived.54  A further punitive expedition was organised 
in December 1819. The Governor of Bombay, Mountstuart Elphinstone, told the 
Governor-General of India that after the retributive campaign he intended ‘to station 
as large a marine force in the Gulf as we can spare, with some armed boats for the 
purpose of visiting different ports, and guarding against any vessels being equipped 
of a warlike character.’55  Forces assembled for this second expedition – which, like 
                                                                                                                                       
‘The History of the Persian Gulf’, in A. J. Cottrell (ed.), The Persian Gulf States – A General 
Survey (London and Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1980), pp.3-40. 
50 For a general discussion, see James Onley, ‘The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The 
Arab Rulers and the British Resident in the Nineteenth Century,’ New Arabian Studies 
(2004). 
51 In 1809 an eleven ship armada laid siege to the Qasimi capital at Ras al-Khaimah and 
burned it. Another Qasimi stronghold at Linegh (on the Persian coast) was stormed next. 
Finally, a joint British-Muscati fleet captured Shinas on Oman’s Batinah coast following a 
fierce battle. Charles Belgrave, The Pirate Coast (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1966).  
52 J.F. Standish, ‘British Maritime Policy in the Persian Gulf,’ Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 
3, No. 4 (July 1967), p. 327. 
53 In 1810 the East India Company struck an agreement with the Ruler of Muscat to 
exclude the French from his territory and British forces captured Île de France (thereafter 
named Mauritius), the last major French base in the Indian Ocean. 
54 Patricia R. Dubuisson, ‘Qasimi Piracy and the General Treaty of Peace (1820),’ Arabian 
Studies, Vol. 4 (1978), pp. 47-57. 
55 Factory Records (Persia and Persian Gulf) Vol. 34. Elphinstone to Hastings, 15 
December 1819. Taken from: J. F. Standish, ‘British Maritime Policy in the Persian Gulf,’ 
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the first, included ships from the Sultanate of Muscat – captured the Qawasim 
headquarters at Ras al-Khaimah town. Smaller parties from the force moved to 
neighbouring Qawasim ports and towns to accept their submission.56 The British 
seized Qishm Island on the Persian Coast in 1820 and retained it as a naval station, 
garrisoning a small detachment of sepoys to defend it. This first attempt to leave a 
garrison in the area ended in failure, as the men quickly succumbed to disease.57 
The British were given a second warning against using troops in the area when a 
force of sepoys from the Qishm garrison,58 landed in Oman to confront the 
recalcitrant Bani Bu Ali tribe, was routed.59 The experiences of 1820-21 convinced 
the British that they should never station troops in the Gulf again.60 Fortunately, in 
safeguarding this key transportation artery to India61 the ship’s cannon was needed 
more than the sepoy’s bayonet.62   
British Indian officials launched the punitive expeditions of 1809 and 1819-20 
to convince the Arab maritime tribes to cease tampering with British shipping on pain 
of destruction.63 But this was not the whole substance of the strategy. In 1820, the 
British proposed a ‘General Treaty of Peace with the Arab Tribes’ in which 
signatories would promise to refrain from piracy at sea and to fly a registered flag.  
                                                                                                                                       
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.3, No.4 (July 1967), p. 327. On the maritime role: R. St Parry, 
‘The Navy in the Persian Gulf,’ Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, Vol.75 (May 
1930), pp. 314-31. 
56 Donald Hawley, The Trucial States (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1970), pp. 126-
30. 
57 Peterson (1986), p. 11; and James Onley, ‘Britain’s Informal Empire in the Gulf, 1820-
1971,’ Journal of Social Affairs, Vol. 22 No. 87 (Fall 2005), p. 37. 
58 The garrison commander was Captain Perronet. 
59 It took a second force sent out from India in early 1821, combined with the Sultan of 
Muscat’s tribal fighters, to defeat the Bani Bu Ali. Afterwards the main settlements of the 
Bani Bu Ali were razed and their leaders were imprisoned in Muscat. Peterson (1986), p. 11.  
60 James Onley, ‘Britain and the Gulf Shaikhdoms, 1820-1971: The Politics of Protection,’ 
Occasional Paper, No. 4 (Center for International and Regional Studies: Georgetown 
University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, 2009), pp. 6-7. 
61 The East India Company and travellers who wished to avoid the long and tedious 
ocean route preferred the Gulf. Halford L. Hoskins, British Routes to India (London: 
Longmans Green, 1928), pp. 89-96; and Ghulam Idris Khan, ‘Attempts at Swift 
Communication between India and the West before 1830,’ Journal of the Asiatic Society of 
Pakistan, Vol. 16, No. 2 (1971), pp. 121-36. 
62 See: Anthony Preston and John Major, Send a Gunboat! A Study of the Gunboat and 
its Role in British Policy, 1854-1904 (London: Longmans, 1967).  
63 Uzi Rabi, ‘Britain’s ‘Special Position’ in the Gulf: Its Origins, Dynamics and Legacy’, 
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 42, No. 3 (May 2006), p.352 
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British naval power would act as the guarantor.64 Officials in India formed a Gulf 
Squadron from the Bombay Marine (re-named Indian Navy after 1830)65 to enforce 
the maritime truce and protect British shipping.66 Commanded by a Senior Naval 
Officer Persian Gulf (SNOPG), the Squadron usually consisted of five to seven 
ships-of-war.67 A residency system of Political Agents, Political Officers and Native 
Agents with a Political Resident at the apex supervised the truces.68  After the 
success of the 1820 General Treaty of Peace, a wider Maritime Truce was signed in 
1835 with the rulers of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ajman, and the Qawasim of Sharjah, Ras 
al-Khaimah, and Lingeh. The Indian Navy patrolled the pearl banks every year 
during the pearling season. It proved so popular that it was renewed without 
hesitation year-on-year, and in 1843 the Political Resident agreed to guarantee a 
ten-year Maritime Truce, which ran without major infraction.69  This success in turn 
led to the signing of the Perpetual Maritime Truce in 1853.70  What British officials 
had once called the Pirate Coast they now referred to as the ‘Trucial Coast’.71 
                                            
64 The texts and the backgrounds to the relevant treaties are found in C.U. Aitchison 
(Comp.), A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and 
Neighbouring Countries, 5th edn (Dehli, Manager of Publications, Government of India, 
1933), Vol.11. 
65 Anirudh Deshpande, ‘The Bombay Marine: Aspects of Maritime History, 1650-1850,’ 
Studies in History, Vol. 11 No. 2 (1995). For a further background see G. S. Graham, Great 
Britain in the Indian Ocean: A Study of Maritime Enterprise, 1810-1850 (Oxford, 1967). 
66 James Onley, (2009) p. 5. For a background to the practice of protecting maritime trade 
at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century, refer to C. 
Northcote Parkinson’s two volumes, War in the Eastern Seas, 1793-1813 (London, 1954); 
and Trade in the Eastern Seas 1793-1813 (London, 1966). 
67 Donald Hastings, The Royal Indian Navy, 1612-1950 (London: Macfarlane & Co., 
1988); Anita Burdett (ed.), Persian Gulf and Red Sea Naval Reports 1820-1960, 15 vols. 
(Slough: Archive Editions, 1993). The Squadron and the SNOPG were headquartered on 
Qishm Island (1823-1911); then on Henjam Island in the Strait of Hormuz (1911-35); and 
finally Ras al-Jufair in Bahrain (1935-71). For two years, Qishm Island was also the 
headquarters of the Lower Gulf Agency, which, after moving to Bushire (where it would 
remain for over a century), would become the Gulf Residency and the seat of the Political 
Resident Persian Gulf. 
68 Refer to M. H. Fisher, Indirect Ruler in India: Residents and Residency System, 1765-
1858 (Dehli: Oxford University Press, 1992) 
69 In 1836 Umm al-Quwain was admitted. G.S. Graham, Great Britain in the Indian 
Ocean, 1810-1850 (Oxford, 1967), p. 254. 
70 In 1861 Bahrain was permitted to sign the Perpetual Maritime Truce. Later signatures 
were Kuwait in 1899 (de facto membership), and Qatar in 1916. Muscat, however, was 
never formally admitted to the Maritime Truce. James Onley, (2009), p. 5. 
71 H. M. Al-Baharna, The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States: Their Legal and Political 
Status and their International Problems (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1975), pp. 47-48. 
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Although the British Government was obligated to punish intransigents, it 
avoided whenever possible becoming embroiled in local disputes.72  This is why the 
British were reluctant to admit Bahrain to the truce, not doing so until 1861. ‘[U]nrest 
within Bahrain and its dependencies and threats to its independence from outside 
powers,’ J.B. Kelly has argued, ‘made it virtually certain that the waters around the 
island would be the scene of almost ceaseless warfare.’73     
The Government of India had designed the Trucial system as a low-
maintenance means of keeping order without constant reversion to the use of force. 
The naval presence was a deterrent force; that is, it dissuaded those from acting 
outside the agreed rules of maritime truce by the threat of retaliatory action.74 In this 
way, the duty of enforcing the truces concretised British naval dominance in the 
area.75 Favouring peace at sea, the coastal rulers entered into the maritime truces 
voluntarily. As a result, the projection of British power in the Gulf was not as nakedly 
coercive as in parts of Britain’s formal empire. They rarely intervened to stop land 
warfare and tribal raiding between the Gulf states before the twentieth century. As 
British interests were offshore, there was little appetite amongst British officials for 
encouraging the coastal rulers to establish local forces or levies.  
 
2.2 Adherence to Treaty Obligations and the Exclusion of Imperial 
Rivals: British Naval Arrangements, 1858-1911 
The second half of the nineteenth century saw a further step change in British 
involvement in the Arab coast of the Gulf. When London took direct control of British 
                                            
72 The Sultan of Muscat, the first ruler to be hesitantly granted protection from the Gulf 
Squadron in 1809. This was despite having already being an ally of Britain’s since the 
signing of the Anglo-Omani treaty of friendship in 1798. It is interesting to note that the 
protection remained on an ad hoc footing until a formal defence agreement was signed with 
Oman in 1958. 
73 J.B. Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1880 (London: Oxford University Press, 
1968), p. 379-80. Bahrain went to war with Abu Dhabi (1839) for harbouring a breakaway 
tribe; the Ruler, Shaikh Abdullah, was deposed (1843) by a confederate of family members; 
and Bahrain knocked back an invasion (1854) by the forces of Feisal ibn Turki of Najd who 
had allied with tribes formerly loyal to the Ruler. 
74 For a discussion on the differences between deterrence and compellence, see Robert 
J. Art, ‘To What Ends Military Power?’ International Security, Vol. 4, No. 4, (1980), pp. 3-35. 
The term ‘compellence’ was coined by Thomas C. Schelling in Arms and Influence (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1966) 
75 Hussein M. al-Baharna, ‘The Consequences of Britain’s Exclusive Treaties: A Gulf 
View’, in B. R. Pridham (ed.), The Arab Gulf and the West (London: Croom Helm for the 
Centre of Arab Gulf Studies, Exeter University), p. 23. 
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affairs in India after the 1857 Mutiny, the future of the naval contingent in the Gulf 
was rendered uncertain. Indeed, at the end of 1862, the British Government recalled 
the vessels of the Indian Navy assigned to the Gulf Squadron back to India.76 This 
was contrary to the recommendation of the Political Resident, Pelly, who called in 
1863 for the relocation of the Gulf Squadron – and the Residency – to the natural 
anchorage of Khasab at the tip of the Musandam Peninsula. Deep enough to 
accommodate the growing number of steamships plying the nearby waters, and 
sitting at one of the narrowest points of the Straits of Hormuz, Khasab was for Pelly 
the ideal location for settling and deterring disputes between coastal Arabs and 
suppressing the slave trade. Despite the added British aim of intercepting ships 
carrying slaves, under new arrangements the East Indies Station of the Royal Navy 
assumed the duties of the Indian Navy in the Gulf, but it stationed no ships in the 
Gulf and only sent ships when the need was urgent.77 This change deprived the 
Political Resident of a dedicated vessel (though the introduction of the Bombay to 
Basra mail steamer from 1862 and telegraph-laying ships did provide the Resident 
with some much needed logistical support).78 According to the official chronicler, 
John Lorimer, this affected Britain’s ability to maintain order: 
 
The chief disadvantages of the new system were that, owing to the extent 
of the East Indian naval station and the relatively small strength in ships of 
the East Indian Squadron, it frequently happened that no vessel was at 
hand when required; that, calls upon ships from different quarters being 
numerous, no vessel could remain long in one place; that the officers 
were, by traditions and training, less suitable for the performance of 
political duties than their predecessors of the Indian Navy; and finally that, 
as the officers and vessels belonged to a Royal instead of local force, 
their services could not be so freely requisitioned by the political 
authorities.79  
 
                                            
76 This was in preparation for disbanding the Indian Navy. On 30 April 1863, officials at 
Bombay hauled down the Indian Navy’s flag, and the service ceased to exist. 
77 Lorimer (1915), p. 248. Khasab was also an important relay station for the British 
telegraph to India. Interests on the western littoral had graduated beyond the suppression of 
piracy. See Christina Phelps Harris, ‘The Persian Gulf Submarine Telegraph of 1864’, The 
Geographical Journal, Vol. 135, No. 2 (Jun., 1969), p. 175. 
78 Lorimer (1915), p. 248. 
79 Ibid. 
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In the mid-1860s, Pelly complained that even though the slave trade was in full 
vigour, he lacked the means to intercept slaving craft.80 He was powerless, for want 
of a suitable means of locomotion, to perform his function as arbitrator of disputes 
arising among the chiefs on the Arab coast. Furthermore, the Admiralty forbade 
ships of the Royal Navy to ply the Gulf waters during the pearling season (April to 
October) – precisely when disputes were most frequent.81 The Resident’s fear that 
for lack of ships the Gulf would revert to its natural state of insecurity seemed to be 
borne out by subsequent events.  
After a heavy attack by the Al Khalifah and their allies from Bahrain on Al 
Thani controlled towns on the Qatari peninsula in October 1867, the first British 
vessel was not able to arrive on the scene until the following May.82 In response to 
the earlier attack the Al Thani sent its fleet to Bahrain in June 1868. Sixty ships were 
reportedly lost and over a thousand Bahraini and Qatari sailors killed in the ensuing 
sea battle. Not until August did the Royal Navy’s HMS Vigilant reach the area to 
carry out reactive and punitive operations.83  The Political Resident appealed to the 
Government of India to put at his direct disposal a vessel sufficiently armed and built 
with all the modern fittings and improvements of the English Dockyard so that he had 
the means to enforce peace.84 
 It is unclear whether the events of 1867-8 directly led to a rethink of the 
existing naval arrangements, but the following year the Government of India agreed 
to subsidise the Royal Navy presence in India. In return, the Admiralty agreed to 
appropriate six vessels from the Royal Navy’s East India Squadron for special 
service under the Government of India control. Three of the six ships were to be 
steam gun vessels or gunboats and were detached for constant and exclusive use in 
the Gulf.85 The officer in command of the flotilla was to consider himself under the 
                                            
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid, pp. 248-9. 
82 Her Majesty’s Indian Navy reverted to the name Bombay Marine in 1863. In 1877 it 
became Her Majesty’s Indian Marine.  
83 In September 1868, the British destroyed the prominent Bahraini fort at Abu Mahir and 
put fire to its dhow fleet. 
84 Lorimer (1915), p. 249. 
85 Ibid, p. 250. A list of British vessels employed in the Persian Gulf from 1863 to 1905 
can be found in J.A. Saldanha’s, Précis on Naval Arrangements in the Persian Gulf, 1862-
1905 (Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, India, 1906). 
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authority of the Political Resident, underscoring the politico-military role of Britain’s 
senior representative.86  
While the Perpetual Maritime Truce of May 1853 provided the Government of 
India with the right to enforce maritime tranquillity, it did not preclude the shaikhdoms 
from entering into agreements with outside powers. With Persia, the Ottoman 
Empire, France, Germany, and Russia87 showing increasing interest in Gulf towards 
the end of the nineteenth century, Britain felt impelled to consolidate and upgrade its 
political relationships with coastal shaikhs of Eastern Arabia. The local rulers signed 
Exclusive Agreements, binding them into even tighter treaty relations with, and 
ceding control of their external affairs to, the British Crown.  These were signed by 
the Ruler of Bahrain in 1880 and 1892, the rulers of the Trucial States in 1888 and 
1892, the Ruler of Kuwait in 1899, the Saudi ruler of Najd and Hasa in 1915 
(annulled in 1927), and finally the Ruler of Qatar in 1916. In return, Britain bound 
itself to defend their territorial integrity and the status of protected state was 
conferred upon them.88 The Sultan of Muscat signed a similar Exclusive Agreement 
in 1891, which recognised his pre-existing diplomatic relations with France and 
America, but his relationship with the British government was just as close as any 
Arab shaikhdom further up the coast.89  
At the century’s turn, the Gulf was more than ever considered by London to 
be a ‘British lake’. Resolved in protecting the western flank of India, the British 
Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, declared to the House of Lords in 1903 that 
                                            
86 The resurrected Gulf Squadron could not undertake hostile without the direction of the 
Political Resident.  Importantly, the general service rule under which hostilities could not be 
undertaken without reference to the Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies Squadron was 
relaxed with reference to the Gulf in light of the peculiar circumstances of the Gulf. 
87 See in particular M. A. Yapp, ‘British Perceptions of the Russian Threat to India,’ 
Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1987), pp. 647-665. For a more general overview on 
British fears regarding the threat from Russia refer to Shareen Blair Brysac, Tournament of 
Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia (Washington D.C.: 
Counterpoint, 1999).  
88 J.B. Kelly, ‘The Legal and Historical Basis of the British Position in the Persian Gulf’, St. 
Anthony’s Papers, No. 4: Middle Eastern Affairs, No. 1 (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1958) 
pp. 135-6; and Onley (2009), p. 10. The most important treaties between Great Britain and 
the Gulf States are listed in The National Archives [TNA] FO 371/156674, ‘Relations 
between Her Majesty’s Government and the Rulers of the Persian Gulf States: List of Princi-
pal Agreements’, August 1961. 
89 For a discussion on the relationship between influence and military power see: 
Lawrence Freedman, ‘Military Power and Political Influence,’ International Affairs, Vol. 74, 
No. 4 (Oct. 1998) pp. 763-79. See also John Vincent, Military Power and Political Influence: 
the Soviet Union and Western Europe, Adelphi Paper No. 119 (London: IISS, 1975). 
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Britain ‘should regard the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified port in the 
Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests [. . .].’90 
As the Exclusive Agreements forbade those who signed to ‘sell, cede, mortgage or 
otherwise give for occupation’ any part of their territory, except to the British 
Government, Britain was in effect creating a cordon sanitaire for the approaches to 
British India. Britain surged its naval presence again in 1909 in an effort to intercept 
local dhows involved in smuggling arms that eventually found their way to India’s 
Northwest Frontier and Afghanistan.91  Dubai and Ajman were believed in particular 
to being used by the French and other merchants to ship 200 rifles a month to India. 
After a Royal Navy landing party searching for a weapons cache in Dubai was 
attacked by the local inhabitants on Christmas Eve 1910,92 Britain demanded that 
the Ruler Shaikh Butti bin Suhail (r. 1906-12) agree to station a British Political 
Officer in the town and to permit a guard force of sepoys for his dignity and personal 
protection.93 Britain later dropped these demands, but extended the idea of 
deploying detachments of sepoys to Bahrain and Muscat, which accepted the 
presence of these Indian Army troops in 1911. These small sepoy detachments 
stayed in Bahrain and Muscat until the both states established professional armed 
forces of their own.  
                                            
90 Lord Lansdowne, Persian Gulf Declaration, 5 May 1903; The Times, 6 May 1903, p. 8. 
Cited in Onley (2009), p. 11. This declaration was repeated in substance by Sir Edward Grey 
in 1907. 
91 L. Fraser, ‘Gun-running in the Persian Gulf,’ Proceedings of the Central Asian Society, 
17 May 1911; Hon. Arnold Keppel, Gun-running and the Indian North-West Frontier (London: 
John Murray, 1911); and Brigadier-General H. H. Austin, Gun-running in the Gulf and other 
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1909-1910 on special duty to the Persian Gulf for the prevention of gunrunning. Two 
additional gunboats from the East Indies Station (HMS Sphinx, a composite paddle vessel, 
and HMS Lapwing, a Redbreast-class gunboat, were sent in March 1909. See: Sydney 
Morning Herald, 30 March 1909. 
92 The National Archives, Kew, UK (hereafter abbreviated as TNA) ADM 116/1250, 
Report by Captain (HMS Hyacinth) to The Commander-in-Chief HM Ships and Vessels, East 
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93 The firefight resulted in the death of at least five of the landing party.  British action 
killed approximately thirty-seven locals and wounded dozens more.  On the role of Shaikh 
Butti see Graeme Wilson, Rashid’s Legacy: The Genesis of the Maktoum Family and the 
History of Dubai (Dubai: Media Prima, 2006), pp. 38-39. 
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2.3 Exercising Shaikhly Authority before Professional Forces   
Before the formation of organised and centrally controlled security forces, the leading 
shaikhs of Eastern Arabia employed a variety of methods to defeat or deter rival 
claimants; to defend key settlements and vital wells against aggressors; and to 
embark on expeditions against neighbours. Several anthropological studies 
conducted in the twentieth century shed light on the practices of shaikhly rule on the 
Arabian Peninsula.94  
The role of tribal shaikhs in Eastern Arabia emerged by group consensus and 
was always dependent upon tribal approval.  A tribal shaikh was more like a 
chairman of a committee and was never more than primus inter pares (first among 
equals).95 He exercised his leadership through personal authority rather than direct 
power: he was a leader, not a ruler.96  By contrast, a ruling shaikh employed a small 
group of armed retainers who could impose his will as a last resort.97 This entourage, 
or Rajail al-Shaikh (men of the head chief), formed a private protective bodyguard for 
the ruler, collected taxes (or tribute) and made arrests in the ruler’s name.98 Because 
ruling shaikhs could never be certain about their relatives’ allegiance, bodyguards 
were most commonly made up of tribesmen from out-of-kin groups, especially slaves 
or manumitted slaves.99 This is an old practice in the Arab world. The caliph al-Mahdi 
                                            
94 See for example: Talal Asad, ‘The Bedouin as a Military Force: Notes on Some Aspects 
of Power Relations between Nomads and Sedentaries in Historical Perspective,’ in Cynthia 
Nelson (ed.), The Desert and the Sown – Nomads in the Wider Society (Berkeley: Institute 
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95 S.B. Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf (London: Frank Cass, 1966), 
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Emirates (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 10. 
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Random House, 1967), pp. 90-94. 
97 William Lancaster and Fidelity Lancaster, Honour is in Contentment: Life before Oil in 
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p. 318.  
98 For a description of how Mohammad Ibn Rashid in northern Arabia organised, armed 
and quartered this force, see Charles M. Doughty, Travels in Arabia Deserta (New and 
definitive edition in one volume, New York: Random House, n.d.), p. 37. 
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(775-785), for example, gave preference to a group of Mawali (manumitted slaves) 
over kinsmen because he could depend on their total loyalty.100 Alois Musil’s 
observations of the northern Najd in the 1920s show that this practice continued over 
a millennium later: 
  
To secure the state and his own life the head chief, or prince [amir in 
Arabic] is compelled to maintain a strong body of mercenary soldiers – 
almost always negroes – who, having no relatives among the settlers or 
nomads, are able to give effect to every order of their lord and to protect 
him against all enemies, since they know that their own fate is linked with 
his.101 
 
Through this bodyguard rulers could to some extent extend their writ over nearby 
territory. Writing specifically about Ibn Rashid’s system of enforcing his control 
around the northern Arabian city of Hail in the nineteenth century, but offering a point 
that could be applied equally to the rulers of Eastern Arabia, Rosenfeld argues that it 
was 
 
[. . .] non-kin elements, slaves (in part, manumitted) and mercenaries that 
served as the initial nucleus and primary military strength used in 
establishing the superiority of the ruling house and protecting its continuity 
[original emphasis]. They were the private force which not only 
superseded but served, as well, as the immediate threat against the 
nomadic and settled kinsmen in case of their rebelling.102  
 
Whilst it was possible to conquer other tribes with one’s kinsmen, the need to protect 
a shaikh’s privileged control of property and trade fell on shoulders of the slaves and 
mercenaries that formed the loyal armed nucleus of his household.103  At points in 
the nineteenth century, the ruling Al Khalifah in Bahrain for example are estimated to 
have had anything up to 2,000 Africans (slave and free) in their household service, 
                                            
100 David Ayalon, Islam and the Abode of War: Military Slaves and Islamic Adversaries 
(Brookfield, VT: Variorum, 1994), p. 25. 
101 Alois Musil, Northern Nejd (American Geographical Society, Oriental Explorations and 
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102 Henry Rosenfeld, ‘The Social Composition of the Military in the Process of State 
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many of whom were personal bodyguards. Indeed, public order in the shaikhly 
capital Rifaa was exclusively in their hands.104     
Maintaining a group of armed retainers did not, however, give leading shaikhs 
a monopoly over force; rulers had to continue to carefully craft their relationships 
within their kingroup and other allied tribes. Indeed, the level of support a shaikh was 
able to maintain from such groups defined the ability to extend his authority over a 
given territory. Allied tribesmen could be scaled up for rapid conquest or to fight in a 
unified way when inspired or called to fight for a common cause. Yet support was still 
subject to the vagaries of tribal politics, including deft marriage strategies. Unable to 
manipulate tribal alliances to gain an unchallenged position, the Al Thani on the 
Qatari peninsula instead offered fealty to the Ottomans in late 1871, who 
subsequently established a military garrison in Doha in early 1872 to provide them 
with the necessary muscle to dominate those around them.105 Towards the end of 
the nineteenth century, the Ottomans attempted to exert greater sovereignty over its 
prodigy, which ended in open hostilities between Qatar and the Sublime Porte, 
culminating in the Battle of Wajba in 1893 between Qatari tribal forces and Ottoman 
troops, at which the Qataris prevailed.106 
In order to counter raiding from unsettled tribes, ruling shaikhs built and 
repaired existing watchtowers.107 Coastal towns also built rudimentary forts made 
from mud and coral called a ghuree, in which fresh water was kept inside in case 
raiders invested the position.108 In some instances, rulers would salary a small 
number of guards (or askars) to permanently man forts and watchtowers. Until the 
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end of the nineteenth century, Muscat’s defence was based on the forts of Mirani 
and Jalali that overlooked the harbour and a series of watchtowers on the fringe of 
the town. Rather than pay and equip a standing force, the Sultan paid an allied tribe 
to provide a quota of its men armed with assorted out-dated muzzle-loading rifles to 
man these positions. Indeed, the Al Said Sultans had an arrangement that lasted 
until the 1970s whereby specific tribes (such as the Bani Umar, Bani Kalban, and the 
Hawasina) were paid to provide askars for guard and rudimentary police duties.109 
Bedouin tribes living in the hinterland of coastal settlements were sometimes paid to 
protect towns at a distance from raiders, thieves, and plunderers.110 Moreover, 
coastal shaikhs paid these martial bands either tribute for this service or exempted 
them from paying tax. Coastal shaikhs also used revenues from taxes levied on 
pearling vessels to pay for Bedouin guards to watch over the town during the 
pearling season when most men were out at sea. 
Beyond exercising their authority and defending settlements against raiders, 
the ruling shaikhs of Eastern Arabia could call a general summons to mobilise the 
wider tribal confederation for an expedition against an enemy. The ability of a ruler to 
tap into the manpower of his own or allied clans was crucial for mounting 
expeditions. In the more heavily settled nineteenth century central Arabia, local 
rulers made greater use of settled townsmen:  
 
When the chief intends making an expedition against another tribe, the 
people of the villages are first individually summoned, and more or less 
forced to engage in the enterprise, everyone on his own camel or horse, 
and with provisions and ammunition of his own for so long a time as the 
expedition is reckoned to last; and these always constitute the main force 
of the army.111 
 
The levies raised from amongst the settled population were paid and equipped 
during their absence from the towns and villages. Townsfolk (Hadhar) called upon to 
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give military service were given rudimentary weapons; most were armed with 
matchlocks, sabres or lances.  
Bedouin would also form up, but contrary to popular perception, nomadic 
tribesmen only formed a minor part of the forces at the ruler’s disposal and had a 
reputation for being unreliable. The rulers did little more than demand a quota of men 
who must appear.  Unsurprisingly, then, the ruling shaikhs of Eastern Arabia 
measured their power and importance by the number of tribesmen prepared to follow 
their banner when called upon to do so. It was in this way that in Oman the 
Portuguese were expelled in 1650 and the Persians in the 1740s. In the event of a 
major emergency, settlers, tradesmen, artisans and divers (i.e. all those had a stake 
in the survival of the town) would also join in a settlement’s defence. In 1920, for 
example, almost the entire population of Kuwait town was mobilised after the Ikhwan 
(religious fighters from Najd) threatened to overrun the settlement.   
As many ruling shaikhs in Eastern Arabia were based in the main coastal 
towns, it is unsurprising that traditional practices of raiding were transposed on to the 
sea. Maritime powers, such as the Al Khalifah in Bahrain, the Al Said in Muscat and 
the Qawasim shaikhs, could press into service hundreds of dhows.112 Used for 
carrying cargo or pearl diving, these versatile vessels could also double-up as 
fighting ships.113 At the turn of the twentieth century, for example, there were 
perhaps as many as 1,200 dhows along the Trucial coast dedicated to pearl diving 
alone.114 In this way, rulers could translate commercial prowess into military 
strength.115 These fleets were primarily used for transporting a landing force, but 
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when two fleets met at seas the fighting was often hand to hand and brutal. Warfare 
at sea often took the form of one vessel moving alongside an enemy vessel, and 
embarking fighters to commandeer it.116 Apart from a small band of armed retainers, 
the leading shaikhs did not exercise political control over their territories through 
establishing centralised repressive institutions. In the 1920s, Britain attempted to 
change this situation.  
 
2.4 The Tradition of Alliance Formation in Eastern Arabia    
Small states can only do so much on their own to ensure security. With small 
territories and populations, the local rulers were required to seek outside help to 
defend themselves militarily.117 One might expect that the rulers entering into such 
bargains harboured the same fears as the King of Siam from the Rogers and 
Hammerstein musical, who asseverated in song: ‘If allies are strong with power to 
protect me, might they not protect me out of all I own?’118 Abuses were avoided 
through a well-established custom of protection-seeking behaviour in Arabia. ‘The 
norms and obligations of the protector-protégé relationship,’ James Onley argues, 
‘provided the rulers with an effective survival strategy in the face of Arabia’s ever-
shifting power dynamics.’119 At various points before the period of British hegemony, 
minor rulers in Eastern Arabia had little choice but to seek the protection of myriad 
regional powers (the Ottomans, Persians, Saudis, Omanis and the Qawasim of 
Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah).  ‘All the ruling families of the Gulf today,’ Onley writes, 
‘have been protégés of regional and extra-regional powers in the past, including the 
                                                                                                                                       
expense.  A great portion of the Residents of Basrah died from bubonic plague in 1773.  
Moreover, the port city was occupied by a Persian army after a long siege that lasted from 
1776 until 1779.  Basrah never really recovered its pre-eminence as a centre of trade after 
these calamites.  
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vessels were destroyed. Lorimer (1915), p. 952. 
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Saudis and Omanis.’120 It was not then a detour from past practices that throughout 
most of the nineteenth and twentieth century, nearly all rulers actively sought British 
protection in exchange for certain concessions, and that they were ready to codify 
these arrangements in legally binding treaties. 
 The security strategies of many of the coastal rulers were to maximise their 
independence from both their external alliances whilst at the same time using these 
alliances to reduce their dependence on internal groups. It will be shown below that 
the British connection created a new distribution of power in the Gulf states and that 
their rulers were able to cement their enhanced position through the formation of 
state tools of coercion. In this way, the ruling families gained in power relative to 
other groups as a result of the British imperial connection.121 One of the key ways 
that this was achieved was through advantages gained from the British connection in 
establishing their own military forces. Britain could provide the local rulers seeking to 
build up their own professional forces with weapons, trained men from India, loaned 
British officers to run and administer the force, uniforms, and, in some 
circumstances, financial subsidies to get the organisation started in the first place. 
Indeed, one of the main arguments presented here is that the establishment of 
professional security institutions consolidated state power in the hands of the ruling 
families. It provided these burgeoning states with the necessary muscle to supress 
challenges to their position.  This dovetails with the thinking of leading anthropologist 
Henry Rosenfeld, whose observation nearly fifty years ago that no state ‘appears 
without the appearance of a state military alongside it’ is germane for the Gulf states 
in the twentieth century.122 Muscat and Bahrain were the first of the Gulf states in 
Britain’s orbit to establish professional forces in the 1920s, soon followed by Kuwait. 
The next chapter seeks to uncover what drove these developments and how these 
forces fitted into British security policy at a time when the area formed the western 
edge of the Government of India’s sphere of influence.  
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CHAPTER THREE: LOCAL FORCES AND BRITISH INDIA  
 
 
3.1 Formation of the Levy Corps in Muscat and Bahrain, 1921-6  
Before the close of the twentieth century, the system employed by the Al Said 
rulers of Muscat of mobilising loyal tribesmen in time of need was showing its 
limitations as a suitable counterweight to the tightening confederacy of tribes in 
the Omani interior who were becoming more opposed to Muscat’s rule. After the 
near loss of the capital in 1895 to these opponents, the Sultan, Taimur bin 
Faisal (r. 1913-1932), decided to add 12-pounder guns to his arsenal and 
recruit more Baluchis from his Gwadur enclave on the Makran coast (present-
day southwest Pakistan) as palace guards.123 Despite the Sultan’s efforts in 
1907 to turn his Baluchi guards into a more credible military force, they 
remained an un-uniformed static force, garrisoning the forts and watchtowers 
around Muscat. At the same time, the Sultan’s adversaries in the interior were 
again organizing in 1913 to move against him. Enthused by a renaissance in 
Ibadism,124 fuelled by a resentment of the influence Britain and Indian 
merchants had in Muscat, and angered at their own economic decline tribal 
forces loyal to the Imam took control of key towns in the interior and appeared 
to be on the cusp of sweeping away the Sultan.125 On 27 April 1914, Sultan 
Taimur attempted again to develop his own military force, issuing a general 
notice in the villages along the Batinah coast calling for recruits for a force of 
infantry and artillery.126 The scheme amounted to very little; recruits were simply 
absorbed into the palace guard without training. British Indian officials 
concluded that to save the Sultan they would have to send more troops to 
support the Sultan’s force of loyal tribal fighters, his guard of askars and the 
                                            
123 Muscat, the seat of the Sultan’s government, is used to describe both the town 
and nearby Mutrah. 
124 The Ibadi are a Kharajite branch of Islam that rejects the notion that the Caliphate 
should be vested in any one descent group. The Ibadi are often called the people of 
consultation (ahl al-Shura) because they select the most qualified member of their 
community as imam without regard to descent or tribal considerations.   
125 J. E. Peterson, ‘The Revival of the Ibadi Imamate and the Threat to Muscat, 
1913-1920,’ Arabian Studies, Vol.3 (1976), pp. 165-188. See also Dale E. Eickleman, 
Theocracy to Monarchy: Authority and Legitimacy in Inner Oman, 1935-1957,’ 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1985), pp. 3-24.  
126 Ian Buttenshaw, ‘Oman’s Military Heritage,’ Journal of the Sultan’s Armed Forces 
Association, No. 61, (March 2012), p. 82. 
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small detachment of sepoys which had been detached from Bushire to protect 
the Political Agent since 1911.127 Back in July 1913, the Government of India 
had sent a small force of the 2nd Rajputs based in Bushire to plug the gap 
before reinforcements from the Indian mainland arrived.128   
When the attack finally materialised on 11 January 1915, the Indian Army 
forces, numbering almost a thousand men, formed a screen on the outskirts of 
Muscat to face approximately 3,000 advancing tribal fighters. The Sultan’s own 
tribal levies, deployed in piquet positions on ridge above Ruwi plain, were the 
first to come into contact with opposition forces. British Indian Army forces 
counter-attacked, pushing the rebels back from the ridge. Outgunned, the 
attackers sustained heavy casualties and withdrew back into the Omani 
interior.129  
 The successful application of force in Oman did not encourage British 
Indian officials to consider the option of permanently garrisoning troops in the 
area to protect the Sultan. The record shows that whilst the Government of 
India did not want to keep the sepoys in the Sultanate, it accepted that the 
presence of troops was nonetheless necessary for as long as (a) the threat from 
the interior persisted, and (b) the Sultan was without the independent means to 
hold his position.130 One way of squaring this circle was for the Sultan to stand 
up his own military. The Government of India provided more than 
encouragement for this proposal: in 1918 the Sultan was furnished with a loan 
of six and a half lakhs of rupees (Rs.650,000) under the explicit condition that 
he must establish a professional force of levies to end his reliance on the Indian 
Army detachment.131  Moreover, even though the Arms Traffic Convention was 
still in force for the Gulf, Britain offered to provide the Sultan with rifles, 
                                            
127 Judging the Persian authorities to be incapable of protecting the lives and 
property of its subjects, the Government of India decided to station an Indian Army 
battalion in Bushire (location of the Residency) and began rotating detachments of this 
formation through Manama and Muscat in 1911. The Indian Army battalion was under 
the supervision of Commander, Gulf Ports. 
128 During late 1914, troops of the 102nd King Edward’s Own Grenadiers and the 95th 
Russell’s Infantry sailed from India. Peterson (1976), pp. 165-188.  For more 
information, see Ibid, Oman in the Twentieth Century: Political Foundations of an 
Emerging State (London: Croom Helm, 1978). 
129 The Indian Army, in contrast, suffered only seven killed and 14 wounded. 
130 James Onley (2009), p. 10. 
131 Due to improved administrative arrangements, the Sultan’s balance in 1921 was 
six lakhs of rupees. The projected annual cost of such a force was two lakhs of rupees. 
IOR R/15/1/427, Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, 7 September 1920,  
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revolvers and two ten-pounder mountain guns.132 The formation of a coercive 
instrument for the Muscat state was but one part of a wider restructuring of the 
government that British India officials induced the Sultan to undertake.133 The 
British Government of India left Sultan Taimur with very little choice but to 
establish a professional force and took complete control in shaping what this 
force would look like.  
The defeat of the Sultan’s opponents led to the signing of the Treaty of Sib 
in 1920, establishing a modus vivendi between the Sultan and the Imamate that 
would last until 1955. Whilst this removed the immediate threat to Muscat, 
British representatives still held the Sultan to setting up a military – a condition 
of the 1918 loan. The Government of India arranged for the soon-to-be 
disbanded British-controlled Seistan Levy Corps in Persia to relocate to Muscat 
and form the nucleus of his new force. Although the financial cost of importing 
these men would be high, the Political Agent in Muscat, Ronald Wingate, told 
the Political Resident in July 1920 that the Sultan could and must afford the 
Seistani levymen. ‘To get this levy corps going will be the greatest stroke of 
policy we have ever done in Muscat,’ Wingate wrote.134 British representatives 
in Muscat and the Gulf continued to push the Sultan hard to set up a force of 
their design.   
The British took control of forming the Sultan’s military, predicating their 
preference for bringing in outsiders – the Seistanis from Baluchistan – on the 
grounds that locals were unreliable. Wingate made his opinion on the matter 
crystalline: ‘what is wanted is a small highly paid and well-trained and loyal body 
of cut-throat mercenaries with no ties in the country in which they serve and no 
love for the Arab. It is no use blinking this fact.’135 This tactic was not unique to 
the British; there were Arab precedents stretching a long way back. The 
Abbasid dynasty in the ninth century, for example, recruited newly converted 
Turkish tribesmen because successive rulers felt they could not rely on the 
                                            
132 For lack of funds, the Sultan did not purchase the mountain guns. 
133 J.E. Peterson (1978), pp. 90-92. See also: H. al-Musawi, A History of Omani-
British relations with special reference to the period 1888-1920 (PhD thesis, University 
of Glasgow, 1990). 
134 IOR L/P&S/10/928, Wingate (Political Agent & HM Consul, Muscat) to Political 
Resident, 22 July 1920.  
135 IOR L/P&S/12/2956, Wingate to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 30 April 1920. 
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loyalty of their fellow Arabs. Indeed, the Al Said Sultans themselves had 
recruited palace guards from Gwadur for the same reason. 
Despite the financial burden involved, Sultan Taimur agreed to import the 
soon to be disbanded Seistani Levy Corps and, on 15 February 1921, 250 
soldiers and their British Indian Army commander, Captain E.D. McCarthy, 
began their two-month long journey to Muscat.136 The Muscat Levy Corps, as 
the force was renamed, camped outside of Muscat until the Indian Army sepoys 
vacated the fort at Bait al-Falaj on the outskirts of the capital in June 1921.  
Although most of the cost of the force came out of the Sultan’s purse 
(albeit through a Government of India loan), the British continued to shape the 
force after it arrived in Muscat and structured it along British Indian Army lines. 
The malaria season, however, tempered the strong British preference for 
foreigners over local recruits. Indeed, so many Seistanis fell ill in the years 
immediately after the force arrived in the Gulf that almost half their numbers 
were on the daily sick list.137 Their intolerance to the climate, combined with the 
cost involved in sending each levyman home on leave, led to a reverse in 
course; British officials were now persuading the Sultan to replace the Seistanis 
with locals. By October 1921, locally recruited men formed two sections and 
there was a waiting list of over fifty others wanting to join. Between September 
1921 and March 1922, Levy Corps discharged 164 Seistanis, and in May the 
last party of 58 left.138 It was not, however, local Arabs who replaced the 
                                            
136 They undertook a seven-day march to the railhead from where they travelled to 
Karachi to await a boat to Muscat.  An outbreak of measles and the inability to obtain 
transport meant that they remained in the Indian port city until mid-April. On 19 April 
1921, after two months’ travelling, they arrived in Muscat. The MLC’s establishment on 
arrival was one British officer, six Indian officers and other ranks instructors, three 
Baluch Jemadars, 12 Daffadars, 12 Naiks, and 217 Sepoys. The force was organised 
in to three troops of 80 men.  
137 IOR L/P&S/10/928, Wingate (Political Agent, Muscat) to Lt. Col. Arthur Prescott 
Trevor (Political Resident), 11 September 1921. In fact, the MLC discharged 17 
Sistanis in the immediate months after they arrived in April 1921 due to malaria. The 
presence of a medical officer in Mutrah and the complete overhauling of the drainage 
system at the end of 1924 reduced levels of malaria. Before, in January and February 
1922 (the worst months for malaria) sufficient men could not be found for guard duties. 
In the same months in 1926 the average daily sick report for the fever numbered only 
four men. Malaria: Feb 1926 (46 admissions), Feb 1927 (six admissions), Feb 1928 (11 
admissions). 
138 IOR L/P&S/10/928, Report by Commandant MLC (Captain McCarthy) to Political 
Agent (Wingate) on progress (for the period 18 February to 31 August), 8 September 
1921. The strength of the Levies on 20 March 1922 stood at 58 Seistanis and 193 
others, the majority of whom were either local or Gwadur Baluchis. 
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Seistanis. Although small numbers of local Arabs and African manumitted 
slaves from the Sultan’s entourage did join the force, the majority of new 
recruits were either Omanis of Baluchi origin (some of whom had already 
served the Sultan as askars) or Baluchis recruited from the Sultan’s Gwadur 
enclave on the Makran coast.139 They were, however, all the Sultan’s subjects, 
and British representatives felt a great success had been achieved. British 
officials were especially keen to get members of leading families into the Levy 
Corps in order to tie it more closely to Muscat regime and to initiate the local 
elite in modern practices. The Sultan’s brother, Syed Salim bin Faisal, whom 
the Political Resident, Lt. Col. A.P. Trevor, had last seen as ‘a slacking, idle and 
good for nothing youth,’ joined the force, after which he became in Trevor’s 
eyes ‘a smart and well set up young officer.’140 Wingate admitted that he did not 
believe at the time that the transformation from the ‘undisciplined and idle mob 
who formed the Sultan’s old so-called army’ into the present force could have 
been possible.141 Resident Trevor believed that continued British leadership of 
the Muscat Levy Corps was the critical factor. Trevor thought Captain 
McCarthy, had made ‘good headway in training this very unpromising material’ 
and wanted him to stay beyond his original six-month engagement to carry on 
this ‘experiment’ in training local Arabs.142  
 
If he [Captain McCarthy] succeeds in turning the local Arab into a 
good soldier, it will save the state [Muscat] from having to rely on 
foreigners for the force, from the risk of the force being rendered 
inefficient by the foreigners not being able to stand the abominable 
climate of Muscat, and last but not least from incurring extra 
expenditure in pay and allowances and leave passages. In addition 
he will have achieved a feat which has hitherto been believed 
impossible by all those competent to form an opinion.143 
 
                                            
139 IOR R/15/1/428, Captain McCarthy (Bait al-Falaj) to Wingate with a final Report 
on the progress of the MLC, 20 February 1923.  
140 Later, the British commander Captain Alban pushed for, and achieved, Syed’s 
resignation; but the Sultan reinstated him in 1924 and soon after he was promoted. He 
retired at his own request in October 1925.IOR L/P&S/10/928, Wingate to Lt. Col. 
Trevor, 11 September 1921.  
141 Ibid. 
142 Britain’s representatives in the Gulf were delighted with Captain McCarthy, who 
stayed in command until March 1923. Ibid, ‘Report on the working of the Muscat Levy 
Corps,’ Lt. Col. Trevor to Denys Bray (Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in 
Delhi), 22 October 1921. 
143 Ibid. 
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The Muscat Levy Corps could only make a limited contribution to British security 
policy. Whilst British officials calculated that the Sultan had his own means to 
defend his capital without British military assistance, they also understood that 
the Levies had little utility outside Muscat.144 Although the force escorted the 
Sultan on a tour of the Batinah Coast in the spring of 1922, its commander, 
McCarthy, still felt that the Levy Corps could not stand up against a large group 
of tribal opponents in the field. He lobbied the Government of India to re-arm the 
force with modern rifles. ‘[A]s the force here is comparatively a small one, and 
as we are likely to engage at some time or other with considerable numbers [of 
opposing tribal fighters] the success of the Levies will depend on the volume of 
fire’.145  In response, the Government of India offered in September 1922 to 
supply modern rifles at reduced rates. The Sultan, however, claimed he did not 
have the funds to purchase these weapons even at a knocked-down price.146 
This provides further evidence that the British placed more importance in this 
fledgling force than the Sultan. 
The limitations of the Levy Corps were on full display later that year. After 
the Al Saad tribe burnt down a customs post on the Batinah coast, the Sultan 
demanded reparations and their acceptance of his right to tax imports. Until the 
twentieth century, the Sultans of Muscat were essentially merchant princes, 
whose commercial interests were largely exogenous to Oman; they had been 
the principle maritime power in the region for much of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century with domains in Zanzibar and much of the East African 
coast.147 With British support, Sultan Taimur wanted to extend the writ of the 
Muscat state over greater territory, starting with the coastal towns to the 
northwest and southeast of the capital.  
Too weak to tackle the Al Saad tribe alone – it was estimated that they 
could assemble 500 armed fighters – Sultan Taimur asked Britain to assist. As 
                                            
144 IOR R/15/1/428, Wingate to Lt. Col. Trevor (forwarding final report by Captain 
McCarthy on MLC), 14 March 1923. Lt. Col H. H. Smith, Commanding Gulf Ports, 
made similar observations after he visited Muscat. . 
145 IOR R/15/1/148 Report by Commandant MLC (Captain McCarthy) to Major M. E. 
Rae (Political Agent, Muscat) on progress (for the period 1 September 1921 to 20 
March 1922), 20 March 1922. 
146 This price included shipping costs and the supply of ancillaries for the rifles.  TNA 
FO 371/8955, Denys Bray to Lt. Col. Trevor, 11 September 1922; and Ibid, ‘Re-
armament of the Muscat Levy Corps,’ Lt Col. Trevor to Denys Bray, 9 March 1923. 
147 John Wilkinson, Water and Tribal Settlement in Southeast Arabia (Oxford, 1977), 
p. 138.  
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the British wanted to capture two notorious slave traders whom the Al Saad 
harboured they agreed. In October 1922, a ship from the Gulf Squadron (HMS 
Cyclamen) towed lighters carrying a hundred men of the Levy Corps and 30 
irregulars up the coast from Muscat.148 Unimpressed by this joint force, the Al 
Saad refused to submit to British-Muscati demands. Even after suffering a naval 
bombardment,149 the burning of beached dhows and the confiscation of other 
vessels the Al Saad tribal leaders did not yield.150 It eventually took the 
combined guns of three British sloops to bring them to heel.151 This affair shows 
that the Sultan’s writ outside Muscat still required British naval guns; the Levy 
Corps could not operate independent of British support outside the capital. 
Nonetheless, the establishment of the Muscat Levy Corps did meet Britain’s 
aims: by creating a centralised and professional British-officered force, the 
Sultan was more secure in Muscat and less likely to need to call on the 
Government of India to send sepoys for his defence. Furthermore, it allowed the 
British in 1925 to remove the detachment of sepoys that had guarded the 
Political Agent in Muscat since 1911. In a further demonstration of British 
support to the Levy force, the Political Resident recommended an increase of 
fifty men to cover guarding duties at the Political Agency. The Government of 
India agreed to pay the salary of the force’s British commander to off-set the 
costs associated with expanding the unit.152  
It was not only the existence of the Muscat Levy Corps that led to a 
reassessment of the concept of stationing sepoy detachments in Muscat. The 
Deputy Secretary of the Government of India’s Foreign and Political 
Department, Mr Parsons, argued to the Political Resident in October 1925: 
                                            
148 As well as official representatives from Muscat, the ship carried the Political 
Agent, Major Rae, and the SNOPG, V. Bradon. 
149 TNA FO 371/9036, V. Bradon (SNOPG) to C-in-C East Indies Station, 
‘Proceedings (No. 26) in Connection with Batinah Coast,’ 1 November 1922. 
150 Ibid, Commander of HMS Espiegle, George Holbrow Lang to V. Bradon, ‘HMS 
Espeigle,’ 14 November 1922. 
151 The threatened targets were the villages of Raddah and Bataha and the towers 
of Sur Mughabasha and Sur Yal Hilal. Heavy bombardment was sanctioned by the 
Political Resident, allowing for unrestricted destruction of property other than mosques 
where these were distinguished. Ibid, Major Rae to V. Brandon, 19 November 1922; 
Ibid, V. Brandon (on board HMS Cyclamen) Major Rae, ‘Bombardment of Yal Saad 
Villages,’ 19 November 1922; and Ibid, V. Brandon to C-in-C East Indies Station, 
‘Proceedings (No. 29),’ 10 December 1922. 
152 IOR R/15/2/118, Lt. Col. Francis Prideaux (Political Resident) to Government of 
India, 31 October 1925 
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Indeed, there seems even less reason for maintaining our 
detachments [of sepoys] in the Gulf while His Majesty’s gunboats 
patrol the Gulf and have access to the ports where British consulates 
and establishments are located. It is on this command of the sea 
rather than on the maintenance of scattered detachments that our 
prestige mainly rests.153 
 
Added to this, Persia’s decision to demand the withdrawal of the Indian Army 
battalion made the system of rotating detachments through Muscat and 
Manama untenable.154 The impending withdrawal of the sepoys from Manama 
meant that Political Agency would be left unprotected. But this, as it turned out, 
was not the chief reason why British officials pressed for Al Khalifah in Bahrain 
to establish a professional force.  
By the beginning of the twentieth century, Bahrain was the most 
developed of the protected states and was a key British interest. During the 
First World War it served as a logistical hub for men and war materiel sent from 
India for the Mesopotamia campaign. Despite Bahrain’s importance, the 
Government of India wanted to remove the sepoys protecting the Political 
Agency and its staff in Manama because of the cost and administrative 
inefficiencies of stationing a small Indian Army guard overseas. There was also 
the additional fear that the Indian Muslim sepoys were susceptible to the 
sedition preached to them at Manama’s mosques and by fellow Indians in 
Bahrain who were non-cooperationists.155 So in 1923, the Government of India 
began exploring the option of replacing the sepoys with a local force. It would 
be wrong to say that finding a substitute for sepoy protection on its own drove 
British policy on this matter. The most important factor in play was the need to 
tip the internal balance of power in Bahrain in the direction of the Ruler. 
 Overall, the alliance with the British provided the ruling shaikhs with 
prestige and revenue, giving them the means to cement their paramount 
                                            
153 Ibid, Mr. A.E.B. Parsons (Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the 
Foreign and Political Department) to Lt. Col. Francis Prideaux (Political Resident), 
‘Withdrawal of Military Detachments in the Persian Gulf,’ 13 October 1925. 
154 The Government of India decided in 1923, largely at Persia’s request, to 
withdraw the Indian Army battalion from the Persian Gulf.  This was to happen in two 
stages; the battalion’s strength was reduced to half a battalion by 1925. 
155 IOR R/15/2/118, Under Secretary of State for India to Bahrain Agency, 30 April 
1922. 
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position.156 Yet the Al Khalifah rulers in Bahrain were often in a weak position 
vis-à-vis their own families and other prominent Sunni tribes that had migrated 
to Bahrain since the latter half of the eighteenth century. The ruling family did 
have some means of maintaining order. In Manama, the leading Al Khalifah 
shaikhs retained men known as naturs (night watchmen) who had the task of 
keeping peace in the busy market. With the establishment of the Manama 
baladiyah (municipality) in 1919, the natur system was superseded by a civil 
force of police.157  The baladiyah’s police, however, was unable to cope with 
disorder; this small force could not provide a credible counterweight to the 
armed tribesmen who were a law unto themselves when in Manama and the 
unrivalled power in the hinterland. Stopping Sunni tribal raids on Shia villages in 
Bahrain became an urgent matter for Britain in the early 1920s. Persia, which 
claimed Bahrain as its own territory, used the attacks on its co-religionists to 
show that the political status quo – the Al Khalifah ruling family backed by 
Britain – should be replaced. Irked by the palsied response of then-aging-ruler 
Shaikh Isa bin Ali (r. 1869-1932) to Sunni tribal attacks and his resistance to 
reform, Britain pressured him to step aside and let his son, Shaikh Hamad, rule 
as regent. Once holding the de facto reins of power, Shaikh Hamad did indeed 
enact a number of reforms, but this put him in a position of opposition to many 
of Bahrain’s most prominent Arab Sunni tribes, especially the powerful Dawasir. 
Shaikh Hamad was now devoid of the means of internal protection that 
successive Al Khalifah rulers had relied upon – the support of fellow Sunni 
tribes.  British military support, largely in the shape of the Gulf Squadron, could 
offer little comfort to Shaikh Hamad when disgruntled tribesmen could achieve a 
coup de main against him with little warning.158  
                                            
156 See David Roberts, ‘The Consequences of the Exclusive Treaties: A British 
View,’ in Brian Pridham (ed.), The Arab Gulf and the West (London: Croom Helm, 
1985), pp. 1-14. J.E. Peterson, ‘Tribes and Politics in Eastern Arabia,’ Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 31, No. 3 (1977), pp. 301-303. Which settlement constituted a shaikhdom 
was in a state of flux. Kalba, for example, was considered a Trucial state for no more 
than fifteen years (1936 to 1951), while Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah were not counted 
as Trucial states until 1921 and 1952 respectively. F. Gregory Gause III, Oil 
Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States (New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994) pp. 20-22. 
157 Fred H. Lawson, Bahrain: The Modernization of Autocracy (Boulder; Co.: 
Westview Press, 1989), pp. 42-43. The naturs were kept but their role was limited to 
unarmed patrolling Manama’s market place at night. 
158 There was a general fear that the Dawasir tribe (before they were compelled to 
relocate to al-Hasa, modern-day Saudi-Arabia’s eastern region in 1923-24) would 
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Shaikh Hamad and the Political Resident agreed that the most sagacious 
policy was to set up a state armed force and to expand the municipal police.159 
A professional armed force would relieve Shaikh Hamad of his dependence on 
tribal fighters; it would provide much needed support to the municipal police; 
and, by making a strong impression on the local population (even in the training 
stage), it would serve to enhance his prestige – no small consideration whilst 
his father, still nominally the Ruler, was alive.160  For Britain, a centralised 
military instrument would nullify the excuse made by successive Al Khalifah 
rulers that they did not possess the power to halt raids on Shia villages. 
Additionally, British officials hoped that the establishment of force on the lines of 
the Muscat Levy Corps might obviate the need for Britain to intervene militarily 
in support of the Ruler.161  Focusing on this latter point, the Political Agent, 
Major Clive Daly, fulminated to the Political Resident in August 1924 that 
because the Al Khalifah rulers did not have the strength to end disturbances in 
their own country, they constantly requested British warships.162 Lt. Col. Francis 
Prideaux, the Political Resident, agreed. Assisting Bahrain in raising a force of 
about 150 men might be just the remedy to halt future requests for British 
intervention on behalf of the Ruler.163  
With Shaikh Hamad’s blessing, the British began organising a Levy 
Force for Bahrain. Offering similar assistance to Bahrain that it had to Muscat, 
the Government of India agreed to furnish the new unit with a British Indian 
Army officer.164  Captain Parke, the selected officer, was tasked with 
commanding the Bahrain Levy Corps and simultaneously administrating, though 
                                                                                                                                
make a bid to seize control of all Bahrain from their stronghold of Budaiya in the 
northwest of the main island.  Being notoriously unruly, the Dawasir never fully 
submitting to the authority of the ruling Al Khalifah shaikhs; and even after their 
migration to the Eastern Arabian mainland, it was still believed that they could return in 
force to capture the country. 
159 IOR R/15/1/347, Lt. Col. Francis Prideaux to Government of India, 7 February 
1926.  For a similar narrative on the Resident’s recommendations, refer to Mahdi 
Abdalla al-Tajir, Bahrain 1920-1945: Britain, the Shaikh and the Administration (New 
York: Croom Helm, 1987), p.69. 
160 IOR R/15/2/127, Major C.K. Daly (Political Agent, Bahrain) to Lt. Col. Francis 
Prideaux, 31 August 1924. 
161 IOR R/15/1/347, Capt. Horner (Manama) to Lt. Col. Francis Prideaux, (Bushire), 
18 August 1926. 
162 IOR R/15/2/127, Major C.K. Daly to Lt. Col. Francis Prideaux, 31 August 1924. 
163 IOR R/15/1/347, Lt. Col. Francis Prideaux to Government of India, 7 February 
1926. 
164 He was succeeded by Captain Geake. 
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not commanding, the police. Ex-Indian Army non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs) were brought in to help Parke train a force whose nucleus was over a 
hundred Omani-Baluchis recruited in Muscat by the British authorities and sent 
up en masse to Manama. The decision to recruit outsiders may have been 
taken to appease the influential Persian merchant community, which would 
have objected to the recruitment of Bahraini Arabs.165 Whilst British officials 
may have listened to the concerns of Manama’s Persian traders – with whom 
the Political Agency had a close relationship – the primary justification for 
selecting Omani-Baluchis was again the British prejudice that local Arabs were 
of unsuitable martial stock. In contrast, the majority of the Omani-Baluchis had 
prior service in the Muscat Levy Corps.166 
The Political Agent in Muscat, Ronald Wingate, had recommended back 
in August 1923 that the Muscat Levy Corps should be reduced by 100 men and 
that these should be transferred to Bahrain to form the nucleus of a new force.  
However, Captain Alban, commanding the Muscat Levy Corps after McCarthy, 
had already, due to financial expediency, whittled his own force down to a level 
he considered barely operational.167 As he had no men to spare, Captain Alban 
instead offered to raise and train a further 100 local Baluchis and send them to 
Bahrain along with an experienced Indian Subadar (1st Lieutenant).168  
By 1926, the Bahrain Levy Corps was a functioning entity.169 As in 
Muscat, the British Indian military system was embossed right across Bahrain’s 
new force.  The Indian Army provided hand-me-down uniforms and passed on 
its rank structure of subadars (1st lieutenants), halvidars (sergeants), naiks 
(corporals), lance naiks (lance corporals) and sepoys (privates). Levies were 
drilled in Indian Army practices and the standard argot of the force was an 
                                            
165 Mahdi Abdalla al-Tajir, Bahrain 1920-1945: Britain, the Shaikh and the 
Administration (New York: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 69. 
166 Sir Charles Belgrave provides this observation in his memoirs: Personal Column 
(London: Hutchinson & Co, 1960), pp. 33-4. 
167 Captain Alban believed the force could not fulfil its role if its numbers dropped 
below 216 men. 
168 Captain Alban described his Indian Subadar, Naiz Ali, as ‘an excellent man, who 
was for some years in the South Persia Rifles and had independent commands and is 
accustomed to being “on his own.”’ The Political Resident thought this would make a 
good arrangement. IOR R/15/1/428, ‘Muscat Levy Corps.’ Lt. Col. Trevor to Foreign 
Secretary to the Government of India (E. B. Howell), 5 January 1924. 
169 The main contingent was based at Manama Fort with detachments at Rifaa and 
Sitra. 
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inefficient mixture of Baluchi, Urdu, and English – never Arabic. Mirroring events 
in Muscat, on 25 March 1926 the Government of India placed enough 
confidence in the new force to remove its sepoy detachment. In return for taking 
over the guard duties at the Political Agency building, British Indian officials 
sanctioned an increase in the size of the Bahrain Levy Corps. 
  British confidence in the Bahrain Levy Corps turned out to be misplaced; 
the project proved troublesome almost from outset. The second British Indian 
Army commander, Captain Geake, spoke of being exasperated with running the 
Corps and administrating the police. Tiring of Bahrain and longing to return ‘to 
his regiment and a mess,’ Geake sailed from Bahrain at the end of June 1926 
on annual leave with no intention of returning.170 Command temporarily passed 
to the newly arrived British financial adviser, Charles Belgrave, who had two 
years of experience in the Egyptian Army Camel Corps in Egypt during the First 
World War. Captain Geake’s departure proved serendipitous – at least for him. 
On the 3 August 1926, an Omani-Baluchi policeman attempted to murder the 
head of police, Haji Sulman, with a revolver.171 The situation deteriorated 
dramatically the following day. Belgrave’s diary entry paints a vivid picture of the 
events on the 4 August: 
 
Daly [the Political Agent] had been talking to one of the Indian officers 
in the Orderly Room when a Baluchi Levyman crept to the open 
window and shot the Indian [a subadar] in the back, the bullet went 
through him and nicked off a piece of Daly’s ear. The other Indian 
officer [a havildar] ran up and he too was shot. Daly tried, bravely, to 
tackle the man, but was stabbed in half a dozen places with a 
bayonet. Both the Indian officers died but Daly recovered.172 
 
The Levy guards on duty fled upon hearing the shooting. Rumours spread that 
the Corps had killed all its officers and was in open mutiny. Fearing a looting 
spree, market traders locked up their stores and joined many of Manama’s 
residents taking flight on boats to Muharraq Island.173 The two attacks appeared 
to Daly as part of a wider plot, and he appealed to the Residency in Bushire for 
help. On 9 August, HMS Cyclamen arrived, landing a party of British sailors 
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(bluecoats) with a machine gun to protect the Political Agency.174 This was 
precisely the kind of military intervention that establishing the Levy Corps was 
supposed to alleviate.     
By the time Captain Bernard Stuart Horner, the Political Resident’s Chief 
Secretary, arrived in Manama to lead an investigation, the culprit was in custody 
(and later executed) and all of the levymen had been disarmed.175 As well as 
the presence of bluecoats, 50 men from Manama’s Persian community were 
organised into a special police under Belgrave’s command to patrol the town at 
night as ‘all the bad hats [had] taken the opportunity of being up to mischief.’176  
As for what should happen next, a flurry of telegrams went back and forth 
between the Agency in Bahrain and the Residency in Bushire.177 The Political 
Resident and Belgrave originally hoped to keep at least half the current 
Muscati-Baluchis.178 Horner, in contrast, argued that, as all the levies (including 
the armed guard) had run away when the shooting started, they must all go or 
be court-marshalled. Daly, recovering from bayonet wounds whilst 
simultaneously fighting off a fever, agreed with Horner that the whole batch of 
Muscati-Baluchis in both the police and Levy Corps was rotten to the core, 
including the Corps’ Baluchi Mullah who the British identified as a dangerous 
agitator.179  Horner’s position hardened at the funeral of the murdered Indian 
subadar and halvidar. The few levymen who attended jeered at the grief 
displayed by the dead men’s female relatives.180 British officials later discovered 
that many of the men in the force were either ex-criminals or men discharged 
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from the Muscat Levy Corps and other units for bad conduct. Levymen were, a 
damning post-incident report concluded, overpaid for the little work they did 
(they were only required to parade on most days for an hour) and when not on 
duty they caused incessant trouble in the markets. Neither were the police 
worth the powder and shot in the Political Agency’s eyes. Instead of being 
quartered in barracks or billeted near a suitable place d’armes where they could 
assemble quickly, they had lived scattered throughout Manama, many residing 
permanently in the town’s brothels. Moreover, as police were either Persians 
who spoke little Arabic or Muscati-Baluchis who could speak neither Arabic nor 
Persian, inevitable linguistic difficulties arose in the course of their duties.   
Daly and Horner’s appeal that Bahrain should rid itself of all the Omani-
Baluchis, ‘bag and baggage,’ won out. At the end of August, all Muscati-
Baluchis from the police and Levy Corps were marched, under an armed escort 
of bluecoats, down to the quayside and boarded onto Muscat-bound ships.181  
Despite the disastrous attempt to set up a Levy Corps and police, the 
British pressed on with a security force for Bahrain, and Shaikh Hamad 
continued to defer to the British on how this should be done. Working on the 
premise that the Muscati-Bauchis would not form part of any future force, 
Horner proposed that Bahrain could: (a) replace the Levy Corps wholesale with 
a unit from the Indian Army, (b) recruit Muslims from other parts of India for a 
new reconstituted force, or (c) build a new coercive instrument made up of 
Bahrainis.182 Horner ruler out option (c) as it would, he warned, inevitably mean 
employing Najdis (Bahraini tribesmen hailing from the Arabian mainland) ‘over 
whom there would be no hold and all security would then cease in Bahrain.’183 
As permanently garrisoning an Indian Army unit was financially prohibitive (for 
both Bahrain and the Government of India), the only feasible option in Daly’s 
mind was (b), i.e. to recruit more men from India. The Political Agent backed 
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this idea and recommended scrapping the Levy Corps184 and police185 and 
raising a single force of Punjabis commanded by a British officer.186 The 
requirement for a security force to protect the Ruler was underscored in October 
1926 when gunmen attempted to kill Shaikh Hamad as he travelled in a 
motorcar outside of Manama.  
Shaikh Hamad sent his financial adviser, Charles Belgrave, to Karachi in 
October 1926 to initiate the recruitment.187 In the interim, Bahrain paid the 
Government of India for the temporary loan of a 100-man Indian Army 
detachment (two platoons of the 3/16th Punjab Regiment). The final batch of 
Indian recruits — mainly former soldiers and policemen — arrived early in 1927 
to relieve the sepoys, whose presence was criticised by many Bahrainis for the 
strain they placed on the government’s finances.188  
The Bahrain Levy Corps mutiny had not dissuaded Britain from building 
up local forces in Bahrain and Muscat. Indeed, British officials were quick to 
reform an armed police for Bahrain and disassociate the events of 1926 from 
the Muscat Levy Corps. ‘The wholesale condemnation of the [Bahrain Levy] 
Corps is to be deprecated if possible,’ the Political Resident told the 
Government of India, ‘as it will naturally throw doubts on the reliability of the 
similar force at Muscat, which has been very well reported on.’189 Establishing a 
force in Bahrain was more of a collaborative effort with the Ruler than it was in 
Muscat where British officials had to cajole the Sultan into setting up a 
professional coercive instrument of state and to take it seriously thereafter. In 
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Bahrain, Shaikh Hamad understood his weak position relative to rival factions in 
the ruling family and his lack of support from armed Sunni tribesmen. He was 
therefore more than receptive to the British initiative to establish a professional 
force. In both Muscat and Bahrain, the Government of India was attempting to 
make their allies better equipped to confront internal foes in order to reduce the 
risk that the situation would demand direct British intervention. A similar 
calculation was made towards encouraging the Kuwaiti leadership to establish 
its own military, so that the Al-Sabah could deter and deflect attacks by Kuwait’s 
hostile neighbours.  
 
3.2 Britain and the Origins of the Kuwait Military in the 1920s 
and 30s: The Ikhwan and Internal Security 
Until the end of the nineteenth century, Kuwait’s domestic security was 
guaranteed by the dominance of the Bani Khalid tribe, which exercised 
hegemony in the principal town (also called Kuwait) and the immediate 
hinterland.190 At the turn of the twentieth century, Shaikh Mubarak Al-Sabah (r. 
1896-1915), who had come to power after murdering his two brothers, faced 
threats to his position domestically (from nephews and enemies trying to 
overthrow him) and from the Ottomans, who were expanding into the area and 
were encouraged by Mubarak’s nephews to occupy Kuwait.  British interests in 
keeping other powers out were heightened after Kuwait was nominated at the 
terminus of the controversial Berlin-to-Baghdad railway. Britain was concerned 
by the extension of Ottoman influence into areas it concerned to be safely in its 
orbit. Thus British and Mubarak’s interests coincided and a special treaty of 
protection was signed in 1899 along with several other ancillary agreements.191 
Each time an agreement was signed, a monetary payment of rupees went with 
it to Mubarak. Although they were irregular, these payments gave Mubarak the 
means to maintain an armed guard, thereby protecting him from his own 
subjects and preventing a bid from power from one of his rivals.192 Hereafter, a 
                                            
190 Mary Ann Tétreault, ‘Autonomy, Necessity, and the Small State: Ruling Kuwait in 
the Twentieth Century,’ International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 4 (1991), p. 566. 
191 Alan Rush, Al-Sabah: History and Genealogy of Kuwait’s Ruling Family, 1752-
1987 (London: Ithaca Press, 1987), pp. 174-5. 
192 Tétreault, (1991), pp. 573-4. 
 
 
53 
ruler-dominated system of political rule would dominate Kuwait, undergirded by 
a salaried armed praetorian guard loyal to the Al-Sabah leading shaikh.  
The threat to this existing order came not from within but from without. 
Kuwait’s proximity to British Mandated Iraq shaped Britain’s policy towards 
protecting its Kuwaiti protégé. The predatory ambitions of Najd led the acting 
Civil Commissioner in Baghdad, Sir Arnold Wilson, to propose in 1919 that 
Britain should declare a protectorate over Kuwait.193 Some believed that the 
RAF in Iraq provided suitable means for defending Kuwait. After all, in the early 
1920s air power was seen as a panacea for policing the empire on the 
cheap.194 In a scheme proposed by Winston Churchill at the Colonial Office, 
and on the back of its success in Somaliland in 1920, in 1921 the RAF took over 
military responsibility from the army for the British Mandate of Mesopotamia 
(Kingdom of Iraq after 1921).195 From this cockpit in Iraq, the Air Ministry, 
subordinate to the Colonial Office, extended its influence into the western shore 
of the Gulf, an area that was traditionally the preserve of the India Office and 
the Royal Navy.196 Wherever their bureaucratic loyalties lay, all British officials – 
whether in London, Baghdad or New Delhi – remained concerned about the 
threat to Kuwait from religious fighters from central Arabia. 
In October 1920, an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 camel-riding Ikhwan loyal 
to Ibn Saud, the Ruler of Najd and future founder of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, entered Kuwaiti territory. The Kuwaiti ruler, Salim al-Mubarak Al-Sabah 
(r. 1917–1921), commanded the defence of his territory from the fort at Jahra, a 
settlement some 20 miles to the west of Kuwait Town. The Ikhwan surrounded 
the fort and, for a time, defeat seemed inevitable. A counterattack by Kuwaiti 
reinforcements, however, forced the attackers to withdraw, likely saving Kuwait 
from being absorbed by Najd. After retreating and regrouping, an Ikhwan 
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delegation sent to speak with Salim warned that, unless he surrendered, 
another attack would come. As Kuwait’s weakened forces would be incapable 
of repulsing a second attack, Salim was compelled to ask for British assistance. 
A British show of strength in the shape of RAF aircraft from Iraq and three 
gunboats from the Gulf Squadron convinced the Ikhwan to withdraw.197  
Relations remained poor between Kuwait and Najd after Salim’s death in 
February 1921. Ibn Saud enacted a blockade in 1921, when Ahmad al-Jabir Al-
Sabah (r. 1921–1950), Salim’s successor, refused to establish a customs post 
in Kuwait to collect fees on behalf of Najd. Through the British-led Uqair 
Conference (held in 1922 to settle the borders between Iraq, Najd and Kuwait), 
two-thirds of territory claimed by Kuwait was awarded to Najd,198 but this failed 
to end Ibn Saud’s designs on, or his hostility towards, Kuwait. The Saudi 
blockade remained in place for a further 15 years.199 A ‘cold war’ ensued; that 
is, both sides were formally at peace but attacked one and other in border 
areas.200 Large Ikhwan raids continued into Kuwaiti territory (as well as into 
Transjordan and Iraq) into the late 1920s.201  
Britain took the Ikhwan threat so seriously that it set up a sub-committee 
of the Committee of Imperial Defence, chaired by Prime Minister Stanley 
Baldwin, to discuss how best to respond. In June 1928, the sub-committee 
recommended establishing a string of desert posts covering a 500-mile frontier 
from Transjordan to Kuwait.202 As part of this defensive scheme, Special 
Service Officers (SSOs), drawn mainly from RAF intelligence, were appointed to 
collect intelligence on Ikhwan movements and direct the RAF’s armoured car 
                                            
197 Anthony B. Toth, ‘Tribes and Tribulations: Bedouin Losses in the Saudi and Iraqi 
struggles over Kuwait’s Frontiers, 1921-1943,’ British Journal of Middle Eastern 
Studies, Vol. 32 No. 2 (2005), p. 147. 
198 John C. Wilkinson, Arabia’s Frontiers: The Story of Britain’s Boundary Drawing in 
the Desert (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), p. 145. 
199 Joseph Kostiner, Saudi Arabia, 1916–1936: From Chieftancy to Monarchical 
State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 152–154 and pp. 179–181. 
200 H.R.P. Dickson covers the attacks and responses in some detail in Kuwait and 
Her Neighbours (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956), pp. 285–330. John Bagot 
Glubb, War in the Desert (London: Hodder and Staughton, 1960), while focusing on the 
Iraq area of conflict, also deals with attacks on Kuwait. 
201 See Anthony B. Toth’s chapter, ‘Last Battles of the Bedouin and the Rise of 
Modern States in Northern Arabia, 1850-1950’, in Dawn Chatty, ed., Nomadic Societies 
in the Middle East and North Africa: Entering the 21st Century (Leiden: Brill, 2006).  
202 TNA CAB 24/196, ‘Frontier Posts in the Desert Area of Iraq South of the 
Euphrates’, Note by the Air Staff, 4 June 1928. 
 
 
55 
convoys and aircraft based in Iraq against them.203 In 1928 British officials in 
Baghdad sent the Basra SSO, Captain Gerald de Gaury, to Kuwait for several 
months to coordinate RAF attacks on the Ikhwan directly from there.204 Even 
the stationing of an SSO in Kuwait territory in 1928 was a precedent bitterly 
opposed by India and its representatives. They feared that the Colonial Office 
and Air Ministry were dragging Kuwait into a wider regional conflict.205 The High 
Commissioner in Iraq, however, claimed that not only did the Ruler support RAF 
activity in Kuwait but that he had personally requested reconnaissance flights 
over his territory to seek out Ikhwan raiders.206 The Air Officer Commanding 
(AOC) Iraq wanted to take the RAF role in Kuwait one stage further by setting 
up temporary air bases in Kuwaiti territory. In clear divergence with their 
Government of India counterparts, officials in Baghdad believed that the affairs 
of Kuwait were subservient to wider British strategic interests, which for them 
meant the security of Iraq.207 The Political Resident saw matters from a different 
standpoint. ‘If we disgruntle Ibn Saud’, he argued to the Colonial Secretary, then 
the embargo on Kuwait would probably tighten. Moreover, ‘it is likely to affect us 
considerably on every face of Arabia.’208 These fears were justified. Ibn Saud 
had already been frustrating British attempts to establish an air route along the 
Arabian Gulf coast, linking RAF commands in Iraq and Aden. In 1927, he used 
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his influence among the tribes of the lower Gulf to scupper a British expedition 
to find suitable landing grounds along the Trucial coast. Sir Denys Bray, Foreign 
Secretary of the Government of India, claimed that ‘Kuwait is suffering from the 
trouble between Ibn Saud and Iraq, partly because it has become linked up with 
Iraq, and partly because the [Royal] Air Force use it as part of the air route for 
getting at Ibn Saud.’209 After some resistance to the idea, the India Office 
conceded that it could envisage air operations over Kuwaiti territory, but there 
could be ‘no question of establishing a permanent air base in Kuwait 
territory.’210  
When authority to undertake flights over Kuwait was granted to the Air 
Officer Commanding Iraq it came with two stipulations: firstly, reconnaissance 
flights must be as infrequent and as least provocative as possible; and 
secondly, the Ruler should be given no grounds for supposing that responsibility 
for the defence of Kuwait now fell at the feet of the RAF. British officials wanted 
the Ruler left in no doubt on this point.211 Indeed British officials in the Gulf, 
including the Political Resident, believed that Kuwait should be doing more for 
its own protection.  
When in 1929 the High Commissioner for Iraq requested that RAF 
armoured cars be temporarily (for one month) concentrated in Kuwait in order to 
protect Iraqi shepherds and tribes from raids launched through Kuwaiti territory, 
the Colonial Office raised no objections, so long as the Kuwaiti ruler agreed.212 
The Political Resident, Lt Col. C. Barrett, however, believed that it would be far 
more effective if the Ruler had the capacity to defend his own territory. One 
contemporary observation estimated that in the late 1920s the Al-Sabah had 
about 300 ﬁdawiyya (loyal armed retainers) at their immediate service and could 
expect the support of an additional 700 well-armed fighters who were an ‘unpaid 
conglomeration of families with tribal backgrounds’.213 In a general emergency, 
the population of Kuwait town could be mobilised to defend the city walls. Yet 
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this was not a sufficient enough force to obviate the need to ask for British 
military support when the Ikhwan threatened again in 1929. Britain had to 
deploy RAF armoured cars for Kuwait’s protection.214 After the Ikhwan threat 
subsided, Barrett repeated his position that Britain should help put the Ruler ‘in 
a position to repel minor raids without constant calls on the Royal Air Force for 
support.’215 The most effective measure that the Ruler could adopt for the 
defence of his territory, Barrett contended, was to purchase a fleet of gun-
mounted motor cars. The Ruler told Barrett that he was willing to purchase such 
vehicles and the RAF in Iraq agreed to fit them with machine-guns and train the 
Kuwaiti crews.216 With British encouragement, then, Kuwait took its first step 
towards establishing a permanent force to confront the Ikhwan threat in 1929. 
Despite setting up a mobile force of armoured cars, Shaikh Ahmad did not 
jettison old methods. He continued to pay a retainer to a small force of armed 
tribesmen to remain at all times within a short camel journey of his person. 
What is more, the plan in the event of a further invasion was for Kuwait to 
commandeer all light-weight cars and trucks from the town (perhaps 20 
vehicles) and to use them to transport tribesmen and armed residents to the 
area of trouble. It was also thought that Kuwait Town could probably produce 
6,000 men and boys armed with a variety of rifles and guns to man the town 
wall, which if maintained was considered a formidable obstacle to any would-be 
attacker.217  
Whilst Kuwait was not the first of the protected states to develop a 
professional armed force, its military quickly became the largest. In the early 
1930s, Kuwait also established a small police force for Kuwait town without 
British assistance. Once the Ikhwan threat subsided, the security forces 
became an influential new dynamic in the internal power struggles in Kuwait. 
Before Ahmad al-Jabir assumed the rulership of Kuwait in 1921, he promised 
the leading merchants of Kuwait that he would rule with the advice of a small 
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elective council. Once in power, Ahmad did not call a meeting of the council. 
Economic woes in the 1930s and more vocal claims by Iraq for absorbing 
Kuwaiti territory led to greater calls from the merchants for participation in 
decision-making. Ahmad reluctantly accepted the council which soon began 
passing laws for administrative improvements such as putting the new police 
force on a more formal footing.218 The activities and ambitions of the council, 
which included attempts to gain control over the military, evoked a vigorous 
response from the Ruler and his supporters. When Ahmad dissolved the council 
in December 1938, the British supported him. In the negotiations that followed, 
the rival Salim branch of the family, which had failed to unseat Ahmad, gained 
control of the police.219  
The fact that different parts of Kuwait’s security forces were controlled by 
different factions of the Al-Sabah worried the British, who believed that separate 
power nodes bred instability.  
 
3.3 Breaking the Sultan’s Parsimony: British Views of the Levy 
Corps, 1925-37 
The Muscat Levy Corps was a sovereign force of the Sultanate but British India 
exercised great influence over it. After 1925, the Government of India paid the 
salary of the force’s British Indian Army commander who, in turn, had almost 
complete autonomy over training and recruitment.220 In 1925, the British 
commander began replacing Baluchis from Gwadur – technically subjects of the 
Sultan – with Baluchis from British India on the grounds that the latter were 
‘more amenable to discipline, of better physique, and stouter-hearted,’ and 
could over time replace the expensive Indian Army seconded NCOs.221  The 
commander outlined his thinking as follows: 
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A Staff Havildar-Major from the Indian Army is still necessary to train 
Levies gunners and superintend recruit training, but I see no reason 
why within two years all Warrant and N. C. Officers’ ranks should not 
be held by men promoted from the Corps [. . .]. The question of 
officers is more complicated, and a certain number seconded from 
the Indian Army [. . .] would appear to be indispensable [for] some 
years.222  
 
Yet Britain did not hold complete sway over the MLC. By controlling the Corps 
budget (except the salary of its commander), the Sultan could, from time to 
time, make his judgements prevail. When the Sultan’s half-brother, Syed Salim, 
who had left the MLC in 1925, tried to re-enter the force the following year, the 
commander failed to resist the Sultan’s pressure to reinstate him even though 
he considered him ‘physically and in other ways unfit to be an officer’.223 
Conversely, the Sultan Taimur’s lack of interest in the force and his inherent 
parsimony had a deep impact on the Levy Corps. Once close to 300-men 
strong, the size of the Corps dropped to 215 men in 1925 and to 190 in 1926. 
Aside from irregular patrolling work along the Batinah coast and escorting a 
geological survey team into the interior, the Levies were now little more than a 
garrison force, guarding key buildings in Muscat.224  British commanders 
complained that because the force had taken on the additional guard duties at 
the Political Agency and the state treasury – as well as preparations to station a 
detachment in the town of Sur – that it should be expanded and not contracted.  
By the late 1920s the Muscat Levy Corps was performing a function very 
different from what the British Government in India had originally intended. 
Searching for a new role for the Levies its British commander, Captain R.W.G. 
Stephens, put the unit to work constructing roads. Almost 40 miles were built 
between Muscat and Sib across difficult terrain. British officials actually 
welcomed this use of Muscat’s fledgling military as a construction party. The 
Political Resident remarked that the road from Muscat to Mutrah was so 
                                                                                                                                
from one of the most prominent Makran families. Jemadar Khan seconded from the 
Indian Army’s 20th Lancers; Jemadar Mumtaz Ali Khan seconded from 2/6th Rajputana 
Rifles. 
222  Ibid. 
223  Ibid. In contrast, the Sultan’s first cousin Syed Khalid bin Mohammad bin Turki, 
who joined on probation in May 1926, was thought to be ‘keen and intelligent,’ and, it 
was hoped, who would ‘make a fitting representative of the ruling family,’ in the force. 
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valuable that it ‘would alone justify the existence of the Corps.’225 Whilst Captain 
Stephens wanted to enlarge the Levies, the Political Resident felt that the force 
should be reduced until the Sultan’s debts were paid off. This austerity was in 
marked contrast to the period when the Sultan explored forming a pipe band. 
When Stephens took over command there were 180 levymen. The Sultan’s 
Finance Minister sought to shrink the force to 150, but Stephens argued that if 
the force dropped to below 165 it would not be able to carry out any tasks 
beyond guarding buildings in Muscat.226  Pressure to reduce the size of the 
Corps came at a time when the Muscat government was trying to press its 
jurisdiction in other parts of the state. 
In Sur, an important dhow harbour for trade (including slaves) between 
India and Arabia, a local headman of the Bani Bu Ali tribe was acting in 
defiance of the Sultan, establishing his own customs house and levying taxes 
on vessels entering the creek (or khor). The Sultan feared that the Imam might 
try and obtain mastery over Sur through proxies, resulting in a further blow to 
Muscat’s finances through lost custom revenues. As early as 1901 the Sultan 
had erected a series of blockhouses in Sur to enforce tax collection, engaging 
100 irregular guards to hold the positions. Their employment, however, was not 
kept up and the local tribes had become increasingly less willing to obey the 
Sultan. British officials believed that the Levy Corps was not in a fit state to 
enforce the Sultan’s writ in Sur. The Political Agent, Major G.P Murphy, offering 
his opinion to the Residency in April 1928, contended that:  
 
The total armed force which the State could muster at present for 
despatch to Sur would be about 70 men. Such a force would be 
inadequate to meet a determined attack on the part of tribesmen, and 
could not look for reinforcement from Muscat. I would be reluctant to 
advise the State to send it unless Government [of India] were 
prepared to support it with a Man of War in case of need.227  
 
In the hope that the Sultan Taimur could gain better control over the coastal 
towns outside Muscat, the Government of India helped him purchase a small 
                                            
225 TNA FO 371/13728 Commandant MLC, ‘Report on the period 11 May 1926-11 
May 1928,’ 11 May 1928. 
226 Ibid. 
227 TNA FO 371/13728, Major G.P. Murphy (Political Agent, Muscat) to Residency 
(Bushire), 28 April 1928. 
 
 
61 
patrol steamer (the Al Said). Writing to the Residency, Murphy dismissed this 
attempt at local naval power as pure fantasy:  
 
In actual practice the Al Said, although armed with two maxims 
[machine guns] and a 4” gun, has not imbued its captain and crew 
with sufficient ardour to enable them to tackle a single dhow, or 
instilled sufficient awe in the tribes to prevent them firing on her.228  
 
If Britain had originally hoped that the Muscat Levy Corps would enable to the 
Sultan to extend his control beyond Muscat, it was clear to the British by the late 
1920s that the Levy Corps could do little more than guard buildings and build 
roads in the town.  For Murphy at least, this meant that Muscat’s prestige and, 
in turn, its survival would always rest on ‘the support, moral and physical, which 
they are able to obtain from the British. Without such support the State is 
impotent.’229 In full agreement, the Political Resident thought the idea of an 
independent state of Muscat was ‘a fiction’. Muscat is, the Resident continued,  
 
[. . . ] an impotent and sterile government, dependent for its existence 
in every inch of its territory upon the goodwill and support of the 
British Government. Were it not for this support it would not last for 
24 hours but would fall into the hands of bigoted and backward 
tribes. 
 
Realising himself that he was too weak to deal with his opponents in Sur alone, 
the Sultan requested ‘strong support’ from Britain.230  Because the continued 
functioning of the Muscat state was important to British interests, the Political 
Resident accepted that ‘we shall thus have to give it the support required and 
repeat at Sur what we have previously done during the last 50 years.’231   
A joint task force of British and Muscati forces sailed to Sur in October 
1928. The Al Said, carrying the MLC and the Council of Ministers, shelled 
opposition positions. The task force left without resolving the problem. Despite 
acquiring two 2.75” screw guns from India and forming an artillery section in the 
late 1920s, British observers considered the forces under the Sultan’s control to 
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be too weak to confront the Sultan’s enemies outside Muscat.232 Murphy did not 
believe that the policy to build up local forces in Muscat was misguided; only 
that it was under-resourced. He wanted the Sultan to expand the MLC to 350 
men to confront the Bani Bu Ali tribe in Sur. The money was not available in the 
Muscat treasury and there was little point in looking to Britain. The Political 
Resident was confident that ‘the Government of India would not be willing to 
incur the expenditure involved.’233  
The MLC’s limitations would remain into the next decade. In 1930, the 
proposal for using the Levy Corps in the simple task of escorting a British 
survey team to the Musandam Peninsula (under Sultanate control) was ruled 
out on the grounds that, if opposed, they would be outmatched by the local 
Shihuh inhabitants who had in their possession over a thousand rifles.234 With 
the force unable to undertake military expeditions away from Muscat or form 
detachments in other towns, the British commander, Captain Walker, argued for 
a more limited scope of duties. He felt that the force should complete its 
transition into a mainly pioneer unit, building bridges and roads around Muscat. 
If re-armed with modern rifles, he still felt that it could ‘give a good account of 
itself in times of trouble, would maintain prestige, esprit de corps and self-
respect.’235 Although in March 1931 the Government of India approved to equip 
the Corps with new rifles, the Muscat treasury again, repeating its position in the 
early 1920s, refused to allocate funds.236  The British had been concerned for 
some time about the lack investment the Sultan was placing in his force.  At the 
end of 1930, the new Political Agent, Major Trenchard C. Fowle, argued to the 
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Political Resident that Britain had to take a new line with the Sultan on the 
question of the Levy Corps.  He wrote in November that:  
 
There must no longer be any question of cutting the Corps down 
beyond [150 men] because of financial stringency in the state 
[original emphasis]. . . .The cost of the Levy Crops must be 
absolutely the first charge on the State Treasury, and no matter what 
other economics have to be made, no reduction of the Corps will be 
permitted.237   
 
Sultan Said, whose accession to the throne commenced in February 1932 after 
being forced to pledge his virtual dependence to the British, spent the first years 
of his rule establishing as much independence from Britain as possible.238 He 
did not initially show any more interest in the MLC than his father. The various 
Muscat government departments regarded the Corps as a source of motor 
transport for their general use, whilst the Sultan used the force as a means of 
obtaining modern rifles for distribution to his slaves and tribal adherents who still 
made up his personal bodyguard.239 The Levy Corps did play a supporting role 
in the second 1932 operation in Sur against the Bani Bu Ali.240 Captain Alban, 
commanding the force for a second stint, positioned a hundred men in a screen 
across the hills leading to a creek from where the Royal Air Force deployed 
three flying boats (and their stores) for attacks against the Bani Bu Ali 
strongholds. 
By providing successive British commanders, and by controlling supplies 
of equipment, the Government of India retained influence over the MLC. It was 
not, however, willing to bankroll the force and did not protest when, as a cost-
saving measure, the Sultan allowed a four-month gap between British 
commanders.241 The line between British and Sultanate control over the MLC 
was opaque. When Captain Alban left his post as commander for the last time 
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in October 1934, the Sultan asked the Political Agent, Major C.EU. Bremner, to 
take charge until Captain Alban’s replacement arrived. Thus a representative of 
the British Government of India commanded (albeit temporarily) the military of 
what was, in constitutional terms at least, a foreign sovereign state. This 
stopgap measure gave the Bremner a chance to observe first-hand the 
difficulties that successive British commanders had highlighted. Almost 
immediately, Bremner noted that as a fighting unit the Muscat Infantry (as the 
force was now more frequently referred to) was of little value; that its 
composition militated against it ever becoming an efficient fighting force; and 
that the various departments of the Muscat government failed to understand its 
role.242  The main problem for Bremner was the makeup of the force. The 
employment of Baluchis rather than local Arabs had long been encouraged by 
Britain. ‘Without subscribing to the necessity of the Levies being expert cut-
throats,’ the then Political Agent, Trenchard Fowle, contended back in 
November 1930, ‘I concur they should be composed of elements which have no 
love for the Arab.’243 In early 1935, nearly the whole force was Baluchi, but less 
than a quarter of these were from the Makran Coast, which Bremner thought 
was a serious drawback. Bremner wrote to Trenchard Fowle, who was now the 
Political Resident, that ‘the Makrani is infinitely superior in every way to the local 
Baluch. He shows an aptitude for military training, his musketry is good, and 
whilst his general conduct and discipline is excellent, he is far superior in 
intellect to the local man.’  Because the local Baluch element was mostly 
townsmen, born and bred in Muscat, they were in Bremner’s eyes not part of 
the ‘fighting classes’ nor ‘true tribesmen,’ and thus ‘devoid of the inborn instincts 
of the fighting man.’ The consequence of this, Bremner asseverated to the 
Resident, Trenchard Fowle, was that: 
 
[T]heir training is exceedingly difficult and what the men learn one 
day, they forget the next. What has often been told me quietly by 
locally enlisted men themselves would appear to have a certain 
semblance of truth – i.e. “those that haven’t the wit to get a better 
living elsewhere join the Levy Corps to do a minimum of work and 
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live at home.” Whatever may be the facts, certain it is that the local 
element is the despair of the Indian Officers of the Corps.244  
 
Trenchard Fowle, visiting Muscat, told the Indian officers under Bremner that he 
‘wanted to hear no more nonsense about the Yatim Khanaa [meaning the 
Orphanage – what the Indian officers disparagingly called the Muscat Infantry], 
and that if three Indian officers could not turn 150 men into a fairly respectable 
force, the fault would not lie with the men but with the officers.’245 But Fowle 
appreciated that the Muscat Infantry was no longer in the mind of the Sultan 
and was underfunded. The solution for Fowle was that the Government of India 
should encourage the Sultan’s interest in the force. 
 
Owing to his minority, and the absentee rule of his father, the Corps – 
as well as the other departments of the State – had inevitably to be 
run by us. The Sultan therefore, not unnaturally, came to look on the 
Corps as ours – though he [original emphasis] paid for it. What we 
have to do now, as I impressed on Bremner, is to make the Sultan 
feel that the Corps is his, and get him interested in it.246  
  
One method was to conduct training exercises to impress the Sultan. In April 
1937, the force carried out a joint exercise with a Gulf Naval Squadron sloop, 
HMS Fowey. The British based the ‘war-gaming’ scenario on a 300-400 strong 
tribal rebellion intending to attack Muscat. The exercise involved the new 
commander of the Muscat Infantry, Captain A. Byard, moving his men by sea, 
landing them at a suitable point and letting them deliver an attack under cover 
of the warships armaments. The plan to counter the tribal-rebellion scenario 
was a further illustration that any action by the Muscat Infantry outside the 
capital would almost certainly require British naval support.247   
The plan seems to have worked.  As an indication that the Sultan now 
put more value in his force, he placed the Muscat Infantry under the 
responsibility of his uncle, Sayyid Shihab bin Faisal Al Said, who was also the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. He also commanded the small town police, oversaw 
the Jalali prison, and administered the municipality for Mutrah and Muscat.  
                                            
244 Ibid, Bremner to T.C. Fowle, ‘The Muscat Infantry,’ 13 February 1935. 
245 Ibid, T.C. Fowle to H.A.F. Metcalfe (Foreign Secretary to the Government of 
India, Simla), 7 June 1936. 
246 Ibid. 
247 IOR R/15/1/430, Instructions by Commandant of Muscat Infantry, 25 April 1937. 
 
 
66 
Because most of the officers and men were foreign recruits, the Foreign 
Ministry was not such a strange home for the Muscat Infantry.248  When the 
Sultan began employing British foreign ministers from the late 1940s, the 
Muscat Infantry came under the purview of Britons privately employed by the 
Muscat state. Because these men were not answerable to British officialdom, 
their decisions regarding Muscat’s forces – as well as in other policy areas – 
frustrated Britain’s representatives in the Gulf. Britain’s experience with Charles 
Belgrave (Advisor to the rulers of Bahrain since 1926) had been the same. 
 
3.4 Al-Mustashar, the Residency and the Bahrain State Police in 
the 1930s 
In the years following Bahrain’s formation of the State Police in 1926, British 
official involvement in the local force waned. At the same time, the influence of 
Charles Belgrave, a Briton privately employed by the Ruler as his personal 
Adviser (Mustashar in Arabic), was waxing. Bahrain originally employed 
Belgrave as a financial adviser, but he soon assumed a much larger role in the 
state affairs, not least in his command of the State Police itself. For a time, the 
British Indian connection was still important as recruits and trained staff came 
from the Raj. Responsible for Bahrain’s budget, Belgrave cut costs by phasing 
out the Indians in the State Police and this served to diminish the importance of 
the connection with the British Government of India in the force.  At first 
Belgrave tried to replace the Indian police with Sudanese, a race with whom he 
had great experience of from his time in the Egyptian Army Camel Corps during 
the First World War. Because there was already a large black African 
community in Bahrain, it was surmised that the Sudanese would better merge 
with the local population than the Indians.249 Belgrave was forced to scrap this 
initiative when he was unable to find sufficient numbers of Sudanese recruits. 
Instead, he turned to recruiting local Bahrainis. Whilst the Political Resident 
supported Belgrave’s plan for Sudanese, he was against local recruits on the 
grounds that they would take sides in the event of sectarian trouble.250 The 
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Political Resident, Lt. Col. H.V. Briscoe, on the other hand did not think that the 
recruitment of local Bahrainis was in itself unique, questioning  
 
[. . .] whether it is correct to say now that the Arab as an armed 
policeman is an unknown quantity; the police in Iraq are all Arabs and 
have, I believe, showed themselves to be reliable and efficient, and 
though the Bahrain Police can hardly be expected to attain quite the 
same standard, my personal opinion is that they should be able to 
deal with minor disturbances  
 
At any rate, Briscoe believed that even if a small nucleus of Indians was 
retained in the State Police it would remain ‘necessary to invoke the assistance 
of His Majesty’s ships’ in the event of serious trouble and rioting.251 Briscoe 
understood that, whatever the risk of letting the Indian policemen go, the dire 
financial situation in Bahrain necessitated this move.252 By the beginning of 
1932, the State Police had 37 Arabs enrolled and the Indian contingent was cut 
down to 48. Nonetheless, British Government of India officials still wanted a 
third of the Bahrain Police to remain Indian as an insurance policy against the 
untested local recruits – a policy that Britain was employing in Aden.253  The 
then Political Agent in Bahrain, Captain C.C. Prior, felt Aden was a poor 
comparison, and offered his favourable view on the locals that Belgrave was 
seeking to recruit. He admonished what he saw as the misconception that, 
 
[. . .] the Aden Arab and the Bahrain Arab are one and the same. I 
believe the Aden police recruit Somalis, one of the most unreliable 
elements in the Arabic speaking world, whereas the ‘Arab’ Police at 
Bahrain are either blacks, who are as trustworthy as Sudanese, and 
invariably employed by mainland Amirs for the bodyguards, or else 
Persians whom I have found to be cheerful mercenaries, faithful even 
when used against their own countrymen.254  
 
Belgrave and Britain’s representatives in the Gulf agreed that Bahrain was in a 
financial mess and had to slash the State Police budget by reducing the Indian 
element.  Despite running a monthly deficit, the civil list of payments to Al 
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Khalifah family members accounted for 57 per cent of Bahrain’s budget. It was 
less trouble to reduce the police budget than it was to tamper with the civil list. 
Supplying Indians gave the Government of India influence in the Bahrain State 
Police, and it was only in light of the great financial difficulties Bahrain was 
facing that it was ‘disposed to allow that [Indian] element to disappear.’ The 
Government of India’s Foreign Secretary told the Briscoe that, although the 
move had his reluctant agreement, he still wanted the following made very clear 
to Belgrave and Shaikh Hamad:  
 
The organisation of the Bahrain Police force on a purely local basis is 
however regarded as something in the nature of an experiment to 
which the Government of India trust that, in view of the risks involved 
and of the importance of avoiding any incident at Bahrain which 
could give any foreign power ground for complaint against the 
administration, you will give your close personal attention and 
impress the same duty upon the Political Agent.’255  
 
These comments took Briscoe aback. He pointed out that in general the 
Government of India had in fact originally been opposed to the employment of 
Indians in Bahrain’s police. Briscoe recounted the comments made by the 
Government of India’s former Foreign Secretary, Sir Denys Bray, in 1927. After 
conducting a flying visit to the Gulf, Bray had said that he was ‘somewhat 
perturbed’ at the level of ‘British interference’ which he believed was, ‘especially 
over-advertised in the police, a particularly fine body of men, all Punjabi 
Mohammadans [an archaic term for Muslims], with uniform and drill of an Indian 
Regiment.’ The problem with this in Brays’s opinion was that: 
 
They [the Bahrain State Police] suggest at once foreign rule and 
make it look as if the present state of Bahrain depends on Indian 
bayonets alone. (A striking contrast is afforded by the appearance of 
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Persian policemen in the British 
settlement at Abadan.) In this, as in all matters, we should cling to 
essentials and discard the trimmings. We might for instance drop the 
uniform or at any rate simplify it; replace some of the Punjabis 
gradually by some element less foreign (e.g. Arabs from the Yemen) 
keeping a diminishing number of Punjabis as a nucleus.256 
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Briscoe added that no one was more anxious to see ‘the Arab rulers of the Gulf 
run their own States on Arab lines than I am . . . but when one has to deal with 
such a perfectly useless individual as Shaikh Hamad of Bahrain there is nothing 
to be done but to more or less run the place ourselves.’  Sympathetic to the 
decisions made by his predecessors at the time of Shaikh Isa’s deposition, 
Briscoe felt that, as Britain was saddled with Shaikh Hamad, it must ‘make the 
best of a bad job.’257 Shaikh Hamad supported Belgrave’s plan for local recruits. 
Even though he ordered his retainers to nominate their sons and young 
brothers for the force, he doubted whether enough Bahrainis would volunteer. 
When recruitment began, however, there was no shortage of men offering 
themselves for service in the State Police. ‘So many applied,’ Belgrave recalled, 
‘that I was able to choose men of fine physique and a certain amount of 
intelligence; many of them were Negroes, descendants of African slaves,’ but 
there were also locals originally from Persia, Yemen and other mainland Arab 
tribes.258 According to Bahrain’s budget report for 1931/32, the change in policy 
had an immediate effect on the balance sheet:  
 
The Indian Police are being gradually reduced and the local police 
are being proportionately increased by which a considerable saving 
has been made in expenditure on public protection. It is proposed 
that by degrees the whole of the Indian Force shall be substituted by 
local men.259   
 
In 1932, half of the 120-strong State Police were Punjabis Belgrave had 
recruited; by 1933, nearly all had finished their service, and only a small number 
of NCOs stayed on as instructors.260  
Although Belgrave believed the state security forces were sufficient – 
Bahrain also maintained over a hundred Naturs as an auxiliary force – this did 
not make Bahrain self-sufficient. For the Mustashar based his calculations on 
the assumption that Britain would always assist Bahrain in the event of external 
attack. The budget statement for 1931/32, which Belgrave wrote, sets out this 
position clearly: 
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It was at one time considered quite likely that the Dawasir [an Arab 
mainland tribe that used to have a branch living in Bahrain, but were 
expelled after incessant raiding of Shia villages in the early 1920s] 
might make an armed attack on Bahrain. I am personally of the 
opinion that there is no likelihood whatever of this occurring. The 
present force is quite sufficient for the internal needs of the State and 
as it has always been assumed that, if Bahrain was made the object 
of attack by a foreign state, the British Government would come to its 
assistance.  I consider it unnecessary for the State to incur heavy 
expenditure on a more powerful and effective military force than is 
available at present.261 
 
It was just as well Belgrave considered the small size of the State Police 
sufficient as there was little means of enacting improvements. Bahrain’s 
economy shrank in the early 1930s largely as result of the collapse of the local 
pearl industry. Ironically, the tensions let loose by this economic downturn gave 
the new local police recruits their first real test. On 26 May 1932, co-workers of 
an arrested pearl diver stormed a police station, forcing several of the newly 
enlisted Bahraini policemen to take refuge on the roof. The Political Agent, 
Geoffrey Prior, and Belgrave armed a dozen of the last remaining Indian police 
at Manama fort and headed to the scene.262 The unrest was only halted when 
the small police force was augmented by all kinds and conditions of men, 
including staff of the Political Agency, Belgrave’s servants, Shaikh Hamad’s 
attendants and the Naturs, ‘armed with every kind of weapon.’263 
Although Prior considered the action by the State Police to be ‘a very 
useful stiffener to the prestige of the Bahrain Government,’ the incident shook 
him.264 He was appalled by the suddenness with which riots, comprising ‘some 
thousands of ruffians and semi-savages from a dozen different countries’, had 
the potential to occur. In the Political Agent’s view, only the discipline displayed 
by the Indian police had stopped casualties running into the hundreds. Yet 
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these were precisely the men that Belgrave was phasing out from the force. 
Once removed, could Britain officials count on the State Police without its 
experienced Indians to maintain stability in the face of growing societal unrest?  
Bahrain’s financial situation in the early 1930s precluded any large-scale 
expansion of the State Police, but enough money was found in the 1934 budget 
to add a dozen more policemen.265 The discovery that oil existed in 
commercially exploitable quantities in Bahrain – first oil was struck in June 
1932, with hydrocarbon exports making their mark on the balance sheet by 
1935 – provided Shaikh Hamad and al-Mustashar with the means to spend 
more on the security forces. Despite Belgrave’s growing number of 
governmental duties, he still commanded and ran the State Police on a day-to-
day basis.  In the second half of the 1930s, Belgrave supervised an increase in 
the number of police stations and outposts. To enhance the Ruler’s control over 
the hinterland and provide protection for the fledgling oil infrastructure, he 
established a small cavalry unit and camel-mounted section (run by a Sudanese 
NCO formerly of the Egyptian Army Camel Corps).266 At the same time, the 
social and political forces unleashed by the economic growth and rapid 
development placed greater demands on the State Police. Fuelled by an 
expansion of the Bahraini economy, the number of schools, cultural clubs, 
newspapers and radio broadcasts rose exponentially in 1930s. This in turn, 
increased political awareness, especially amongst the labour force. In 
November 1938, the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO)267 was crippled by 
strikes. Demonstrators took to the streets in Manama in sympathy, forcing 
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shops and businesses to close. The State Police, using its horse cavalry to 
great effect, dispersed the crowds in the town.268  
Britain stepped up its assistance to the Bahrain Police at this time, 
loaning Bahrain several trainers from the Indian Army to teach an influx of 
recruits an abbreviated training course that included bayonet fighting, musketry, 
general police duties and lathi (a form of fighting with wooden poles used by 
security forces on the Subcontinent for riot control). Perpetuating this 
connection, four Bahraini policemen were sent to Karachi to be trained as future 
instructors for the State Police so that British Indian methods would be 
cascaded down into the force. Much of British security policy in Bahrain was 
directed towards helping to improve the capabilities of the local armed police 
which, by the eve of the Second World War, had grown to three times its 
original size.269 With the outbreak of global conflict, local security forces in 
Bahrain, the other protected states, as well as Muscat and Oman, took on 
added importance for Britain.  
 
3.5 Gulf Indigenous Forces and Global War, 1938-45 
In the lead up to the Second World War, RAF Command in Iraq was initially 
given responsibility for forming local defence schemes for protecting British 
interests along the Arab littoral, including the oil infrastructure and the air 
facilities which were vital for the strategic air route.270 At this stage, British 
planners identified the principle threats as sabotage or attacks by neighbouring 
tribes. Since a concerted enemy air or sea attack was ruled out, the initial 
review concluded that local security forces would be more important adjuncts to 
Britain’s stretched military resources than fixed defensive positions.271 Britain 
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policy was therefore focused on developing local capabilities.272  In some cases 
there were no established forces to work with, forcing Britain to improvise.  
British involvement in Qatar was informal empire at its most “light touch”. 
An Exclusive Agreement with Qatar was not signed until 1916, but even then 
there was little direct political interference. A tradition of family-based factional 
opposition marked succession in Qatar in the first part of the twentieth century. 
When the First World War ended, Shaikh Abdullah bin Jasim Al Thani (r.1913-
49), who had just become ruler, found his claim contested by a dozen brothers 
and cousins. He thus turned to Britain in 1916 in the hope that it would 
guarantee his position.273 To be sure, the treaty bolstered the position of 
Abdullah, but he was still vulnerable to machinations of other powerful clans.274 
One such practical method for limiting the power of rivals in the peninsula was 
making the Al Thani ruler the sole legal distributer of weapons. The 1916 treaty 
gave Shaikh Abdullah the authority alone to purchase arms (up to 500 rifles 
annually) from the Muscat arms warehouse, which he was permitted to 
apportion to loyal tribesmen for maintaining order in the peninsula and 
protecting his frontiers. Shaikh Abdullah’s economic woes in the early 1930s – 
he was forced to mortgage his house at this time – were alleviated in 1935 
when he signed an oil concession agreement with the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company (APOC).275 The Qatari ruler now received an immediate payment of 
400,000 Indian rupees with a further 150,000 Indian rupees paid to him per 
annum. As part of the 1935 agreement, the British, against its usual practice at 
the time, recognised Abdullah’s favourite son, Hamad, as heir apparent, helping 
to limit the potential for rival claimants to make a bid for power. The position of 
Shaikh Abdullah and his lineage was therefore strengthened by the 
agreement.276 The agreement also contained a promise that Britain would 
defend Qatar by land against foreign attack (the 1916 agreement had promised 
only maritime protection).  Whilst Shaikh Abdullah commanded the allegiance of 
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most of the tribes of eastern Qatar, they had little control over the tribes of 
western Qatar. The two sides fought it out. At the 1937 Battle of Zubara the Al 
Thanis prevailed. In this way, the Al Thanis had to fight for their supremacy over 
rival clans on the Qatari peninsula. With British backing for his named 
successor, a monopoly over arms and the rival tribes defeated, Shaikh Abdullah 
felt he had little need for a trained – and expensive, it must be said – unit along 
the lines of the levy corps in Bahrain and Muscat. With the success at Zubara, 
not to mention the earlier victory against the Ottomans at the Battle of Wajbah 
in 1893, there seemed little incentive to move away from use of allied tribal 
fighters. Nor, until the advent of war, was there pressure from Britain to do so.    
As the Second World War approached, the India Office discussed 
whether there was a need to establish a locally raised guard force in Qatar to 
protect future oil sites. The Political Resident at that time, Trenchard Fowle, did 
not believe that Qatar would make a financial contribution towards such a 
project. Although Britain guaranteed to protect Qatar against attacks on his 
territory by sea (from 1916) and land (from 1935), it had also been made clear 
to Shaikh Abdullah that he was expected to take all reasonable steps for his 
own defence and for maintaining order within his own frontiers.277 Whilst the 
Residency acknowledged that the Ruler could probably count on considerable 
support from loyal tribesmen, most of them carried antiquated rifles of doubtful 
offensive value.278 The British defence scheme for Qatar, formed in the lead up 
to war, recommended that Britain encourage the Ruler to buy more arms and 
trucks for mobility; British military planners assessed that the Qatari terrain 
would render heavy armoured cars useless. Officials at the Residency were 
confident that in due course Shaikh Abdullah ‘may be able to put into the 
defence pool two or three light lorries mounted with machine guns after the 
Kuwait pattern.’279  
The efficacy of indigenous forces was also a concern for Britain in the 
Trucial States in the late 1930s. Along this stretch of the coast, Britain identified 
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its key security interest as the defence of the rest house fort and adjoining 
aerodrome in Sharjah and the continued use of the creek in Dubai for landing 
seaplanes. Because it was assessed that the Ruler in Dubai was not in a 
position to effectively protect the seaplane alighting area in the creek, in the 
event of an emergency Britain would switch to using creeks in Ras al-Khaimah. 
Securing the facilities in Sharjah was more difficult. During the war, the airfield 
at Sharjah became an important air station for the RAF, which began stationing 
operational aircraft there in June 1940.280 In Britain’s view, the Ruler had ‘far too 
little control in his own state for us [Britain] to be able to place any real reliance 
in him or even in the small guard which he provides at present.’281 In 
accordance with a 1932 Agreement to use the airstrip in Sharjah, the British had 
been paying the Ruler to supply 40 guards, arming these men with service 
rifles.282 After auditing these arrangements, British military officials in Iraq, who 
were given primacy for the defence of the Gulf in the event of global war, 
concluded that the guards were of little practical value; worse, they might 
actually pose a danger in an emergency. Except for sentries, the report 
recommended that the rifles of guards should be withdrawn and kept in the 
arsenal of the rest house fort.  The small guard force provided by the Ruler 
proved ineffective at stemming the pilfering of ammunition and equipment at the 
RAF camp by Bedouin. British military planners felt compelled to bring in a 
company of RAF Levies from Iraq to guard RAF Sharjah in 1943-44.283 
  Some of the local rulers proactively wanted to improve their own 
capabilities. In Bahrain, Shaikh Hamad instructed Belgrave as early as 1938 to 
request from Britain more machine guns for the State Police and two or three 
anti-aircraft guns so that, should war break out, he had the means to defend his 
country, especially the oil refinery.284  This, as it turned out, was a prescient 
request. Bahrain was subject to one of the longest, though ineffective, bombing 
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raids of the war. In October 1940, Italian aircraft, flying from the Dodecanese 
islands carried out a failed sorty on the oil refinery.285   
On the 3 September 1939, Britain declared war on Germany and the 
refinery was immediately put on a wartime footing. Despite Shaikh Hamad’s 
efforts to expand the State Police (from 250 men in 1938 to 300 the following 
year with plans to add a further 50), the Political Resident had little faith that the 
force, even when supported by the Naturs, were adequate to prevent sabotage 
against Bahrain’s important oil facilities. The police and Naturs were ‘rather poor 
material when removed from the loving care and constant attention of Belgrave,’ 
Reginald Alban, the Political Agent sardonically told the Political Resident in 
October 1939.286 In an effort to improve capabilities, the Political Agency 
ordered motorbikes from India to speed up the patrol work done by the camel 
corps.287 Also, the Government of India sent an Indian Army NCO to train 
Bahraini policemen in the use of the machine-gun.288 
The Resident seized upon the Political Agent’s suggestion in early 1939 
that, if war came – and it was looking more likely at this stage that this would be 
the case – British oil workers should be armed with half a dozen machine-guns 
and as many rifles as possible.289 A British officer was appointed to train a 
volunteer oil worker force in the use of the Bren gun, which, with anti-aircraft 
mountings, could in a perfunctory way be used to defend the refinery from low-
flying aircraft.290 When war broke out, BAPCO, the British Government and the 
Bahrain Government collaborated to strengthen Bahrain’s forces for wartime 
security measures. Over 150 Bahraini special policemen were employed by 
BAPCO for oil facility protection and anti-sabotage work. BAPCO, which paid for 
the majority of the costs associated with improving wartime security, were 
critical of the volunteer force organised from among the oil workers.291 BAPCO’s 
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General Manager, Mr. Lipp, thought that the British officer assigned to train the 
oil workers, Byard, was ‘incapable either of organising the Volunteer Defence 
Force or of maintaining discipline in it. His manner and deportment are 
unsuitable and he has become an open laughing stock with the British 
personnel.’292 As for the work of the special police, Lipp told the Political Agent 
in Bahrain that this was done ‘in a very dilatory and negligent manner and that 
there was no real defence against sabotage if sabotage were really intended.’ 
For Lipp, the only ‘bright spot’ was the BAPCO-employed police of 75 men, 
who, being servants of the Company, showed a proper sense of duty in their 
work. In response, the Political Agent recommended replacing Byard as quickly 
as could be managed with another officer from India.293   
 When the ruling family was told that a British police expert, Hallows, 
would be visiting Bahrain to inspect local security arrangements, they 
responded that they hoped his proposals would not be based too closely on 
Indian practices, which they thought were unsuitable to Bahrain. After spending 
a month in Bahrain in 1940, Hallows observed that the 350-man State Police 
(including 22 mounted policemen and the 18 men of the camel section)294 were 
more like a military force, protecting Bahrain against tribal attacks from the 
mainland or suppression of internal disturbances.  Because training was carried 
out along military lines, he believed that civil police work was poor. His chief 
recommendation was to split the State Police into military and civil wings, 
                                            
292 The Political Agent in Bahrain, Hugh Weightman, had urged London that a British 
officer be appointed to run the volunteer oil worker force, otherwise the ‘scheme would 
be doomed to failure, and frankly it would not be worthwhile taking the trouble to bring it 
into existence.’ IOR R/15/2/661, Reginald Alban (Political Agent, Bahrain) to Prior 
(Political Resident), 20 November 1940. On the Local Defence Volunteers see multiple 
files from AIR 23/5992 and AIR 23/5896. 
293 Ibid. 
294 The force comprised eight Havildars, 12 Naiks, 28 Lance Naiks and 298 men. 
With an estimated 150,000 people this worked out at one policeman for every 445 
people in Bahrain. Of these, 241 were Bahrain Arabs, 23 Baharna, 27 Persians, 7 
Baluchis, 5 Indians, 1 Somali and the rest Sudanese, Swahilis, Yeminis, mainland 
Arabs and manumitted slaves. In addition to this, there were 70 Naturs in Manama and 
50 in Muharraq. The Duty of the Camel Patrol was to patrol the coast and more 
inaccessible parts of the Island. The camel section sent out four-man patrols for four 
days at a time. As soon as one patrol came in, another was sent out. The general route 
followed was: Budaya, Zekrit, Amar, Muttals, Dair, Jau, Askar, Sitra and back to the 
fort.  The Mounted (Horse) Police did not patrol and always remain present at 
Headquarters. 
 
 
78 
offering to stay in Bahrain to mentor the latter.295 Commenting on Hallows 
report, the Political Resident concluded: ‘We should be under no delusion that 
the errors and omissions disclosed will not be remedied unless there is constant 
supervision by a British officer.’296 The Political Agent, Hugh Weightman, 
however, warned that the ruling family would ‘resent the suggestion that their 
police are so inefficient that they need to be pulled together by a British Police 
Officer.’ Moreover, one of the leading Al Khalifah shaikhs was attending courses 
in Bombay on the understanding that he would take charge of the State Police 
on his return. Weightman thought this was an important consideration. There 
would be little hope of popularising service in the State Police ‘for men of better 
class’ unless it was headed by one of the Al Khalifah family.297 Weightman 
fretted that the Ruler, Shaikh Hamad, would not take well the suggestion that 
the State Police needed fixing, for he had been ‘congratulated by Kings, 
Admirals, Ambassadors and lesser men on the appearance of their Police.’298 
Yet the Political Resident told Weightman to bring the point home to the ruling 
family that just because they have a body of men that could impress visitors 
with ceremonial displays that they did not necessarily possess an efficient 
police force.299 Before the Allied victory over the Axis, Britain loaned Bahrain a 
detachment of seven British police officers to handle criminal cases involving 
the increasing number of European and American construction workers in the 
oil industry.300 
The ability of Britain’s Gulf representatives to shape the State Police was 
limited compared to that of al-Mustashar. This caused British officials some 
consternation. The Resident complained to his superiors in the Government of 
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India that Belgrave knew ‘nothing about police work.’301  Musing why Belgrave 
clung so tenaciously to his position as commander of the police, Prior 
suggested it was for the extra money he received. Over the course of the war, 
the Political Resident became increasingly dismayed with Belgrave, a man he 
felt whose ‘mental capacity has not kept pace with the growth of Bahrain, and 
owing to 15 years in a debilitating climate [. . .] appears to me to be losing his 
mental grip.’302 After Shaikh Hamad’s death in February 1942, Shaikh Salman 
continued his father’s close relationship with al-Mustashar. The privately 
employed British adviser would retain his central position in the Bahrain state, 
including his oversight of the police, for more than a decade after the war’s end.  
Similar to Bahrain, the oil company in Kuwait paid for additional guards 
who were handpicked by the Ruler. Additionally, as a wartime measure 
automatic weapons and rifles were kept at the oil field facilities for use by British 
and American oil workers in case of an emergency.303 A small contingent of 
British police was posted to the main oil camp in order to deal with incidents 
involving workers under British jurisdiction. As for the fledgling Kuwaiti military, 
a British training team from RAF Command in Iraq instructed the security forces 
in armoured car drills. Commenting on the wartime value of the Kuwaiti troops, 
British military officials believed they were ‘efficient from an Arab standard and 
would give a good account of themselves in any fight under Arab conditions.’304 
Further improvements could be made, they argued, by holding combined 
exercises with RAF armoured cars and aircraft, and by providing weapon 
instruction by a British officer.305   
In Muscat, the Sultan cut his military down further just as war broke out. 
This was bad news for British officials who feared that agents of hostile 
European powers might assist and encourage tribes of the interior to once 
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again challenge his rule.306 The British assessed that potentially several 
thousand tribesmen, armed with old fashioned rifles, could be induced to 
advance on Muscat, but that they would be incapable of putting in a successful 
attack on even a small force defending the key passes, so long as those 
guarding the approaches to Muscat were well-armed and trained. In terms of 
staying loyal to the Sultan in an emergency, British military planners assessed 
in 1939 that, because the Muscat Infantry were mostly Baluchis, they were not 
liable to be affected by local propaganda and could be trusted.  As Britain would 
probably not be able to spare a sloop or send RAF aircraft to support the 
Sultan, it wanted Muscat’s own defence forces as strong as possible ‘so that 
they can deal with any likely trouble with their own resources.’307 The main 
difficulty in strengthening Muscat’s local forces was lack of money – any 
improvements would have to be at Britain’s expense.  RAF Command in Iraq 
judged that any minor expense incurred in connection with re-equipping and 
training were worth the cost and would be, at any rate, far cheaper than 
reinforcing the Muscat Infantry from India.308 Britain therefore granted the Sultan 
a wartime subsidy to offset the cost of making defensive improvements and 
provided additional arms and equipment. The Muscat Infantry had already 
acquired three 3-pounder guns in April 1938. The Sultan was now asking Britain 
to supply him with a large supply of ammunition and modern mountain artillery, 
offering future payments from the Zanzibar subsidy as collateral.309 Whilst the 
Sultan had been increasing his sway across the Oman interior largely by 
peaceful means, the Political Agent ruminated that the acquisition of a large 
stock of arms and ammunition might induce some influential shaikhs ‘who have 
not yet made up their minds to forsake the Imam [of Oman] for His Highness 
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[the Sultan of Muscat].’310 The increase in the strength of the Sultan’s armed 
forces through the introduction of modern weapons, stockpiled ammunition and 
better training was to the advantage of both the Sultan and Britain, provided 
there was no doubt – from the British perspective – on which side that force 
would be employed in an emergency.311 In the hope of keeping the Sultan 
steered in the right direction, a British military adviser was posted to Muscat.312 
Though Muscat was officially neutral during the war, the Political Resident 
hoped that some kind of ‘confidential bargain might be struck with the Sultan by 
which, in return for his receiving free re-arming and training, he would agree to 
let us use his waters and territory in time of war.’313 The Sultan agreed to these 
terms, leading to greater British assistance in his security forces. 
In receipt of the British war subsidy, the Sultan increased the Muscat 
Infantry to over 350 men and in 1942 the artillery section was expanded to troop 
size after the Sultan purchased three 3.7 inch Howitzers.314  Before the 
outbreak of war, the Sultan had concluded that there was no longer a 
requirement for a British commander for the Muscat Infantry and employed an 
Indian instead. During the war, however, a British officer began retraining the 
force.315 
The high stakes brought about by the outbreak of global conflagration 
made Britain take a pause and evaluate its security approach in Eastern Arabia. 
With Britain’s military resources prioritized to more pressing theatres of the war, 
the value of local solutions for protecting British interests – chiefly oil facilities 
and air stations – took on a new importance. Before 1939, the Government of 
India had encouraged and helped some of the rulers to establish organized 
forces in response to specific security challenges: in Bahrain and Muscat the 
threat was internal; in Kuwait it was external in the shape of the Ikhwan. In the 
decades that followed the Second World War, the British Government – and the 
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Foreign Office more specifically – encouraged a widespread build-up of local 
forces to address and protect a broadening array of interests.  
 
 
 
83 
CHAPTER FOUR: LOCAL FORCES IN A PERIOD OF 
HEIGHTENED BRITISH INVOLVEMENT, 1947-60 
 
 
4.1 Local Forces and Foreign Office Policy, 1948-52   
Historians have tended to depict the period after the Second World War as an 
irreversible retrenchment of Britain’s world role – the ‘Long Retreat’, as C.J. 
Bartlett coined it back in 1972.316 Yet, in the decades after 1945, Britain’s 
involvement in the affairs of the Gulf Arab states deepened. A clear step change 
in the way Britain interpreted its responsibilities and obligations occurred during 
this period. A former Political Resident, Sir William Luce, would later remark: 
‘Foremost was the recognition that protection of the [Gulf Arab] States and 
responsibility for their external relations carried with them an indirect but 
nonetheless real responsibility for what went on inside the States.’ Luce 
believes that at this time Britain realised that it ‘should not be responsible for the 
protection of something rotten without assuming limited powers to make it 
sound.’317 After Indian Independence in 1947, and the resulting transfer of 
responsibility to the Foreign Office for formulating British policy on the region, 
Britain began to extend its involvement in its protected states, as well as Muscat 
and Oman, beyond what the constitutional foundations – the treaty-bound rights 
and commitments – of its position specified.318 Britain, however, did not shift 
from its informal imperial style; it continued to favour collaboration with local 
elites rather than coercion and top-down rule. The Foreign Office still told its 
British representatives in the area that their first duty was ‘to cultivate direct, 
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friendly, personal relations with the Ruler with whom he works.’319 In many 
respects the stakes in the Gulf were higher for Britain after the Second World 
War than before it.  
Expanding oil activities (both existing production as well as exploration) 
made stability of ever-increasing import. Ironically, the granting of oil concession 
rights served to ignite new territorial disputes and resurrect old ones. How was 
Britain to protect these growing interests? Britain largely dismantled the military 
architecture it had built up in the Second World War: air bases created or 
enlarged to meet wartime needs were abandoned or scaled back; the RAF 
Levies, brought in from Iraq by the RAF to guard airfields, were disbanded; the 
Indian Army sepoys who had operated the anti-aircraft guns along the coast 
were sent back to their home bases, and the volunteer oil workers in Kuwait and 
Bahrain stopped training. It is argued here that Britain increasingly turned to 
local solutions for the protection of these expanding interests.   
Though responsibility for Gulf policy passed from the Government of 
India to the Foreign Office (via, for a year, the Commonwealth Relations Office), 
much of the old political and military architecture remained unchanged. The 
Political Resident remained at the apex of Britain’s cohort of representatives; 
the Senior Naval Officer Persian Gulf (SNOPG) still commanded the Gulf Naval 
Squadron; and the Air Office Commanding (AOC) in Iraq continued to be 
responsible for the defence of the RAF stations and staging posts in Eastern 
Arabia. Likewise, for a time Britain’s approach to protecting its position in the 
Gulf and meeting its treaty obligations largely continued as before. British 
planners still viewed the guns and landing parties from the frigates of the Royal 
Navy as the best means to respond to a crisis. 320  Indeed, in 1948 the Political 
Resident and Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies Station worked in tandem 
to lobby their respective masters to increase the number of Gulf Squadron 
frigates from two to three.321 In the event of a wider emergency, the practice of 
flying in troops from Iraq or the other Middle Eastern bases still formed the 
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centrepiece of British defence planning.322  This may have been sufficient in 
former years, but the Foreign Office and its officials in the Gulf now believed 
that Britain must take a more active role in the Gulf’s internal affairs and this 
required constant management of the Gulf security scene, especially inland. 
Divisions opened up between British governmental departments over how 
Britain could best protect its interests, particularly its burgeoning oil activities.  
In January 1948, senior British military officers stipulated that ‘special 
consideration’ must be given to the ‘means of maintaining internal security in 
this [Eastern Arabia] area, so as to ensure that exploitation and development [of 
oil] can continue unhindered.’323 As oil companies paid large sums for 
concession rights, some British officials felt that the local rulers were obligated – 
and in some cases they were in fact bound by specific agreements – to provide 
protection.324 C.J. Pelly at the Bahrain Political Agency, for example, was 
adamant that the Ruler should not shirk from his commitment to employ the 
Bahrain State Police to protect oil workers and facilities in Bahrain.325 ‘The [oil] 
companies pay large sums in royalties and there are clauses in each of the 
concessions by which the rulers bind themselves to give such protection as is in 
their power; they should, I submit, be held to this,’ Pelly wrote.326  ‘Primary 
responsibility for protection of oil installations and personnel,’ the Foreign Office 
wrote to the British Middle East Office in Cairo, ‘should rest with local police 
forces. This is the present position at Bahrain and Kuwait and we hope will be 
later at Qatar when state police force is formed there.’327 In April 1948, the 
Political Resident, Sir Rupert Hay, throw his support behind the Ruler of Qatar’s 
request for 1,600 rifles and armour-clad vehicles mounted with machine guns 
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on the following grounds: ‘the Shaikh genuinely requires the arms as the 
activities of the Petroleum Development (Qatar) Limited in the peninsula are 
rapidly expanding and he is responsible for the protection of their personnel and 
material.’328 Hay’s view dovetailed with what the War Office had advocated 
some months earlier. From its side, the British military could provide advice and 
assistance; however, it was ultimately up to the local rulers to improve ‘such 
security forces as already exist, until they [were] capable of providing adequate 
immediate protection.’329  Whilst this may have been the case for Kuwait, 
Bahrain and (hopefully) Qatar, it was recognised that it would be unrealistic for 
the leading shaikhs of the Trucial States or for the Sultan of Muscat to provide 
the same guarantees as they had less control over their interiors. The ruling 
shaikhs of the Trucial States kept retainers to whom they distributed British 
rifles.330 In addition to this, the only forces that were employed were untrained 
askars, armed with antiquated rifles to man watchtowers in the frontier lands 
and forts in more substantial outlying settlements. To be sure, the more 
prominent of the Trucial rulers could gather sizeable camel-mounted tribesmen 
in times of need, but these were mobilized for raiding and quick sorties rather 
than keeping order over territory.331 It would be several more years before the 
Sultan of Muscat could enter the oil-bearing interior with his own forces, let 
alone guarantee the protection of oil prospecting parties. 
One solution was that oil companies set up and pay for their own guard 
forces. Britain’s military planners could countenance this suggestion on the 
condition that any force formed would be under the authority of the local ruler – 
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there would be no private armies.332 Indeed, this was the approach that was 
later taken in Oman (see below). Shaikh Zayed, the Governor of Al Ain, did 
provide oil prospecting parties with armed guards, but each time a local 
boundary was reached a new set of local tribesmen had to be found and 
furnished with payment.333 A different approach was therefore needed for the 
Trucial States.  
Writing to the British Chiefs of Staff about the difficulties of protecting the 
growing number of British oil personnel operating, or wanting to operate, in 
Trucial Oman, Foreign Office officials proposed establishing a British-officered 
levy force.  Setting up a unit similar to the Aden Protectorate Levies (APL) – 
similar in that it would be locally raised, commanded by British officers and 
wholly or partly bankrolled by the British tax payer – would be, the Foreign 
Office tried to convince the British Chiefs of Staff, a useful adjunct to Britain’s 
conventional military forces.  Although the proposed British-run levy force would 
be based in the Trucial States, the Foreign Office argued that it could also be 
used up and down the Gulf to protect Britain’s wider interests. The Joint 
Planning Staff in London felt that a force of levies might prove useful, but 
doubted that the cost of such a scheme would pass through the styptic Defence 
Vote.334 When asked for their views, British military planners in the Middle East 
came out against the idea. For a start, such a force would be needed only after 
oil was discovered, when oil workers and valuable assets began arriving. Oil 
companies were some way from reaching this stage in the Trucial Oman area. 
Also, because trouble in the area was limited to minor tribal disputes, and as 
Sharjah airfield – identified as Britain’s only military asset of real value in the 
area – was not seriously threatened, they felt the costs involved in the Foreign 
Office’s levy force proposal outweighed the benefits.335 Moreover, the Chiefs of 
Staff rejected the Foreign Office proposal on practical as well as financial 
grounds. Not only would this force lack the mobility to respond to events up and 
down Eastern Arabia, it would, owing to a paucity of suitable recruits, be near 
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impossible to establish in the first place. If Britain needed troops to intervene in 
Kuwait, Qatar or Bahrain – the most important states in terms of British interests 
– Britain should stick, they argued, to the existing plans of flying in regular 
units.336  By February 1949, a ‘Persian Gulf Levy Force’ commanded by British 
officers seemed dead in the water. Developments in 1949, however, 
resurrected the idea. 
  The need for an armed unit to escort Britain’s representatives travelling in 
unruly parts of the Trucial States, who were involved at the time in settling 
incendiary boundary disputes, was underscored when the Bani Kitaab tribe in 
the Buraimi oasis area fired upon British officials.337 But what really breathed 
new life into the idea of establishing a British-run force for the area was the 
slave trade, which had again become very profitable in Trucial Oman during the 
late 1940s.338  When the British explorer Wilfred Thesiger emerged on the 
Trucial Coast in the spring of 1949 after travelling across southeast Arabia, he 
arrived with a first-hand account of the slave trade flourishing in Buraimi oasis. 
Thesiger told British representatives that the trade had become so blatant that 
he observed a party of 43 slaves ‘being driven out of Buraimi like cattle, their 
owners having reverted to the more brutal and less expensive methods of 
former days.’339  Whilst the importation of slaves by sea had largely been 
suppressed by naval action, the new practice of abducting residents in the 
Trucial States and selling them into slavery could only be confronted on land.  In 
Thesiger’s opinion, 100 men with modern rifles might suffice to establish law 
and order in the interior and to put down the slave trade.340  The influence 
Thesiger had on the Political Resident, Sir Rupert Hay, and his subordinates is 
visible in the despatches they sent back to the Foreign Office. Thesiger’s 
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reports were also taken seriously in London; it seems more than coincidental 
that it was at this time that the British government gave the question of quelling 
the slave trade its fullest attention.  
Alive to the damage that reports of slaving could do to Britain’s 
international standing, the War Office nonetheless ruled out deploying British 
troops to the area or bombarding slave camps from air and sea. It was as much 
by default, then, that the Foreign Office’s proposal for a levy force was back on 
the table – this time with the new purpose of destroying the slave trade.  
As a stopgap measure until a force could be raised from scratch, Sir 
Rupert Hay initially proposed that Britain send a detachment of Aden 
Protectorate Levies (APL) to deal with the slavers and base them in Sharjah. 
Thesiger convinced Sir Rupert to drop the idea. He thought the Adenis were ‘of 
poor quality, they speak a different language from the local tribesmen and [. . .] 
would cut no ice and certainly not inspire the local tribesmen to enlist.’341 
Heeding Thesiger’s advice, Sir Rupert hoped that the British-led Jordanian Arab 
Legion, which was reducing its strength, could provide a detachment in the 
short term whilst the recruitment of local tribesmen was underway.342 When the 
earlier idea of the ‘Persian Gulf Levy Force’ was muted,  Britain’s most senior 
military officers in the Middle East ruled out the recruitment of local Arabs on the 
grounds that they were unsuitable; the assumption was that Iraqi Assyrians or 
Somalis would fill the ranks of any new force.343 Extending this prejudicial 
scope, the Political Agent in Bahrain, C.J Pelly, believed Britain would have to 
look even farther afield.  ‘We agree,’ Pelly wrote to Sir Rupert,  
 
[. . .] that Baluchis do not make reliable soldiers. The little I have 
seen and what I have heard of Somalis disposes me to believe that 
they are unreliable, temperamental and in fact thoroughly difficult 
people to manage. I do think, though, that the idea of employing 
Indian or Pakistani mercenaries might be entertained, officered of 
course by British ex-Indian Army officers.344   
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Thesiger, whose advice now extended to the composition of the putative levy 
force, urged the Political Resident not to discount local Arab tribesmen. In a 
letter to the Foreign Office in May 1949, Sir Rupert Hay relayed Thesiger’s 
thoughts.  
 
[Thesiger] thinks that if a good officer can be found he should be able 
to raise a force recruited from the Bedouin tribes and not the local 
riff-raff of the coast in a period of about three years. He is of the 
opinion that these tribesmen would enlist if they were well paid, fed 
and clothed and that they are not less promising material than 
[Major-General John Bagot] Glubb [British Commander of the 
Jordanian Arab Legion] had to work on to begin with.345 
  
At the same time, the Foreign Office sought the views of Glubb himself, who 
was fortuitously in London. Major-General Glubb (or Glubb Pasha, as he was 
popularly known) was, like Thesiger, quick to expurgate the disparaging views 
some British officials held about the suitability of the local men. When the Arab 
Legion began, he told Foreign Office officials at the May 1949 meeting, it 
started with the ‘most intractable material but soon found that even the wildest 
Bedouin could be trained to perform with mechanised equipment and signals 
work.  It was very much a matter of training.’ Due to their arduous climate and 
lifestyle, Glubb surmised that the locals in the area may prove a tough bunch. 
With modern weapons and travelling in jeeps or a lorry, Glubb believed that the 
local Arabs would ‘be a match for anyone they were likely to meet.’346 Whilst the 
Foreign Office had in the first instance tilted towards bringing in soldiers from 
abroad, they were now convinced that the advantage lay in local recruiting. For 
one thing, local men would supply better intelligence and local knowledge than 
recruits from outside, which would be crucial for anti-slaving tasks.  Also, by 
providing employment for their followers, the force could also reconcile the 
leading local shaikhs into accepting it.347 
In August 1949, the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, informed the Cabinet 
that he was recommending ‘the establishment of a small local force under 
British command [. . .] with the primary object of stopping the trade in slaves, 
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which has recently increased.’348 The Treasury later sanctioned the funds for 
the formation of what came to be called the Trucial Oman Levies (TOL). The 
soon-to-be-established TOL was something different than other British 
organised forces in the area that had come before it – this was a British project, 
paid for by the Foreign Office and under the delegated authority of the Political 
Resident.  
  As an extemporal measure, a small contingent from the Jordanian Arab 
Legion would be flown in, around which the Levies would be built up with local 
recruits. Before deciding on setting up the force, Britain did not canvass the 
views of the local rulers and their sanction was never sought; Sir Rupert Hay did 
not see the need to ask for the Shaikhs’ consent, ‘but simply notify them of what 
we intend to do.’349 Visceral opposition to the levy force did come, but from 
outside the Trucial States. In December 1950, Ibn Saud lodged his first formal 
protest against formation of the British levies because it represented, in his 
mind, an aggressive move against Saudi Arabia.350 Ibn Saud was impervious to 
the argument that such a small force could hardly constitute aggression. No real 
thought was given to abandoning or even delaying the force’s formation due to 
Saudi pressure.  At any rate, it was thought Ibn Saud had ‘become so crotchety 
and unreasonable that he can only be dealt with either by giving way completely 
to his demands or by standing firm against him.’351  The Saudi Ambassador in 
London told British officials off the record that Ibn Saud’s objections derived 
from his fear that the Arab Legion personnel forming the core of the new force 
would promote anti-Saudi propaganda amongst the tribes in the Trucial States. 
Some in the Foreign Office did suggest not sending Arab Legion instructors.  
Glubb and Resident Hay quickly retorted that the creation of the TOL was 
impossible without them.     
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  The Treasury only earmarked sufficient funds for 70 men. Glubb had 
prepared for the Foreign Office a detailed proposal – including a putative 
budget, equipment list and the pay scales – for a much larger force. 
Nevertheless, at the end of February 1951 Major J.M. Hankin-Turvin, who had 
been decorated for his bravery in Jerusalem during the Arab-Israeli war in 1948, 
travelled from Jordan to Sharjah (the TOL’s headquarters) to assume 
command. He was joined by two Arab officers and 30 other men from the Arab 
Legion. The War Office provided a small consignment of weapons (30 rifles, two 
Bren light machine-guns, and 2-inch mortars) and vehicles (six Land Rovers 
and four 3-ton trucks).352   
Amongst the early local security forces the TOL were sui generis in that 
they were a wholly British-controlled force operating in the territory of the Trucial 
States. The main duties of the TOL, as outlined in the Directive of 22 April 1951, 
were threefold: ‘(i) to maintain peace and good order in the Trucial States; (ii) to 
prevent or suppress any traffic in slaves; and (iii) to provide and escort for any 
British representatives travelling in the Trucial States.’353 The force also had 
specific powers of arrest that in theory could be exercised in any part of the 
territory of the Trucial States for the maintenance of law and order.354 The men 
of the Trucial Oman Levies, one chronicler of the force notes, were in an 
anomalous position: ‘although their officers were British regulars and the Levies 
were paid by the Foreign Office, the men took no oath of loyalty, so that 
traditional forms of military law were on an uncertain foundation.’355 Britain 
made great efforts to present the TOL as a force that existed in the interests of 
the rulers.356 Two months after its inception, for example, the Levies provided 
an honour guard at the funeral of the Ruler of Sharjah, Shaikh Sultan bin Saqr 
al-Qasimi.357 For the first months of its existence, the Levies visited the local 
rulers, recruited more men and undertook patrols.   
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Britain intended the Arab Legion contingent to be a temporary measure to 
allow time to recruit locals. Britain’s representatives questioned whether, 
beyond the unemployed migratory workers whom the oil companies had already 
rejected, the Levies could find suitable men amongst the population.358 
Replacement of the Arab Legion Jordanians took on an added urgency in May 
1951 when there was a minor mutiny amongst them at their Sharjah base and 
several were discharged.359 By the summer of 1951 the TOL had taken on 
enough men to patrol further into the interior, especially along the border with 
Oman. Largely acting on tip-offs, the TOL carried out a number of arrest 
operations against notable slave traders in this area. Those apprehended were 
prosecuted in the Trucial States Court. British representatives and Levy officers 
acted as legal defence and prosecution with a British judge deciding the 
verdict.360  
The Levies struggled to keep up their coverage over the Trucial States. 
Beset by difficulties in recruiting men, the force numbered only one British 
Officer, 30 Jordanians and 50 local other ranks in October 1951. Britain 
approached the Aden Protectorate Levies (APL) for instructors, and in 
December 1951 five ex-members of the APL came across to the TOL.361 
Despite early teething troubles, British representatives believed the TOL were 
having a stabilising influence in the area.  The Political Officer for the Trucial 
States wrote in April 1951 that: 
 
The mere presence of the Levies is having, as far as can be judged, 
a considerable effect. Their appearance, which is so markedly 
different from that of the average inhabitant of the coast, and their 
arms and equipment, which contrast even more strongly with those 
on general view here hitherto, both inevitably impress the natives and 
especially the Bedouin tribesmen.362 
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In the early part of the Levies’ existence, the force dealt chiefly with incidents 
that in other places might be considered police matters but which in the Trucial 
States could lead to tribal warfare. In the summer of 1952, for example, the 
Levies, joined by a Royal Navy landing party of 60 sailors (bluecoats) and 
marines, broke up internal fighting in northern part of Ras al-Khaimah.363 This 
was precisely the kind of preventative action that the British hoped the Levies 
would perform. Resident Hay, accompanying a routine TOL patrol soon after it 
was formed, gave his mixed observations: 
 
The Levies who accompanied me perform their duties quietly and 
efficiently. To one with long acquaintance of the Indian Army and 
Frontier Corps they appear somewhat lax in their general behaviour 
and in their administrative and security arrangements. They lack spit 
and polish, there are no sanitary arrangements at their outposts and 
practically no attempt is made at picketing. This however appears to 
suit the Arab temperament and fortunately the Oman hills, though 
much like those of the North West Frontier Province of the old British 
India in appearance, harbour much less warlike and aggressive 
inhabitants.364 
 
Faced with the need to move the Trucial States into an age of oil, Britain no 
longer assented to bloody accessions. The TOL now provided a tool to control 
this tradition.  As the Political Officer at the time, John Wilton, explains: 
 
It was possible for the British Government to frustrate the murderer’s 
accession because the presence of the Levies, small force though 
they were, meant that an effective gesture could be made in time 
without mounting a ponderous combined operation involving British 
troops.365 
 
The establishment of a local military force answerable ultimately to the Political 
Resident was a significant development in Britain’s security approach to the 
region.  As a reflection of what this meant, a Local Defence Committee (Persian 
Gulf) was established in 1951. Chaired by the Political Resident and comprising 
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the SNOPG, the Senior Air Officer Persian Gulf (SRAFOPG) and, after 1952, 
the Resident’s Military Adviser, who was later titled the Senior Army Officer, 
Persian Gulf (SAOPG), the LDC (PG) acted as both an intelligence-sharing 
forum and a decision-making body for security matters up and down the coast.  
As late as September 1949, some British officials had still referred to the 
proposed British-run local force as the ‘Persian Gulf Levy Force’ in the 
expectation that it might later set up an additional post in Qatar for keeping 
order in the northern Gulf as well.366  Others had been quick to shoot down the 
idea of a British-run force that could be used in Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar. 
‘Bahrain as an Island has not the same need of protection from desert Bedouin 
and the RN [Royal Navy] is at hand in emergency’, the Foreign Office 
concluded in September 1949.  As for Kuwaiti oil facilities, the Foreign Office 
assessed that these were ‘too far away to be covered by any force based on 
our more southerly protected states’ and was, at any rate, ‘comparatively well 
protected by oil company and state guards.’367  (In addition, the Kuwait Oil 
Company hired its own Baluchi watchmen to counter pilfering of property.)  
Whilst the Levies would be of little value in protecting oil interests, some 
believed that they could be a distinct advantage in political matters. The Political 
Agent in Bahrain, C.J. Pelly, argued in 1949 that a mobile desert force capable 
of being flown in detachments to other parts of the Gulf unobtrusively (unlike the 
very public deployment of British troops) could be, ‘a weapon of very great 
political advantage to us in the whole of the Gulf [. . . .] It could,’ Pelly 
elaborated to the Political Resident, ‘be used in Qatar or Kuwait where, as so 
often may happen, a show of force would be just what is required to tip the 
scales in our favour in a political issue.’368  Pelly’s arguments were prescient.  
When in the summer of 1949 Britain decided that it must safeguard the Qatari 
accession – it was unclear whether the incumbent Shaikh Ali would be accepted 
by powerful factions of the Al Thani ruling family – the acting Political Resident 
first suggested sending a British Arabic-speaking officer and a small 
detachment of Arab Legionnaires by air from Jordan in order to (a) assure the 
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accession, and (b) to begin training a local police force.369  Rejecting this idea 
on the grounds that it would ‘involve too much delay and complication,’ the 
Foreign Office reverting back to the time-tested practice of landing an armed 
party from one of the frigates of the Gulf Squadron positioned off the Qatari 
coastline.370 Later at the accession ceremony of Shaikh Ali, HMS Flamingo 
provided an armed honour guard. These were precisely the types of scenario in 
which Pelly thought a show of force from British-controlled Gulf-wide local force 
and would offer a better option than flying in British troops or landing bluecoats 
from a Gulf Squadron frigate.  
 With the Trucial Oman Levies constricted – in principle and in practice – 
to only operate in the lower Gulf, and as Britain wished to reduce the chances of 
being forced to intervene militarily in the northern Gulf, British representatives 
counselled the rulers of Qatar and Kuwait to employ British security experts to 
establish a force in the former and guide the existing security forces in the latter.  
Even though they confirmed their pre-eminence over the peninsula at the 
Battle of Zubara in 1937, the Al Thani rulers never felt they could fully rely on 
the Qatari tribes, partly because many of them had branches in Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia and the Trucial States. What is more, Shaikh Abdullah Al Thani faced 
mounting pressure from his extended family to distribute revenues from oil 
exports, which had begun in 1949. Vocal members of the family threatened to 
oppose him directly unless they received a greater share of the income. The 
death of the heir apparent, Shaikh Hamad bin Abdullah Al Thani, in 1948 had 
thrown the succession issue into turmoil. On investigation, the Political Resident 
found the Ruler desperate to abdicate to his other son, Shaikh Ali. But Shaikh 
Ali would only take up the mantle if Britain confirmed that it would protect him 
from internal attacks. This was understandable, as some members of the Al 
Thani were backing the ruler’s grandson, Khalifa bin Hamad.371 Abdullah and 
Ali’s weakness put Britain in an influential position to make its influence felt. To 
ensure that the passing of the baton from father to son went unopposed, the 
acting Political Resident, Jakins, oversaw the accession procedures, flanked by 
                                            
369 The idea was that they bring their own arms, but would use local vehicles. TNA 
FO 371/74944 Residency (Bahrain) to Foreign Office, 16 August 1949. 
370 Ibid, Foreign Office to Residency (Bahrain), 17 August 1949. 
371 Crystal (1989), p. 437. 
 
 
97 
an armed honour guard of British sailors from the Gulf Squadron from HMS 
Flamingo.372  
British officials viewed the newly installed Shaikh Ali (r. 1949-60) as a 
‘rubber-stamp’ ruler. His weak position in Qatar meant that he would be 
malleable to British wishes; on the other hand, it also meant he would need 
‘considerable propping up.’373 Rather than have Shaikh Ali rely totally on British 
military support, Britain pressured the Qatari ruler to employ a British adviser 
with a police and military background whose first task would be to form a force 
capable of maintaining order in Doha and protecting the Shaikh from ‘the 
intrigues of his numerous relatives.’374  With Shaikh Ali isolated within his family 
and dependent on British support, Britain now had the leverage to impose 
British advisers and set in motion administrative reforms in Qatar.375  The first 
task of the Political Officer, John Wilton, when he was appointed to Doha in 
1949 was to encourage Shaikh Ali to develop a rudimentary administration.376 
The task was made more difficult by the fact that Shaikh Abdullah had taken the 
contents of the state treasury with him when he abdicated.377 Shaikh Ali 
assented to British cajoling, employing a British security expert by the name of 
Ronald Cochrane, whom he hired from the Bahrain State Police.378 Cochrane, 
who changed his name to Mohammad Mahdi upon his conversion to Islam in 
1964, and remained at the heart of the Qatari security apparatus for decades 
after his appointment, arrived in 1949 with a small consignment of rifles on loan 
from Bahrain and began forming up a small armed police. In June 1952, the 
Qatari armed police were able to force the surrender of members of the Bani 
Ahmad section of the ruling family who had assaulted the director of customs 
and were holed up in their part of Doha. The SNOPG believed that this first 
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instance of the use of the police against the ruler’s family was ‘a most 
encouraging precedent’.  Nevertheless, the police were not in possession of 
anything more lethal than rifles.  Cochrane estimated that the Bani Ahmad 
gathered at the ruler’s palace for negotiations had over 100 modern automatic 
weapons.379 Although Britain was able to pressure Shaikh Ali into spending his 
revenue on a security force and British adviser, this did not guarantee that he 
would place his faith in his security apparatus. Shaikh Ali looked at the police as 
a foreign force and for some time preferred to rely on his immediate band of 
armed retainers (or fidawiyya) for his personal protection. 
Britain encountered more resistance in Kuwait when it came to the 
appointment of British adviser.  With expanding oil revenues and a rapid influx 
of foreigners in the late 1940s, Britain wanted Kuwait to develop its government 
structures and spend newly acquired wealth on infrastructure.380 The Political 
Agent in Kuwait and the Political Resident worked assiduously to persuade the 
Al-Sabah family to accept a British financial adviser; they wanted the Ruler, 
Shaikh Ahmad, to take on a man who could ‘exercise a preponderant influence 
in the administration of the State while keeping his personality in the 
background.’ It was, Resident Hay informed the Foreign Secretary, Ernest 
Bevin, in April 1948, ‘our primary objective at Kuwait.’381 Although the Shaikh 
Ahmad rejected the appointment of an adviser, British officials did not let up. 
What is more, now they adjured Shaikh Ahmad to appoint a British security 
expert similar to Cochrane in Qatar. The inability to expedite this latter 
appointment frustrated British officials even more. By October 1948, Hay 
considered a British expert for Kuwait’s police more urgent than a financial 
adviser.382 Worried about the influx of unruly American and British oil workers, 
however, Britain wanted Kuwait to follow Bahrain’s example and agree to 
employ a section of British police officers and to appoint a British 
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commandant.383  Earlier in March 1948 the British Foreign Secretary signed off 
a ‘King’s Regulation’ which gave the Political Agent in Kuwait, as District 
Magistrate, the power to appoint Special Police Officers from among those 
residents of Kuwait outside the jurisdiction of the Ruler.384   
When in the latter half of 1948 Shaikh Ahmad again rejected the 
appointment of a former British superintendent of the Palestine Police, 
Middleton, as his adviser to the Public Security Department, the Political Agent, 
Colonel Galloway, could not hide his disappointment. He told Resident Hay in 
January 1949 that the Kuwaiti police were,  
 
most certainly inefficient and quite unable to cope with the rapidly 
increasing number of foreigners pouring into this gold-rush state and 
the rapid change from slow animal transport to the onslaught of ill-
trained drivers of high powered American cars.385 
 
Shaikh Ahmad tried to convince Britain that there was no need for a British 
security adviser as he was on his own initiative doubling the size of his security 
forces and was hiring two British-trained Palestinians as police officers.386 
Shaikh Ahmad also agreed to appoint several British police officers to deal with 
people subject to the jurisdiction of the Political Agent under the Kuwait Order in 
Council.  Moreover in 1949 Shaikh Ahmad appointed his cousin, Shaikh 
Abdullah Mubarak, to head a restructured Public Security Department, which 
controlled the armed gendarmerie but not the town police.387   These measures, 
in the eyes of the Political Agency in Kuwait at least, laid the groundwork for 
great improvements in security scene.388  Nonetheless, Britain kept up the 
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pressure on Kuwaitis to employ a British security adviser similar to Ronald 
Cochrane in Qatar.  
Deterring would-be opponents of Abdullah al-Salim’s succession by 
sending a squadron of British armoured cars from Iraq and flying RAF Dakota 
aircraft overhead during the accession ceremony, probably put Britain in a 
stronger position to influence the new ruler on security matters. By 1950, there 
were three British police officers employed by the Public Security Department 
and in the same year two of the late ruler’s sons, Shaikh Jabir and Shaikh 
Sabah, toured New Scotland Yard and the police training college at Hendon in 
England.389 At the year’s end, the Ruler requested that his agent in London (a 
British national by the name of H.T. Kemp) seek out, with Foreign Office 
guidance, suitable British experts for Kuwait’s finance and customs 
departments. This appeared to signal the green light for the appointment of a 
security adviser.390 However, when Britain again raised the matter of a British 
expert for the Public Security Department, Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak dug his 
heels in.  Thought by the British to be untutored and harsh in his role as head of 
the Public Security Department,  the Political Agent, Jakins, fretted that Shaikh 
Abdullah – also was considered by many to be Kuwait’s likely future ruler – was 
becoming ‘increasingly surrounded by a number of Palestinian and Syrian 
sycophants.’  Rather than accepting this situation, Jakins recommended in 
November 1950 that Britain should try to win him over to British ways by placing 
a British security adviser alongside him. 
 
With Abdullah Salim, physically, an aging man, the future of Kuwait is 
too great a stake to permit our running risks with Abdullah Mubarak’s 
schooling.  We should in my view take the earliest opportunity of 
putting a British official, in the form of a security expert, alongside 
Abdullah Mubarak to train him on the right lines.391   
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Claiming that accepting a British adviser would result in a serious loss of face, 
Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak continued to reject the idea. Britain’s inability to get 
the Kuwaiti leadership to agree to taking on a British security expert displayed 
the limitations of British influence in Kuwait.   
 With Cochrane’s arrival in Doha in 1949 and the formation of the TOL in 
Sharjah two years later, there was now some form of organised professional 
security forces in all of the Gulf shaikhdoms within Britain’s informal empire. The 
forces for Qatar and Trucial States were British initiatives designed to create a 
degree of order in these territories. British oil interests in Eastern Arabia 
became measurably more important after the Iranian government threatened to 
nationalise its oil fields.392 Would a local approach to protecting this vital 
resource suffice? 
In mid-May 1951, the new Iranian government of Prime Minister 
Mossadeq nationalised the South Persia oilfields and threatened to do the same 
to the massive Abadan refinery, Britain’s largest overseas investment. As 
tensions mounted throughout July and August, Britain assembled forces for 
military action. The Cabinet decided that, in view of Washington’s attitude 
against the use of force, the operation would not go ahead.393 Britain evacuated 
employees at the refinery in September 1951, abandoning the facility on 3 
October 1951.394 The subsequent boycott of Iranian oil lifted Kuwaiti, Qatari, 
and (to a lesser extent) Bahraini hydrocarbon production to a previously 
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unimagined level of importance for Britain.395 Was the British system for 
protecting these interests fit for task? The inter-departmental debates in 
Whitehall on the question of how best to protect oil interests in the Gulf 
continued into late 1951 and early 1952 and took a number of interesting twists 
and turns. The defence of Gulf oil should not be divorced from wider strategic 
discussions taking place at the time.  After Winston Churchill returned to 10 
Downing Street in the autumn of 1951, he initiated a review of Britain’s global 
strategy.396  Though the final report gave greater prominence to nuclear 
weapons in defence policy, Britain would retain traditional forces east of Suez 
area to protect its political and commercial interests.397  Out of these traditional 
military resources, the Foreign Office and the Political Resident still favoured 
naval power as the most solid undergird to Britain’s political position in the Gulf 
and the best means to respond to a crisis.  
The Foreign Office believed that it was usually far quicker and certainly 
more discrete to land ashore a naval party from a frigate than it was to fly in 
troops from outside the Gulf. In June 1951, the LDC (PG) called for an 
expansion of the number of frigates from three to four to better defend British oil 
interests. The Admiralty first rejected the proposal, but the Foreign Office asked 
them to reconsider on the grounds that ‘the present situation in the Persian Gulf 
merits very special consideration’. The Admiralty stuck to its position; there 
were simply not the resources available to commission an additional ship for the 
Gulf.  With an increased naval presence ruled out, defence planners began to 
explore other options for the protection of British interests.398   
At the time of the Abadan crisis, the British Chiefs of Staff Committee 
considered an RAF proposal to establish an operational air base at Kuwait and 
to station a small force of 50 British soldiers. Whilst this force would be there to 
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guard the proposed RAF base, British planners also felt that it could act in 
support of the Ruler if an attempt was made by outside interests to ferment 
internal unrest in an attempt to overrun his regime.399 The Foreign Office, 
awaiting the views of the Political Resident, Sir Rupert Hay, let the defence 
chiefs know in advance its own doubts about ‘whether such a force is required 
for protecting the Ruler, who is safeguarded from his immediate neighbours by 
our protection and against whom there seems to be no particular internal 
threat.’400 Nonetheless, the idea to establish an RAF base in Kuwait was not 
dropped.  
Simultaneously, John Bagot Glubb, whose advice had earlier been 
sought on establishing the TOL, proposed an ambitious plan to stand up a 
British-run Arab Army that could be used as a British military tool across the 
whole Middle East – in essence the Jordanian Arab Legion writ large. In the 
context of wider British post-Second World War defence thinking, Glubb’s 
proposal was not as revolutionary as it might first appear. In January 1948, 
British defence planners in the Middle East called for the greater utilisation of 
the Arab forces in the event of war. Britain did not expect the militaries of Egypt 
and Iraq to withstand a full-scale attack; through training these forces and 
assisting them, British military officials thought that they ‘might undertake not 
only internal security but also minor operational roles if used in conjunction with 
allied forces. We should therefore take every opportunity of organising and 
training them for these roles.’401 Thus the idea that Arab armies could augment, 
or even be used in place of, British forces had already found a place in British 
defence policy circles. Glubb’s concept for an Arab Army comprised three 
battalions (one raised in the Gulf, one in southern Arabia, and a third stood up 
in the Sinai), garrisoned across ‘A Chain of Gibraltars’ – i.e. bases established 
on islands or strips of land bought or leased from Middle Eastern states. As its 
soldiers would be able to operate in areas that possessed an unsuitable climate 
for British troops, it would offset the loss of the British Indian Army.   
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Displaying his proclivity towards the concept of noble savage, Glubb 
believed that the northern Arabs (or, as he refers to them, Mediterraneans) 
were too intellectual for enlistment. The central Arabian or desert Arab, in 
contrast, would make fine recruits for his force, Glubb thought. Kuwait in 
Glubb’s mind would make an ideal recruiting ground for a battalion; indeed, 
several hundred men from the tribes in western Kuwait were already serving in 
the Arab Legion. If this proved impractical, Glubb suggested that Britain raise 
the Persian Gulf battalion of the Arab Army in Bahrain or Sharjah with the 
nucleus coming from the Arab Legion, similar then to the way the Trucial Oman 
Levies was formed.402 Likening Bedouin fighters to Australians – in that they 
were proud, independent and sometimes unruly – Glubb concluded they would 
need natural leaders to follow. Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Nevil 
Brownjohn, judged it impractical to raise troops in Sinai and doubted the 
usefulness of more troops in the Aden Protectorate on top of the Levies there.  
He did think, though, that ‘raising an Arab force in the Persian Gulf, with the 
primary role of defending and providing a stabilizing influence in the Persian 
Gulf oilfields, would have a definite strategic advantage.’403  Britain’s military 
chiefs gave both proposals – a RAF base at Kuwait with a detachment of troops 
and Glubb’s Arab Army – their full consideration. Glubb joined the British 
defence chiefs on 10 October 1951 to discuss the relative merits of his Arab 
Army concept. No decision was made at this meeting on either proposal and the 
matter was passed on to the British Defence Coordination Committee, Middle 
East in Cairo for further discussion.  This committee, meeting on 22 October 
1951, veered towards Glubb’s suggestion; stationing troops in Kuwait, they 
argued, was unsuitable on general political principles. In strikingly similar tones 
to the proposal for a Persian Gulf Levy force made by the Foreign Office in 
1949, the Committee supported the idea of a Gulf-wide local force under British 
command:  
 
Strategically, it would be desirable to have a military footing in the 
Persian Gulf area. A native force under British control stationed in the 
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area in peace would form the nucleus for a defence organisation for 
the oilfields in war, and a foothold for operations elsewhere, e.g. 
against Persia [. . . .] although Kuwait is potentially a good recruiting 
area, it is too close to Iraq to be a suitable war-time base for an Arab 
Army, and too far forward to assist in the defence of the Bahrain oil 
area.404   
 
The Committee deferred making a final decision until after a first-hand appraisal 
had been made. They sent Brigadier J.A.E. Baird of the British Military Mission 
in Saudi Arabia to make an on-the-spot assessment and to garner the opinions 
of the Political Resident and his staff.405 Baird’s findings, endorsed by the Chiefs 
of Staff in a February 1952, rejected both ideas and instead argued that 
Britain’s best policy was to improve the capabilities of local forces in the area.406 
Brigadier Baird’s conclusions were seized upon. He was made the Political 
Resident’s military adviser with one of his primary tasks was to advise and 
assist the local rulers in raising the standard of their existing forces. He was 
instructed to do this in ways that placed the fewest financial and manpower 
obligations on Britain.407   
Even with a programme of improving the capabilities of local forces in the 
Gulf, British military planners in the Middle East remained wedded to view that 
flying in British troops from Iraq or the Canal Base Zone in Egypt would 
continue to be the surest way of protecting British interests in the region.408  Yet 
there was a clear link between the effectiveness of local forces and these 
reinforcement plans by air: flying in British troops depended on airfields 
remaining in friendly hands.409 Outside of the oil-producing protected states, the 
chief threat to British interests in the early 1950s came from Saudi territorial 
expansion.  
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4.2 Strategies for Containing Saudi Arabia in Trucial Oman, 
1951-55 
Concern that Saudi Arabia would press its territorial claims in Trucial Oman –
either by direct attack or by stirring up and supporting local opposition – was the 
main driver behind British efforts to expand the Trucial Oman Levies and the 
Sultan of Muscat’s Armed Forces.  
In the years following the Second World War the Sultan of Muscat placed 
little store by his military. Sir Rupert Hay told Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin in 
July 1949 that he found the ‘small number of men available for the defence of 
Muscat in the event of tribal attack [. . .] disquieting’.410 Because the majority of 
the three hundred troops were committed to guard duties around Muscat, the 
force could only produce a few dozen men when ordered to parade.411 One of 
biggest obstacles to improving the Muscat Infantry was the Sultan’s lack of faith 
in the force. This further diminished in September 1950 when 30 Baluchi men 
attacked the guardroom and released three of their comrades under 
detention.412 Some 90 Baluchi soldiers from the Makran coast were dismissed 
and sent back to Pakistan on a steamer.413 After the incident, Hay wrote again 
to the Bevin of his continued doubts of ‘the amount of opposition they [the 
Muscat Infantry] would offer to a serious tribal attack on Muscat’.414 In the short 
term, however, Saudi moves into Oman united the Sultan and Imamate and 
decreased the likelihood of an attack on Muscat.  
At the end of April 1949, the Saudi Arabian government made a claim to 
a frontier that superseded its previous 1935 territorial demands. This new claim 
included much of the coastline of Abu Dhabi, the Liwa Oasis area and the 
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region around Al Ain and Buraimi, which was split between Oman and Abu 
Dhabi’s control. When a force pursuing this claim on the Saudi’s behalf took 
possession of the Omani village of Hamasa in the Buraimi oasis area on 31 
August 1952 on the orders of the Saudi King, the Sultan had few options but to 
evoke the centuries-old practice of mustering loyal tribal fighters. The Sultan 
jointly raised with the Imam of Oman a general levy of approximately 8,000 
tribal fighters, supported by the Muscat Infantry and its light artillery guns.415  
Rallying at Sohar on the Batinah coast, the assembled force was stopped by 
Britain, which pressured the Sultan to delay military action in favour of British-
led negotiations. Though the expedition was called off, the Sultan wanted to 
impress the assembled tribal levies with a display of the Muscat Infantry’s 
artillery guns. The artillery could not be fired; a key working part for the guns 
had been left in Muscat. Infuriated by the incompetence displayed at Sohar, the 
Sultan’s poor impression of the Muscat Infantry stiffened.   
On this occasion, Sultan Said was able to assemble a tribal force, but a 
shift in tribal dynamics could just as easily render this unworkable. The threat 
from Saudi Arabia made it all the more important that the Sultan had a military 
force entirely at his disposal and not reliant on the vagaries of tribal alliances. 
To this end, the Sultan established the Batinah Force soon after the Saudi 
move into Buraimi. Recruits were drawn largely from the Hawasinah, an Arab 
tribe who lived in the foothills behind Sohar. Command of the new unit fell to a 
British contract officer, Colin Maxwell, a veteran of the Second World War and 
of the Palestine Police.416 Fellow Briton St John Armitage, formerly a military 
adviser with the British Military Mission to Saudi Arabia, soon joined as 
Maxwell’s second in command. The Batinah Force was set up to operate along 
the north-eastern coastal strip, but by April 1953 it had only recruited 30 men.417 
Unlike the Muscat Infantry, which was under administrative control of the 
Sultan’s Foreign Ministry, the Batinah Force’s British officers reported to Sultan 
Said and, in his absence, to his close relative Sayyid Shehab.418 Being 
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comprised of mainly Arab tribesmen, the Batinah Force was more akin to a 
traditional tribal levy force.419 In contrast, because the Muscat Infantry continued 
to recruit much of its soldiery from the Sultan’s Gwadur enclave on the Makran 
Coast, it sat more naturally within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ orbit.   
Since 1948, the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs had been filled by 
British nationals (initially Mr Woods-Ballard until he was replaced by Neil 
McLeod Innes in October 1953). Under Woods-Ballard and Innes, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs was responsible for running, alongside the Muscat Infantry, 
the municipality for Muscat and Muttrah, the school and the Sultan’s Gwadur 
possession on the Makran Coast.420 Although these were privately employed 
individuals, the British Foreign Office had put them forward as candidates, 
ensuring a measure of British influence.421 Like his foreign ministers, the Sultan 
favoured employing Britons as contract officers for his military. In late 1953, the 
Muscat Infantry commander resigned under a dark cloud. Although the 
Pakistani Subhadar-Major, Aziz al-Rahman, who was left in temporary charge 
was, according to the Oman’s British Foreign Minister, a ‘splendid man’ who 
‘had been bred in the best tradition of the old Indian Army; probably the best 
leader the force had known for some time, being utterly loyal, trustworthy, 
straightforward and a tiger for action,’ the Sultan soon replaced him with a 
British contract officer.422     
Whilst Britain had dissuaded Sultan Said from sending his makeshift force 
from marching on Buraimi and favoured a diplomatic solution, it nevertheless 
held the belief that a credible military was needed at Buraimi if Saudi Arabia 
was to take the negotiations seriously. Rather than permanently deploy its own 
forces, Britain hoped to make use of the TOL in this instance and moved part of 
the force into positions around Buraimi in 1952. The TOL was joined at certain 
moments of tension by British ground-attack aircraft and RAF Regiment 
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armoured car squadrons stationed in Sharjah. By the end of 1952, the Levies 
were only 80-strong and severely overstretched due to this new commitment. 
More local tribesmen were recruited, especially from Abu Dhabi, and plans were 
under way to increase the size of the force. Owing to continued difficulties in 
finding medically fit men from the local tribes, Britain initially reinforced the 
Levies with detachments of Aden Protectorate Levies (APL) and several more 
British officers.423 In order to rapidly expand the force, Britain recruited men 
from Aden for the force. One of the TOL squadrons made up entirely of men 
from Aden mutinied in late 1953, killing their British squadron commander, a 
British medical officer and an Arab sergeant major.424 When the relief force 
arrived the following morning, all the levymen from the squadron except the 
three murderers, who had fled, were at their posts and were disarmed.425  
The mutiny undermined confidence in London about the strategy of relying 
on the TOL to secure British interests in the Trucial States. When Anthony Eden 
was still the British Foreign Secretary he told the Chiefs of Staff that because he 
attached the highest importance to the Gulf he wanted a small British force of 
either one or two companies permanently stationed in the area. Senior Foreign 
Office official, L.A.C. Fry, relayed Eden’s thinking to the Residency in December 
1954:  
 
The Royal Navy and the Trucial Oman Levies are at present enough 
for all normal security purposes in the Gulf (the Treasury, by the way, 
are urging us to reduce the size of the Levies, a proposition to which 
I need say our reaction was firm). The problem, as I see it, is not one 
of having more Arabs under arms in the Gulf area, a possibility that 
was recently considered and might be suggested again [here Fry 
was most likely referring to Major-General John Glubb’s 1951 
proposal for an Arab Army]. The problem is that of providing against 
an emergency, and most if not all foreseeable emergencies would 
call for British troops. It would be their reliability and impartiality that 
we should need. That, I feel sure, is what the Secretary of State 
[Anthony Eden] had in mind when he said that he would prefer to 
have a small British force actually stationed in the area.426 
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The disbandment of the Adeni squadron meant that the TOL was severely 
under strength. To fill the gap, Britain implemented its Persian Gulf 
reinforcement plan. For the second time in as many years, an RAF Regiment 
detachment was sent to Sharjah from Iraq. Whilst the British defence chiefs 
were content to help the TOL get back on its feet, they were adamant that the 
RAF Regiment should leave Sharjah – the base, crucially, was without air-
conditioned barracks – and return to Iraq before the end of March 1954 at the 
very latest. The dispersion of small detachments to remote parts of the world, 
they argued, was grossly uneconomical and contrary to the principle of 
‘flexibility of force’ – a leading doctrine in British military circles in the 1950s. 
Though Eden wanted the option of stationing British troops in the Gulf 
considered, Britain’s defence establishment was against the idea of scattering 
small units around the globe. They believed that an expanded and more reliable 
local force in the Trucial States was the better option.  
   After the mutiny the decision was taken to make the TOL into a truly 
local force. Ninety Adenis of C Squadron were discharged, leaving the TOL 
nearly a full squadron under strength.427 This suited the TOL commander, Lt-
Col. W.J. Martin, who had earlier complained about the high proportion of 
‘unsatisfactory characters’ that had arrived in the second tranche from Aden 
and who made up the majority of levymen of the mutinying squadron.428 The 
plan was to expand the TOL from 100 to 500 men with the focus on local 
recruits. By the end of 1954, this had been achieved.429 This sudden influx of 
local men posed a huge challenge for the British officers and NCOs seconded 
to command and train the force. As one former TOL officer recalls: ‘Unlike any 
other force under British Army tutelage, the TOL was unique in that there was 
no comparable local military tradition to build on and everything had to be 
taught, and learnt, from the absolute beginning.’430 The Saudi incursion into 
Buraimi changed the shape and role of the TOL. Britain had raised it as a form 
of local gendarmerie; the TOL were now being asked to act as a regular armed 
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unit.431 Signposting future changes, the Foreign Office handed over the 
administration of the TOL to Middle East Land Forces at the beginning January 
1954. This meant that the commander of the Levies, himself a regular British 
officer, was responsible to the SAOPG in Bahrain who in turn answered to 
Middle East Land Forces. In reality, the TOL acted ultimately on the direction of 
the Political Resident whose authority was normally exercised by the Political 
Agent, Trucial States.   
If the mutiny in 1953 had raised a question mark about the reliability of the 
force in London, this was largely answered over the course of 1955. On the 
night 12/13 May the Levies, supported by two Royal Navy frigates, moved from 
Sharjah to Dubai to support the Ruler who was facing a challenge to his 
authority from his pro-Saudi uncle and his followers. Seemingly overawed by 
the presence of Levies in full battle dress manning checkpoints around the 
uncle’s stronghold in Deira (on the eastern bank of the creek), the recalcitrant 
members of the ruler’s family had little choice but to accept exile.432 Then after 
arbitration talks on Buraimi broke down, Britain ordered the TOL to evict the 
Saudis by force.433 Two separate parties of Levies arrived in Buraimi just before 
dawn on 26 October 1955 supported by two RAF Lincoln planes from Bomber 
Command in Britain, as well as other aircraft already flown in from Aden and 
Bahrain. One menacing Lincoln flew low over the Saudis to encourage their 
surrender; the second carried out a reconnaissance of the western approaches 
to Buraimi in case of Saudi retaliation. None came; but as a precaution, Britain 
flew an infantry company of the King’s Royal Rifles Corps (KRRC) into Sharjah. 
When it came to the question of removing the KRRC from Sharjah, Anthony 
Eden, now the British Prime Minister, displayed less faith in local forces in the 
Gulf than his predecessor Winston Churchill who had supported the build-up of 
the TOL and the Sultan’s forces to counter Saudi hostility. Chief Staff Officer at 
the Ministry of Defence, Nevil Brownjohn, told Middle East Land Forces in 
November 1955 that Prime Minister Eden was ‘extremely sensitive about the 
Persian Gulf’ and remembered the TOL 1953 mutiny. Moreover, according to 
General Brownjohn, Eden had, 
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[. . . ] little confidence in the local forces and is not disposed to give 
them credit for recent operations [. . . .] The Prime Minister does not I 
think fully appreciate the undesirability of permanently stationing 
British troops in the Persian Gulf area, and is attracted to the idea of 
retaining the British company at Sharjah on a rotating basis, at any 
rate for the time being.434 
 
Eden’s thinking was out of step with British military planners in the Middle East 
who viewed the TOL’s action in Buraimi as a vindication of its policy of using 
local forces where possible. Britain had elected to use the TOL in Buraimi to 
evict the Saudi forces rather than its own troops partly because Saudi Arabia 
had recently signed a defence pact with Egypt. The use of regular British troops 
was thus bound up with wider diplomatic sensitivities whilst the TOL provided a 
veneer of legitimacy because they were a local force.  
Even before the Buraimi operation, British defence officials recognised 
that the force would need to be re-equipped and expanded if it was to be used 
in a war-like role again. In the days before the levies advanced on Saudi forces, 
the General Headquarters of the Middle East Land Forces recommended to the 
Ministry of Defence that Britain should double the TOL’s strength by: (a) adding 
a fifth rifle squadron; (b) increasing each squadron from 94 to 150 men; and (c) 
by adding a training wing and a mortar platoon. This would, British military 
planners hoped, put the TOL in a position to relieve British Middle East Land 
Forces of most of its commitments across the whole Persian Gulf during 
peacetime and ‘would undoubtedly be of great value to us in war in helping to 
maintain order there.’435 The scheme required more funds and the difficult task 
of finding additional British officers and trainers. ‘[O]wing to the particularly 
unattractive conditions under which they [British military personnel] serve when 
compared with those of other colonial forces,’ British senior military officers 
recognised that recruitment would be a challenge.436   
The Ministry of Defence endorsed the proposal for expansion, but made it 
clear that the TOL was a force for security of both the Trucial States and 
northern Oman; any reference made of the Levies having a wider Gulf role, they 
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stated, must be extricated.437 Although the idea to widen the TOL’s role to the 
entire Gulf was buried for a second time it had, as an organisation, nonetheless 
morphed irreversibly from its original concept. What Britain had first conceived 
as a small anti-slavery and escort unit was now being touted as an asset for use 
in counter-insurgency operations in the Omani interior and for resisting 
organised armed attacks from Saudi forces on Abu Dhabi. In line with the TOL’s 
expanded role, the War Office agreed in 10 November 1955 that the Levies 
should be re-styled as Scouts (the official name change came in March 1956). 
The Levies gained additional logistical support in the shape of access to four 
RAF Pembroke light transport planes based at Sharjah which allowed the TOL 
to operate more closely with the Sultan’s forces in the Omani interior. These 
Pembrokes could land small bodies of troops (they could carry eight men) on 
makeshift airstrips in hilly country.438  
The Political Resident was anxious that Whitehall had not yet formerly 
approved the recommendations for doubling the size of the force. Who funded 
the force became a contentious issue.  Foreign Office officials argued that as 
the Levies were now responsible for defending the frontiers and for protecting 
oil interests they were fulfilling an ‘Imperial commitment’. Therefore, the War 
Office should contribute to the upkeep of the force as well as the Foreign 
Office.439 The Treasury rejected this thinking. ‘The curbing of Saudi Arabian 
infiltration is not Imperial Defence [. . .] it is clear that the Levies meet no 
worthwhile military mobilisation requirement – certainly not one that we should 
consider paying for,’ one senior Treasury official representing the views of the 
War Office lashed back in December 1955. The view of the Treasury was thus 
unchanged: the Foreign Office should remain financially responsible for the 
Levies.440    
Without the money to increase numbers, however, the TOL would be 
unable to establish a post near the Liwa Oasis in western Abu Dhabi to check 
Saudi infiltration and to provide adequate protection for oil exploration. Much to 
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the relief of the Political Resident, financing from the Treasury was authorised in 
February 1956. In that same month, levymen hailing from the Liwa Oasis area 
of Abu Dhabi left their posts in Sharjah en masse without warning. This display 
of unreliability gave cause for Whitehall officials to think again as to whether 
Britain should station a unit of its own regular troops in the Trucial States. In an 
attempt to put the actions of the Abu Dhabi recruits in context, the Political 
Resident wrote to London that:   
 
It should be borne in mind in assessing the incident that the Force 
[TOL] is still only a very few years old and that the men joining it have 
absolutely no military tradition or experience and, to begin with in 
some cases at any rate, are inclined to join simply as they would join 
an oil company, in order to make some money, and they have little 
more compunction in leaving if the conditions do not appeal to them 
than they would in leaving a commercial organisation. Everyone is 
fully aware of the need to build up a regimental tradition and I am 
sure that this will gradually take place.441 
 
Though Britain could be surer about the loyalty of its own troops, maintaining a 
regular battalion in the area was expensive and inefficient. The Political 
Resident did not think there was need for a British unit permanently stationed in 
Sharjah. However, a company flying in for a couple of weeks now and again for 
training and showing the flag, he suggested, would be very welcome.442   
The name change in March 1956 to the Trucial Oman Scouts (TOS) was 
partly to debunk the impression it was a unit of conscripts – the term levy 
implied forced recruitment.443  After the TOL became the TOS, the Foreign 
Office kept up its efforts to get the War Office to share the costs of the force. 
The War Office, however, remained obdurate. When the Treasury in August 
1956 finally came around to the cogency of the Foreign Office’s position, the 
War Office had little choice but to ungraciously agree to pay half the costs of the 
Scouts.444 In spite of its reluctance of the War Office to part finance the force, 
the TOS worked hand in hand with the British military in the area. RAF planes 
kept up a steady vigil over the disputed border area in western Abu Dhabi and 
the TOS established new outposts to respond more effectively to any 
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incursion.445 If required, Venom ground-attack aircraft from their bases in Aden 
could be called in. One former TOS officer explains how this cooperation would 
have worked in practice: 
 
[TOS] ground patrols would locate and shadow any incursion and call 
for air strikes from Bahrain. Should the Lincoln [aircraft] be in the 
area, or have spotted the incursion, it would take over the task of 
airborne strike control for the Venom ground-attack sorties. A 
succession of RAF pilots from the Venom Squadron based in Aden 
were attached to Clayton Force [as the makeshift TOS force in the 
area became known] as Air Liaison Officers (ALOs) to talk the aircraft 
on to their targets.446  
 
The Saudi threat to the western approaches of Abu Dhabi and meddling in the 
internal affairs of Oman would continue into the 1960s. The decision to use of 
TOL at Buraimi rather than British troops was based on the calculation that the 
latter would be more controversial. The Anglo-French military misadventure in 
Egypt in October-November 1956 left Britain in little doubt about the 
international sensitivities that existed in using armed forces in the Arab World. 
The Suez debacle served to further excite Arab nationalist sentiment that had 
been on the rise since Gamal Abdul Nasser seized power in Egypt and used all 
the tools of the state to propagate his message.447  
 
4.3 Unrest in Bahrain and Qatar, 1954-1957: Direct Intervention 
or Local Coercion?  
Seeing rising Arab nationalist sentiment in Egypt and the Levant spreading to 
the Gulf, Prime Minister Anthony Eden considered in early 1956 despatching 
British troops to Bahrain and to Kuwait to demonstrate Britain’s resolve.448 The 
Resident, Sir Bernard Burrows, however, strongly opposed using British military 
forces to quell what were, for him at least, political issues. He felt that even 
visitations by British troops created more trouble than any benefit gained 
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because they reminded local inhabitants, and especially those with Arab 
nationalist sympathies, of Britain’s overt military control. Moreover, these short 
visits could encourage Egyptian propaganda against British military imperialism. 
There was also the reaction of the rulers to consider. Whilst Shaikh Salman Al 
Khalifah of Bahrain (r. 1942-61) would welcome visits by British troops, it could 
engender in him the belief that Britain would back him in all circumstances, and 
therefore make him less likely to carry out political reforms.  In Kuwait, Burrows 
thought the amir would reject proposals for visits by British troops outright, as 
they would be an affront to his independence. Moreover, the presence of British 
soldiers would make it more difficult for him to maintain his links with Britain in 
face of hostile criticism from inside and outside his majlis (ruler’s court in 
Arabic). The Ruler of Qatar would welcome evidence of British support for him 
for internal purposes, Burrows surmised, but would be nervous of Saudi 
Arabia’s reaction to troop visits. Far better, Burrows concluded, to intensify 
naval visits – especially by a larger cruiser – instead sending troops.  These 
were a well-known, traditional feature of Britain’s position; and because they 
rarely attracted little or no hostile comment, the rulers generally appreciated 
them.449  
The view that overt displays of British military power brought more 
problems than they could ever help to quell began to crystallize in the mid-
1950s onwards in the minds of British officials. The preference for naval power 
in the Gulf extended to situations that required direct action. Burrows still 
pressed for additional frigates assigned to the Gulf as, in his opinion, ‘naval 
landing parties are always going to be earliest available internal security 
reinforcements.’450 Nonetheless, in terms of an actual military intervention in an 
emergency, Burrows warned the Foreign Office that this ‘would no doubt [. . .] 
become a major target for Egyptian propaganda.’451 Such a test was developing 
in Bahrain.   
In Bahrain, latent tensions exploded in protests, violence and riots 
between 1953 and 1954.452  A general strike in December 1954 by both Sunni 
                                            
449 TNA AIR 20/9894, Bernard Burrows to Foreign Office, 9 March 1956. 
450 Ibid. 
451 Ibid. 
452 Willard A. Beling, ‘Recent Developments in Labor Relations in Bahrayn’, Middle 
East Journal, Vol. 13, No.2 (Spring, 1959), p. 156. For a discussion of the social and 
political tensions in Bahrain in the 1950s, see ‘The Nationalist Movements of the 
 
 
117 
and Shia Bahrainis showed that the disorder was more than the usual inter-
sectarian discord.453 Alongside labour unrest, people attacked the judicial 
system for its unfairness and the State Police for not employing enough 
Bahrainis.454 Britain saw a strong police force as the only means of avoiding an 
intervention with its own troops. New agreements with BAPCO in December 
1952 doubled Bahrain’s revenues, making more money available to spend on 
the State Police.455  Sitting as a judge in the court and taking a very public role 
as Police Commandant, the Mustashar became the symbol — and a foreign 
one at that — of the coercive arm of the state. Animosity between Belgrave and 
British officials, who believed the British adviser’s very public profile was 
destabilising to Bahrain, deepened during this period. According to the Political 
Resident, Sir Rupert Hay, the problem centred ‘round the personality and 
position occupied by Mr Belgrave the Financial Adviser’, who was also 
Commandant of the Bahrain State Police. Back in 1949, Hay explained to the 
then-Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, how it came to pass that a Briton wielded 
such power in Bahrain.  
 
Shaikh Hamad who ruled Bahrain as Regent or Shaikh from 1923 
until 1942 took little interest in the affairs of the State and left 
practically everything to Mr Belgrave after his appointment.  As a 
result he became to all intents and purposes the Ruler of the State, 
and he still holds this position in the eyes of the public although the 
present Shaikh takes an active an effective interest in State affairs.456 
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Belgrave deeply resented any suggestion that a separate officer be appointed in 
his place.457 Burrows, Hay’s successor as Political Resident, thought it was 
impractical that Belgrave should command the State Police alongside his other 
executive duties. In time, Britain would work for the removal of al-Mustashar, 
but in October 1953 the Political Resident sat down to discuss with Belgrave 
various ways that the British and Bahraini governments could improve the State 
Police.458 When trouble flared up at the end of 1954, British officials were quick 
to complain that Belgrave had not built up the force to enable it to keep order. In 
fact, the police had changed very little since the 1930s, except that Bahrain had 
replaced the camel-mounted section – a unit that in Belgrave’s words had 
become a ‘picturesque but expensive survival’ – with car patrols.459 Burrows 
claims in his memoirs that he persuaded Belgrave to relinquish the day-to-day 
running of the force and to make much-needed improvements to its size and 
structure.460 It is not clear whether Belgrave acted directly in response to 
Burrows’ appeals.  What is known, however, is that by 1955 the Bahrain State 
Police had increased the number of British officers in the force, including the 
appointment of Colonel St John Hammersley, a former Governor of Sinai in the 
Egyptian service, as Assistant Commandant. Bahrain enlarged the force to over 
400 men, and, in an act that appeared to presage coming trouble, equipped 
police with steel helmets.461 The improvements to the State Police had only just 
begun before the disturbances became more serious.462 
On 2 March 1956, the motorcade of British Foreign Secretary Selwyn 
Lloyd, who was visiting Bahrain en route to India, was caught in a crowd leaving 
a football match as it crossed the causeway between Muharraq and Manama. 
Rocks were thrown as the vehicles forced their way through. The day had not 
begun well for British interests in the Middle East.  The radio was awash with 
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news that John Bagot Glubb, the long-time and high-profile British commander 
of the Jordanian Arab Legion, had been dismissed.463 For many activists in 
Manama and Muharraq, Belgrave was Bahrain’s Glubb; and, as in Jordan, they 
wanted rid of him. The Foreign Secretary was temporarily unable to return to 
the airport after dinner with the Ruler because protestors still blocked the 
causeway. A Royal Navy frigate sent ashore a landing party, but the State 
Police’s riot squad had already cleared the route.464  ‘I do not like to think,’ the 
Political Resident wrote in his memoirs, ‘what might have happened if the police 
had not received this strengthening during the past three years.’465   
It was not quite the time for triumphalism. Bahrain, especially Manama, 
remained in a state of high tension.  An argument in a Manama vegetable 
market on 11 March 1956 led to deadly clashes between rioters and police.466 
By the afternoon, 100 police were trying to contain an angry crowd numbering 
somewhere between 400 and 500. Wearing their newly purchased steel 
helmets, the police initially tried to calm the crowd, which responded by pelting 
the police with fish and potatoes.  There are conflicting accounts of what 
happened next, but upon hearing what sounded like a small explosion, the 
police started firing from the hip into the air. The crowd scattered; the shooting 
stopped; several protestors lay dead.467 As an emergency meeting of the LDC 
(PG) sat at the Residency, news arrived that the Bahrain State Police had 
opened fire on demonstrators.468 The SNOPG, Captain Wight-Boycott, reported 
that he already landed one platoon of men from HMS Loch Alvie and that a 
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second platoon would be landing within half an hour. Exercising its delegated 
authority, the LDC (PG) decided to airlift in a British Army infantry company (the 
King’s Royal Rifle Corps) from Sharjah.469 The Committee based this decision 
on the fear that a general strike called for the following morning might turn 
violent and they had little faith that the State Police could keep order. Shaikh 
Salman, whom the LDC (PG) did not consult, reacted unfavourably to the arrival 
of British troops. In view of the security challenges facing him, he did not protest 
too loudly, but wanted assurances that the presence of British troops was but a 
temporary expedient.470 With a full infantry company in Bahrain, the SAOPG, 
Brigadier Baird, believed that no further reinforcements were necessary, but 
Britain should make preparations should the situation deteriorate.471   
Despite deploying two companies of infantry to Bahrain, the Political 
Resident did not want British troops used against protestors.472 They were 
there, in his mind, for moral support only. The Foreign Office took a different line 
and wanted Shaikh Salman to ‘feel confident that we stand behind him and 
would of course send in British troops to assist in restoring order if there were a 
breakdown.’473 Continuing in this spirit, the Foreign Office wanted the LDC (PG) 
to consider whether it was possible to send the TOS to Bahrain, Qatar or Kuwait 
to help quell any outbreaks of disorder. Committee members were united in the 
view that the Scouts should not be used as first-line troops in any disturbance 
outside the Trucial States.474 
When violence again threatened to boil over in Bahrain in May 1956, 
British officials feared that its troops would be dragged into an intractable 
internal conflict. Such a development would leave the country open to the 
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acquisition that, in the Gulf, Britain was little more than a reactionary colonial 
power that suppressed the legitimate aspirations of downtrodden people. With 
stirrings of possible fresh outbreaks of violence at the end of Ramadan in May, 
Hammersley feared that if his police were asked to act they would again use 
firearms out of nervousness. He therefore wanted to know if the British 
government would be prepared to back the police with its troops for at least a 
year while he was building up his force and training it to act without shooting 
first. The SAOPG, Brigadier Baird, was not sure what assistance Hammersely 
was asking for. It was not practicable in his mind for British troops to take over 
police duties.475 The Resident, Sir Bernard Burrows, warned the Foreign Office 
that Britain’s standing would be damaged if British troops were used to ‘help put 
down a political movement which had remained almost entirely within the 
bounds of law.’ A more sagacious policy, Burrows again insisted, was to assist 
Bahrain in strengthening the State Police so that it could deal with any disorder 
that might arise.476  To this end, Brigadier Baird proposed that Bahrain employ a 
further cadre of British police officers; that the number of policemen be 
increased; and that if suitable Bahrainis could not be recruited fast enough to fill 
the new positions, which had been a problem in the past, then Britain should 
help Bahrain recruit trained Iraqis who could form the backbone of this enlarged 
force.477 The Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, gave his support to these 
recommendations and, in a memorandum to the Cabinet in April 1956, made 
note of the weakness of the Bahrain Police and the difficulty in strengthening 
them. ‘The reformists strongly oppose the introduction of reinforcements from 
Iraq but I hope that by bringing in small numbers of Iraqis unobtrusively and 
increasing the number of British police officers, we shall be able to build up the 
Bahrain Police to the point where they are adequate to control any outbreaks,’ 
he told his Cabinet colleagues.478  
 Improving the efficacy of the State Police was not the only means by 
which British officials felt Bahrain could improve the security situation. Burrows 
believed Belgrave was a source of discontent amongst a large section of the 
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Bahraini population and wanted the Shaikh Salman to retire him.479 The sheer 
strength of feeling against Belgrave impressed Burrows, believing that ‘some 
early news of plans for his replacement would do more than anything to 
stabilize the situation.’480 The Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, also wanted al-
Mustashar gone: 
 
The future of Sir Charles Belgrave is of great importance in all this.  
He is still the focus for hostility against the Bahrain Government and 
indirectly against Her Majesty’s Government. Feeling against him is 
widespread and shared by many responsible citizens in Bahrain. He 
has also lost the confidence of the majority of his British officials and 
is regarded as a liability by people in London with interests in the 
Gulf.481 
 
Selwyn Lloyd proposed to the Cabinet that Britain dictate the timing of 
Belgrave’s retirement ‘and take immediate measures to ensure the retention of 
an Englishman in a key position with the Ruler and the Government of 
Bahrain.’482  By early May, the Political Resident was in receipt of direct 
instructions from the Foreign Office to begin preparing the way for Belgrave’s 
retirement. The Ruler was furious with the British Government for listening to 
the opposition’s demands on the subject of removing Belgrave, and did not 
waver in his support for his adviser.  In a fiery letter to the Foreign Secretary, he 
asked sardonically whether Britain actually wished for the opposition to seize 
authority from him.  Was this the thanks that he deserved for his friendship with 
Britain, he asked?483 Castigating Britain for accepting without hesitation his 
opponent’s complaints about Belgrave, the Ruler wrote that: ‘The position of our 
Adviser differs from that of General Glubb and it is not our intention to dispense 
with his services.’484  By way of palliation, Selwyn Lloyd tried to explain why the 
British government was mediating with the opposition. Bahrain’s best policy, 
Lloyd advised, was to guide the opposition leaders ‘into channels of 
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reasonableness and cooperation with the government, rather than to attempt 
repression.’ This, as Lloyd stated, was a short term expedient until Bahrain was 
in possession of the means to keep down the opposition by coercion. 
 
Your Highness’s police have been regrettably unable to prevent 
hostile political demonstrations; nor are they at present strong 
enough to preserve public security in all eventualities. Until therefore 
there has been time for the reorganisation and training of the Police, 
Her Majesty’s representatives have thought it essential in Your 
Highness’s own interests to advise that your Government should 
avoid doing anything to provoke such opposition as might endanger 
the security of the people of Bahrain.485 
 
The British adviser, who been so instrumental in forming and running the State 
Police, was now forced to retire but only after he saw the leaders of the 
opposition sentenced to long prison terms and banished to the island of St. 
Helena. 
In Qatar, the reluctance of the Ruler, Shaikh Ali Al Thani, to use his armed 
police to maintain order was no surprise to British officials. Whenever the Ruler 
felt threatened, he simply ordered the distribution of rifles from the state 
armoury to his loyal Bedouin. It was not simply a matter of Shaikh Ali holding 
little confidence in his police – he actively hindered their work. British 
representatives in the Gulf believed that Shaikh Ali withheld support to the 
police whenever they tried to confront labour violence or attempted to arrest 
tribesmen accused of stealing oil company equipment. This problem reached its 
nadir earlier in August 1955 when a serious strike broke out at Umm Said port. 
In what the Political Agent in Qatar described as ‘the one serious breakdown of 
the government machine’ that year, the Ruler made it clear to police that they 
should not to get involved because he favoured the Qatari rioters over the non-
Qatari police.486  Officered almost exclusively by Britons with the rank-and-file 
predominantly from Yemen, the force had the look of a foreign enterprise.487  
Following the strike at Umm Said, both the British adviser to the Ruler and 
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Political Agent tried to influence Shaikh Ali to back his own police in their 
attempt to uphold law and order.  Though it is unclear what effect this lobbying 
had, it seems more than coincidental that at the same time batons, shields, 
helmets, and tear gas were ordered, a new fort and police headquarters were 
established, and the idea of forming a special wing of Qatari irregulars to break 
up future incidents was given serious consideration.488  British hope that the 
Ruler would now pay greater mind to the police was put to the test on 16 August 
1956 when a pro-Egyptian demonstration advanced on, and threatened to 
overrun, the Political Agency in Doha. The Ruler conceded that he and his 
British commandant, Ronald Cochrane, had been unwilling to use the armed 
police because they would probably have had to open fire on the crowds.489 
Ultimately, the armed retainers of the ruling family dispersed the crowd.490 
Reluctant to dispense with his sizeable coterie of armed retainers, Shaikh Ali 
placed little faith in the police force. This in turn meant that Britain lacked 
confidence that the Qatari government would be able to protect the Political 
Agency. A landing party was sent ashore from one the Gulf Squadron’s frigates 
as a precaution during the incident. The presence of British bluecoats in Qatar 
was seized upon by the Egyptian press and provided a further warning of how 
the direct use of British military forces in the Gulf could be used for propaganda 
purposes.491     
When he met with Shaikh Ali in the days after the rioters advanced on the 
Political Agency, the Political Resident spent the majority of the meeting urging 
improvement of security organisations both in Doha and at the oil installations. 
‘The Ruler’, Burrows told the Foreign Office,  
 
appeared genuinely willing to do this, but there are the usual 
difficulties, largely the impossibility of getting Qataris into the police 
force either as officers or men, and consequently the unwillingness of 
the Ruler to use force against his own people. Underlying everything 
there is, as in Bahrain, traditional absence of display of authority by 
Government who have hitherto been able to deal with matters by 
individual and paternal methods and by lavish distribution of funds, 
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none of which is adequate to deal with agitation of a more 
professional kind inspired from the outside.492  
 
Perhaps Britain with its experience in ‘dealing with such violence’ could be of 
more help, Burrows suggested.493 The Ruler initially showed enthusiasm to 
make improvements, but, as Burrows predicted, ‘his zeal will no doubt 
evaporate after a time if nothing more happens.494 Despite entreaties from 
Britain, Shaikh Ali (now in possession of large revenues from oil production) did 
little to develop Qatar’s police, and, perhaps more importantly, he did not give 
the force his backing. He preferred to rely on his ex-slave bodyguards and 
irregular Bedouin retainers.  
The decision to send troops to Bahrain in March 1956 was taken with 
great reluctance. The defence chiefs wanted to remove this regular force as 
soon as possible. ‘Every effort must be taken to strengthen the [State] Police to 
the degree which will release the static garrison,’ the Chiefs of Staff stated in 
July.495  Although tensions in Bahrain had subsided by October, the LDC (PG) 
recommended that two infantry companies remain in Bahrain ‘to provide cover 
and support for Bahrain Police during remaining phases of expansion and 
training,’ the progress of which was deemed ‘satisfactory but slow.’496  
Beginning on 29 October, the Suez Crisis inflamed Arab nationalist 
feeling in Bahrain. The situation deteriorated fast. The State Police were able to 
keep order in Manama, but Muharraq was in open revolt. After the events of 
1956 died down, Britain worked more closely than ever to improve the 
capabilities of the Bahrain State Police. By the 1957, dozens of Iraqi policemen 
that Britain had helped recruit for Bahrain had arrived, boosting the capabilities 
of the police but upsetting the equilibrium between officers and other ranks. In 
October of that year, in an incident uncannily similar to thirty years before, a 
Baluchi policeman claiming to have been unfairly treated by his Iraqi superiors 
walked into the Fort and shot dead an Iraqi officer.  Another Arab officer tried to 
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rush the murderer but he too was shot and killed. The Baluchi fired at and 
slightly wounded the sentry on the gate before finally giving himself up.497 
Britain had no doubts that it would take time for the Bahrain State Police to have 
a firm grasp of internal security purposes. Whilst Britain’s representatives 
considered that the presence of British troops in large numbers ‘have favourably 
impressed moderate opinion and helped it move towards the [Bahraini] 
Government’ and ‘thus contributed to steadying of the situation in recent 
months,’ they nonetheless observed that ‘unfavourable press comment is 
beginning and sooner or later, the presence of troops is bound to become a 
propagandist issue’.498   
British officials and politicians would certainly have preferred to leave the 
maintenance of internal order in Qatar and Bahrain to the local armed police. In 
both cases (March 1956 in Bahrain and August 1956 in Qatar), Britain was 
forced to deploy its own military forces.  
 
4.4 Britain and the Sultan’s Military: From Support to Direct 
Control, 1953-60 
Aside from the Saudi incursion into the Buraimi Oasis area, the major spur for 
expanding the Sultan of Muscat’s military came from the protection of oil 
exploration teams wanting to penetrate the Omani interior – an area where the 
Sultan’s sway was still weak.499 The Imam of Oman enjoyed temporal power 
amounting to autonomy in internal affairs over the surrounding tribes around his 
headquarters in Nizwa.  He was nominally under the suzerainty of the Sultan 
but had recently tried to assert his independence and had received Saudi and 
Egyptian assistance.  Sultan Said had tried to court the support of tribal leaders 
of the interior through subsidies and what little patronage he could offer, but he 
could not guarantee the safety of oil company geologists.500  Prospecting 
parties from the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) – or more precisely, its 
subsidiary entity Petroleum Development, Oman (PDO) – wanted to survey a 
strip of land, known as Huqf, where four prominent tribes converged, all of 
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whom at the time acknowledged the Imam’s leadership rather than that of the 
Sultan. When a geological exploration was first muted in 1949, British explorer 
Wilfred Thesiger warned British officials that if the party went to Huqf with some 
of the Sultan’s retainers, as they proposed, it was ‘very unlikely that they will be 
allowed to land and if they do succeed in landing they will run into serious 
danger.’501 Hitherto the only oil surveys conducted in the Omani interior had 
been done by air; actual drilling required well-trained guards to withstand any 
raids upon oil camps or to protect personnel from casual attack.502 Sultan Said 
and his British advisers estimated that, owing to the numerous militant 
tribesmen in the area, the expedition would need a force of approximately four 
hundred men for protection.503 The IPC agreed to pay for the formation of such 
a unit originally called the Huqf Force.504   
The Foreign Office supported the establishment of this force as it would 
enable the Sultan to better assert his authority over more of Oman. Moreover, 
because the oil company were footing the bill, it would place no extra strain on 
the Sultan’s already stretched finances.  As no private company could be 
authorised to operate with its own military force, the Huqf Force remained 
ultimately answerable to the Sultan, but was commanded by a British contract 
officer, P.J. McGill, who was selected partly for his fluency in Arabic and his 
experience with an Arab force in Eritrea.505 McGill recruited two further Britons 
and two Sudanese officers to train and administer the force.   
The Huqf Force established a training camp near Sohar on the Batinah 
Coast and began recruiting. McGill found it difficult to find recruits and struggled 
to train those he attracted. By the middle of October 1953, he had trained only 
21 recruits for a force that was supposed to be 400-strong.506 By early 
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November, at best only 60 men had received rudimentary training.507 At the 
same time, the oil company was heaping pressure on the force, which was now 
called the Muscat and Oman Field Force (MOFF), to be ready to land the 
exploration team and equipment by early 1954 at the latest. The Sultan was 
adamant, however, that there would be no landing until the MOFF was several 
hundred strong. British officials explained to the Sultan that the beach-landing 
phase would need much fewer men – it was only when the exploration team 
moved into the interior that it would need a larger force. At any rate, because 
British lives and interests were at stake, a frigate of the Gulf Squadron could 
anchor off the landing site.508 Nonetheless, the Sultan stuck to his guns: there 
would be no beach landing unless the Huqf Force was 200-strong and no 
penetration inland until it numbers reached 400.509  
 The turning point for McGill’s tenure as commander of the MOFF came 
in December 1953. Having raised the number of men to 75, McGill punished ten 
men for some peccadillo by handing them over to the local wali to be jailed.  
Fifteen more deserted, taking his force down to 50.510  There was simply no 
prospect that McGill would have the requisite number of men ready for an early 
1954 landing.  The oil company, which had already shipped much of the 
equipment, were disturbed. Feeling he had been set an impossible task, McGill 
quit his job in a fit of pique the following month. Sultan Said was so furious with 
McGill that he wanted to take legal action against him for breach of contract.   
The setback in building up the MOFF jeopardised the whole exploration 
operation. The Political Resident suggested that a contingent of Aden 
Protectorate Levies join the landing party until a suitable force was raised to 
move into the interior.511 The Foreign Office, however, replied that 200 Aden 
Protectorate Levies, some of whom were stationed at RAF Masirah, could not 
be spared.  Moreover, the SNOPG could not guarantee a naval vessel to 
standby in order to assist the oil party.  The Foreign Office did advise the 
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Political Resident that Britain ‘would do [its] best to restore the situation if the 
party got into difficulty at the bridge-head.’512  The Foreign Office suggested that 
the oil company should fall back on the Sultan’s offer to put together a scratch 
force made up from untrained tribesmen from the Huqf area as well as auxiliary 
tribal irregulars loyal to the Sultan.513   
Colin Maxwell of the Batinah Force took temporary command of the 
MOFF until Percy Coriat, a tall commanding figure with a piratical black patch 
over one eye, assumed command. Initially reluctant, Coriat had been placed 
under considerable pressure from both the Foreign Office and War Office to 
accept the role. Whitehall officials pressed upon him that it was in the nation’s 
interest to have a force in place and under British command.514 An IPC 
personnel officer, Frank Haugh, who was a former Hussar Captain with military 
experience in the Trans-Jordan Field Force behind him, joined as Coriat’s 
number two.  
Despite its poor preparation under McGill, the column of MOFF and oil 
company personnel formed up on the southern shore at Ras al-Duqm in early 
1954 with Land Rovers and trucks for transport. They were joined by members 
of the Duru tribe who were from the area the party was moving in to and whom 
the Sultan had convinced to offer the expedition team assistance.515 A crisis of 
confidence struck Coriat. Claiming he was too old for the job he resigned as the 
force was training at the Ras al-Duqm base camp. Let down a second time in 
the space of six months, the Sultan asked Britain to help him find a British 
successor. Coriat agreed to stay on until Bill Cheeseman, a former Indian Army 
colonel with experience in Eritrea who was undertaking Arabic classes, was 
ready to take on the role. The IPC seconded the SAOPG Brigadier Robert Baird 
as a temporary military adviser and assigned Edward Henderson as it political 
adviser.  
When Coriat and his 126-man MOFF party, along with its Duru tribal 
allies, set off from Ras al-Duqm in September 1954, the Sultan believed it to be 
a simple oil exploration mission in the Fahud desert area, but the column 
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became an occupation force of the Omani interior.516 Supporters of the new 
Imam had moved into the town of Ibri in response to the prospecting party’s 
penetration. As the column reached Fahud, the Duru tribesmen refused to 
continue unless their date gardens and property in and around Ibri were 
protected from Imamate forces. Coriat thus had little choice but to advance 150 
miles beyond the permanent camp in Fahud and occupy Ibri. The taking of the 
town in October was concluded without the knowledge of the Sultan who was 
unreachable in Salalah.517  This move served to end the 34-year-old Treaty of 
Sib which had given de facto autonomy to the Imam in the Omani interior.518  
The Sultan was reported to have been furious that his authority had been 
undermined by the independent action of the MOFF – a force commanded by 
British contract officers, paid for by British oil interests, largely overseen by 
Oman’s British Minister for Foreign Affairs, but ultimate answerable to him. The 
MOFF established a permanent base outside Ibri and in December Bill 
Cheeseman arrived to take command, allowing a tired Coriat to head home. 
 Imamate forces did not immediately try to reverse these loses in the 
interior, gifting the Sultan a year to reorganise his military. The Sultan 
established an administrative headquarters at Bait al-Falaj for the military and 
appointed the British commander of the Muscat Infantry, Pat Waterfield, as his 
Chief of Staff.  More British officers were added to the MOFF, which was still 
largely controlled by the Sultan’s British Minister of Foreign Affairs. Innes 
related that: ‘The Sultan had come to look on the MOFF so much as my 
responsibility that when he spoke of it to me he would call it ‘your Force’.519 
Thus a complicated set of relationships emerged between British officials, 
British contract officers, Oman’s British Foreign Minister and the Sultan.  
The British government was encouraged by the advance of the Sultan’s 
forces into the interior and wished to support the build-up of his military. Soon 
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after the MOFF had taken Ibri, the Political Resident recommended to the 
British Foreign Secretary that Britain should help the Sultan double this force so 
that he had the means to extend his authority even further.520 The Political 
Resident informed the Sultan that the British Government was prepared to 
make available £150,000 with which to provide arms and equipment for the 
additional 400 soldiers.521 In early 1955, Baird submitted his proposal for the 
expansion of the MOFF. At the same time, the MOFF commander, Bill 
Cheeseman, undertook a review of the force’s future needs. Contrary to Baird 
and the British government’s standpoint, Cheeseman did not think the Sultan 
needed to double the size of the MOFF; bringing in more instructors to train the 
men already under arms was more pressing.  Rather than build up the MOFF 
by a further 400 men as, British officials expected him to, the Sultan only 
planned to add two more squadrons (200 men in total) and an artillery unit of 60 
men to the MOFF.  Instead he instructed the Muscat Infantry to recruit a further 
80 soldiers and ordered the establishment of a new Dhofar Force to counter 
Saudi activity in the far south of the country. Starting with 50 men brought over 
from the Sultan’s own bodyguard, and commanded by British contract officer, St 
John Armitrage, who transferred from the Batinah Force, the Dhofar Force 
remained separately under the Sultan’s control. These arrangements rankled 
British officials, especially Brigadier Baird, who thought that all British funds for 
expansion should be spent on the MOFF alone.  Resident Burrows, however, 
was willing to take a more conciliatory approach.  
 
We have hitherto been inclined to feel that the Muscat Infantry, owing 
to its excessively static role, is not really much good for the purposes 
we have in mind of safeguarding the Sultan’s frontiers and extending 
his authority in the interior.  There has however been an important 
change in this respect in that the detachment of the Muscat Infantry [. 
. .] is in Dhofar manning the most forward post there at Wadi 
Mugshin and that the Sultan is now ready to send part of the existing 
artillery unit of the Muscat Infantry into the interior if this is necessary 
before the new artillery unit is ready.522 
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The question over the military’s future direction caused relations between British 
representatives and those Britons privately employed by the Sultan to 
deteriorate. The former group held low opinions about the standard of British 
contract officers.  The Political Resident, Bernard Burrows, told British Foreign 
Secretary Harold Macmillan in June 1955 that although the equipment that 
Britain had paid for the expansion of the MOFF had arrived in Muscat and 
recruitment was underway, ‘it was now becoming evident that the Field Force 
as it is now organised suffers from an incurable weakness in its officering and 
this deficiency augurs ill for the success of the new expanded force.’  Burrows 
outlined the main issues:  
 
The Sultan as a matter of policy employs only British officers in the 
senior ranks of his regular forces. When he needed only two or three 
such officers, there was a reasonable hope of finding retired regular 
officers or others with similar qualifications to fill these posts, though 
in practice there was even then too high a proportion of misfits.  But 
now with the creation of the Field Force the requirement has grown 
and by the time the additional men have been raised, the Sultan will 
need at least ten British officers.523 
  
As the eminent Gulf historian J.B. Kelly has noted, it was ‘neither novel nor 
exceptional for an Arab or Muslim ruler to employ foreigners in his army.’524 Yet 
Britain wanted the Britons employed by the Sultan to be competent and 
amenable, to a degree, to serve British interests and follow its direction.525  
This, however, was not always the case. As one former senior mandarin has 
observed:  
 
The last century produced a notable roll-call of British military officers 
who chose to make their careers amid the political upheavals of the 
Middle East [. . .] The majority among them absorbed a deep 
familiarity with the cultures and the systems of the Arab societies 
among which they lived, and a lasting trust and affection which they 
found to be warmly reciprocated. The diversity of rivalries and 
aspirations that motivated their new partners they soon made their 
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own, albeit occasionally at odds with an imperial authority back in 
Britain to which they owed their commissions.526  
 
Back in 1950, the Political Agent in Kuwait pointed out that ‘British experts 
engaged by local government tend to show a sturdy independence of His 
Majesty’s Government and we must, I think, expect that they should consider 
their first loyalty is to the local government.’527 When it came to British contract 
officers working for the Sultan, this caused much frustration.528 Brigadier Baird 
believed that the solution was to have serving British officers attached to the 
Sultan’s military. For Baird there was no alternative but to move away from 
contract to seconded officers. The Political Resident fully endorsed Baird’s 
position:  
 
The contrast between the state of efficiency and morale between the 
officers of the Trucial Oman Levies, who are seconded regulars, and 
those of the Field Force is very striking and fully bears out the view 
that a change is urgently necessary in the system of providing 
officers for the latter force.529 
 
British officials in particular blamed Innes and Pat Waterfield for not 
implementing the expansion plan, even though it had been six months since it 
was submitted.  The Residency informed the Foreign Office of their suspicion 
that both Innes and Waterfield were ‘purposely blocking this expansion plan 
because they were not consulted about it in the first place and are now against 
an expansion of the Sultan’s forces. . . . It is easy for them to ignore our 
recommendations,’ the Residency continued, ‘because they are not in fact 
under our control, being in the Sultan’s service, and as we know, he is 
somewhat elusive person not given to clear expressions of his views or 
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wishes.’530 The Residency had strong words to say about the Sultan’s privately 
employed British nationals: 
 
This brings me to the general question of the British officials in the 
Sultan’s service. These officials do not strike us as being satisfactory 
in their actions on the spot in Muscat as we might have expected. We 
were instrumental in obtaining them for the Sultan who can therefore 
regard us as at the least partly responsible for the manifestly 
unsatisfactory state of affairs which Baird’s report discloses.531   
 
The Residency requested that the Foreign Office push the War Office to provide 
seconded officers in future for the Sultan’s military.  Accepting this local advice, 
on 29 July 1955 Foreign Secretary Macmillan wrote to the Minister of Defence, 
Selwyn Lloyd, stating that the problem with the Sultan’s forces lay with the 
quality of British contract officers. He asked for Lloyd’s support on providing 
seconded officers.532   
As the TOL, with British military support, prepared to move against the 
Saudi forces in Buraimi in October 1955, elements of the Sultan’s military 
moved into the interior towards the oasis. This advance of the Sultan’s forces 
became the first move in what the Sultan’s British Foreign Ministry later called 
the ‘Grand Design’.  In short, it was a bid to take complete control over all of 
Oman for the Sultan.533 The Sultan’s plan had the strong backing of British 
Foreign Secretary Macmillan. In spite of the criticism from other Arab states that 
the Sultan’s move was ‘the action of a British puppet manipulated in our 
interests,’ Macmillan urged Prime Minister Eden to ‘allow the Sultan to go ahead 
and give him the assistance he needs. We have encouraged him to prepare for 
it, and he is showing a very stout spirit.’534 On 13 December 1955, 340 men and 
eight British officers of the MOFF with dozens of Land Rovers and a number of 
three-ton trucks carrying, amongst other things, light mortars and four pack 
guns and their crews from the Muscat Infantry began moving further into the 
Omani interior. A small number of officers and specialists from the TOL, RAF 
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observers and a selection of tribal leaders joined this makeshift force. On 15 
December the column, as it was advancing into opposition heartland, received 
word that the Imam had fled. Soon after, Nizwa, the Imamate capital, fell without 
incident. Simultaneously, the Batinah Force, which had hitherto confined its role 
to patrolling the coast to prevent resupply of Imamate forces, marched on 
Rustaq, the stronghold of the Imam’s brother. There they encountered stiff 
resistance but the town was taken. With the completion of this action, the 
unification of the interior and the coastal region was almost complete. 
Although faced with the task of maintaining a grip on the interior after the 
successful campaigning at the end of 1955, the Sultan displayed a general 
aversion to increasing spending on the military.  From its side, the British 
government did not want to provide an annual military subsidy to the Sultan as it 
did in Jordan with the Arab Legion – a force portrayed by Egypt as a puppet of 
British imperialism. Britain had been willing, however, in 1954-5 to pay a one-off 
payment of £150,000 to help the Sultan take control of his territory with the 
wider strategic aim of resisting Saudi encroachment in the Trucial Oman area. 
What the British government did want to contribute were more seconded 
officers to replace what it considered to be substandard contract officers. The 
British Defence Coordination Committee (Middle East) considered that ‘high 
quality Arabic speaking British regular officers would make a great difference to 
the efficiency of the [Sultan’s forces] and enhance the United Kingdom’s 
influence with the Sultan.’535  The Chiefs of Staff in March 1956 concurred, 
stating that,  
 
[. . .] the provision of British regular officers would greatly increase 
the efficiency of the [Sultan’s forces] and the War Office have already 
indicated that they are prepared in the first instance to provide up to 
ten. We consider that the Political Resident should be asked to seize 
any favourable opportunity to promote joint planning, exercises and 
liaison between the Sultan’s forces and those under our control.536  
 
The Consul-General, Leslie Chauncy, enquired through Pat Waterfield (the 
Sultan’s Chief of Staff) whether the Sultan would accept British officers on 
secondments. The Sultan rejected this proposal on the grounds of the higher 
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pay of these officers and their restricted conditions of service. Yet the 
Residency also suspected that the Sultan and his British military contract 
officers feared that: 
 
[. . .] we [the British Government] would exploit the presence of these 
serving British officers as a means of establishing a more direct 
measure of control and command over the Sultanate Force than a 
present exists or than Waterfield and the Sultan would wish to see.537  
 
Whilst the Foreign Office and the Residency wanted greater British influence 
over the Sultan’s forces – exercised through seconded officers – they were also 
wary of putting a too-British face on this local military. ‘A western style, and to 
some extent, centrally controlled force [in Muscat and Oman] under British 
officers might be regarded in a similar sort of light to the way the Qatar Police 
are regarded by the Qataris,’ the Foreign Office warned.538  There may also 
have been a more calculated reason at play as to why Britain did not want 
Muscat and Oman’s forces to expand independently of British oversight. The 
Foreign Office and War Office were in agreement that whilst it was in Britain’s 
interests for the Sultan to have the wherewithal to maintain his authority 
throughout Oman, he should not be permitted to become too strong internally 
and ‘to be tempted and able to dispense with British advice and support.’539 
Nonetheless, there was confluence when it came to the view that the Sultan 
should be able to have capacity to counter Saudi encroachment.   
In March 1956, British military planners, restructuring Britain’s defence 
architecture for the whole Arabian Peninsula, proposed a further expansion of 
the MOFF from three rifle squadrons to five. They also wanted the force to 
operate even more closely with the TOS, coordinating joint training so that, in 
the event of a Saudi threat to Muscat, combined operations could be conducted 
under the command of the Senior Army Officer Persian Gulf (SAOPG). The idea 
of greater integration between Muscat and Oman’s540 military and the TOS 
reached such a level that in April 1956 the SAOPG, Brigadier Baird, put in place 
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joint operational instructions to defend Buraimi Oasis area.541 It was even 
proposed the following year that the Commander Land Forces, Persian Gulf – 
the SAOPG’s new title – should be appointed as an inspector-general of the 
Muscat and Oman Armed Forces and that the commander of the TOS should 
be field commander during any operation that involved both forces.  
Slow progress in building up the Muscat and Oman Field Force was 
frustrating Brigadier Baird. The IPC had provided funds and arms for a force of 
800 men, but the force fell well short of this number.542 The small Batinah 
Force, commanded by two British officers, had less than a hundred men and 
the Dhofar Force was only 60 strong.543 British officials also complained that the 
Muscat Infantry was well short of its target strength of 270 men.544 Moreover, 
the training depot at Ghobra only had 100 recruits.545  At an earlier meeting with 
the Sultan, the Consul-General, and Pat Waterfield in January 1956, the 
Political Resident, Sir Bernard Burrows, had stressed the need for the Sultan to 
maintain a mobile reserve of troops to block a Saudi advance against Buraimi or 
the western frontier. With such a reserve force earmarked, the Political Resident 
was content that the Sultan’s reorganisation plans were sufficient, despite being 
below Baird’s previous recommendation.546  In February 1956, the Sultan made 
it clear that he alone retained the right to structure his force how he wished. The 
Sultan issued Directive No. 1 that stated that as sovereign and commander-in-
chief, he retained sole authority for ‘(a) The strategic employment and 
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deployment policy of the Armed Force; (b) Defence expenditure and 
Establishments.’547  
The internal dynamics of the Muscat and Oman state reduced the ability 
of the Sultan to professionalize parts of his security apparatus.  The Consul-
General, Leslie Chauncy, had been trying to convince the Sultan of the merits in 
setting up an armed police to take over guard and garrison duties (i.e. jails, 
palaces, gates and so forth), but the Sultan was reluctant to do away with 
askars who were detached to support walis (regional governors) in every part of 
the Sultanate.  The askars were supplied at the request of leaders of tribes who 
supported the Sultan and it was an important patronage mechanism. It afforded 
the Sultan, according to Chauncy, ‘a means of attaining support and showing 
confidence and favour.’  The Sultan had reportedly told Chauncy on many 
occasions that ‘although the Sultanate is in theory an absolute monarchy, each 
man with his rifle is in fact his police and his army, and he can do nothing 
without consultation with and support of the tribes.’548   
The threat to the Sultan’s newly acquired position in the Omani interior 
did not dissipate with the Imamate’s defeat. Brigadier Baird believed that the 
Saudis would still endeavour to encourage dissension amongst the interior 
tribes and in Dhofar. Baird recommended that Sultan reorganise his forces on 
the lines of the Sudan Defence Force since the problem – that of controlling 
territory – and the terrain generally, was analogous to Northern Sudan. He 
advocated dividing the Sultan’s territory into districts each with its own garrison 
force.549 In October 1956, Waterfield proposed an increase of 400 men on top 
of the 1,200 already under arms, as well as equipment purchases to enhance 
the force’s mobility and firepower. There was also a plan to improve local police 
forces in the major towns with the intention of freeing up the military from static 
duties.550 None of these initiatives were enacted and in 1957 the Sultan suffered 
a great setback.   
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Contrary to Baird’s belief, Waterfield wanted to expand the Sultan’s forces.  
As they were both passing through Beirut in Lebanon at the same time, 
Waterfield and Burrows sat down on 1 October to discuss the future of the 
military. The Sultan’s British Chief of Staff told the Political Resident that he 
agreed that the Sultan’s forces should be enlarged and made more mobile. He 
also told Burrows that police should be located in all the major towns with a 
Home Guard formed in the villages. According to Waterfield, the Sultan had 
shown interest in these ideas, but that he was concerned about the financial 
implications. Moreover, the Sultan had recently reiterated to Waterfield that he 
was reluctant to take on commitments now that he could not pay for in the 
future if oil was not found. Thus, until the Sultan knew that there was oil he 
refused to borrow money. The Political Resident speaking unofficially told 
Waterfield that: 
 
I had always had it in the back of my mind that if it turned out there 
was no oil in Muscat we might very well be faced with the decision 
whether we would treat Muscat in somewhat the same kind of way as 
we had treated Jordan in the matter of financial assistance for the 
armed forces.  It was, however, always particularly difficult for us to 
financially commit ourselves for more than one year at a time and I 
thought that there might even be some disadvantages from Muscat’s 
point of view if we were to provide an open and regular subsidy.  It 
was already represented by Egypt and Saudi Arabia that Muscat was 
under British control and could not speak for itself.  The fact of British 
subsidy would confirm such ideas and to that extent weaken 
Muscat’s voice in the Arab World.551 
 
On the 31 October 1956, Mr Riches of the Foreign Office gave a surprising 
response to Burrow’s despatch after his conversation with Waterfield. The 
Foreign Office told the Political Resident that whilst it supported the idea for a 
police presence in the major towns the proposed expansion of the military was 
unnecessary. He laid out his reasoning by making the following points: 
 
Our view of our military relations with the Muscat Government is that 
we should accept that the Sultan must be dependent on us for 
defence against serious external (i.e. Saudi) aggression. Internally 
his forces should be organised so that the Sultan may: (a) protect the 
operations of the oil company; (b) dispose sufficient strength in the 
last resort to maintain his authority throughout Muscat and Oman. 
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But that authority should normally be achieved by political means 
only. The armed forces should not be regarded as a means of 
enforcing unpopular measures.552   
 
Riches raised a third point that he felt should guide British policy on this subject, 
which was that ‘we [Britain] should prefer that the Sultan should not feel himself 
so strong internally [original emphasis] as to be tempted and able to dispense 
with British advice and support.’ Even if the Foreign Office supported the 
expansion plans, Mr Riches made it clear that no money would be forthcoming 
from Britain.  Yet without British financial assistance, the Sultan was not willing 
to allocate more money for his military.553    
The Sultan entered 1957 with high hopes for the future. Oil, however, 
was not found.554 To make matters worse, a bid by his opponents to resurrect 
the Imamate in 1957 put the Sultan on the back foot and forced him to accept 
greater British management over his military.555 That year, Imamate forces stole 
back into Oman with Saudi financial backing and support from the leader of the 
Bani Riyam tribe, Sulaiman bin Hiymar and the MOFF (which had recently been 
renamed the Oman Regiment in March of that year) moved to confront the 
rebels. After suffering a series of setbacks, the Oman Regiment retreated to 
Fahud. This left the path clear for the Imam’s forces to retake Nizwa and other 
important interior towns as well as maintaining complete control of the vast 
Jebel Akhdar area. Muscat and Oman’s British Minister for Foreign Affairs, Neil 
McLeod Innes, was derided in British newspapers for not heeding the calls 
made by the British authorities to expand the military, especially the MOFF, 
during the previous 12 months.556  
Unable to defeat Imamate forces, Sultan Said had with few options but to 
ask for British military assistance. Britain moved units of the TOS into positions 
in Oman and sent a company of British infantry (the Cameronians) from Bahrain 
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to Ibri.557 Further British detachments from Sharjah arrived at Buraimi and 
Baraka to relieve the TOS. Britain flew in a third company from Kenya to Ibri 
and a troop of the 15/19th the King’s Royal Hussars with Ferret armoured cars 
from Aden.558 Once assembled, the conglomerate force moved against 
Imamate positions. The RAF flew in supplies and reinforcements and Venoms 
from Sharjah gave close air support with machine-gun fire and rocket attacks.559  
In August, the joint force seized Nizwa, Bahla and Izki without encountering 
much resistance. The Imam’s remaining supporters sought shelter in the 
vastness of Jebel Akhdar.  
After much of the interior, apart from Jebel Akhdar, was retaken, the 
Sultan moved against his military which had failed to stop the Imamate force’s 
early advance. He disbanded the Oman Regiment and sacked its commander, 
Bill Cheeseman. The remnants of the Oman Regiment merged with the Batinah 
Force to form the new 450-man Northern Frontier Regiment (NFR) 
headquartered at Nizwa and under the command of a British contract officer, 
Colin Maxwell. The Sultan reached out again for further British succour to build 
up his forces.  
Through signing in 1958 an ‘Exchange of Letters’, the Sultan gave Britain 
de facto control over the newly designated Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF). The 
re-organisation came into effect on 23 April 1958.  Under British auspices, the 
military was overhauled.560  In short, the aim was to create a force that could 
retain control of the interior for the Sultan.561   
Colonel Pat Waterfield assumed the office of Minister of Defence whilst 
Britain selected Colonel David Smiley to Command the SAF.562 Smiley was a 
former British officer with a wide experience of irregular warfare in Albania and 
Thailand during the Second World War. Colin Maxwell, the British contract 
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officer in charge of the NFR, was appointed his second-in-command.563  Whilst 
Smiley officially served the Sultan, officials in London made it clear that he 
could challenge, through appealing to the Political Resident, any order given by 
the Sultan that he considered contrary to British interests. As such, Smiley 
considered his immediate superior to be the British Army’s Commander Land 
Forces, Persian Gulf in Bahrain.564 ‘I was an officer not only of the Sultan but of 
the Queen, and my first duty was to the Queen,’ Smiley wrote in his memoirs.565  
With a seconded officer now at the helm, Britain had the influence that it felt had 
been necessary in the Sultan’s military for many years.566 
The SAF Smiley took control of in April 1958 included the Muscat 
Regiment (as the Muscat Infantry was now called) commanded by Briton Mike 
Reid who had replaced Frank Haugh; the Northern Frontier Regiment; the 
Sultan’s Air Force, composed of two single-engine Pioneer airplanes flown by 
RAF pilots and used for communication and casualty evacuation; the Sultan’s 
Navy, which now had five ships (two harbour defence launches, a native boom, 
and two native dhows); and an intelligence branch under Malcolm Dennison 
(who served in this position until 1983).  
Along with Smiley came an influx of British military personnel and 
equipment.567 The Northern Frontier Regiment gained artillery, scout cars and 
instructors seconded from the British Royal Marines Corps. Another British 
officer and 25 trainers reorganised the SAF training brigade. Jasper Coates, a 
retired RAF officer with prior experience in Bahrain as the Senior RAF officer 
Persian Gulf, and who had joined the SAF in 1957, assumed command of a 
new gendarmerie force for the Batinah Coast that initially consisted of a group 
of Persian smugglers – due to their previous nefarious activities they knew the 
area intimately. Simultaneously, the Senior RAF Officer Persian Gulf 
(SRAFOPG) conducted a study for expanding the Sultan’s Air Force. Though 
the creation of an air force would not do away with the need for RAF support, 
the British military chiefs saw several advantages in building up indigenous 
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striking power from the air. Firstly, on occasions when offensive action by 
Sultanate Air Force would be adequate without the need for RAF support, 
Britain would avoid the international publicity and odium associated with British 
air operations against Arabs. Secondly, the Sultan would be in a position to use 
his aircraft immediately – use of the RAF required authorisation from London. 
Thirdly, the military chiefs thought that the Sultan might be willing to carry out air 
strikes more ruthlessly than Britain was prepared to use the RAF.  This, they 
believed, would act as an added deterrent to would-be rebels. There were also 
disadvantages.  For one thing, the defence chiefs noted, the cost of establishing 
and running a separate air force would be large and, as such, an uneconomical 
method of providing air support. Also, the offensive and deterrent capabilities of 
three Provosts (a multi-role plane designed for reconnaissance, strike and 
escort duties) earmarked for the force were small, and the RAF would still have 
to be called upon if anything serious occurred. Thirdly, as it would be common 
knowledge that the pilots and the whole organisation of the force was British, 
Britain would still be exposed to international criticism when attacks on civilian 
life and property were undertaken. The British Government might be in a 
position of accountability whilst unable to ensure that the Sultan used the 
weapon sparingly and with proper safeguards. Finally, it could degrade the 
political advantages of having the Sultan dependent on the RAF for 
reconnaissance duties and air transport.568 After reviewing the pros and cons, 
the defence chiefs recommended that it would be far better for the Sultan to 
establish a competent armoured car squadron if he wanted striking power in the 
country. Nonetheless, British Cabinet ministers agreed to assist Sultan in 
establishing an air force, helping to finance the purchase of three Provosts and 
two Pioneers (used for freight and light transport).569 The Sultan of Oman’s Air 
Force (SOAF) was commanded by a British squadron leader and also had two 
British flight lieutenants and four flying officers on secondment, RAF personnel 
serviced the aircraft until a private British contractor, Airworks, took over.570 The 
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SOAF became operational at Bait al-Falaj (Muscat) in 1959.571  The foundations 
of Sultan of Oman’s Navy (SON) were also laid down at this time.572 
British influence had been pervasive in the Sultanate’s security forces 
since the formation of the Muscat Levy Corps in 1921; with the signing of the 
1958 ‘Exchange of Letters’, Britain’s position was paramount. The CLFPG, 
Brigadier Baird, claimed to now be in control of the budgeting, reorganisation 
and training of the Sultan’s military.573  Yet greater control brought greater 
responsibility, and Britain now had to bankroll much of this expansion and 
reequipping.  The Foreign Office fretted that, like with the TOS, the three 
Services would try to push most of the costs its way. In a June 1958 internal 
memorandum, one senior mandarin outlined his worries about the costs 
incurred in the setting up of an air force for the Sultan:  
 
What I understand the Secretary of State [for Foreign Affairs] to have 
in mind was that instead of the Service Departments working out the 
detailed cost of a Muscat Air Force and then expecting the Foreign 
Office to pay (including the salaries of British officers and presumably 
here and there a percentage of ‘departmental charges’!), they should 
adopt a more brotherly attitude and squeeze what they can out of 
their existing personnel and material to help the Muscat Air Force 
without insisting on every ounce of flesh from the Foreign Office vote; 
in short to ‘take the Muscat Air Force under their wing.’574 
 
Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd later explained the British government’s 
thinking: ‘The policy adopted by Her Majesty’s Government in 1958 was 
directed at ensuring that, if at all possible, British forces should not again be 
compelled to intervene openly in Oman.’575 The expanded and reorganised SAF 
failed to get to grips with rebel forces in the interior, even with continued British 
air support. Using modern mines, rebels continued to carry out successful 
attacks on SAF and TOS patrols and oil company convoys in broad daylight.  
The Foreign Secretary agreed to a request from the Sultan for British Army 
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subunits to work alongside his forces. The Royal Fusiliers based in Bahrain 
were ordered to send small teams of half a dozen men to enter the area of 
Oman where operations against the rebels were taking place to assist SAF in 
firing machine guns and as well as mine detection.576 British military 
intervention, with assistance from the TOS, was necessary to finally dislodge 
Imamate forces from their strongholds and bring the rebellion to an end in 
January 1959.  As Smiley later acknowledged:  
 
It was already clear to me that we could never hope to capture the 
Jebel Akhdar with the forces now at my disposal: they were barely 
enough to contain the rebels, and not enough to prevent them from 
mining the roads – as the oil company never ceased to remind me. 
To add to my difficulties, the squadron of the Trucial Oman Scouts 
based at Izki were withdrawn from the country in June 1958 and I 
had to garrison the town with recruits from the depot who had not 
even completed their basic training. Although they were being very 
helpful, air attacks alone would not compel the enemy to surrender; 
in fact, as we discovered afterwards, they caused very few 
casualties.577 
 
In early 1959, the Special Air Service (SAS) with support from the TOS, SAF 
and regular British military forces took control of the Jebel Akhdar, forcing rebel 
leaders to flee. Following the complete defeat of the Imam’s forces, the British 
commander of the NFR, Colin Maxwell, assumed administrative control of Jebel 
Akhdar as military governor, implementing a hearts-and-minds campaign.578  
Military intervention in 1959 was intended to be a once-and-for-all 
operation to restore the situation in interior, after which it was hoped the Sultan 
would stand on his own two feet without the need for future British intervention. 
However, the capture of last rebel stronghold in January 1959 did not end the 
rebellion as leaders escaped to Saudi Arabia and attacks in Oman continued. 
The Saudis, supported by the Egyptians, continued to back a campaign of 
mining and sabotage in Oman. Three British Desert Intelligence Officers (DIOs) 
were established at Ibri, Nizwa and Rostaq in 1959. They provided intelligence 
to the SAF and to the British military.579 Rather than scaling back its role in the 
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Sultanate after January 1959, Britain actually agreed to increase its military aid. 
Selwyn Lloyd prepared a position paper for the Cabinet as to why it was in 
Britain’s interests to keep assisting the Sultan. Lloyd captured what was behind 
Britain’s continued presence in the Gulf: the importance of Kuwaiti oil and future 
production from Abu Dhabi. The principle reasons for staying the course in the 
Sultanate in support of this central interest were: (a) the air base at Masirah and 
overflying rights over Oman – both were required for the defence of Kuwait; (b) 
the air and land base at Sharjah, which could be threatened by events in Oman; 
and (c) the negative effect on the amir of Kuwait and the other Gulf rulers if 
Britain withdrew its support to the Sultan.  
After the Foreign Office received a proposal on the future shape of the 
SAF from David Smiley and Pat Waterfield that they thought was too costly and 
ambitious, the British government sent out its own expert to Muscat to make a 
recommendation. Brigadier M.R.J Hope-Thompson from the War Office visited 
Muscat and Oman between January and March 1960.  His report called for 
significant increase in SAF personnel from 1,470 to 2,140 and for the force to 
have greater mobility.580 Hope-Thompson’s proposals were formalised in an 
Agreed Minute between Britain and Sultan in August 1960, committing the 
Sultan to implement his recommendations over three years. The Sultan was to 
pay £232,500 annually in recurrent costs of SAF whilst the British government 
contributed £943,500. Britain also agreed to pay capital costs of £1,025,000 and 
some additional short-term measure costs and to provide an increased quota of 
British seconded officers.581 
 
4.5 The Trucial Oman Scouts in Britain’s Gulf Policy, 1956-61  
A question Britain faced in latter half of the 1950s was whether the Trucial rulers 
should be encouraged to set up their own forces to perform internal security 
duties or continue to rely on the TOS. The ruler of Dubai wanted to set up his 
own police force in 1956, and in the end the TOS were heavily involved in 
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setting up this initiative over the course of 1956/7.582 Indeed, its first 
commander, Major Peter Lorimer, was deputised from the Scouts and the 
force’s nucleus were ex-Scouts or untrained recruits put through the TOS 
training school.583 Major Peter Clayton, another TOS officer, was also involved 
in training the first recruits.584 The British contribution to setting up the force 
went further than agreeing to transfer TOS personnel. Whilst the Ruler agreed 
to contribute one lakh (100,000 rupees or £7,500) to the cost of the police, the 
British Government paid the rest. Major Peter Clayton of the TOS 
recommended this arrangement because the ruler’s resources were too meagre 
to pay for the force in its entirety.585 The War Office rejected the proposal that 
the newly formed Dubai Police take on responsibilities outside of Dubai town.  
Major-General J.R.C. Hamilton at the War Office explained his thinking to the 
Foreign Office on 5 December 1957: 
 
An expanded Dubai Police Force, which can only be used in Dubai 
State, would be quite unable to perform these duties [internal security 
role of TOS] which really amount to keeping the peace between the 
Trucial Oman Shaikhs and preventing murder and raiding by Bedouin 
tribes.586 
 
There was a further reason why the War Office did not favour local police forces 
taking on TOS duties: Britain would be unable to exercise the same control over 
them as it did over the Scouts. This could easily result in a tricky situation 
whereby Britain would be required to intervene with its own troops should 
armed police forces be misused by the local rulers.587 Taking away the internal 
security role of the TOS, the Political Resident concluded, ‘would involve the 
creation of seven separate police forces; you will recall that when the Dubai 
                                            
582 Kahlifa Rashid Al Shaali and Neil Kibble, ‘Policing and Police Accountability in 
the UAE: The Case for Reform,’ Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2000), pp. 292-4.  
583 The force’s second commander, Major Jack Briggs, was a former British police 
officer who had served in the Bahrain and Qatar police forces. Briggs would remain in 
charge of the Dubai Police until 1975 (thereafter he was retained as Adviser and 
Inspector General to the Ruler until 1998) 
584 Peter Clayton, ‘The New Dubai Police Force – Our First Challenge,’ in Tempest 
(2009), pp. 170-2. 
585 Clayton’s proposal is partially quoted in FO 371/140239, W.F. Marshall (Foreign 
Office) to S.E. Wigmore (Treasury), 5 February 1959. 
586 TNA FO 371/126953, Maj. Gen. J.R.C. Hamilton (War Office) to H. Beeley 
(Foreign Office), 5 December 1957. Extract contained in text. 
587 Ibid. 
 
 
148 
Police force was set up we had to promise that it was not the thin end of the 
wedge for setting up police forces in every Trucial State.’588 It is clear that 
British officials, and especially the Political Resident, did not want the place of 
the TOS supplanted.  
  Through its role in Buraimi and the Omani interior, the TOS had 
displayed that it had a role beyond internal security duties in the Trucial States; 
in short, the Scouts had proved their worth in the field. In recognition of this 
revised role, Britain provided the Scouts with a new scale of equipment suitable 
for modern warfare.589 Part of the force was essentially a motorised infantry 
regiment, capable of operating across Trucial Oman and working alongside 
other forces in mountainous terrain or in the sand seas of Eastern Arabia.590  
The deployment of the TOS outside of the Trucial States in support of the 
Sultan brought into sharp relief the differences inside Whitehall and between 
Britain’s Gulf representatives as to what the exact role of this British-controlled 
force should be. Should it be a lightly armed, mobile gendarmerie for police-
style internal security operations strictly in the Trucial States? Or did its future 
lie more closely along the lines of a British Army unit, ready to meet any 
emergency that threatened British interests in Trucial Oman?591 This conflict 
between ‘the requirement to operate efficiently as a concentrated, mobile, 
fighting force and the need to keep the peace over a vast area of difficult 
terrain,’ Michael Mann writes, ‘was never completely solved.’592 Having two 
paymasters, the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office, ‘who rarely held the 
same view of the force and its tasks,’ meant that the TOS was being pulled in 
two directions.593  The War Office wanted to treat the TOS as though it was a 
permanent British infantry regiment. It officials contended that the force must be 
kept at full strength (1,200 men) and the terms of service for the British officers 
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and NCOs improved. The TOS were by the late 1950s a much larger institution 
than the component parts of their squadrons alone. The Scouts had a network 
of Desert intelligence Officers (DIOs) throughout the Trucial States (and Oman) 
to gather tribal information.594 The headquarters establishment had also swelled 
since the mid-1950s. Some in the Foreign Office were deeply concerned about 
the spiralling costs and resuscitated the argument that as the Scouts was set up 
along the lines of a British infantry regiment, and as they were carrying out 
tasks more akin to ‘imperial commitments’, the War Office should accept 
complete financial responsibility for the force. The War Office shot down this 
proposition: ‘we strongly oppose your contention that the force has now become 
unsuitable for the work which it was intended [i.e. maintaining law and order in 
the interior of the Trucial States].’ Furthermore, the War Office considered that 
the imperial commitment role that the TOS played, 
 
[. . .] could well be maintained by a force half the size of the present 
one. Should the Foreign Office continue to insist therefore that they 
are unable or unwilling to bear the cost of the remaining 50 per cent 
of the force, then the War Office would have to consider reducing the 
force to half of its present strength and leaving the Foreign Office to 
make such arrangements as they can for taking over the I.S. [internal 
security] role hitherto covered by the Trucial Oman Scouts.595 
 
Military Coordination Committee, Persian Gulf (MCC (PG)) – previously the 
Local Defence Committee, Persian Gulf, but still chaired by the Political 
Resident – did not share the view of the Foreign Office that the TOS could no 
longer fulfil its original internal security role. Only three of the six squadrons 
were dedicated at any one time to the defence of the frontier, the other three 
being on gendarmerie duties.596  In December 1957, the MCC (PG) repeated 
what they saw as the manifold functions of force:  
 
The Trucial Oman Scouts are at present required to garrison and 
patrol in the following areas: Baraka, Sharjah, Buraimi, Ras al-
Khaimah, and the borders with Saudi Arabia. The commitment also 
includes the protection of oil company workings, the prevention of 
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gun-running and smuggling and escorting officers of the Foreign 
Office on duty in the Trucial States.597 
 
The War Office also believed that the TOS was suitably organised to perform 
myriad tasks, including the original policing role. Indeed, Britain’s re-
organisation of the force intended to improve its ability in the field as well as its 
internal security role.  ‘I do not think it is possible to define precisely where the 
interest of one Department ends and of the other begins,’ one official in the War 
Office contended.598  The Foreign Office in June 1958 seemed to come around 
to this thinking.  ‘The Eastern Department,’ one internal memorandum read,  
 
[. .  ] shares the military view of the importance of the Trucial Oman 
Scouts. Furthermore, although it is hard to say whether the strictly 
internal security value of the force, which accounts for the Foreign 
Office financial [contribution], has multiplied in the same ratio as the 
costs, the fact is that internal security on the Trucial Coast depends 
very largely on this unit and that, with the prospect of large-scale oil 
development off Abu Dhabi, we should not be at present be niggardly 
in counting the cost of maintaining stable conditions.599 
 
Capturing the lessons of the Jebel Akhdar War, the TOS commander, Stewart 
Carter, set up a Desert Regiment to give the TOS a more warfighting unit. The 
Political Agent in the Trucial States, Donald Hawley, expressed his concern to 
Carter, that the Scouts were becoming far too military owing to direct 
administration from Aden and the formation of the Desert Regiment.600 Whilst 
Hawley accepted the Scouts’ role fulfilling the War Office’s ‘imperial 
commitment’, he nonetheless felt the ‘prime consideration’ was that the Scouts 
should be a ‘truly Trucial States force, which is accepted by the local people as 
their own.’601 To make it more of a local force, Hawley advised replacing the 
high proportion of Britons in the TOS with Arabs and setting up a camel 
section.602 To facilitate the Arabisation of the force he also proposed setting up 
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a TOS school, and ‘as an increasing number of boys become literate, I see no 
reason why most of the administration of the force should not be done in 
Arabic.’603  With these measures implemented, Hawley thought the TOS could 
naturally shift into the likely future political framework of a federation amongst 
the Trucial States. If the TOS resembled too much a regular British unit – 
exemplified through the proposal to add a Desert Regiment604 – it might shorten 
Britain’s tenure in the area, Hawley warned in September 1960.605 While the 
outgoing Political Resident, Sir George Middleton, may have given a 
sympathetic ear to Hawley’s views on the TOS, Sir William Luce, the new 
Political Resident after 1961, did not.  Luce dismissed the need to Arabise the 
TOS, informing the Foreign Office that: ‘The only British personnel in each 
squadron are two officers, and so far as the public in the Trucial States are 
concerned this is all they see of the British element.’606 The tension between the 
requirement of operating as a mobile fighting force and the need to keep the 
peace over challenging terrain was never resolved.607 
Whilst the MCC (PG) had stipulated in 1957 that the TOS could undertake 
limited operations outside the Trucial States, this was only ever intended to 
mean support given to the Sultan.  With relations between the Sultan and many 
of the Trucial States rulers strained in 1961, the MCC (PG) concluded that ‘no 
account should be taken of the Trucial Oman Scouts as possible re-
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enforcements to the SAF [Sultan’s Armed Forces] for use in the Sultanate.’608 
The growth of the SAF in the late 1950s reduced, at any rate, the likelihood that 
the TOS would ever be needed to intervene again in Oman.  As for repelling an 
armed attack into the Trucial States, which was the first directive in May 1960 
issued by the MCC (PG) to the incoming commander of the TOS, Luce believed 
by 1961 that it would be unrealistic to expect the TOS to resist a committed 
Saudi attack.  More appropriately, the TOS were seen simply as a means of 
slowing an advance until British military assistance arrived.609  As an indication 
of this more limited role, Britain disbanded the Desert Regiment in 1961, which 
had been set up the year before to act as a striking force. 
 
4.6 Britain, the Kuwaiti Security Forces: Succession, Arab 
Nationalism and the threat from Iraq, 1952-60 
The meteoric rise in Kuwait’s importance to Britain had ignited the debate about 
British security policy towards the protected state. Britain reached the 
conclusion that rather than station the RAF and troops in the country it should 
use its influence to develop the Kuwaiti security forces. This policy, however, 
was easier stated than implemented, especially when the security institutions in 
Kuwait formed part of the power play between competing members of the Al-
Sabah. Kuwaiti oil revenues doubled in 1952 and again in 1953, enabling the 
ruling family to buy the allegiance of domestic elites, especially the merchant 
class.610 Whilst this served to consolidate their position in Kuwait, there were 
deep divisions amongst the Al Sabah. In attempting to steer Kuwait’s security 
apparatus in the right direction, Britain would have to work within a bifurcated 
system: on one side the Town Police, responsible for maintaining law and order 
and carrying out investigations inside Kuwait town; the Public Security 
Department controlling the Kuwait Force and police units outside the town, on 
the other.611  
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The Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) had run its own guard force and 
investigative branch operating at its facilities, but the Public Security 
Department gradually acquired these responsibilities in the early 1950s. Over 
the winter of 1952/3, the Kuwait Force was renamed the Kuwait Army and was 
divided into a 1,250-strong Security Force and a 350-man Frontier Force.  
Armed with rifles, light machine guns and an assortment of vehicles, the 
Security Force was akin to a gendarmerie. Aside from static guard duties, it also 
provided the personal bodyguard to the Ruler and maintained a pipe, silver and 
brass band. The Frontier Force, equipped with armoured cars, tracked 
machine-gun carriers, jeeps and trucks, operated as a mobile force to patrol 
desert areas and keep a watchful eye over the northern border with Iraq, 
especially for smugglers and illegal migrants. Although the Kuwait Army wore 
British-style battledress and Khaki drill uniforms, Britain’s involvement was, 
compared to the role it played in other Gulf forces, slight. No British officer 
commanded any section of the Public Security Department.612 What is more, 80 
percent of the officers of the Frontier Force were Palestinians.613  The discovery 
of a communist subversive cell in Kuwait may have jolted Shaikh Abdullah 
Mubarak out of his initial opposition to British involvement. Soon after, he 
agreed to the appointment of a British police officer, C.F. Coutts, from Sudan to 
train the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) under his control.614 The only 
other policemen were Lieutenant Hawkins and Captain Edge who performed 
police duties for purposes of British Government jurisdiction. In December 1952, 
Britain loaned out Major P.M. Boileau from the British Army to serve as the chief 
instructor of the Frontier Force.615 The expansion of the military, especially the 
purchase of 20 advanced armoured vehicles (Daimler scout cars), must have 
made the need for a military expert unavoidable. Having served in Palestine, 
Egypt and Libya, Boileau was a strong Arabic speaker who would end up 
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spending almost six years training the Kuwaiti military in armoured car 
patrolling. 
Considering Kuwait’s importance to Britain, one might expect British 
influence to be more prevalent in the rapidly expanding military and police 
forces. To be sure, Kuwait had in the past resisted British involvement, standing 
firm against the appointment of a British security adviser. This was only part of 
the story. Internal dynastic politics conditioned British involvement in the Kuwaiti 
security forces. That the British Government wanted its Gulf representatives to 
take a more active role in Kuwaiti affairs is in little doubt.  In unflinchingly stark 
language, the Foreign Office told the new Political Resident, Bernard Burrows, 
in July 1953 that he must take a greater interest in Kuwait’s internal situation, 
including matters that were previously beyond the scope of British 
representatives. The importance of Kuwait to Britain meant that:  
 
Her Majesty’s Government can no longer afford to confine 
themselves to the role authorised by the treaties and agreements in 
force and sanctioned by usage but must also interest themselves in 
all matters which affect the political and economic stability of 
Kuwait.616 
  
The Foreign Office’s remarks were taken to mean that British influence must be 
used to steer the future succession in Britain’s favour. As the two strongest 
candidates also held key positions in the two main sections of the security 
forces, this political consideration had a strong bearing on Britain’s involvement 
in the Kuwaiti police and military. 
Like his predecessor Jakins, the new Political Agent in Kuwait, C.J. Pelly, 
believed that the accession of Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak as ruler would be a 
disaster for British interests. Favouring Jabir al-Ahmad, who was Deputy 
Commander of the Town Police, the question for Pelly was whether there was 
anything that Britain could do to ‘further the cause of the Ruler in keeping 
Abdullah Mubarak in his place and towards improving Jabir al-Ahmed’s chances 
of succeeding’.617 Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak derived much of his power through 
his command of the Public Security Department. ‘He guards the frontiers, holds 
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the keys of the prison and controls all movements in and out of Kuwait,’ Jakins 
had observed back in November 1950.618 The Political Resident suspected that 
a combination of solipsism and a desire to be seen as ‘the real kingpin in 
Kuwait’ lay behind Abdullah Mubarak’s efforts to expand the forces under his 
purview.619 
Leaving Abdullah Mubarak’s motivations aside, British officials were 
unsure if the expansion of the Kuwaiti forces was, at any rate, actually in 
Britain’s interests. The Kuwait Political Agency questioned Brigadier Baird’s 
recommendation that he made back in February 1952 for building up local 
forces. Indeed, by 1954 the expansion of the Kuwaiti military was now 
concerning Resident Burrows, particularly the Frontier Force, which had 
outgrown its original gendarmerie role and was now judged to be a serious 
potential armed opponent in the event Britain intervened militarily in Kuwait and 
it was on the opposing side.620 Pelly at the Political Agency concluded that the 
existence of Frontier Force meant that Britain would struggle to ‘take over 
control in Kuwait by landing a small party of sailors from the Persian Gulf 
Squadron.’ But as Pelly continued, this had ‘probably been dangerous ever 
since an armed police was organised in Kuwait.’621  A second issue that 
Burrows highlighted – one that would later be identified with the expansion of 
the armed forces under the Sultan of Muscat – was that with a large force of its 
own the Kuwaitis would feel that they could do without British protection, 
weakening British political influence in the process.622 What is more, due to the 
size of the forces under Abdullah Mubarak’s command, Burrows questioned 
how Britain could carry out its responsibility for Kuwait’s foreign relations when 
a crisis between it and Iraq or even Saudi Arabia could be precipitated by the 
irresponsible action of a military over which Britain had virtually no control. 
Should Britain be content with an ‘indefinite continuation of unofficial command 
over the mobile part of the force [Frontier Force] by a British officer in [Major 
                                            
618 TNA FO 371/82010, H.G. Jakins (Political Agent, Kuwait) to Rupert Hay (Political 
Resident), 16 November 1950. 
619 TNA FO 1016/367, Bernard Burrows (Political Resident) to C.J. Pelly (Political 
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Peter] Boileau’s position’ or should Britain, Burrow’s pondered, ‘insist on a more 
senior officer being appointed as [Abdullah] Mubarak’s military adviser?’ Pelly’s 
response was not encouraging. 
 
Boileau is not in practice in command of any part of the Frontier 
Force and I doubt whether any British officer could achieve such a 
position. I am even more certain that [Shaikh] Abdullah Mubarak 
would not readily agree, at least at present, to take a senior British 
officer as his Military Adviser, and if we could force him to take one, 
we would have to find a way of ensuring that he was allowed to be 
effective, otherwise he would be treated like Coutts [British police 
officer in Kuwait’s Criminal Investigation Department].623 
 
Switching viewpoints antiphonally, Burrows argued that an enlargement of 
Kuwait’s military could also be an advantage. If the Frontier Force was now a 
serious military unit, Burrows argued, should it not take a place in Britain’s 
general scheme of defence for the Middle East in time of war?624  Pelly, 
however, held serious doubts whether the Frontier Force could ever be ‘used in 
a directly war-like role.’625 Its chief instructor, Major Boileau, agreed: the Frontier 
Force may be ‘excellent as convoy escorts, desert patrols, and small desert 
reconnaissance units,’ but it could not in its very formative stage of evolution be 
of much use in advanced warfare.626  
If on balance Britain deemed the unrestrained expansion of the security 
forces under Mubarak Abdullah as damaging to its interests, what could the 
British government do about it? Pelly recommended refusing to deal directly 
with Abdullah Mubarak’s frequent requests for British military weapons. Instead, 
he proposed, Britain should help the Ruler set up an efficient security 
organisation to counter the growing power of Abdullah Mubarak.627 Burrows 
agreed, and strived to implement a policy whereby the profile of the Town 
Police was raised vis-à-vis the Public Security Department. At 540 men in late 
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1954, the Town Police under the control of Shaikh Sabah al-Salim were less 
than half the size of the Public Security Department.628  
Domestic unrest in Kuwait 1956 led Britain to reappraise its attitude 
towards Abdullah Mubarak and the security forces under his control. Whether 
the security forces would remain loyal to the Al-Sabah during the rising tensions 
was a question of critical import. Yet British involvement in Kuwait’s Public 
Security Department (which oversaw the Kuwait Army and Frontier Force) was 
limited. There was never the same opposition to British involvement in the Town 
Police. By 1955, several British officers were serving in police and the force’s 
commander, Sabah al-Salim, visited Britain in July to inspect Scotland Yard, 
police training colleges and British courts. Britain hoped that the trip would 
encourage Sabah al-Salim to continue reforming the Town Police and to 
institute British practices. By the beginning of 1956, plans were in place to 
reorganise the Town Police, to expand its numbers from 733 to 1,501, and to 
purchase new equipment. Despite showing an enthusiasm for British policing 
methods, later attempts by the new Political Agent, Gawain Bell, to get Sabah 
al-Salim to accept a high-ranking British security official into the Town Police to 
help with reform proved unsuccessful.629   
The instability of 1956 led to a tightening of relations between Britain and 
Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak. Rather than placing its hopes in the Town Police, the 
Foreign Office now arrived at the conclusion that ‘strong armed forces under the 
control of Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak represent a powerful deterrent to any 
persons who might wish to cause strikes or other disturbances in Kuwait for 
political or other reasons.’630 On these grounds it was recommended that Britain 
should keep supplying the Kuwaiti military with weapons, for Abdullah Mubarak 
could turn to Czechoslovakia or somewhere else to purchase weapons if Britain 
refused him.631  With no means of stopping Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak building 
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up the strength of his forces, British officials thought it was a far better policy to 
curry favour with him by agreeing to his requests for arms, otherwise they could 
be marginalised in the defence scene.632   
British policy towards the development of the Kuwaiti security forces 
between 1954 and 1956 was often contradictory. The Political Resident and 
successive Political Agents were unable to reconcile the need for strong 
security forces in Kuwait with the damage that this could do to British interests 
and its ability to intervene. In the months leading up to 1956 Suez intervention, 
the Foreign Office had argued against moving troops to Kuwait because local 
forces were fairly strong and able to hold the position. Britain based military 
plans for intervening in Kuwait with a relatively small force on the assumption 
that the Kuwaiti forces remained loyal. ‘If they were against us,’ the Chiefs of 
Staff warned, ‘operations on a larger scale would be necessary.’633  The 
‘vigorous and deterrent action’ taken by the Kuwaiti security forces against 
disturbances on 15-16 August 1956, the high state of readiness shown by the 
Kuwaiti detachment at the oil installations, and the Ruler’s reassurance to the 
Political Resident of his determination maintain order all assuaged British fears 
about the Kuwait Government’s resolve.634  
Britain’s former policy of supporting the Town Police at the expense of 
the Abdullah Mubarak’s Public Security Department thus came undone during 
the Suez crises. Whilst large numbers of the Town Police’s senior police officers 
and NCOs resigned over Suez, Abdullah Mubarak’s Public Security Department 
stayed firm and kept order.635 British representatives were impressed with the 
way Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak dealt with further outbreaks of disorder on 3 and 
4 November. Although the reformist elements had mobilised large numbers, the 
Kuwait Government had shown itself able to keep order. Thus, in the second 
half of 1956, Britain’s relationship with Abdullah Mubarak became markedly 
closer. ‘The immediate joint interest of Her Majesty’s Government and the 
Ruling family, that is to say the maintenance of public order, has drawn us 
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during this past week very close to Shaikh Abdullah al-Mubarak,’ the Political 
Agent, Gawain Bell, wrote to the Political Resident on 9 November. This was 
unfortunate, Bell thought, as it brought Britain ‘closer to the reactionary 
elements of the Ruling family at precisely the time when we had hoped to work 
towards closer cooperation with the younger and more liberally minded 
members’.636 Eight explosions on the night of 10/11 November underscored for 
Britain the need to keep a tight lid on subversive activity in Kuwait, especially as 
some of the attacks were against oil infrastructure.637 And from 1957, Britain 
supplied military trainers as part of a Kuwait Training Team to enhance the 
ability of the Al-Sabah to maintain order.  
The Suez crisis showed how events exogenous to the Gulf could affect 
the local security scene. The 1958 Iraqi revolution had a similar, albeit more 
focused, impact, prompting Britain to reassess Kuwait’s vulnerability. After the 
pro-western government of Nuri al-Said was overthrown in July 1958 – and after 
he, the young King Feisal, and the ex-Regent Abdullah were murdered – the 
political climate of Iraq and the unstable personality of its dictator, Qassim, had 
made an Iraqi attempt to forcibly absorb Kuwait a distinct possibility. In 
response, Britain prepared plans for intervening to thwart an Iraqi attack.638 The 
Joint Planning Staff of the Chiefs of Staff Committee judged in August 1958 that 
the Kuwaiti Armed Forces could not repel armed aggression by Iraq without 
outside assistance, but could impose a slight delay. Nevertheless, British 
military planners thought that the performance of the Kuwaiti Armed Forces 
could be materially improved if their equipment included some anti-tank 
weapons.639 Not all were in favour, however, of enhancing Kuwait’s military 
capabilities. In April 1959, the Air Ministry questioned the sagacity of selling 
Kuwait fighter aircraft. ‘There are certain dangers in Kuwait having an air force’, 
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Salthouse at the Air Ministry told the Foreign Office.640 ‘Whether Kuwait has 
aggressive or defensive intentions, the existence of another air force in the 
Middle East,’ Salthouse thought, ‘is bound to have complicated the political 
position.’ He recommended that the line to take with Kuwait was as follows:  
 
[. . .] the United Kingdom is ready, willing and able to help them with 
the Royal Air Force at any time they require them. If however they 
prefer to have some measure of military air capability under their own 
control then I agree we can hardly deny the right to purchase aircraft 
for this purpose.  But I do not think we should accept this position 
without attempting to dissuade them.641 
 
With the emergence of a hostile regime on Kuwait’s northern border Britain 
worked more closely with Abdullah Mubarak, who, by 1959, had become head 
of all Public Security and Police Forces in Kuwait, and served as acting ruler 
when the Ruler, Shaikh Abdullah Salim, was absent.642  During a visit to London 
in late 1959, Abdullah Mubarak reaffirmed his commitment to what he called 
Kuwait’s ‘British connection’. Under Abdullah Mubarak’s direction, the Kuwait 
Government purchased a dozen more armoured cars and 16 modern Centurion 
tanks from Britain (eight were for Kuwait’s use and eight were stockpiled in the 
event that British forces were called to defend the country). Military cooperation 
between Kuwait and Britain moved forward with these purchases. Whilst 
assuring Kuwait that it would help to build up its armed forces, Britain cautioned 
that some of the equipment being supplied – the Centurion tanks in particular – 
required considerable training and expertise to operate.  Although Kuwait sent 
some soldiers to Britain for tank training, there was a growing need to take on 
British seconded personnel to maintain and service the tanks and other 
stockpiled equipment.643 The Kuwaiti leadership, however, feared that the 
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presence of British military personnel in the country would (a) provoke Iraq, and 
(b) would provide Cairo – which had a sympathetic audience in a large section 
of the Kuwaiti population – with an opportunity to claim that Kuwait was little 
more than a British military base.644  Unlike in Muscat and Oman, any decision 
on British military involvement in the Kuwaiti security forces had to take greater 
account of these strong domestic attitudes.  The Suez debacle combined with 
the appeal of Abdul Nasser’s brand of Arab unity served to increase anti-British 
feeling in Kuwait.645 In 1959, the emir had to break up a demonstration in 
support of the United Arab Union (the union between Egypt and Syria) on the 
anniversary of its inception.   
A reassessment of the threat from Iraqi armoured divisions in the early 
1959 led Kuwait to risk the criticism of bringing in British experts. Britain 
seconded a gunnery officer (Lt. Col. Pierce) and three British technical NCOs to 
offer advice on the use and upkeep of the Kuwaiti tanks. The small team, called 
the Kuwait Liaison Team (KLT), came under the direct authority of the Kuwaiti 
military. The Political Resident, Sir George Middleton, thought the KLT, and 
especially the presence of Lt. Col. Pierce who ‘appears to be rapidly gaining 
[Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak’s] confidence’, would help Britain retain influence in 
Kuwaiti military affairs. As Middleton told the Foreign Office:  
 
Abdullah Mubarak appears to be realizing dangers which beset 
Kuwait and is turning to us for advice and help.  Unless this is 
handled with great delicacy we may give him or the Ruler the 
impression that we are trying to encroach on Kuwait’s independence. 
We are only at the exploratory stage and there is little substantially 
that can be done to help except to ensure that requests for supply of 
military equipment for officers to proceed on courses or for other 
forms of military cooperation made by Kuwaitis are met without 
delay.646 
 
The debate over what military hardware Britain should agree to sell Kuwait 
continued, however.  When in 1960 Kuwait inquired about purchasing British 
Hunter aircraft the Foreign Office supported the move as it saw the advantages 
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for military planning purposes. The Political Agent in Kuwait, J.C.B. Richmond, 
was against the idea from the start. Britain ‘should not encourage the Shaikh to 
spend money unwisely because of any incidental advantage which might 
accrue to our military planning.’  Many in Kuwait, Richmond argued, would look 
to these aircraft as,  
 
[. . .] an unjustifiable extravagance. They would go on to argue that 
our supplying them was a proof of our intention on getting hold of 
Kuwait’s money at any cost or alternatively of getting Kuwait’s 
military forces into our control by providing them with weapons they 
could only use with our assistance. The opponents of Shaikh 
Abdullah Mubarak – and there are many – would see this as further 
proof of British support for his ambitions for the succession . . . . 647 
 
In the first half of 1961, Kuwait renewed its request to acquire the six Jet 
Provosts (ground attack aircraft) and sent pilots to Britain for training in advance 
of the expected delivery. The Air Ministry was worried in July that Kuwait was 
not in a position to run its own air force. Without proper programmes and 
procedures in place, the Air Ministry believed the air force could ‘meet with 
disaster.’ Officials evoked the case of Sudan which tried to ‘go it alone’ in 1957.  
In November that year two Provosts of the Sudan Air Wing collided killing four 
pilots. The solution for the Air Ministry was for Kuwait to appoint a British air 
adviser.648   
Britain would need to tread a careful line between supporting the build-up 
Kuwaiti forces whilst avoiding the claims by opponents that Britain was pursuing 
its financial interests at the Kuwaitis’ expense. There was little prospect in 1960 
that the Kuwaiti military would be able to stand up to a determined armoured 
attack, and the British defence guarantee continued to underpin Kuwait’s 
security strategy, even after it elected for independence in 1961. Even Kuwaiti 
opponents of British involvement in their country understood this.649  
In time, the British Government would seek Kuwait to take a greater role 
in its own protection, allowing Britain to scale-down forces dedicated to the 
defence of the emirate. Apart from a potential Saudi move on parts of Abu 
Dhabi and Oman, the other protected states did not face the same existential 
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threat from a neighbour as did Kuwait. In the decade ahead, British efforts 
among its other protégés in the Gulf were focused on internal security through 
improving the coercive instruments available to the local rulers.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: LOCAL FORCES DURING BRITAIN’S 
SILVER AGE IN THE GULF, 1961-67 
 
 
5.1 Britain’s Resurgence in the Gulf  
At a time when it was winding up its overseas commitments elsewhere, Britain 
was more willing than ever in 1961 to protect its position in the Gulf.650 Even 
after Kuwaiti independence on 19 June 1961, Britain remained committed to its 
defence. Though the special treaty relations were relinquished, Britain re-
affirmed its readiness to assist Kuwait if requested to do so.651  
In the weeks following independence, Britain implemented its plan for the 
defence of Kuwait (Operation Vantage) after it assessed that Iraq was preparing 
an invasion.652 The British completed the build-up of its military forces in Kuwait 
by the first week of July, reaching 7,000 troops. The Iraqi attack never came.653 
Harold Macmillan realised that with every day that the troops remained in 
Kuwait, Britain’s presence became harder to defend against accusations of neo-
colonialism. Before Britain withdrew its force, however, it wanted a suitable 
alternative in place. As a temporary stopgap, a peacekeeping force from the 
Arab League states replaced the British military contingent. British military 
experts judged that the Arab League forces were only capable of holding Kuwait 
Town and the airfields needed for Britain’s re-entry from a determined Iraqi 
attack for a maximum of 36 hours.654  This meant that Britain had to raise the 
state of readiness of the troops earmarked for re-entry into Kuwait. The new 
intervention plan (Operation Sodabread) required Britain to station a parachute 
battalion group permanently in Bahrain. 
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Since March 1956, the Ruler of Bahrain had allowed Britain to station 
troops in its territory without a formal agreement. On 25 October 1961, Sir 
William Luce despatched an official request to the Ruler, Shaikh Salman, for his 
agreement to accept an increase in number of British soldiers on his soil from 
425 to 1,100 (i.e. rising to battalion group strength).655 The Bahraini ruler 
acceded but wanted the increase to be (a) temporary, and (b) the use of these 
forces confined to the defence of Kuwait.656 In Kuwait, the amir agreed to pay 
for a stockpile of British weapons (including tanks, armoured cars and artillery) 
and allowed British personnel to remain in Kuwait for its maintenance.657 By 
stationing more troops in Bahrain and stockpiling equipment in Kuwait, Britain 
attempted to improve the resources immediately available for defending its vital 
interests in the emirate.658 In the 1960s, Kuwait remained the single most 
important economic interest in the region for Britain. As a result of this, the 
primary aim of British policy in the Gulf still remained after 1961 safeguarding 
Kuwaiti oil production on terms favourable to Britain.659 Britain’s ability to protect 
this interest was hindered because the Ruler refused to permit British units to 
be stationed on Kuwaiti territory out of fear of the criticism he would attract from 
Arab nationalists at home and abroad. 
The British intervention in Kuwait provided reassurance to the other 
rulers that Britain would not baulk when it came to protecting its protégés. At the 
end of 1961, the Political Resident, Sir William Luce, noted to the British 
Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, that: 
 
Britain at this moment stands more deeply committed in the Persian 
Gulf, both politically and militarily, than at any time since the last war, 
a situation which stands in marked contrast with the great contraction 
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of our political and military commitments elsewhere in the world over 
the past fifteen years.660  
 
Yet the series of politically sensitive military interventions in the Middle East 
between 1956 and 1961 led Britain to the conclusion that the states in the 
region should take a greater lead in their own security arrangements.661 The 
historian Nigel J. Ashton contends that: ‘The anxieties caused in the Jordanian 
and Kuwaiti cases by debates over whether to intervene, how to get forces in, 
how to supply them, and, crucially, how to get them out, left their psychological 
imprint on policy-makers.’ 662 Despite Britain’s continued resolve to meet its 
commitments in the Gulf, its politicians and Whitehall officials were 
incrementally compelled to accept that it was more and more difficult for Britain 
to deploy or garrison its troops in the Middle East. Logistical hurdles, growing 
international pressure for decolonisation, and the rise of Arab nationalist 
sentiment all combined to make it more attractive for British assistance to be 
applied discreetly and informally through local forces than direct military power. 
After the Kuwait crisis of 1961, Air Marshall Sir David Lee writes in his account 
of the period,  
 
[. . .] efforts had been made to encourage the various States with 
which Britain had defence agreements to establish, or in some cases 
expand, their own indigenous forces with a view to relieving Britain of 
some, if not all, of her defence responsibilities towards them. The 
Kuwait Air Force had been formed with British help and equipment, 
the Sultan of Oman’s Air Force had been built up into a viable force 
in support of his army, and a start had been made in the formation of 
an Abu Dhabi Defence Force equipped with Hunters.663 
 
It is important to not lose sight of the fact that Britain did not believe that local 
forces could fully step out from the shade provided by Britain’s military umbrella. 
As one Foreign Office official pointed out in January 1962:  
 
The larger neighbours of the Gulf States are notoriously rapacious 
and it would have been asking a good deal of the most Buddhist-
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minded state not to help itself to the riches of even so modest a place 
as Bahrain, let alone Kuwait, Qatar or (in the future) Abu Dhabi.  We 
must face the fact that the Gulf States are so scattered that they 
cannot defend their riches against their larger neighbours.664 
 
Nevertheless, the record shows that after 1961 Britain ramped up its efforts to 
enhance local security capabilities, starting with Kuwait.   
 
5.2 After Operation Vantage: The Kuwaiti Military and Britain’s 
‘Air Alone’ Concept, 1961-67 
After Operation Vantage, both British and Kuwaiti officials began re-examining 
how Kuwait’s armed forces could be better organised to deter future Iraqi 
aggression or deflect an attack if it came to it. Although Britain judged that Arab 
League peacekeepers to be of little military value, it reasoned that the force’s 
presence was a political deterrent to Iraq, and this would give Kuwait some 
breathing space to expand its military. The Al Sabah not only wanted to double 
the army to 3,000 men, but sought to re-equip it with more tanks, armoured 
cars, anti-tank missiles and jet aircraft (Jet Provosts and Hunters).665 In early 
August 1961, British defence planners offered the Ruler a large British training 
team to oversee this build-up of Kuwait’s military.666 On 19 August 1961, Sir 
William Luce told Prime Minister Harold Macmillan that it would be politically 
impossible for Kuwait to accept a training mission of more than handful of men. 
Would the Ruler consider hiring a mercenary force of Pakistanis, Macmillan 
enquired? Luce politely rejected this proposal, for ‘there was a prejudice in the 
Gulf against both Indians and Pakistanis and he [Luce] would be surprised if the 
Ruler would agree to hire forces from either country.’667 In the end, the Ruler 
accepted the presence of some British trainers. The Kuwait Liaison Team 
(KLT), as the cadre of instructors was called, comprised initially of only one Lt. 
Col. (Lyon) and six technical NCOs. British military officials soon tried to 
increase its numbers. Deputy Commander and Chief of the General Staff of the 
                                            
664 FO 371/156670, Internal Minute by E.F. Given (Foreign Office), January 1962.  
665 The Kuwait Air Force remained under the control of the army. TNA FO 
371/156893, Foreign Office circular despatch, ‘Kuwait – Troop Withdrawal and Re-
deployment,’ 25 October 1961. 
666 Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak went into exile in 1961. 
667 FO 371/156888, Record of Conversation between William Luce (Political 
Resident and Harold Macmillan (Prime Minister), 19 August 1961. 
 
 
168 
Kuwait Army, Brigadier Mubarak, asked Britain for a further sergeant major and 
a further sergeant to run training in Kuwait for junior officers and non-
commissioned officers. ‘The Kuwaitis are showing a commendable desire to get 
on with their training, Ambassador Richmond cabled back to London in 
November 1961, ‘and we should, of course, encourage this.’668  Whilst Britain 
hoped that a well-equipped army and air force might delay an Iraqi advance into 
Kuwait – providing more time for British reinforcements to arrive – there were 
some who felt that selling advanced equipment to Kuwait might also be 
damaging.669 At a meeting of the inter-departmental Arms Working Party on 5 
December 1961, the Foreign Office put forward its view that Britain ‘should not 
attempt to sell Kuwait weapons which were too sophisticated for them to handle 
as this would cause them to diversify and waste their effort and efficiency.’ Of 
course Kuwait should be sufficiently equipped, but this they argued had to be 
balanced against the fact that it was a small country with limited trained 
technical personnel.670 Taking a similar line, Ambassador Richmond railed 
against the behaviour of British arms manufacturers, who he believed were not 
acting in accordance with Britain’s approach. ‘We have,’ he wrote to the Foreign 
Office on 21 May 1962,  
 
[ . . . ] a national interest in the balanced and effective growth of the 
Kuwait armed forces. Although Brigadier Mubarak has a penchant for 
shiny catalogues and new toys we are usually able to keep him on 
the straight and narrow path of military virtue.  This task is made 
more difficult by free lancing by arms peddlers, many of whom are 
British.671  
 
For Ambassador Richmond at least, an effective Kuwait military should take 
priority over the profits of British arms companies. When it came to Kuwaiti 
military equipment purchases not related to the stockpile, British officials 
realised that they could potentially be in competition from the arms 
manufacturers of other nations. Independent Kuwait’s residual dependence on 
British arms, advice and expertise had a finite lifespan. On the issue of wire-
guided anti-tank missiles, for example, the Ministry of Defence could see no 
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operational objection in selling them, especially ‘since the Kuwaitis can no doubt 
get a similar weapon from the French, if they wish, as the Israelis have done.’  
What is more, there was an ‘obvious political advantage in having them “buy 
British,”’ defence officials concluded.672  
The Kuwaiti military’s ability to offer credible resistance to an Iraqi attack 
continued to drive British defence policy towards Kuwait in the early part of the 
1960s. British efforts to enhance Kuwaiti military readiness by selling suitable 
weapons and providing a military assistance team had mixed results.673 Britain’s 
Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which produced finished estimates from 
multiple intelligence agencies, assessed in February 1962 that ‘although the 
Kuwaiti Armed Forces continue to improve, and could be expected to offer 
resistance, their operational capability is not high.’674 The Joint Planning Staff at 
the Ministry of Defence concluded that the Kuwait Armed Forces, comprising 
now 5,500 men, Centurion tanks, armoured cars, and the recently acquired 
Vigilant anti-tank missiles, could not be relied upon ‘to hold up the Iraqis, but our 
plan [to intervene] becomes more valid as the Kuwaiti efficiency improves.’675 
The Foreign Office was ‘keenly interested in the progress of the Kuwait Army’ 
and instructed the Political Resident to include ‘an assessment of how the latest 
developments affect its ability to keep the Iraqis at bay’ in any correspondence 
on Kuwait he sent.676 Despite a steady stream of Kuwaiti officers and specialists 
attending military courses in the Britain, a January 1963 report by the KLT, 
warned that the standard of general training in the Kuwait Army was very low.  
They pleaded with the Kuwaiti defence establishment to halt further recruitment 
until the standards of the existing force was raised.677 
                                            
672 TNA FO 371/156904, F.A. Kendrick (Ministry of Defence) to G.P. Jefferies 
(Ministry of Aviation), 22 December 1961. War Office agrees to supply the Vigilant 
wire-guided anti-tank missile system but not surface-to-air guided weapons. Ministers 
ruled out the proliferation of such weapons to the Middle East. 
673 Richard A. Mobley, ‘Deterring Iraq: The UK Experience’, Intelligence and National 
Security, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2001), p. 70.  
674 TNA DEFE 6/78 Chiefs of Staff Committee, Joint Planning Staff (62) 25, ‘Kuwait 
– Re-Examination of Current Plans,’ 23 February 1962.  
675 TNA DEFE 13/268, ‘Revised Directive to Commander-in-Chief, Middle East,’ 25 
May 1962. 
676 TNA FO 371/168766, Letter from E.F. Given (Foreign Office) to Bahrain 
Residency, 23 January 1963.   
677 Ibid, Letter from Michael Errock, (British Embassy, Kuwait) to Bahrain Residency, 
6 January 1963. 
 
 
170 
Much of Kuwait’s own plans to deter Iraq formed around developing air 
power. Already in February 1962 Kuwait had received six Jet Provosts combat 
aircraft and eight of its pilots had been trained in Britain. The British 
government’s efforts to exert a measure of control over the Kuwait Air Force 
(KAF) were hampered by the presence of Colin J. Woodward, a British ex-RAF 
squadron leader. Privately employed by Kuwait as chief flying instructor to the 
Kuwait Flying Club back in August 1961, Woodward referred to himself as ‘Air 
Adviser to the Kuwait Army’ and acted outside of official British channels. The 
RAF liaison officer to Kuwait, Wing Commander Calvey, complained that: 
‘Woodward has made it plain that he resents outside policy assistance from the 
RAF, considering it as a threat to his position as air adviser to Mubarak.’ In 
Calvey’s view, the future of the KAF was not secure with Woodward advising, 
especially as his only previous experience was with light piston engine aircraft.  
‘Its [the KAF’s] control has to a large extent been withdrawn from the RAF and it 
will remain thus until Woodward’s demise.’678 Ambassador Richmond proposed 
to the Political Resident that Britain adopt a more pragmatic approach to 
Woodward issue:  
 
Woodward has many deficiencies and it is unlikely that he can put 
the KAF on a sound basis or materially assist in its development. It is 
likely that he will in due course come a cropper. But for the time 
being he has [Brigadier] Mubarak’s [Chief of Staff of the Kuwait 
Armed Forces] ear and confidence and is reluctant to share this 
position of influence with an RAF officer. For the present, we shall 
therefore have to channel RAF advice and assistance through him . . 
. .679 
 
Richmond thought, however, that it would only be a matter of time before 
Brigadier Mubarak (promoted to Major General in December 1962) would 
become disillusioned with Woodward and turn to the RAF for help.680   
On 8 February 1963, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Colonel Abd al-Karim 
Qassim, was overthrown. This did not immediately alleviate London’s concern 
about the Kuwaiti military’s poor efficacy because in March 1963 Baghdad 
received its first batch of MIG 21s (advanced combat aircraft) from the Soviet 
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Union. As a response Kuwait accepted the need to bring in British contactors to 
provide ground staff, maintenance crews and technicians for its own jet combat 
aircraft. Also, it ordered dozens more armoured and reconnaissance vehicles 
from Britain. Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations did improve towards the end of the year, 
marked by the signing of a treaty in October 1963 between the two states. With 
the perception that tensions had lessened, British planners increasingly focused 
throughout 1964/65 on Kuwaiti internal stability and, in particular, the loyalty of 
the military.681 The British now assessed that Iraqi forces would only intervene 
in conjunction with a coup attempt against the Al Sabah. As part of its counter-
coup plans, the British defence chiefs concluded that they would not be able to 
produce a large enough force to enter Kuwait if a proportion of the military were 
supporting the putsch. Was it then wise to make the Kuwaiti armed forces too 
strong, British policy-makers ruminated? The lure of financial rewards for selling 
advanced weapons also had to be taken into consideration when it came to 
British policy towards the Kuwait military.  
The potential loss of its monopoly over Kuwaiti arms purchases worried 
Britain. When it came to purchasing a squadron of combat aircraft in 1965, 
Kuwait showed that it was prepared to look beyond Britain. They were 
considering the British Lightening attack aircraft only because the United States 
had refused to sell them its superior Phantom. Again when the Kuwaitis later 
sought tanks, armoured cars, and small naval craft in 1968, they turned first to 
the US, which again told them that they should in the first instance seek to meet 
their requirements from British sources.682 As early as January 1964, the British 
Embassy in Kuwait was alive to this danger:  
 
Being more intelligent as well as smaller than the Saudis, they have 
so far shown, I believe, little of the deplorable tendency to want arms 
as status symbols. But supposing owing to the present gentlemen’s 
agreement breaking down, the United States government stops 
discouraging arms peddlers from attacking Kuwait, this may not last: 
not merely Americans but later others – including Russians – may 
arrive . . . . 683 
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The worry for Britain was not only that it would be nudged out of the arms trade, 
but also that, owing to the ‘the unscrupulous behaviour by the arms peddlers,’ 
Kuwait might find itself ‘subject to those private pressures which the Americans 
deplore in Saudi Arabia; bribes will be offered and a demand thus created for 
useless things which will reduce the efficiency of the Kuwait forces.’684 
When it came to a potential order of British surface-to-air guided 
weapons (SAGW) in 1964, British government opinion was divided.  Although 
the Ministry of Defence wanted Kuwait to buy SAGWs from Britain, it doubted 
whether Kuwait would be able to absorb these complicated weapon systems.685  
Looking further ahead, the Foreign Office took a different line: ‘if Kuwait decided 
to abrogate the 1961 Exchange of Letters, or if we could no longer count on 
facilities in Aden and Bahrain, the missiles would be of the first importance for 
Kuwait’s defence against air attack.’686  A further advantage, the Foreign Office 
argued, was that unlike aircraft, SAGWs could not be used in support of a coup 
d’état.  Rumours of a potential move against the Ruler’s life – and that that Iraq 
would capitalise in the ensuing confusion by making a move on the emirate – 
was widespread in Kuwait in September-October 1964. Indeed, Kuwait 
government put the army on high alert at certain points over this period.687 By 
November 1965, General Mubarak told British defence officials that whilst a 
coup attempt was possible, the security forces now had the threat under 
control.688  
The increased lead time Britain required for flying in troops to Kuwait in 
the event of an emergency led to a change in British plans. On the 24 
November 1965, the British Government’s Defence and Overseas Policy 
Committee conceded that unless the Ruler gave sufficient notice to move in 
land forces from Britain or the Far East, and as advanced warning for either 
event was unlikely, British military assistance if Iraq attacked would in future be 
limited to air support. This revised plan was not simply Britain cutting its coat 
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according to its cloth, but it presupposed other factors: firstly, that danger of an 
Iraqi attack had diminished greatly by 1966; secondly, that Kuwait’s military had 
been built up to such a level that it could, with British air support, deflect an Iraqi 
attack.689 So whilst this new ‘air alone’ concept was borne out of the reality of 
Britain’s diminished capability to intervene at short notice with the impending 
closure of the base at Aden,690 it also took account of Kuwait’s growing ability to 
defend herself.691 This was not just a British assessment. Kuwait in 1966 was 
more confident that as long as the British provided air support its 6000-strong 
armed forces,692 which continued to buy more tanks, scout cars and artillery, 
could repel an aggressive incursion from its northern neighbour.693  
The Ruler told the British Ambassador, Noel Jackson, in February 1966 
that he thought air power was the most valuable assistance Britain could 
provide. If additional ground forces were needed, his first appeal he told 
Jackson would be to his Arab friends, including King Feisal of Saudi Arabia who 
had recently promised him support.694  Shaikh Jabir, the Kuwaiti Prime Minister, 
also thought that the revised defence arrangements were sufficient, especially 
as Kuwait’s own air force – which had an assortment of aircraft – was making 
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great strides.695 Kuwait was further strengthening these forces by purchasing 14 
Lightening British aircraft and on land by improvements in the army’s size (the 
military jumped from about 6,000 men in 1966 to 8,400 men by the following 
year) and acquiring more British military hardware.  
The ‘air alone’ concept depended on the ability of the Kuwaiti Army, 
against the possible background of a coup, to hold the Iraqis at the natural 
defensive barrier provided by the Muttla Ridge.696  Operation Domino, as the ‘air 
alone’ plan for Kuwait was called, was an attempt to address Iraq’s 
overwhelmingly superiority in the air. Chiefly because of the poor standard of 
Kuwaiti pilots, British defence planners thought Kuwait’s air force to be of little 
operational use in combat.697 But the Kuwaiti Army also had to become battle-
worthy if Operation Domino was to be a credible plan. Not all British observers 
were confident about the abilities of the enlarged Kuwaiti ground forces.698 
Though Britain believed the Kuwait Army could stand toe-to-toe with invading 
Iraqi troops, these forces would more than likely be needed to simultaneously 
quell a coup attempt. After all, this was considered the most likely backdrop of 
any move by Iraq on Kuwait. The balance, therefore, was still with Iraq. 
Because of this assessment the British wished to step up its mentoring role 
provided by the KLT.699  Britain proposed expanding the team’s personnel by 50 
per cent – from 62 (39 British Army and 23 RAF) to 90 (65 Army and 25 RAF) 
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and pooling British personnel into a dedicated training team.700 In the event of a 
crisis, the British head of the KLT could also act as nexus for intelligence 
sharing between Britain and Kuwait. As British air action against the Iraqis 
would be coordinated by British Forward Air Controllers embedded with the 
KLT, a larger training presence would enhance the RAF’s ability to strike Iraqi 
targets in the event of war.701  
Britain understood that when it came to overt British military assistance 
Kuwait was walking a tightrope. In order to maintain an independent sovereign 
status meant retaining the political support of Egypt, which was hostile to the 
British military involvement in the country, whilst at the same time continuing to 
retain the British defence guarantee. When Iraqi aircraft entered Kuwaiti 
airspace in May 1967, however, British diplomats noticed a change in Kuwait’s 
attitude towards the British military support.702 It was clear to the British 
Embassy that ‘the Kuwait Government, as well as many private Kuwaitis of the 
older generation, set great store by what they regard as our commitment to 
defend them.’703 On 6 November 1967, Kuwait’s Minister of Defence and 
Interior, Shaikh Saad, confirmed Kuwait’s acceptance of the revised and 
expanded KLT.704  
Political scientists Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett have argued 
that the principal mechanism, aside from overt military intervention, by which 
states pursue their objectives in a subordinate state is through creating a 
dependency in security matters.705 In the case of Kuwait after 1961, however, 
Britain wanted Kuwait to be less dependent on British military support. To that 
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end, British policy was to help Kuwait build up its military so that Britain could 
limit its military commitment to, in practice, air power only. It was in fact an 
independent Kuwait which sought continued British involvement in its security 
affairs.  
 
5.3 Britain and Internal Security in Bahrain and Qatar, 1961-67 
Whereas the threat to Kuwait was largely external – in the shape of an Iraqi 
land grab – the threats posed to the rulers of the protected states were internal, 
especially after improvements in relations between London and Riyadh in the 
early 1960s reduced the likelihood that the latter would press its territorial 
claims in Eastern Arabia by force.706  With anti-colonial feeling on the rise in the 
1960s, Britain was even more reluctant to embroil its military in the internal 
security tasks. Strengthening the indigenous coercive instruments of the 
protected states became even more important for Britain in this period. This 
dovetailed with British moves at the time to push the protected states to 
modernise their government structures.707 Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart 
later outlined this agenda in a memorandum to the Cabinet in 1965:  
 
With the object of making our positions in the Gulf more secure and 
of anticipating pressure from local nationalist movements, we are 
actively engaged in modernising our relationship with the 
Shaikhdoms, and this involves keeping up pressure on the Rulers to 
modernise their own Administrations.708 
 
Even though the British Government had no formal right to interfere in the 
internal affairs of the nine protected states, it nonetheless wanted the local 
rulers to improve their capacity for governance, including placing the means for 
exercising law and order on a more formal footing.  
 The most advanced of the protected states, Bahrain had the oldest police 
force. Yet Britain’s Gulf representatives doubted the ability of the State Police to 
keep order in the event of a breakdown in security. Even the police’s British 
commander, Robert Hugh Winder, expressed his deep reservations in 1963 
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about the ability of his force to contain disturbances. The Political Resident, Sir 
William Luce and the Political Agent in Bahrain, Peter Tripp, both formed the 
impression that Winder – unlike his predecessor, St John Hammersley – was 
‘the opposite of robust in his ideas of the role of the police.’ They wanted 
Winder left with absolutely no doubt that the police were to take ‘full 
responsibility for measures to deal with disturbances, at all stages of their 
development,’ and they had to ‘disabuse him of the idea he may have that he 
can rely on the automatic support of British troops should the police find 
themselves in difficulties.’709 Britain was reluctant to use its troops, stationed in 
Bahrain since 1956, in an internal security role. The Foreign Office was sure 
that the use of the British military garrisoned in Bahrain against protesters or 
rioting would be ‘criticised as foreign intervention’. For this reason, the Foreign 
Office instructed the Residency, the use of British troops in Bahrain ‘must 
naturally only be used in the last resort, and every encouragement should be 
given to the local police force to show themselves resolute.’710 The Political 
Agent thought that the cause of Commandant Winder’s dubiety was that he did 
not feel he had the Ruler’s support and that the rank-and-file would not go into 
action against fellow Arabs in political cases.711 Reflecting this uneasiness 
about the reliability of the Bahrain State Police, London invested the Political 
Resident with the standing authority to use British troops stationed in Bahrain to 
protect the lives and property of those under British jurisdiction should a 
situation arise where the police were unable to cope.  
In December 1964, Britain renewed a confidential undertaking first given 
in 1958 that the British would, based on existing treaties and engagements, 
offer support to Bahrain state to retain its independence. The Foreign Office 
received legal advice that this guarantee in fact extended to help against 
internal as well as external threats. This clarification took on greater relevance 
when the dismissal of BAPCO workers in March 1965 triggered serious 
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disturbances.712 The Foreign Office advised the Foreign Secretary that, 
because there was no Bahrain Army, ‘if the Bahrain Police, which is an efficient 
force with British officers, should lose control of the situation, there would seem 
to be no alternative to the use of British troops to restore order.’ The Foreign 
Office judged that the parachute battalion stationed in Bahrain, ‘should amply 
suffice’ for the task of maintaining order should it come down to that.713 Britain 
again reconfirmed that the Political Resident had the authority to use British 
troops to maintain security if he assessed that the situation passes beyond the 
control of the Bahrain Police. By mid-March 1965, however, the State Police 
had regained almost complete control of Bahrain except for parts of Muharraq, 
and the prospect of deploying British troops had, for now, dissipated.  
 Coincidentally, at the time of the March disturbances the Foreign Office 
had sent a British police expert, Mr Turnball, to review the Bahrain State 
Police.714 Turnball undertook his assessment when the whole force was 
mobilised to confront widespread political dissidence and labour agitation. In 
response to the March 1965 unrest, the Ruler wanted to double the size of the 
police as soon as possible, but Turnball advised that a period of training and 
reorganisation was needed instead. The Ruler agreed to implement Turnball’s 
recommendations and hired more Britons, including white Africans of British 
descent, to reform the force.715  
 Concerned that the restarting of the school year (on 1 October) would 
bring with it a fresh bout of violence, Commandant Winder met with the Ruler, 
Shaikh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifah, on 29 August 1965 to discuss police 
matters. The Ruler decided to order more armoured vehicles, to augment the 
police with 200 Pakistani ex-servicemen, and to transfer a further hundred men 
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from the Naturs over to the regular police.716 Bahrain also purchased its own 
helicopter from Britain for controlling riots. At the end of 1965, the Bahraini 
authorities asked Britain if it would loan one of its helicopters during the periods 
that its machine was being serviced.  The Ministry of Defence agreed so long as 
Bahrain was back-charged. The Political Resident and his subordinates were 
incredulous at this tight-fisted and myopic attitude:  
 
[. . .] it would be impossible to ask the Ruler to pay for an operation 
which, quite apart from the fact that it contributes to safeguarding the 
British position in Bahrain, is part and parcel of our defence 
commitments. One of the duties of British forces in Bahrain is to 
protect British lives and property.  Since the Ruler’s own helicopter is 
performing this duty for much of the time (without charge to us), it 
would be unreasonable to ask him to pay for the use of a helicopter 
which took over the job when his machine was out of action.717 
 
While the Foreign Office and its representatives in the Gulf were encouraged by 
Bahrain’s attempts to take greater ownership over internal security duties, the 
assessment by British intelligence that militant elements in Bahrain were 
preparing to carry out attacks on the refinery and pipeline raised the stakes.718 
This served to refresh the concern that Britain had over the British leadership of 
the Bahrain State Police. The new Political Agent, Anthony Parsons, thought 
that Commandant Winder was: 
 
[. . .] becoming increasingly irrational and showing signs of mental 
and physical exhaustion verging on incipient senility. I cherish hopes 
that he may now be on the last lap and that we shall find ourselves 
with a new Commandant by the autumn.719 
 
A further problem was that the top echelon of the police was at sixes and 
sevens with each other and that Shaikh Mohammad, the hands-off head of 
police and public security, was on the worst terms with the Ruler. To make 
matters worse, in early 1966 subversive groups began attempting to kill officers 
of the recently established intelligence and investigation unit of the security 
                                            
716 TNA FO 371/179806, K. Oldfield (Political Agency, Bahrain) to M.S. Berthoud 
(Foreign Office), 30 August 1965. 
717 TNA FO 371/179806, S.J. Nuttall (Foreign Office) to K.E. Oliver (Ministry of 
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forces, the ‘Special Branch’.720 Parsons believed that these attacks were the 
‘first move in a general campaign of terrorism on Aden lines.’721 In response, 
Bahrain hired Ian Henderson, a colonial police officer with vast experience in 
tackling the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya, along with four more British and two 
Jordanian officers.722 The Special Branch was renamed the Security and 
Intelligence Services (SIS), which Henderson continued to lead until 2002. 
Bahrain also wanted to improve the morale and standards of the Arab officers in 
the force by sending them on courses in Britain, which the Foreign Office 
agreed to pay for out of its technical assistance budget. By 1967, several 
Bahrainis were attending the British police academy in Hendon and the British 
Army’s Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. Parsons was not sure whether 
this was the most sagacious policy:  
 
For the new intake of officers into the Police it would be better to 
have officers promoted from the ranks rather than playboys from the 
Ruling Family who had been accepted at Mons or Sandhurst for 
political reasons and had either failed or had been allowed to drift 
through without doing any work in order to avoid the embarrassment 
of the sack.723 
 
Despite the purchase of a further tranche of armoured vehicles and a second 
helicopter, Parsons warned against unrestrained optimism: 
 
We must clearly not be deceived by these improvements into thinking 
that everything in the garden is lovely.  Although the Bahrain State 
Police is probably better in all respects then it has been over the past 
eighteenth months, or even longer, there is still plenty wrong – there 
is a number of incompetent British officers still to be removed, the 
relationship of Shaikh Mohammad to the force leaves much to be 
desired.724  
                                            
720 On 5 March 1966 Special Branch officer Bob Langdale (his brother William was 
also in the Bahraini Special Branch) was travelling in his car with his wife and daughter 
between Jufair and Manama when they were shot at by assailants. A week later when 
Langdale and his Jordanian assistant, Mohsen, got into respective cars at their 
respective houses their vehicles blew up. Langdale lost a leg; Mohsen sustained back 
injuries. Derek Franklin, A Pied Cloak: Memoirs of a Colonial Police (Special Branch) 
Officer (London: Janus Publishing, 2006), p. 146. 
721 TNA FO 371/185352, A.D. Parsons (Political Agent, Bahrain) to M.S. Weir 
(Foreign Office), 14 March 1966. 
722 Ibid. 
723 TNA FCO 8/553, A.D. Parsons (Political Agent, Bahrain) to M.S. Weir (FO), 
‘Bahraini Military Cadets,’ 25 November 1967.  
724 TNA FO 371/185352, A.D. Parsons (Political Agent, Bahrain) to M.S. Weir 
(Foreign Office), 6 October 1966. 
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Tension in Bahrain heightened in June 1967 with the Six Day War between 
Israel and its Arab neighbours. Large demonstrations were followed by attacks 
on the small Jewish community in Manama and on citizens of Persian heritage 
because Tehran was supplying Israel with oil. The Nasser-inspired Arab 
Nationalist Movement had been the biggest internal security threat in Bahrain 
throughout much of the 1960s. But support for this organisation fizzled out after 
Israel’s rapid victory in the war destroyed Nasser’s credibility.  
In Qatar, the earlier accession issue between Shaikh Ahmad bin Ali and 
Shaikh Khalifah bin Hamad Al Thani, which dominated affairs in Qatar in 1958, 
had provided Britain with greater leverage to push for reforms in the Qatari 
security forces.  When the Ruler, Shaikh Ali, visited London as a guest of the 
British Government in August 1958 his main preoccupation in discussions at the 
Foreign Office were the succession question and the military assistance that the 
British government would afford him in the event of an internal threat from within 
the ruling family. He asked whether Britain would support his son Shaikh 
Ahmad if Shaikh Khalifah opposed the succession.  Although British officials 
replied that succession should be conducted by proper and traditional 
processes, they assured Shaikh Ali of Britain’s readiness to assist him in the 
event of his inability to maintain law and order and to support him in the event of 
an attempt to overthrow his government by violence. This support, however, 
was conditional on his efforts to proceed resolutely with the task of preserving 
internal security and promoting good governance.725  Whilst Shaikh Ali readily 
agreed to this stipulation, little attempt subsequent was made to put this into 
practice. Indeed, as a parting shot on his retirement in 1960, the Ruler’s British 
adviser, Hancock, submitted an end-of-employment report in which he wrote 
candidly to the Ruler that there was little point in expanding the police if they 
were not given the authority to enforce the law.726  Hancock was referring in 
particular to industrial strikes during which the Ruler had refused give his 
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backing to the police. In June 1960, the Political Resident also remonstrated 
with the Ruler that he had not given the police the necessary authority or his 
backing to act, and, moreover, that police guards had in fact been withdrawn 
from essential installations during the trouble. Shaikh Ali, who the Political 
Resident judged to be teetering on the edge of abdication, asked the Political 
Resident to reaffirm the British commitment to come to his aid whilst at the 
same time he requested more arms and equipment from Britain for the police, 
which was still led by the privately employed British national, Ronald 
Cochrane.727 
Tired of the burdens of governing and suffering from poor health, Shaikh 
Ali finally stepped down as ruler towards the end of 1960. When the acting 
Political Resident, M.C.G. Man, entered the main courtyard of Rayan Palace on 
23 October 1960 to oversee the succession of the Ruler’s son he observed: 
 
[. . .] what looked like a great white wave surged in from the left and 
came to rest in front of [Man’s] car – this was a solid phalanx of 
Shaikh Ahmed’s retainers in flowing white robes complete with 
bandoliers, rifles and revolvers, headed by Shaikh Ahmed himself in 
a back abba with the ever-present [Ronald] Cochrane at his side. At 
the same moment there emerged from the main majlis on the right 
Shaikh Ali himself at the head of a smaller wave of warriors.728 
 
Concerned about what Shaikh Khalifah and his supporters might do next, 
Shaikh Ali appealed to the acting Political Resident for British support and to 
legitimise his son’s accession. The next morning the leading members of the Al 
Thani family swore allegiance to Shaikh Ahmad in a ceremony watched over by 
a combined honour guard of Royal Marines (landed from HMS Loch Ruthven 
for this purpose) and the Qatari Police. Tellingly, Ronald Cochrane stood at the 
new Ruler’s side during the proceedings.  
Britain hoped that Shaikh Ahmad would give the Qatari security forces 
more backing than his father had. The early signs were positive. By the end of 
1960 Qatar had put in orders with British manufacturers for mortars, heavy 
machine-guns and armoured vehicles. Such arms would make the Qatari 
security forces the strongest power on the peninsula. But the new Ruler 
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seemed intent on building up a military force rather than an effective police for 
internal coercion, for Qatar later enquired about purchasing anti-tank weapons 
and Jet Provost aircraft from Britain. Whilst Britain broadly supported the growth 
of the British-led Qatari security forces, especially by helping Qatar hire suitable 
British police officers, the Foreign Office was cautious about British aerospace 
firms trying to sell attack aircraft to Qatar. At an Arms Working Party held in 
Whitehall in April 1961, the Foreign Office put forward its position: 
 
[. . .] the Qatari Government should not be encouraged to spend 
money on an air force for which they have no real need.  Apart from 
the strain on Qatari financial resources, however, there may well be 
undesirable repercussions elsewhere in the Persian Gulf to their 
purchasing aircraft, particularly in Bahrain, Qatar’s rival, whose 
finances are also stretched.729 
 
By March 1961, the security force had become, in the words of the Political 
Agent in Qatar, J.C. Moberly, ‘more an armed gendarmerie than a police force 
as we understand it.’ Its tasks had developed from normal police functions to 
internal security and frontier guard duties more usually carried out by an army. 
Moberly regarded the armoured squadron in particular as ‘a Qatari army in 
embryo.’730 Indeed, the force was now armed with light and medium machine-
guns, mortars, field guns, and an assortment of Land Rovers and armoured 
vehicles.731   
In contrast to Shaikh Ali, Shaikh Ahmad saw this armed force as a 
means of protecting his position, placing it under his personal control. On 
balance, Britain was pleased that the Ruler gave the security forces greater 
attention and resources. Along with Kuwait and Bahrain Qatar became a 
significant oil producer among the Gulf shaikhdoms. Britain’s aim was for the 
local government to have the wherewithal to keep order to maintain the flow of 
oil.  
Taking a similar approach to the Ruler of Bahrain and the Sultan of 
Muscat, Shaikh Ahmad insisted on employing British officers to command and 
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run his force, confiding to Political Agent Moberly on more than one occasion 
that he did not trust Arab officers.732 Indeed, 19 out of the 37 officers of the 
armed police were British.733 Under Shaikh Ahmad, Ronald Cochrane, the 
British commander of the re-styled Public Security Department became ever-
more indispensable; nearly always found at the ruler’s side, Cochrane oversaw 
the armed police as well as its semi-autonomous offshoots (the mobile regiment 
and guard regiment) – all in all, 1,401 men. The post of Police Commander 
went to R.G. Lock, another former colonial police officer who had served in the 
British Empire – in this case, Palestine, Nigeria, and Cyprus.  
If Britain believed that the enlarged police force now carried the full 
confidence of the Ruler, then this was shattered following disturbances in Doha 
in February and April 1963 that coincided with the Iraqi revolution and the calls 
for Arab unity. Retainers of a minor shaikh shot demonstrators during the night 
of 19/20 April, hardening feeling against the ruling family and precipitating a 
general strike.734 The Ruler came to see the Political Agent on 21 April, telling 
him that he had little confidence in the loyalty of the security forces.  Would 
Britain stand by the 1958 commitment to come to his aid if they mutinied, he 
asked?735 As in Bahrain, London invested the Political Resident with the 
authority to use British troops in Qatar should British interests be threatened. 
On 22 April, Britain put the Parachute Regiment battalion in Bahrain on standby 
to intervene in Qatar and positioned a landing craft loaded with four tanks and 
supporting vehicles off Doha should the paratroopers get into difficulty.736 When 
it looked as though a general breakdown of order in Qatar was a very real 
possibility, Luce had recommended that Britain stand by the Ruler militarily; 
however, any future help was conditional on the Ruler making reforms, 
including to the armed police.737 In a further round of talks between the Political 
Resident and the Ruler in June 1963 the latter intimated that he would 
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strengthen his own forces if he could no longer count on the 1958 assurance. 
Rather than support this initiative, Luce believed that:  
 
Further, and probably extensive, expenditure on his police and army 
[the armoured squadron of the police] could only make the financial 
situation worse and is, I consider, quite unnecessary. Provided his 
present forces remain loyal, they together with the several hundreds 
of armed tribesmen whom the Ruler can call upon at very short 
notice (and did so last April) should be quite adequate to deal with 
any purely internal trouble.  Equally, if the loyalty of his forces were in 
doubt (which Cochrane would deny) then there could be no possible 
advantage in strengthening them.738   
 
Because the armed police lacked any association with Qatari society, there was 
significant hostility towards it from the local population. There were only three 
Qatari officers and hardly any Qataris in the other ranks. The officers were 
predominantly British and Pakistanis and the men were a variety of other Arabs 
(Yeminis and Hadhramis). Cochrane had recently been recruiting Bedouin from 
the Northern Arabian tribes. In his eyes, they were good material and not too 
politically minded.739 British representatives were concerned that the Qatari 
government was a long way from holding a monopoly of coercion in the 
peninsula. A large part of the problem was that Shaikh Khalifah and other 
members of the ruling family held their own stockpiles of weapons with which 
they armed their retainers. As the Political Agent observed:  
 
Although I have no illusions as to the probable outcome, the Political 
Resident may wish to draw the Ruler’s attention once more to the 
dangers of allowing any arms to be held by other members of his 
family. It is really too fantastic that every shaikh has his own armed 
force, but the only satisfactory solution, their complete disarming, is 
to my mind most unlikely to be achieved.740 
 
Lacking confidence in the ability of his armed police to keep order, and in 
Britain’s guarantee to come to his aid if they failed in this task, the Ruler 
requested in 1964 to purchase 1,500 rifles from Britain. When it came to internal 
security, he said he did not want ‘to put all his eggs in one basket.’ Instead, the 
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Ruler wished to retain the ability to call on, and arm, loyal Bedouin should there 
be any doubt as to the loyalty of Qatar’s security forces.741 For Britain, Qatar 
could best achieve this by developing an efficient and professional armed 
police, not by arming ill-trained tribal allies with modern rifles. In response to 
criticism from British representatives about this policy, the Ruler brought up 
recent events in Zanzibar and Tanganyika, where, he noted, Britain did not 
intervene on behalf of the rulers. Accepting that Shaikh Ahmad could obtain 
rifles from the Saudis if he wished and that internal security was his own 
responsibility, Britain issued a ‘No Objection Certificate’ for the import of British 
rifles.742 
Britain’s confidence in the Qatari police took a further dip in 1967. The 
Political Agent in Qatar, Boyle, recorded the reactions of the force to events 
elsewhere in the Arab World. 
 
[A]fter Egypt’s defeat and Nasser’s threatened resignation, a near-
mutiny broke out in the Fort Headquarters, brought on by emotional 
strain. Firm action and personal intervention by the Deputy Ruler 
averted an outbreak, but he had a severe shock, and the result was 
that a large section of unstable Yemini and Yafei soldiers were 
weeded out and returned to their own countries.743 
 
When violence broke out during the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War, the police were 
unable to deal with a demonstration outside the Political Agency. A number of 
windows were smashed and it took the Ruler’s Bedouin armed retainers to 
restore calm.  
 
5.4 Policing in the Trucial States, 1961-67 
Unlike Bahrain and Qatar, none of the Trucial States were producing oil at the 
turn of the decade. This meant that, except for a few of the coastal towns 
(notably Dubai), the Trucial States were largely undeveloped. By the late 1950s, 
Dubai and Abu Dhabi had police forces functioning in the main towns, but for 
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the most part responsibility for internal security in the Trucial States, and 
especially the smaller northern shaikhdoms (Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, 
Ras al-Khaimah, and Fujairah), belonged to the British-run TOS. The Foreign 
Office, however, sent a colonial police expert, Robert Waggitt, to appraise 
policing arrangements in the Trucial States in 1961. Although the rulers of the 
northern shaikhdoms kept armed retainers (askars), and could appeal to 
Political Resident for assistance from the TOS, Waggitt recommended that 
Britain set up a police force to cover these five states.744 Resident Luce, did not 
judge a police force necessary for the northern shaikhdoms, arguing to the 
Foreign Office in August 1961 that: 
 
Given the size and very unsophisticated nature of the five smaller 
Trucial Shaikhdoms in question, and the absence of anything more 
than large villages, there is little to warrant the creation of a special 
force of the kind envisaged by Waggitt. The incidence of crime is 
inconsiderable and the maintenance of law and order in each of 
these Shaikhdoms by the authority of the Ruler backed up by his 
“Askars” [armed retainers] continues to be reasonably satisfactory. In 
other words I see no need to have policemen “on the beat” in any of 
these Shaikhdoms.745  
 
Luce did believe, however, that the TOS should employ a police expert at its 
headquarters to command a small mobile police unit of about 35 men.746 Would 
the War Office pay half the cost of such police wing, particularly as it would not 
be performing a military role?  To advance Luce’s case, the Residency 
suggested quoting The Trucial Oman Levies Regulation (King’s Regulation No. 
1 1951) which made it explicate that police work remained the primary function 
of the Scouts and the raison d’être for its existence.747 Plans to create a police 
wing within the TOS for policing the towns of the northern shaikhdoms took form 
with the hiring of Major Jack Briggs from the Qatari armed police. Briggs did not 
think that a police unit following the mobile patrolling methods of the TOS would 
                                            
744 Until 1961, the Political Agent based in Dubai was responsible for all the Trucial 
states, but was also assisted by a Political Officer in Abu Dhabi after 1957. Reflecting 
Abu Dhabi’s growing importance this post was upgraded to a full Agency in 1961. 
745 TNA FO 371/157062, William Luce (Political Resident) to Foreign Office, 5 
August 1961. 
746 Hawley diary entries show that he devoted a great deal of his time in April and 
May to this matter. Hawley (2007), p. 307. 
747 TNA FO 371/163046, M.C.G Man (Bahrain Residency) to A.R. Walmsley 
(Foreign Office), 10 March 1962. 
 
 
188 
work. As prevention of crime was the main aim of any police force, Briggs 
believed that only stationing men in the towns would be of benefit.748 For this to 
happen, the TOS police wing concept would require the backing of the local 
rulers in the northern shaikhdoms. Towards that end, Briggs toured the area in 
the summer of 1963, spending time with each leading shaikh.749 Not all the local 
rulers supported the police wing concept – let alone the TOS as a whole. 
Shaikh Saqr of Sharjah, for example, thought the TOS ‘were of no value to him 
and were intended only to protect Britain’s oil interest.’750  Ultimately, the rulers 
did not assent to the TOS police wing operating in their towns. The scheme 
suffered a setback which it never really recovered from.751 With no immediate 
work for him to do, Briggs accepted an invitation from the Ruler of Dubai in May 
1965 to become the commandant of the police there.  
Britain decided to switch course and decided help each shaikhdom 
develop its own police when asked for assistance. For instance, the British 
agreed to Shaikh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah’s request to acquire 50 rifles for a 
proposed police force and supported the proposal that his son, Shaikh Khalid, 
visit British police establishments to learn more about policing methods. The 
Political Agent for the Trucial States thought that agreeing ‘would pay a 
dividend’ as it ‘is essential that the Ruler should feel he has our positive backing 
in launching his police force.’752  When the unruly Habus tribe occupied Ras al-
Khaimah’s municipal water rig in May 1965, the TOS joined the recently 
established Ras al-Khaimah Police to confront the group. Even so, Shaikh Saqr 
reverted back to mobilising four hundred tribesmen to the scene as he did not 
want the TOS to intervene against his own subjects, even rebellious ones. 
British support for the fledgling Ras al-Khaimah Police cooled when it was 
suspected that Shaikh Saqr was using the establishment of a police force as 
veil behind which to arm his tribesmen with modern rifles. Distrust of Shaikh 
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Saqr’s motives was fuelled by his association and with open support for the 
Cairo-sponsored Arab League. Britain thought he needed close watching.753 
The two most powerful shaikhdoms of the Trucial States already had 
established police forces (Dubai Police was formed in 1957 and the Abu Dhabi 
Police in 1958). The Ruler of Abu Dhabi, Shaikh Shakhbut Al Nahyan, had 
played with the idea of a small police force as early as 1955, even putting 
several of his askars through a TOS-run training course. From their inceptions, 
British officers commanded both the Abu Dhabi and Dubai police forces but with 
very little direct involvement from Britain. Equipped with a hodgepodge selection 
of vehicles, as well as a small naval launch, Shaikh Shakhbut treated the Abu 
Dhabi Police ‘very much as his own private army,’ which meant, according to 
British police expert Waggitt, who inspected the force in 1961, that ‘[e]very item 
of expenditure on the force has to be personally approved by the Ruler, even for 
such minor items as having a P.C.’s [police constable] boots repaired.’754 When 
later Britain hoped that the Trucial States would form a joint police force, Britain 
held little hope that the Shaikh Shakhbut would consider even for a moment any 
form of amalgamation.755  
When Shakhbut decided to form a police force, he had asked Britain to 
find a suitable officer to run it. Britain’s candidate, Cosby Stokes, who had 
experience in the Indian and Sudanese police forces, did not last long.756 Whilst 
Shaikh Shakhbut persistently challenged British representatives, he raised no 
initial objections to Britain’s selection of Stokes.757 Soon after his arrival in Abu 
Dhabi, however, Shaikh Shakhbut terminated his employment. So although 
Britain could recommend police commanders, the rulers had final say on 
whether their employment continued or not. Even in Dubai where the Foreign 
Office paid the salary of the Commandant, Peter Lorimer, he answered 
ultimately to the Ruler. On 17 May 1965, the Ruler, whose relations with 
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Lorimer had been strained for some time, sacked him.758 Despite the disaster 
with Stokes, Shaikh Shakhbut told the Political Agent in the Trucial States, 
Donald Hawley, that he would still accept the Foreign Office’s recommendation, 
William (Bill) Edge, for a replacement.759  After a year commanding the Abu 
Dhabi Police, Edge complained to the Political Agent in a confidential note that 
salaries were appallingly low (120 rupees a month, which was 30 rupees lower 
than a labourer) and never paid on time, that supplies were never ordered, and 
that guards on duty at the palace were denied water and food. Although Shaikh 
Shakhbut agreed to increase the police to 400 men, Edge was finding it difficult 
to obtain recruits because of the poor conditions.  ‘It appears that the Ruler is a 
lonely and suspicious person, he does not trust anyone . . . his name is a 
password amongst the people as a miser’.760  The police’s inadequacies were 
more than trifling matter for Britain.  
 Labour violence in May 1963 at Abu Dhabi’s oil facilities provided stark 
illustration of the ineffectiveness of the police. The shaikhdom’s growing wealth 
had made Abu Dhabi attractive for workers from other Arab countries, many of 
whom brought Arab nationalist and revolutionary ideas with them to the oil field. 
The Political Resident in Bahrain and Political Agent in Abu Dhabi, Hugh 
Boustead, impressed on the Ruler the seriousness of the situation and his 
responsibility for maintaining law and order. The Political Resident told him that 
‘if he and his police are unable to protect the lives and property of foreigners 
under our jurisdiction we [Britain] shall be compelled to do so.’ Indeed, units of 
the TOS were readied and were standing by for this purpose.761 Commenting 
unfavourably on the police, the American oil workers at the Abu Dhabi 
Petroleum Company camps stated emphatically that they would not stay and 
work unless security improved. Boustead advised Shakhbut that he must have 
more experienced police officers who ‘would give Abu Dhabi the proper kind of 
training, in particular for security duties, generally, and when strikes got out of 
hand.’  Shakhbut agreed to Boustead’s recommendation to bring in a British 
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police training officer from Bahrain, as well as a further British NCO and three 
Arab sergeants from the TOS for three months.762 Duncan Slater at the Political 
Agency in Abu Dhabi believed that a British officer from Bahrain could be a 
great opportunity to expand British influence in the Abu Dhabi Police. ‘As I see 
it,’ Slater wrote,  
 
beyond our immediate objective of giving the Abu Dhabi Police some 
training in riot drill, we ought to be looking for someone who, in 
Edge’s absence (he was on leave), will show Shakhbut what a real 
and efficient police officer is like, and how effective he can be. It 
ought to be someone who can do a disproportionate amount of good 
in a short period of time.  The Ruler will then be readier to agree to 
the appointment of other British officers in due course, to get rid of 
Edge, so that our ultimate main objective, that of radically improving 
the Abu Dhabi Police, will be furthered.763   
 
The Resident’s expectations that the labour unrest in 1963 would encourage 
Shakhbut to seek more British support for the police proved a miscalculation.764 
The British officer loaned from the Bahrain State Police, Mr. Parrett, tried to set 
up a riot squad in Abu Dhabi but had his work frustrated at every turn. British 
officials blamed the Ruler and Bill Edge for whom they had a growing distrust.  
Hugh Boustead in particular wanted Edge replaced with a new British 
commandant, but accepted that this would be difficult as it was accepted that 
Edge had Shakhbut’s ear.765 Edge would later be involved in secretly planning 
for setting up a military force for the Ruler.  
Unlike the Abu Dhabi Police, Britain valued the Dubai Police from its 
inception, especially its role in intercepting mines and arms coming through its 
port and destined for insurgents in Oman. Local intelligence sources also 
believed rebels were using Dubai for storing landmines and as a safe haven.766  
The ruler of Dubai, Shaikh Rashid Al Maktoum, ordered his British police 
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commandant, Peter Lorimer, to devise a scheme for keeping not only Dubai but 
also all of the Trucial States clear of arms smuggling.767 The proliferation and 
use of landmines continued to be of concern for British interests in Trucial 
Oman.768 The extent of the problem was brought home on 8 April 1961 when a 
bomb planted by Omani terrorists exploded on the British India Steam 
Navigation Company ship, MV Dara, off the coast of Dubai killing 238 out 819 
passengers.769 Britain’s representatives called on London to do more to support 
the Dubai Police.  
 Although half of the population of the Trucial States resided in Dubai, the 
police force numbered little over 100 in 1962. Britain subsidised the police 
budget on the grounds that majority of those subject to British jurisdiction in the 
Trucial States (mostly the 5,000 Indians and Pakistanis) lived in Dubai town. 
British officials thought the British contribution, which covered the salary of 
Peter Lorimer, gave Britain ‘an influence within the force out of all proportion to 
the cost.’ When the Ruler stated his aim to expand the force, the Political Agent, 
James Craig, argued Britain should assist by increasing its financial subsidy.770 
‘The town has grown immensely busier, richer, and more sophisticated,’ Craig 
wrote to the Residency in February 1962.771 In his appeal for more British 
support, Craig remarked that Abu Dhabi, which had a total population one 
quarter of Dubai’s and a town population one-twelfth, had a police force three 
times that of Dubai. Continuing with comparisons, he noted that ‘Qatar’s 
population is only slightly larger than Dubai’s but it has eighteen hundred 
policemen – nearly fifteen times as many [as Dubai].’  The Political Resident’s 
initial rejection of increasing the British subsidy did not deter Craig. The Political 
                                            
767 Diary notes of conversation between Shaikh Rashid and the Political Agent 
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Agent picked up his theme again in early 1963.772 Craig’s arguments on the 
issue are worth including in full. ‘I need not remind Your Excellency,’ Craig 
wrote to the Resident, Sir William Luce, in January 1963,  
 
[. . .] of the fact that HMG have in recent years largely accepted 
responsibility for the internal security of the Trucial States; that 
throughout most of the other states their security is dependent in the 
Trucial Oman Scouts which cost us far more per head than the Dubai 
Police and for which Her Majesty’s Government pay every penny; 
and that a special wing of the Trucial Oman Scouts is about to be 
formed which will carry the police duties in five of the seven States 
and for which, again, Her Majesty’s Government will bear the sole 
financial responsibility. No one knows better than Your Excellency 
the extent and the closeness of the cooperation which the Dubai 
Police affords to this Agency, to the Residency in Bahrain, to the 
Trucial Oman Scouts and to Her Majesty’s Armed Forces in the area.  
There can be no doubt that the help we have had from the Dubai 
Police in combating the Omani terrorists has been invaluable – far 
more zealous, certainly, and wholehearted than from any other police 
force except that of the target area, Muscat itself.773  
 
Craig’s entreaty to the Residency worked; the proposal to increase Britain’s 
contribution to the Dubai Police was given the backing of the Resident.774 
 Britain did not view the dangers to the Trucial States purely through the 
lens of Omani rebels however. From the mid-1960s, British officials increasingly 
warned of the coming dangers to the area from Arab nationalist ideologies 
which sought to discredit the existing governments of the Gulf by labelling them 
reactionary and imperialist stooges.775 The cockpit of Arab nationalist criticism 
of Britain was Cairo and the mouthpiece was Egypt’s president, Gamal Abdel 
Nasser, who used his elaborate propaganda machine to push anti-British 
sentiment.776 In May 1966, the Political Agent in the Trucial States gave his 
assessment of the internal security situation for the coming two years. He 
concluded that the area (the report did not encompass Abu Dhabi in the states 
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under review) was ‘ripe for subversion and singularly ill-equipped to undertake 
counter-subversive action.’ The only local counter-subversion resources were 
negligible, limited to the Intelligence Officers of the TOS and Jack Briggs and 
his assistant in the Dubai Police. ‘Major Briggs, with immense effort, has 
organised a force in Dubai which by his own assessment can only be described 
as elementary,’ the Political Agent contended. Elsewhere there was nothing 
‘except feudal levies,’ which were called out ad hoc and not a useful tool in 
dealing with the security problem, his report warned.777 The Political Agent 
identified Dubai and Sharjah as the focal points for agitation and recommended 
setting up a British-led Special Branch in Dubai (as well as adding another 
British policeman to the Dubai Police) and establishing a regular police force of 
50 men for Sharjah commanded by a British officer with an Arab officer 
assisting. Though the report proposed that the Ruler of Sharjah, Shaikh Khalid 
Al-Qasimi (Shaikh Saqr was deposed in 1965, see below), pay for most of the 
police, the Political Agent believed that Britain should select, and pay for, two 
officers ‘to ensure that the Ruler did not, left to his own devices, make 
unsuitable appointments.’ Other recommendations included forming a Special 
Branch in the Police Wing of the TOS to cover the five smaller Trucial States 
and to increase the number of Desert Intelligence Officers recruited by London 
from two to five.778 
 The Resident agreed that the situation as he saw it in mid-1966 was 
cause for alarm. In the British government’s eyes, the primary responsibility for 
dealing with the forecasted increased threats to stability rested with the local 
state police forces, where they existed, backed throughout by the TOS. Yet the 
only local police force considered by Britain to be worth its powder and shot was 
in Dubai. And even then, Jack Briggs, its British commandant, had little 
confidence in its reliability. Voicing his opinion in November 1966, Jack Briggs 
wrote:  
 
Anyone who has ever served in locally enlisted Forces anywhere in 
the world must have questioned the loyalty of his men at some time 
or another. The Dubai Police Force is, like all other Police Forces in 
the Gulf to a greater or lesser extent, a mercenary force. There are a 
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number of so-called Dubai subjects in the Force but these are either 
Bedouin or of Iranian or Baluch parentage. The Rulers are all against 
having their own subjects in their police forces and armies and prefer 
to rely on mercenaries. Personally I have had many doubts in the 
past about how most of these men, and particularly those from the 
South Arabian Federation and the Yemen, would act if committed to 
action involving the use of force by the police against persons 
demonstrating for some Arab Nationalist, or anti-imperialist, cause.  
This happened last March [1965], in Bahrain and the Force showed 
no sign of cracking, apart from one or two of the Bahraini officers.’779 
 
The Political Resident judged the Abu Dhabi Police to still be ‘notoriously 
ineffective,’ and Britain could not count on Ras al-Khaimah’s 80 ill-trained 
policemen largely because the political reliability of the Ruler, Shaikh Saqr, was 
suspected. The rulers of the four other shaikhdoms (Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-
Quwain and Fujairah) possessed nothing beyond a handful of armed retainers. 
Sympathy for the Arab League in the northern Trucial States worried Britain. 
The rulers of Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman and Umm al-Quwain were 
meeting daily in May-June 1965 to discuss this issue; Britain expected them to 
apply to join the Arab League and fretted that Dubai and Fujairah could follow 
suit.780 Britain viewed the Arab League’s attention towards Trucial States as a 
Nasserite scheme to undermine its position in the area. Britain later helped in 
the deposition of Shaikh Saqr as the Ruler of Sharjah in 1965 by his family 
largely because of his active support for an Arab League development office in 
the Trucial States.781 British officials had little doubt that Saqr’s sympathies lay 
with Cairo rather than with Britain.782 On 22 June 1965, the Resident, Sir 
William Luce, reported to London that Shaikh Saqr was preparing passports for 
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Arab League visitors. The following evening, leading members of the ruling 
family handed the Deputy Resident a letter calling for the Ruler to stand down. 
On the morning of the 24 June, the Deputy Political Resident summoned Shaikh 
Saqr to the Political Agency in Dubai to inform him of his family’s wish to 
replace him with Shaikh Khalid and to instruct him to leave the country 
immediately. 
The Political Resident warned his subordinates that a strong case was 
needed if the Foreign Office was to be persuaded to bankroll further British 
police officers for nascent police forces in Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah. In May 
1966, the Political Agency in Dubai picked what it thought was the strongest line 
of argument to be delivered to London:  
 
It is considerably more in the interests of HMG than the Ruler of 
Sharjah that the State Police Force is raised and trained and run in 
an efficient way right from the start. If HMG pay the commander’s 
salary it is liable to have considerably more influence over the Police 
Force than otherwise. At this stage this seems desirable. It is 
pertinent to point out that where a state such as Ras al-Khaimah has 
been left to remit and pay its own police officers, the first three 
officers to be recruited are all Egyptian-trained.  We do not want this 
in Sharjah.783   
 
When asked on 2 August 1966 whether he would accept a British officer to 
command his police, the Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah replied that he would do so 
without hesitation. Because Ras al-Khaimah was regarded by the Political 
Agency as one of the most likely places for hostile forces to infiltrate the area, a 
British officer was considered as useful as in Dubai and Sharjah.784 The 
Residency agreed, adding that it was also important to get Shaikh Saqr back 
onside with Britain after his support for the Arab League in 1965 led to a break 
down in relations.  
Against the backdrop of a shrinking British economy, financial authority 
was granted to pay for a deputy commandant to support Jack Briggs in Dubai; 
for a new British commandant in Sharjah; for four Special Branch officers (two 
for Dubai and two for the TOS police wing); and, lastly, for a British officer to 
head up the Ras al-Khaimah Police. The Foreign Office picked colonial police 
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officers for these positions (Trevor Bevan for Ras al-Khaimah, Bob Burns for 
Sharjah, and Jack Humphreys for Dubai).785  The Ruler of Sharjah, however, 
claimed he had no money for a police force. British officials suspected that his 
real concern was Cairo’s reaction if a British officer commanded his force.786    
 In order to tackle subversion in all the protected states, Britain formed in 
1966 a Persian Gulf Local Counter-Subversion Group and pushed for British 
commanders to head each police force so that there was a regular exchange of 
information up and down the coast.787 The genesis of this information sharing 
group can be traced to December 1965 when the Residency coordinated the 
first meeting of the British police commandants from Bahrain, Doha, Abu Dhabi 
and Dubai. In 1967, British commandants from Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah 
joined the annual conference for coordinating police activities, which came to be 
called the Committee of Police Arabian Gulf States.788 Britain also paid for an 
intelligence bureau in 1967. Housed in the Sharjah Police fort and staffed by a 
British officer and clerk, the bureau held card indexes for 20,000 personalities of 
interest in the Gulf, as well as suspect shipping and business. As an additional 
measure, the Residency employed a Security Liaison Officer from the British 
Security Service’s (MI5) counter-sabotage section. He visited all the Gulf states 
to make recommendations on protection of key points such as government 
buildings and oil installations.  
 
5.5 Subsidy and Secondments: Britain and the SAF, 1961-67  
The 1958 ‘Exchange of Letters’ and the 1960 ‘Agreed Minutes’ together codified 
British influence over the development of the Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF). In 
return for subsidising the defence budget, Britain had the right to undertake 
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annual inspections to ensure that the military was being structured along the 
lines of the 1960 Hope-Thompson recommendations. For Britain this was the 
route map that had to be followed. When the Sultan proposed buying armoured 
cars from Britain, for example, the Treasury replied that the subsidy money 
could not be used, as this equipment was not in the Hope-Thompson report.789 
It would be misleading to say that Britain was now in complete control, however. 
The Sultan could – and did on occasion – reject British candidates for command 
positions in the SAF.790  
Britain continued to subsidize the SAF after the Jebel Akhdar campaign 
of 1957-9 because it believed that rebels in the Omani interior, funded and 
supported by Saudi Arabia, posed a current and future threat. Britain wanted to 
reduce the Sultan’s dependence on British direct military support in controlling 
his territory. British combat units and the TOS on training visits to Oman in the 
early 1960s also assisted the SAF curtail dissidents in the Omani interior. 
Despite the exile of the principle rebel leaders, mine-laying in Oman continued 
after the seizure of Jebel Akhdar from the rebels in January 1959. Other 
developments at the time included placing the gendarmerie force that operated 
on the Batinah Coast onto a more formal footing and strengthening the 
intelligence apparatus. In addition, a British contract officer, Jasper Coates, was 
transferred from the gendarmerie force to the fledgling Sultan of Oman’s Navy 
(SON) to turn it into a modern force capable of undertaking coastal patrol work 
to halt the import of mines and other weapons.  
In mid-1961, the British Treasury was pressing to end the British-assisted 
expansion of the SAF. The Residency pushed back, arguing that because of 
continued rebel activity in the interior and with little hope of a settlement, there 
was the possibility of the SAF being unable to deal with a more general 
insurrection, thereby necessitating British involvement. ‘Such intervention would 
be,’ the Residency warned, ‘costly and politically very undesirable.’ Moreover, 
the Residency argued that the ‘increased efficiency of the SAF has greatly 
reduced this possibility, and promises to do so still further, but any falling-off of 
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this efficiency would, of course, have the opposite effect.’791  Even the 
Residency lost its patience when the Sultan cut his own financial contribution to 
the SAF by half in 1961-62 (from £40,000 to £20,000).  What really irked British 
officials was that at the same time the Sultanate spent £20,000 building a house 
for Chauncy, the former Consul-General now privately employed as an adviser 
to the Sultan.792  
 In anticipation of an impending re-examination of the subsidy in 1963, the 
Foreign Office asked the Ministry of Defence to re-state Britain’s strategic 
interests in Muscat and Oman. An earlier Cabinet review on this same question 
in 1960 declared that the air facilities at Masirah and Sharjah were 
indispensable for the defence of Kuwait. As instability in the Omani interior 
would affect either base, it remained crucial that Britain help the Sultan gain 
greater control over his territory. Not only did the British Chiefs of Staff believe 
that this thinking remained just as relevant in 1963, but that the expansion of 
Abu Dhabi’s oil production and the increased military use of the airbase on 
Masirah Island since 1960 made continuing the assistance to the Sultan’s 
military even more important than before.793 The Treasury was unconvinced 
and steadfast in its desire to end the financial subsidy to the Sultan. The 
Ministry of Defence thought that the Treasury’s thinking on this issue, and its 
more general attitude towards British overseas defence policy, was myopic:  
 
Their [the Treasury’s] whole approach to the provision of any money 
for defence purposes east of Suez [. . .] is governed by their 
determination to keep defence spending within 7% of the United 
Kingdom Gross National Product and to this end they are, in the high 
level review of our military dispositions east of Suez now being 
conducted as a result of the Defence Committee Meeting at 
Chequers on February 9, questioning the basis for our long term 
policy, commitments and dispositions in the Middle East theatre and, 
in anticipation of gaining their way, they are also trying to oppose any 
short or medium-term projects which can remotely be linked with 
defence anywhere east of Suez.794 
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In contrast, the Ministry of Defence thought that furnishing money on the SAF 
was sound and might perhaps in the long run be less costly. The Permanent 
Undersecretary explained the ministry’s reasoning in May 1963: 
 
The Treasury’s position is illogical since [. . .] one of the investments 
we can now make in the hope of eventually being enabled to reduce 
our defence expenditure overseas is the building up of friendly forces 
e.g. by training, secondment, loans and even, as here, in grants of 
aid.795   
 
With great reluctance the Treasury agreed in 1963 to extend the subsidy for a 
further year. This was a relief to British officials who pointed to intelligence 
reports of 1964 that claimed that bands of Omani rebels were training in Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq and Syria, and that a renewed campaign was around the corner. A 
rebellion when it came did not emerge in the interior but in the southern Dhofar 
province. All the same, Britain was drawn deeper into the Sultan’s defence 
apparatus as a result of this new threat. The rebellion in the mountainous 
Dhofar province from the mid-1960s onwards demonstrated the Sultan’s 
continued reliance on British succour. Handcuffed by the anti-colonial mood of 
the day, Britain flinched from overt military intervention. Instead the policy of 
building up the Sultan’s own means of confronting the rebels was favoured.  
A series of mine attacks around Salalah (the principal town in Dhofar 
Province and the site of a RAF base) in August 1964 had signalled the 
rumblings of the coming rebellion.796 Figuring out a response to mine explosions 
between the airbase and the jetty, and on the oil company road to north, the 
RAF commander at RAF Salalah, the British Consul-General and the Resident 
all agreed that ‘RAF flag-waving sorties over tribal territory’ would be of little use 
in combating these attacks. Instead, British officials wanted the Sultan’s small 
Dhofar Force to carry out patrolling with the support of the Sultan’s air force to 
disrupt the planting of mines. The Sultan rejected this proposal leading British 
officials to conclude that the RAF contingent would have to be reinforced.797 
British representatives and military officers did not hold the SAF in high regard. 
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A Baluchi mutiny in the Northern Frontier Regiment in August 1963 hardened 
the opinion that the SAF were unreliable and that sub-standard British contract 
officers were holding back the development of the military. Britain’s response 
was to increase the proportion of regular seconded officers to the SAF, 
cementing this policy in a 1964 agreement which committed Britain to provide 
33 regular officers on loan. Words are often easier than deeds, and Britain 
struggled to produce these officers. According to the Sultan’s Military Secretary, 
Pat Waterfield, this failure was ‘a serious matter under present conditions 
particularly bearing in mind our added commitment in Dhofar and the 
uncertainty of rebel capabilities and intentions in Oman.’798  Moreover, a further 
15 British officers (on top of the promised 33) would be needed if the Sultan’s 
third battalion of the SAF was established. The British Ministry of Defence’s 
Director of Military Operations, who visited Muscat and Oman in 1965, told 
Waterfield that as the Sultanate was now higher up in British worldwide 
priorities it would be first on the list for secondments.799 The reality was very 
different, as one senior official in the Foreign Office explained: ‘It looks as 
though Brigadier Waterfield may have misunderstood what the Director of 
Military Operations said to him. The general situation with regard to the supply 
of British officers has not improved; if anything it has worsened.’ The demand 
for secondments of British officers had been growing in the newly independent 
Commonwealth countries. The Foreign Office promised to keep the pressure 
on, but accepted that the Ministry of Defence could only provide perhaps one or 
two additional officers at most.800   
The Sultan excluded the British-officered SAF units from taking an active 
role in the rebellion in the Dhofar province.801  The Provosts and Beavers of the 
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SOAF with their British contracted pilots, however, provided air support to the 
Sultan’s small Dhofar Force in the area.802 Deadly ambushes against several 
patrols in 1966 by the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF), as the rebels called 
themselves, followed by an attempt on the life of the Sultan by members of his 
own bodyguard brought into stark relief the unsuitability of the Dhofar Force and 
the pressing need for a new approach.803 British officials considered this small 
Dhofar Force, consisting of a couple of hundred men plus armoured cars, 
inadequate to carry out operations against the DLF. After the attempt on the 
Sultan’s life, slaves and ex-slaves were formed into a new unit, commanded by 
contract Pakistani officers. The Sultan also retained about 400 Omani askars in 
Dhofar from loyal Arab tribes. These untrained men and boys – their ages 
ranged from eight to 80 – provided their own rifles. They guarded the perimeter 
of RAF Salalah and provided an escort for the Sultan.804   
Perturbed by the growing dissident activity in the vicinity of RAF Salalah, 
and holding little confidence in the Sultan’s ability to do anything about it, Britain 
decided to fly in a detachment of the paratroopers based in Bahrain to defend 
the base.805 The Sultan increased the SAF presence in Dhofar to three 
companies in early 1966, but this was not enough. Staging attacks from across 
the border in the East Aden Protectorate, the rebels had the initiative. ‘If rebel 
attacks still prove difficult to deal with,’ Sir William Luce surmised, the Sultan 
‘might have to consider seeking British help on the ground.’806 In an effort to 
disrupt rebel bases across the border in the East Aden Protectorate, Britain 
launched Operation Fate in October 1966.807  
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There was also fear at the time about a second front opening up in 
central Oman, and that rebels would attack oil infrastructure in the area.808 To 
combat this threat, Britain wanted the Sultan to set up a regular police force and 
establish an intelligence unit (a Special Branch) for counter-subversion duties. 
The Sultan only really had the Oman Gendarmerie, with 14 officers and 411 
men, which performed quasi-police duties along the land frontier with the Trucial 
States and along the Batinah Coast.809 Beyond this force and the armed 
watchmen manning the gates and prison in Muscat, there was no police force to 
speak of. British police adviser, Mr. Turnball, argued that a Special Branch force 
could only function within the framework of an efficient police force – both had 
to be developed in tandem. Appreciating the financial and manpower 
constraints the Sultan faced, Turnball proposed in June 1965 that Muscat and 
Oman begin with a modest 150-man police force, concentrated in the capital 
Muscat. This, he proposed, could then grow to take over responsibility for 
policing the whole of Oman, including the oil installations.810 Sultan Said, 
however, refused to allocate any funds for a police force. It was not until 1968 
that the Sultan formed a town police for Muscat and hired a British police officer 
to command it.811 In September 1966, the oil company, Petroleum Development 
Oman (PDO), set up and paid for its own special police force to operate within 
the oil producing areas.812  
In contrast to the proposed police force, the Sultan did wish to expand 
his military. He and his Military Secretary, Pat Waterfield, discussed their 
intention to expand the military with British officials. The Sultan wanted to 
purchase and deploy attack and light transport aircraft in Salalah to help the 
efforts against rebels. Britain hoped that a more capable air force in the Sultan’s 
hands would reduce the likelihood of a request for direct intervention by the 
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RAF.813  But how the Sultan was to pay for expanding his military was another 
question.  
According to a second set of ‘Agreed Minutes’ from 26 July 1965, the 
British declared that the financial subsidy to the SAF would be extended to the 
middle of 1967 but thereafter end for good. Whilst this would in effect release 
the Sultan from British supervision of his military, it was expected that he would 
still continue to request other forms of British military assistance.814 The Consul-
General, D.C Carden, thought it was ‘virtually certain that [the Sultan] will ask 
for the continuation of help in the form of the secondment of officers and NCOs 
to his army, and possibly in larger numbers than hitherto’.815 Although the 
Sultan regarded the British subsidy as important, he told Carden that the 
continued secondment of personnel was, in contrast, irreplaceable.816  He 
remonstrated in February 1967 when Britain presented him with a new 
agreement that only provided for one more year of secondments to his forces. 
Carden tried to explain to the Sultan that Britain could not be expected to loan 
military personnel forever. The Sultan, however, replied that Carden had missed 
the crux of the matter: providing British personnel on loan to the SAF was a 
common interest. Carden had initially recommended to his superiors that 
seconding should be reviewed on a year-on-year basis on order to give Britain 
leverage over the Sultan, but he now wanted to abandon this approach. The 
reason for this was that Carden believed,   
 
Britain must accept the fact that providing him these men is the heart 
of our relationship with him, and is firmly tied to our interest here, i.e. 
P.D.(O.) Ltd., the RAF air stations, the BBC relay station (Masirah), 
and the Sultanate’s bearing on the position in the Gulf.817   
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Secondments to the SAF continued and remained at the centre of British 
involvement in Omani defence affairs for decades to come.818 
 
5.6 The Scouts: The Force for the Trucial States? 
It was not the presence of the Trucial Oman Scouts that deterred Saudi Arabia 
from pursuing its territorial claims in Eastern Arabia; it was Britain’s special 
treaty obligations that conferred protective status on the Trucial States. The 
United States understood this. A State Department position paper from 1962, 
‘Oil and Interdependence in the Middle East’, assessed that:  
 
Should the British completely sever their special ties with these 
shaikhdoms, Saudi Arabia would probably not hesitate to occupy the 
Trucial Coast by force. It is unlikely that Iraqi or Iranian threats to 
intervene would deter the Saudis in this move, nor would the 1,000 
British-officered Trucial Oman Levies pose much of an obstacle.819 
 
But the TOS was part of how Britain would protect the area from attack, and the 
force was reconfigured into a war-fighting organisation for this purpose. By 
emphasising the TOS’s military utility for Britain’s presence in the Gulf, and by 
deploying squadrons into the Omani interior in the late 1950s, Britain had 
undermined its original policy of encouraging the Trucial States rulers to look 
upon the force as their own. The Political Agent in the Trucial States, Donald 
Hawley, was particularly alarmed at the move away from the TOS’s original 
policing role. On 3 May 1961, Hawley met with the British commander of the 
Qatari armed police, Ronald Cochrane, to seek his counsel on how best to re-
organise the TOS to fulfil its original internal security functions.820 British officials 
appreciated that any use of the force outside the Trucial States increased the 
view amongst the rulers that the TOS was simply a British tool.821 The 
expansion of the SAF since the Jebel Akhdar War of 1957-9 obviated the need 
for the TOS to operate in Oman in the future, so the Foreign Office initiated a 
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re-examination of the TOS’s organisation and role. It asked the Political 
Resident for his appraisal. In his final proposal, Sir William Luce made it clear 
that he did not want to make any changes which might ‘cause the TOS to 
degenerate into some kind of “scallywag” gendarmerie’, but he recommended 
that it should be reconfigured from two regiments (one of which was the new 
mobile, Desert Regiment) in to five squadrons.822  By doing so, Luce felt that 
this more adaptable configuration would allow the Scouts to perform both a 
military and police function. Reflecting this revised approach, the recently 
formed TOS Desert Regiment was disbanded and a greater focus on policing 
was prescribed.823 The War Office, which paid 50 percent of the costs for the 
TOS, agreed on the new structure of the TOS.824  During 1962 the TOS was 
used mostly for traditional rural policing duties. In 1963 three squadrons of 
Scouts were deployed to Abu Dhabi when the local police were unable to cope 
with rioting by oil workers (see above).825  
The move away from using the Scouts in future scenarios in Oman was an 
attempt by the British to deflect the local rulers, especially Shaikh Shakhbut of 
Abu Dhabi, away from setting up their own militaries and instead look to the 
TOS as the best means for securing their territories. But Shaikh Shakhbut was 
adamant that he required an armed force of his own, predicating this need on 
the threat from Saudi Arabia. Britain, however, believed that the defence of the 
western approaches to Abu Dhabi should remain the responsibility of the TOS 
and the British military. Under plans at the time, the TOS commander was 
directed to prepare his forces to forestall a Saudi advance into the western part 
of Abu Dhabi – with support from the RAF – for four days, allowing time for 
British troops to assemble and defeat the Saudi forces in a land battle.826 Once 
British ground forces arrived, the TOS would carry out a scouting role, providing 
reconnaissance, flank protection and local knowledge to the regular British 
                                            
822 TNA FO 371/157062 William Luce (Political Resident) to Foreign Office, 5 August 
1961. 
823 Mann (1994), pp. 131-32.  
824 TNA FO 371/163046, R.A.M. Hendrie (Bahrain Residency) to T.A.H. Tyler 
(Foreign Office), 14 November 1962. 
825 Mann (1994), p. 139. 
826 TNA FO 371/157038, William Luce (Political Resident) to A.R. Walmsley (Foreign 
Office), 12 December 1961. 
 
 
207 
forces.827 The War Office wanted Shaikh Shakhbut to recognise this 
contribution to his defence and, now that he had significant wealth from oil 
production, to contribute towards the costs of running the TOS.828  On 21 May 
1963, the War Office explained its position to the Foreign Office: 
 
It is, as you are doubtlessly aware, the normal practice to recover the 
cost of military assistance from foreign territories whenever possible, 
and it seems to us that we would now be fully justified in inviting the 
Ruler of Abu Dhabi to contribute to the cost of this force [the TOS].829  
 
Britain’s Gulf representatives quickly shot holes in this argument. Why, they 
pointed out, would Abu Dhabi ever want to contribute to the costs of a force 
over which it had very little direct control at a time when it planned to set up its 
own military? The Political Agent in Abu Dhabi, Hugh Boustead, informed the 
Political Resident, Sir William Luce, of the rumours circulating about Shakhbut’s 
intentions of setting up his own army. By May 1963 these plans had become 
more definite. ‘[S]omething is certainly in the air,’ Boustead observed, and the 
affair was being conducted ‘in great secrecy and as usual when anything fishy 
is going on in Abu Dhabi, the Edge family is deeply involved.’830 Boustead 
suspected that Bill Edge, the British Deputy Commander of the Abu Dhabi 
Police, was planning to command the new force and accused Edge’s wife of 
obtaining quotes from British manufacturers for weapons and military 
equipment. As for Edge himself, Boustead, a veteran of both World Wars, wrote 
that he is ‘not a suitable person to set up such a force since his military, as 
opposed to police, experience is limited to a period as a lance-corporal in the 
Lincolnshire Regiment before the [Second World War], and as far as I know 
there is no intention of employing any other British officers.’ Boustead 
disapproved strongly of the proposal of an army for Abu Dhabi, especially as he 
was not consulted. ‘The army is clearly intended for the Ruler’s personal 
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prestige,’ Boustead wrote, ‘and is probably designed eventually to supplant the 
TOS.’831 
If Abu Dhabi did decide to go its own way and create an army, Luce 
thought it would be in Britain’s interests to assist.  He proposed offering to hand 
over perhaps two squadrons of the TOS, together with some administrative 
staff, to provide the nucleus of an Abu Dhabi force. In this way the Abu Dhabi 
army could take over some of the Scouts’ responsibilities in the shaikhdom.  By 
1964, however, the Residency considered this policy unwise. What had 
changed?  British officials now had less faith in Shakhbut’s ability to develop the 
Abu Dhabi state and believed that he was creating a military force to defend 
himself against challengers to his rule. It is quite possible, Mr Brown at the 
Residency told the Foreign Office, 
 
[. . .] that one of the main reasons for him thinking again of having an 
army is to protect his own personal position vis-à-vis other members 
of his family, for instance against Shaikh Zayed who already has 
between 100 and 150 armed retainers in his employment in 
Buraimi.’832  
 
Hugh Boustead suspected that Shakhbut’s pursuit of his own military force been 
encouraged after visiting King Faisal of Saudi Arabia had been told about the 
formation of a loyal Bedouin National Guard (or White Army as it was more 
commonly known) which had been formed to protect the Saudi throne from 
internal challengers.833 Like the ‘White Army’, Shakhbut’s proposed force was 
for regime survival.834 Shakhbut was concerned about excessive numbers of 
Palestinians, Jordanians and Lebanese workers in Abu Dhabi who might stoke 
subversion and opposition to his rule.835 The proposed military, Britain 
suspected, would be positioned to defend the palace and causeway only and 
not the western approaches to Abu Dhabi, thus there would be little advantage 
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in encouraging the scheme. In this way, transferring two TOS squadrons over to 
an Abu Dhabi military would simply mean that Britain would have to raise two 
more squadrons for guarding against Saudi incursions.836  
When formulating policy on this issue, the Foreign Office accepted that it 
could not do very much to stop the Ruler if he had set his mind on forming his 
own military.837  For one thing, Britain no longer controlled the import of arms. 
The unrestricted influx of modern arms was already causing concern. Luce 
informed the Foreign Office in October 1964 that Shakhbut had armed his 
personal bodyguard with automatic weapons, that his tribesmen loyal to him 
had been seen leaving his palace with new rifles, and that were reportedly 
suspicious unopened crates stored in his palace.838 Faced with the reality that 
the horse had already bolted, the Residency advised that Britain should,   
 
[. . .] try to get in on the ground floor and give him all the help in 
recruiting British and Jordanian officers, in training and in selling 
weapons and equipment we can, in the hope that the force will be 
efficient and that we can guide it into undertaking sensible tasks and 
carrying them out properly.839   
  
As the new British policy was to guide rather than oppose Shaikhbut’s scheme 
for a military, the Ministry of Defence submitted a detailed plan for an Abu Dhabi 
Defence Force (ADDF). By the end of 1964, this force was established with 
about 250 men filling the ranks.  Shakhbut gave his son, Shaikh Sultan, who 
had spent three years in the TOS, responsibility for overseeing the creation of 
the ADDF. In 1965, Britain tried to slow the rapid growth of the force by delaying 
arm exports to Abu Dhabi by throwing up bureaucratic obstacles. The Foreign 
Office asked the Ministry of Defence to process weapon orders slowly, though 
not too slow that Abu Dhabi looked elsewhere for arms supplies.840 Shaikh 
Shakhbut continued to look to Britain for arms and officers to train and run the 
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ADDF. In order to ensure Britain retained a level of direct influence in Abu 
Dhabi’s military scene, Hugh Boustead thought it was critical that the two British 
officers Shakhbut asked for should be seconded and not contract officers.841  
This advice was heeded, and the TOS was asked to give up one of its most 
experienced officers, Major ‘Tug’ Wilson, to command the new force.842 Wilson 
would remain a regular British officer on loan to Abu Dhabi. The willingness to 
provide Wilson to the ADDF represented one part of a more supportive 
approach towards the new force. Resident Luce sketched his thinking in April 
1965 to the Foreign Office as to why Britain should abandon the policy of 
delaying weapons supplies to Abu Dhabi: 
 
I think we must accept that the Ruler intends to have an army, and, 
this being so, I recommend that we should meet his requests as far 
as possible for our assistance in equipping and training it. It is in our 
interests that it should become a reasonably efficient force. The order 
of equipment should therefore be allowed without further delay on 
our part.843 
 
The Foreign Office, following Luce’s recommendation, dropped the plan to 
delay the delivery of equipment.844 The change in British policy towards the 
ADDF was remarkable. Britain now hoped that the ADDF would be more than a 
prestige force, perhaps assuming some the TOS commitments in Abu Dhabi. It 
held the prospect,’ the Foreign Office hoped, ‘of an eventual saving by the 
reduction in the number of squadrons in the Scouts as soon as the Abu Dhabi 
army is sufficiently developed to take over from the Scouts in Buraimi or the 
oilfield, or both.’845  T.F. Brenchley wrote to the Residency in August 1965 that 
‘we should be ready to go out of our way to promote a rapid development of the 
Abu Dhabi army, not only by seconding British officers to it and supplying arms, 
but also by helping it build up its strength in Arab personnel.’846 The 
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appointment by Shaikh Sultan of an anti-British Jordanian, Mufla bin Sulaiman, 
to a senior position in the ADDF threatened to scupper this policy.847 According 
to a report from the Political Agency in Abu Dhabi, Mufla, who it later transpired 
was expelled from the Jordanian Arab Legion for pro-Nasser activities, was 
 
[. . .] making no secret in the bazaar that he is working against British 
influence in Abu Dhabi, his major target at present being Colonel 
[Tug] Wilson. He is demanding that the Abu Dhabi Army should be 
composed only of Bedu and that the Imperialistic trick of putting 
British officers in command should be thwarted.848 
 
Suspecting that Mufla had the ear of the Ruler and his inner circle, the Political 
Agent, Archie Lamb, argued that Britain could not ‘tamely accept the presence 
of an anti-British agitator’.849 Mufla bin Sulaiman was unable to cement his 
position before another British officer, Captain Wotner, joined as Tug Wilson’s 
deputy.  
Shaikh Shakhbut had originally stated that he wanted an army of 500 
men with the ability to conduct camel patrols into the far reaches of his territory. 
Colonel Tug Wilson commanded a force in mid-1966 that was under a third of 
this size.850 Despite his initial enthusiasm for an army, Shakhbut’s parsimony 
towards the police was extended to the ADDF – he refused to pay for the most 
basic of essential stores and equipment. In light of this, the Political Agent 
recommended that Britain should scrap plans to withdraw the two TOS 
squadrons from Abu Dhabi; the ADDF could not fulfil the task of protecting the 
western approached to the Trucial States.851  
Spending money on a defence force whilst at the same time depriving 
the shaikhdom of any real investment in infrastructure or social services was 
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one of the reasons that his family decided to depose him in August 1966.852 The 
TOS Commander at the time, Freddie De Butts, recalls in his memoirs: ‘In true 
Arab style, Shakhbut was prepared to spend his oil revenue not where it was 
needed but where it would give him heightened prestige amongst his peers – on 
a private army of his own.’853 For a long time Britain had considered Shaikh 
Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi as the most opposed to modernization among the rulers 
of the protected states. By the mid-1960s, he ruled over the largest and richest 
of the Trucial shaikhdoms.854 The shaikh’s general resistance to change and his 
determination to maintain absolute control over the internal affairs of his 
shaikhdom thwarted British plans to harness the growing oil wealth for the aim 
of modernising Abu Dhabi.855 At the same time, British officials were forming a 
very favourable opinion of his brother, Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan. In 
Sir William Luce’s opinion, ‘The replacement of Shakhbut by Zayed offers the 
only real hope of peaceful evolution for Abu Dhabi in the difficult years which lie 
ahead; the continuation of Shakhbut’s rule spells revolution, sooner or later.’856  
Luce proposed withdrawing British recognition of Shakhbut’s rule and 
transferring it to Zayed. If necessary, British officials would assist Zayed in 
removing his brother from the shaikhdom by arranging for the Trucial Oman 
Scouts to escort him to Dubai or Sharjah.857 Prime Minister Harold Wilson 
approved the Foreign Secretary’s plan for deposing Shakhbut in December 
1964.858 The planned coup did not take place for a further 20 months. On the 4 
August 1966, senior members of the ruling family presented the acting Political 
Agent in Abu Dhabi, Mr Nuttall, with a signed letter informing the British 
Government that they had collectively decided to depose Shakhbut. To avoid a 
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disturbance to peace and order, they requested British assistance in 
permanently removing Shakhbut and his two sons, Said and Sultan, from the 
shaikhdom.  As soon as Nuttall received the letter, Balfour-Paul travelled to Abu 
Dhabi to inform Shaikh Shakhbut that his family had decided to depose him. In 
the event that the Ruler would reject the wishes of the family, the Residency 
flew in two squadrons of the TOS to Abu Dhabi overnight under the pretence of 
training manoeuvres. As the then-Deputy Political Resident, Glen Balfour-Paul 
recalls in his memoirs that the TOS moved close to the palace in the event they 
needed to intervene.859 These preparations proved necessary: Shakhbut 
refused to step down, calling out that he would stay in the palace and defend 
himself with his armed retainers. The TOS closed in around the building 
shouting at the guards to come out and lay down their arms.  Shaikh Shakhbut 
then emerged and was escorted to the airport and departed on an RAF 
plane.860  
 With Shaikh Zayed now at the helm, the Foreign Office thought it was the 
opportune moment to integrate the ADDF into the TOS. The Foreign Office was 
working towards a position in 1966 where it could hand over formal control of 
the TOS to the rulers. This goal would be easier to achieve if there was one 
integrated force (i.e. if the ADDF was amalgamated into the TOS).861 The 
Political Agent, Archie Lamb, thought this proposal was little more than ivory 
tower thinking:   
 
My conversations [with Shaikh Zayed] have revealed that the Ruler 
has the ADDF close to his heart and is determined to build it up into 
a really effective force. He sees it as essential for the security of his 
state both because of its professional competence under the 
command of Wilson, for whom he has the highest regard, and 
because of the pathetic state of the police force, upon which he 
cannot presently rely.862   
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Moreover, in Lamb’s opinion pushing integration would result in the Ruler losing 
confidence in Britain’s willingness to support the ADDF. Zayed wanted to 
expand the force to 1,500 men and add a sea wing of fast patrol boats. The 
Political Agent advised that Britain should therefore drop the idea of 
amalgamation and concentrate on building up the ADDF to a standard where it 
is able to work with the TOS and perhaps relieve one squadron in Abu Dhabi 
territory.863 But the Residency still wanted to pursue integration out of fear that 
the other Trucial States would set up their own militaries. Such a move by the 
other rulers would undermine the position of the TOS as the future force of a 
future federation. In August 1966, the Deputy Political Resident, Glen Balfour-
Paul, explained the Residency’s position: 
 
If Zayed goes ahead with the expansion of his own Army, it seems to 
me inevitable that the fashion for private Armies will spread up the 
coast, beginning in Dubai. If this happens, we shall sooner or later 
find the TOS squeezed out of the most of the Trucial States – and 
this at a time when stability is increasingly threatened and the need 
for a centrally controlled security force covering the whole area and 
acceptable to the Rulers is greater than ever. By all means let the 
Rulers have their own Police Forces but we must surely prevent the 
situation arising in which the acceptability and impartiality of the TOS 
as the recognised common security force are undermined.864 
 
Britain’s use of the TOS to depose unfavourable rulers surely made its aim of 
promoting the force as belonging to the rulers of the Trucial States – including 
Shaikh Zayed – that much harder. In 1965 the TOS had been involved in 
deposing Shaikh Saqr of Sharjah. Along with the Deputy Resident, the TOS 
escorted Saqr to the airport and he was flown on an RAF plane to Bahrain. 
When the TOS received reports that the Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah was raising 
tribesmen to march on Sharjah and depose Shaikh Khalid, Britain deployed the 
Scouts in blocking positions on the roads leading to Sharjah.865 Similarly, the 
TOS were, as shown, involved in Shaikh Shakhbut’s deposition. Though Zayed 
benefitted from the TOS role in ousting his brother, it would not have escaped 
his attention that the Scouts were used to depose one of the serving rulers they 
were supposed to be protecting.  
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Realising that Zayed was inexorably opposed to integration, Britain 
pursued a middle option of placing the ADDF under the operational command of 
the TOS, synchronising training and compatible weapons and equipment. The 
British government tried to make this official in an ‘Exchange of Letters’.866  
Shaikh Zayed gave his initial assent but then reversed course. He declared that 
there had been too much talk recently of Britain wanting to take over the ADDF. 
He was the Rais [ultimate commander], he told the Political Agent, and the 
ADDF Commander would be Wilson. Zayed was adamant that TOS 
Headquarters in Sharjah would have no control of his force. Though he was still 
a serving British officer on secondment, Colonel Wilson spoke of his resentment 
of military and political direction from the British government.867 By the end of 
1966, fractures between the TOS and ADDF widened. Wilson did not want to 
pass on his monthly intelligence and patrol reports to the TOS because he did 
not receive similar information from the TOS squadrons based in Abu Dhabi. 
Matters worsened when Wilson met the new TOS commander-designate. “So 
you are the officer who deserted the TOS,” the soon-to-be Scouts commander 
remarked. Wilson was livid. It was unforgivable, he told the Political Agent, that 
a remark about desertion should have been made to a regular officer of the 
British Army.868  
The formation of the ADDF not only scuppered British plans to have a 
single force for the Trucial States under a common command, but it also led to 
some of the other rulers embarking on building their own forces. The former 
TOS Commander, Freddie De Butts, recalls in his memoirs that although ‘the 
ADDF was not an operational force of any consequence for several years, its 
formation started a chain reaction, inevitably undermining the role of the 
Scouts.869 The Political Resident had recently fought off an attempt to reduce 
the size of the Scouts. In August 1966, the Chief of Defence Staff (Britain’s 
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most senior military officer) endorsed Resident Luce’s appeal to keep all five 
squadrons.870  
In 1967, the Ruler of Dubai, Shaikh Rashid, decided to establish a military. 
The idea of his own force had been brewing in the Ruler’s mind for some years. 
In 1965, Rashid made enquiries about purchasing Ferret scout cars. The 
Political Agency at the time did not believe that they would be for the police but 
that the Ruler had a new quasi-military force in mind. British officials recognised 
back then that if Shaikh Rashid decided to buy some kind of armoured vehicle 
there will be very little Britain could do to stop him.’871 The events of 1966/67 
pushed Shaikh Rashid towards a final decision. In September 1967, Balfour-
Paul described the evolution of Shaikh Rashid’s thinking:  
 
Ever since Shakhbut insisted on forming a private army two years 
ago we have recognised the likelihood that other Rulers in the Trucial 
States – Rashid anyway – would want to follow suit. Certainly he 
began brooding actively on the idea when he saw his own 
expansionary ambitions thwarted last summer by the replacement of 
Shakhbut by Zayed (with TOS assistance). His discovery of oil in 
commercial quantities soon after no doubt pushed the process 
further. The disturbances last June disclosed to him the inadequacy 
of his civil police. His growing resentment at Zayed’s unconcealed 
intention to dominate the Trucial States has been bringing him, I 
suspect, steadily nearer the point of decision. The collapse of 
shaikhly rule in South Arabia provided both justification and pretext 
for finally reaching it.872 
 
Balfour-Paul tried to dissuade Shaikh Rashid, arguing that the proliferation of 
private armies was counter to the attempts to bring Trucial States together. He 
told Rashid of Britain’s aim to associate the TOS with the Trucial States Council 
so that it would eventually become the defence force of the rulers. If that was 
the case, Rashid responded, why had Britain permitted Abu Dhabi to form its 
own military? The reality was, of course, that Britain could not stop Shakhbut. 
Accepting that his entreaties were not hitting their mark with Shaikh Rashid, 
Balfour-Paul changed tack, proposing that Britain nominate a TOS squadron 
placed at the Ruler’s personal disposal. Rashid rejected this suggestion, for 
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calling in help from an outside force would damage his standing with his people 
– he must have his own force. Moreover, the danger that Britain might one day 
leave the Gulf made it imperative, he said, for the Al Maktoum to rely on their 
own resources. Balfour-Paul tried one last argument. He argued that a small 
defence force would be inefficient and expensive. Would it therefore not make 
more sense to simply add a riot squad to the police rather than set up a new 
organisation from scratch? But Rashid was determined to have something with 
a military flavour which would inspire respect of a different kind than the police 
did. Shaikh Rashid wanted his British police commandant, Jack Briggs, to 
command the defence force as well. In addition, he told Balfour-Paul that he 
wanted several other British officers of the same type found in the TOS to assist 
Briggs; he told Balfour-Paul that he did not want or trust Arab officers. Although 
Rashid had decided to press ahead in spite of British entreaties, Balfour-Paul 
thought there were some ‘crumbs of comfort’. He believed that British advice 
would continue through Briggs and that the Ruler might settle for a force no 
more distinct from the police than was the case with the Qatari ‘army’. In this 
way, Balfour-Paul mused, ‘Briggs would become the Cochrane of Dubai’.873 
Writing to the Political Resident, Sir Stewart Crawford, in late October 1967, the 
Foreign Office repeated its position that Britain 
 
[. . .] ought not to encourage Rashid to go for his own Defence Force; 
it would not make any military sense; it is unlikely he could afford it; 
and it would in the present situation exacerbate his political 
relationships not only with [Shaikh] Zayed but also with his Northern 
neighbours.874  
 
Whatever the future held for Britain’s longevity in the Gulf, Sir Stewart Crawford, 
like his predecessor, believed that it was in the interests of the Trucial States 
rulers to back the TOS: 
 
[G]iven our long-term aim of ensuring stability, both while we are 
present in the Gulf and after we have gone, we must, I am quite sure, 
hold on tight in the Trucial States to preserving the Scouts as an 
effective and unified force for local security.’875   
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Rashid’s enthusiasm for an army appeared to wane at the end of 1967. He 
instructed Briggs to expand the police from 350 to 600 and to add a mobile wing 
for internal security duties and anti-riot work. Crawford was confident that Britain 
‘can forget about the possibility of a Dubai Defence Force in the foreseeable 
future’.876  
The forthcoming withdrawal from Aden and South Arabia, coupled with 
sharpened confrontation in the Arab World, exposed the British position in the 
Gulf and the shaikhly regimes alike. The impending build-up of the British 
garrison at Sharjah to 2,400 personnel worried local officials.877 For one thing, 
the increased British Army and RAF presence in Sharjah made it increasingly 
difficult for the TOS to maintain a separate identity as a local Arab force 
intimately connected with the rulers and people of the Trucial Coast. Indeed, the 
TOS was already becoming known locally, the Political Resident reported, as 
just a part of the ‘al-Jaysh al-Ingleezi’ (English Army).878 As it was highly 
undesirable that British troops stationed in Sharjah should be involved in 
internal security matters, save in an extreme emergency, the Political Resident 
argued that any TOS reduction would weaken the British Government’s ability 
to maintain law and order.879   
 
5.7 British Decision to Withdraw (1967-8): Protégés to Guard 
Themselves? 
In January 1968, Britain announced that it would be withdrawing from the Gulf 
by the end of 1971.880 Britain had assured the rulers throughout 1967 that it had 
no immediate plans to abandon its military presence in the Gulf. They were thus 
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understandably ‘dumbfounded by the abrupt reversal’.881 The Foreign Office 
Minister of State, Goronwy Roberts, had to return to the area in January 1968 to 
deliver Britain’s volte-face personally to the local rulers.882 Anthony Parsons, the 
Political Agent in Bahrain, recalls in his memoirs that, whilst in the car with 
Goronwy Roberts, en-route to the see the Bahraini ruler, he ‘made no bones 
about the fact’ (to Roberts) that the news ‘would come as a violent shock’.883 
Britain was giving the protected states less than four years to prepare to go it 
alone. Muscat and Oman, which had relied heavily on Britain’s defence 
architecture in the area, would also be affected. Britain’s impending exit meant 
that indigenous forces would have to take on even more of an important role. 
Philip Larkin, in his poem Homage to a Government (1969), one of the few 
cultural commentaries that marked the ending of the ‘east of Suez’ role, 
observed that self-reliance would be the new watchword for Britain’s protégés:    
 
Next year we are to bring all the soldiers home 
For lack of money, and it is all right. 
Places they guarded, or kept orderly, 
Must guard themselves, and keep themselves orderly. 
We want the money for ourselves at home 
Instead of working. And this is alright.884 
 
Observers at the time were sceptical about the ability of the small Gulf 
monarchies to ‘guard themselves, and keep themselves orderly,’ predicting a 
bleak future for the area after Britain’s coming exit. Analyses at the time pointed 
out that Gulf states would be left wide open to Soviet encroachment and Arab 
nationalist movements.885 The rulers themselves neither sought Britain’s 
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impending exit nor welcomed it.886 Indeed, some of the rulers endeavoured to 
stave off the pull out by offering to compensate London financially to maintain a 
military presence. Abu Dhabi and Qatar offered to make direct payments to 
Britain and Bahrain proposed to waive the rent on its bases used by British 
forces.887 Dubai later confirmed the offer (speaking with the authority of the 
other protected states) as a joint one, designed to enable British forces to stay 
beyond 1971 until ‘satisfactory alternative arrangements could be made.’888 For 
one thing, they wanted to buy more time to develop their own security 
capabilities.  
The British Government rejected the offer to subsidise its presence, 
explaining that the cost of stationing troops in the Gulf was but one part of the 
overall financial burden associated with meeting its defence obligations.889 
British Defence Secretary Denis Healey explained to the House of Commons in 
February 1968 that, ‘among the various elements of military capabilities which 
we need to keep so long as we are in the Gulf there is the cost of the carrier 
force whose total functional cost is about £140 million a year.’890 Without the 
ability to bring to bear a large maritime force in an emergency, Britain would be 
left in a position of responsibility without the real means of control. Goronwy 
Roberts, returning from his humiliating trip to the Gulf, made a similar point in 
the House of Lords:  
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[O]nce our forces are redeployed in Europe [Roberts said] it would 
not be practicable after 1971 to give a continuing military presence in 
the Gulf the backing in men and material it would need, even with the 
financial contributions from the rulers.891 
 
The tumultuous events of 1967 had already given the local rulers cause to 
worry about security arrangements in the region. Referring to 1967 as ‘The Year 
of Ostrich’ (in that Qatar had to take its head out the sand), the Political Agent, 
R.H.M. Boyle wrote to the Residency that: 
 
[. . .] the Middle East [Six Day] war and its aftermath with its threat to 
oil production, the devaluation of £ sterling, and finally the debacle in 
South Arabia wrought the inevitable change, and showed the 
Qataris clearly enough that an era was over, and that they must 
think in terms of existence, if not on their own, at least with less 
reliance on a friendly, protecting power.892 
 
With the offer rejected, the Gulf states were left in little doubt that they would 
have to prepare for Britain’s exit. Britain would also be ending its loose defence 
commitment to Kuwait. Britain’s other commitment in the Gulf was to Muscat 
and Oman, though this was not directly affected by the decision to withdrawal, 
the Sultan had long relied on the British military presence, especially RAF 
transport for airlifting his troops between north and south Oman.893 According to 
Anthony Parsons, the Gulf rulers were anxious because, 
 
Apart from Oman, there were no indigenous defence forces in the 
area, only the police and the Trucial Oman Scouts controlled by the 
Political Resident. Also the Gulf was rich prey for external predators. 
Iran claimed Bahrain and Saudi Arabia had claims against parts of 
Oman and Abu Dhabi.894 
 
Britain’s vast commercial interests in the region would not vanish after 
1971. The British government had a great deal at stake in ensuring that it left 
behind a stable order after withdrawal. During 1968-71, the years leading up to 
British withdrawal, Britain’s policy in the protected states (and to a lesser extent 
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Muscat and Oman) was concentrated on preparing them to adjust to coming 
changes that the end of Pax Britannica in the Gulf would bring. British efforts 
would be centred on creating the right conditions in the area in order to 
minimise the dismantling of Britain’s military architecture.  
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CHAPTER SIX: PREPARING THE GULF FOR 
WITHDRAWAL: TOWARDS A RESIDUAL ROLE, 1968-71 
 
 
6.1 Strength in Unity: Preparations for Security in the Trucial 
States, 1968-69 
When the government of Harold Wilson finalised the decision that Britain would 
withdraw from the Gulf, all British officials with an interest in the area held the 
common view that the seven Trucial States were too small to survive on their 
own. From here on, Britain and pushed for their political federation with Bahrain 
and Qatar.895 The US State Department, taking a greater interest in the region 
after Britain’s January 1968 announcement, agreed that:  
 
In the longer run, stability will depend on whether more viable 
indigenous political and economic mechanisms can be created, and 
this will probably only be possible if a greater measure of regional 
cooperation can be established among the weaker Gulf states.896  
 
Anthony Parsons was optimistic about the prospects for federation, contending 
that the British decision ‘had in fact stimulated a desire towards unity which our 
previous efforts had failed to achieve.’ ‘[T]he pressure of events’, he believed, 
had ‘created a new dynamic towards union in all the Gulf states’.897 The ruler of 
Qatar instigated the first move – later called the Dubai Agreement – by 
obtaining in February 1968 an agreement in principal from the other rulers to 
form a union.898 Myriad disputes and quarrels amongst the rulers and territorial 
claims from Iran and Saudi Arabia complicated efforts to bring the nine 
together. The American Central Intelligence Agency concluded in January 1969 
that the nine protected states were ‘unlikely to achieve any significant unity’ and 
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that the scheme ‘may even fall of its own weight before the British depart.’899 
Nevertheless, in the months immediately after the withdrawal announcement, 
Britain’s efforts to prepare the protected states for the removal of British 
protection were based on a federation of nine.  
The British Government’s 1968 Supplementary Statement on Defence 
Policy stated that in the Gulf there should be ‘a steady evolution in the local 
arrangements for defence and cooperation’.900 For Britain this would be best 
achieved if the protected states moved towards unity in both political and 
security matters. In order to steer the protected states towards the model of a 
unified military, the British government appointed a joint defence adviser, Major-
General Sir John Willoughby, to the protected states.901 In 1969, Willoughby 
proposed to the rulers an integrated military built around an expanded TOS, 
with an air force of 18 Hunters and a naval component of 12 patrol boats 
added.902 Willoughby also advocated that, as there was no Gulf Arab capable of 
serving as the commander of an integrated force, the federal military would 
need a British officer in the cockpit. Lord Chalfont, writing on behalf of Foreign 
Secretary Michael Stewart, added in August 1969 that, 
 
[. . .] the rulers would mistrust the choice of an Arab who was not 
from the Gulf. Indeed, except for the Ruler of Bahrain, they are 
opposed to the appointment of any Arab; and we know that they 
would welcome a British commander.903  
 
The report was read with varying degrees of interest. Shaikh Zayed rejected 
Willoughby’s plans because they were (a) not ambitious enough, and (b) placed 
too much emphasis on the TOS.904     
Rather than lead the local rulers to think more seriously about integrating 
their security forces, the decision to withdrawal accelerated the move towards 
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separate military arrangements for each state. In fact, this move towards 
individual militaries was codified at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the 
nine rulers meeting in Doha between 20 and 22 October 1968. It was decided 
that in any prospective union the individual states had the right to retain their 
own national guards.905 Moreover, the uncertainty caused by the British 
withdrawal announcement served to re-ignite Shaikh Rashid’s enthusiasm for 
what would become the Dubai Defence Force (DDF).  
In the months before the Doha meeting, Shaikh Rashid asked Jack 
Briggs to make a plan for three rifle companies and a headquarters staff – all in 
all, a force of 500 men.906  British officials once again tried to convince Shaikh 
Rashid to contribute financially to the TOS instead of starting his own military. 
The Political Resident, Sir Stewart Crawford, proposed stationing a TOS 
squadron in Dubai territory as well as giving the Ruler a private assurance of 
support against any overthrow attempt. The Foreign Office rejected this 
proposal outright. Giving an assurance to any ruler was inconsistent with 
Britain’s policy of progressive disengagement. Moreover, the Foreign Office 
stated, a squadron of TOS was unlikely to meet Dubai’s defence requirements. 
The Foreign Office set up a special working party to forestall Rashid from 
making a final decision on the DDF. British officials accepted that, so long as 
Rashid feared Shaikh Zayed dominating the future union, Shaikh Rashid could 
not be dissuaded from setting up his own force.907 Britain decided, therefore, 
not to oppose Rashid on this matter. At any rate, continuing to do so would, the 
Foreign Office calculated, ‘increase his [Shaikh Rashid] suspicion that we are 
backing Abu Dhabi, harden his resolve to go his own way and further reduce 
our chances of retaining any influence.’908 Britain wished to remain involved in 
the Dubai defence scene. It was encouraged when Shaikh Rashid asked Britain 
to accept his third son, Muhammad bin Rashid, who was appointed Head of 
Police and Public Security, onto the British officer cadet course at Mons.909 
Getting young members of the ruling family on to military training courses in the 
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home country had been a British policy for some time. At an interdepartmental 
meeting on defence exports in early 1965, for example, the Ministry of Defence 
noted that because young members of the ruling family would reach senior rank 
quickly in their own forces, it would be an advantage for British defence sales in 
the long run to engender in them a sense of preference in all things British. 
This, defence officials concluded, could be achieved by loading them on military 
and police training courses in Britain.910 
Unlike Britain, Shaikh Zayed did not see a large independent ADDF as 
antithetical to the proposed federation. In a radio interview broadcast on the eve 
of a visit to Iran in early November 1968, Zayed claimed that his expansion 
plans for Abu Dhabi’s military ‘represents support for the Federation and 
strength for the Arabian Gulf Emirates.’911 At any rate, there is no evidence that 
Shaikh Zayed ever seriously entertained the idea of merging his rapidly 
expanding defence force – by 1970 it was 3,500 strong – with a future federal 
military.912 In Shaikh Zayed’s opinion the ADDF was necessary because the 
TOS – still touted by Britain as the nucleus around which the federal military 
would grow – was only effective so long as it had the British military power to 
back it up. His position to think only in terms of the ADDF is illustrated by his 
arms purchasing policies at the time. When Britain proposed to Zayed that he 
purchase its combat aircraft (BAC.167s), as these would be compatible with 
other aircraft in a planned federal military, he declined on the grounds that 
planes were not prestigious enough. Shaikh Zayed wanted aircraft that would 
give him more influence vis-à-vis other Gulf rulers.913 He requested British 
Hunter aircraft, but as these would not be ready for two to three years, Britain 
feared he might turn to France. In Britain’s eyes, any prestige order of advanced 
aircraft by Abu Dhabi would reflect scepticism about the UAE and would in turn 
serve ‘to deal a mortal blow to the Union force idea.’ Moreover, as well as 
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alarming Dubai and Qatar, which, in the case of the latter, might feel obliged to 
emulate Shaikh Zayed, it was feared that such an order would have ‘wider 
repercussions in Arabia and the Gulf.’914 Abu Dhabi’s growing dominance in the 
lower Gulf – Ajman, Umm al-Quwain and Fujairah were by the late 1960s 
financially dependent on Abu Dhabi – was partly the reason for the small 
shaikhdom of Ras al-Khamiah to set up its own force. One British official 
described Shaikh Saqr’s (ruler of Ras al-Khaimah) ‘fear and hatred of Shaikh 
Zayed’, to be ‘almost pathological’ and ‘not all of it is misconceived.’915 
Shaikh Saqr told Britain’s representatives that Ras al-Khaimah needed 
its own force to deal with the perennial problem of unruly tribes in the northern 
part of the shaikhdom, especially the Shihuh.916 In 1968, for example, Shihuh 
tribesmen had fired at workers of a German company that the Ruler had 
contracted to quarry rock. They also shot at a Ras al-Khaimah Police 
detachment in April that same year.917 Shaikh Khalid, the Ruler of Ras al-
Kaihmah’s son and heir apparent, visited Riyadh on Christmas Day 1968, and 
asked King Faisal for financial support for his police and to help the shaikhdom 
set up a small defence force. He requested sufficient funds from the Saudi king 
to cover the cost of armoured cars, trucks, mortars, rocket launchers and the 
salaries of two British officers and 300 men (which included the existing police 
of 150 men) for a period of two years.918 Unable to stop Ras al-Khaimah coming 
under Saudi influence, the Political Agent, Julian Bullard, encouraged Khalid to 
purchase arms of British manufacture so that when a union formed the Ras al-
Khaimah military could merge with the other forces.  Moreover, Bullard urged 
the Shaikh Khalid – and by extension his father Shaikh Saqr – to keep General 
Willoughby informed of their plans since the more numerous and larger the 
armies of the individual Trucial States, the more complicated would be his task 
in recommending how to weld them together. British officials hoped that Saqr 
would regard General Willoughby as the quarter from which he should draw all 
advice on the development of his security forces. The Military Coordination 
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Committee, Persian Gulf decided that, when it came to reacting to requests for 
military equipment from Ras al-Khaimah, British policy should follow the 
principle of ‘festina lente’. 919 If British officials could not stop Ras al-Khaimah 
from establishing a force they wanted to minimise its impact by slowing down 
the import of modern weapons.  As with the ADDF and the DDF, the Ruler of 
Ras al-Khaimah recruited a TOS officer to run his new force – Major David 
Neild. And so it was that in March 1969, the Ruler formerly invited Neild to raise 
and command a force of 150 men.920 As for the matter of Saqr’s selection for a 
British commander, Julian Bullard thought that Major Neild had the qualities to 
do the job excellently. Also important in Bullard’s calculation was that Neild was 
a man who could serve Shaikh Saqr ‘without losing sight of HMG’s interests.921   
Even at this stage, the Political Resident had not abandoned hope that 
Bullard might be able to steer him away from an army concept and instead 
expand the police.922  For one thing, a new force would undermine the position 
of the TOS. The Political Resident explained to Bullard: 
 
In present welter of uncertainty about TOS, it seems clear at least 
that they should continue to be responsible for security in Northern 
Trucial States in period ahead. Saqr can have no possible complaint 
about their performance in this role or about the support they give to 
rulers. Creation of Ras al-Khaimah [military] would be bound to be 
seen as a challenge to them and might well lead other rulers to seek 
to follow. Also this is very bad moment for one ruler to go ahead 
independently with creation of Union force under consideration. 
Willoughby in a letter to me advises strongly against.923 
 
Because the putative force would liaise closely with the TOS, and because 
Britain would not need to contribute financially towards the force – Saudi Arabia 
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agreed to Shaikh Khalid’s request – British officials were not entirely against its 
formation. Bullard wrote on 26 March 1969 that:  
 
I understand that General Willoughby has accepted the case for a 
small local defence force in Ras al-Khaimah, chiefly as an insurance 
against recurrence of trouble with Shihuh tribesmen. This being so, 
and since there is no question of our being asked for financial 
assistance, I suggest that we should not oppose the project as such, 
even though it will obviously consume resources which could 
otherwise be spent on economic development.924 
 
London balked at this line of reasoning: the Foreign Office could countenance 
the creation within the police of a strike wing armed with some mortars, but they 
were set against Ras al-Khaimah forming its own military apparatus at a time 
when General Willoughby was making proposals for a federal military based on 
the TOS.925 But Bullard did not think Britain could dissuade Saqr. He relayed his 
conversation with the Ruler on the subject back to the Residency:  
 
[Saqr] said he wanted to show his tribes who was master in the 
State, and to make it impossible for almost anyone to wander in from 
outside to stir up trouble or even attack him. When I suggested that 
he need have no fear so long as a TOS squadron was encamped at 
Hamham [a TOS camp inland from Ras al-Kahimah Town] he agreed 
at once, but said he felt obliged to make dispositions for the future. If 
the UAE succeeded in setting up effective forces (of which Saqr 
seemed sceptical) he would be glad to convert his little army into 
policemen. I then suggested that a Police Mobile Force on the Dubai 
model would be enough. Saqr said he did not think so; every man 
had his trade, and policemen and soldiers were two different 
things.926 
 
Moreover, Shaikh Saqr would not wait for all the rulers to agree on a federated 
military and wanted to ‘snap up the Saudi offer while it is still on the table,’ 
according to Bullard.927 Bullard proposed that Saqr should not call the new force 
an army but a mobile force, and should make it cooperate and not compete with 
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the police.928 Soon after, Major Neild – who was still serving with the TOS – 
travelled to London with the ruler’s son, Khalid, to place orders for British 
weapons and vehicles.929 Ras al-Khaimah also asked if regular British troops 
stationed at Sharjah could help train Mobile Force soldiers in the use of 
armoured cars. This could be problematic, as A.J. Coles at the Trucial States 
Political Agency explained: 
 
I do not think the [British Troops in Sharjah] have ever provided 
training facilities for local defence forces and I do not think they 
should start now (they have of course done a certain amount of 
liaison e.g. the ADDF and run one or two small-scale exercises.) The 
Iranians might I suppose take exception to the British army training 
the Ras al-Khaimah Mobile Force [Iran claimed the Two Tunbs 
islands that belonged at the time to Ras al-Khaimah].930 
 
Although an operational directive for land forces in the Gulf stated that a 
secondary role of British troops was to ‘assist in the development of local 
forces,’ British officials thought it was far more sensible to let the TOS fulfil this 
role.931 A.J. Coles again:  
 
The TOS have of course provided quite extensive training facilities 
for local defence and police forces, particularly the ADDF. As regards 
the Ras al-Khaimah force, a third batch of recruits is under training 
with the TOS who are also instructing a detachment of machine 
gunners and expect to begin in October the training of a mortar 
detachment.932 
 
In the summer of 1969 Major Neild requested that a British military instructor be 
loaned to the Ras al-Khaimah Mobile Force (RAKMF) for a fortnight to conduct 
armoured car training. Coles thought this could be done, but he did have his 
reservations.  
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This [the loan of an armoured car instructor for British troops in 
Sharjah] would hardly be likely to come to the notice of potential 
critics e.g. the Iranians. But in making any offer I think we should 
make it abundantly clear that it is unlikely that we shall be able to 
provide further assistance in the future. I have in mind particularly 
possible reactions from neighbouring states, e.g. Fujairah, if British 
troops, whom they regard as impartial, get too deeply involved in 
training the Ras al-Khaimah Force.933 
 
Fujairah did in fact remonstrate against British assistance to Ras al-Khaimah in 
setting up the mobile force.934 In October 1969, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the 
Shadow Foreign Secretary and the former Prime Minister, told the government 
that he was ‘rather disturbed by some knowledge which has come my way 
about Saudi Arabia being encouraged to pay for a strike force for Ras al-
Khaimah.’ Douglas-Home, who would be Foreign Secretary the following year, 
argued that the danger in the Gulf was the proliferation of private armies, which 
was already in evidence in Abu Dhabi while Dubai and others were seeking 
arms. ‘Is not all this exceedingly dangerous and does not allowing Saudi Arabia 
in on the act queer our pitch with Iran?’ Douglas-Home asked.935 The Foreign 
Office’s response to Douglas-Home on 3 November 1969 is worth quoting in 
full: 
 
As you know, the task of maintaining internal security in the Northern 
Trucial States is at present performed by the Trucial Oman Scouts. 
We hope that the TOS will eventually be incorporated into the Union 
Defence Force, as the Union Defence Adviser, General Willoughby, 
has recommended. But this recommendation has not yet been 
accepted by the Rulers. We believe it was generally endorsed at their 
recent meeting but until they go firm on acceptance we cannot count 
on this. Furthermore, as you probably know, Ras al-Khaimah suffers 
from a good deal of tribal unrest and we were advised by the British 
military authorities in the Gulf that a force of the type and size 
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envisaged by Shaikh Saqr would not be unreasonably large to 
maintain internal security in the State. In view of this we raised no 
objection to the idea in principle, even though we knew that it might 
not be very welcome to the Ruler of Fujairah or, perhaps, to Shaikh 
Zaid of Abu Dhabi.936 
 
In mid-November, Julian Bullard tried one more time to convince the Ruler that 
the RAKMF was an unnecessary cost, especially as the TOS were already 
providing adequate security cover.937  Shaikh Saqr replied that not one of his 21 
years as ruler had been free from some kind of trouble with the tribes in the 
north. He wanted to rid himself of this problem. More than this, Britain’s 
announcement to withdraw meant he had to guard against external threats. In 
an ideal world, Shaikh Saqr told Bullard, he would prefer the TOS to continue in 
its role beyond 1971, but he was certain that this would not happen, leaving his 
state exposed. When Saqr decide to continue with his mobile force, Bullard felt 
that Britain should desist with opposition. If there was any more criticism on this 
issue on the lines of Sir A. Douglas-Home, Bullard proposed making use of the 
Foreign Office’s argument that Britain ‘cannot very well stand in the way of such 
measures as the rulers think it necessary to take to guarantee their own security 
after we are no longer prepared to guarantee it ourselves.938 
The case of the Trucial States illustrated the point that the British 
government aspired for the protected states to form one political entity upon 
Britain’s exit with a single military; a force built around the TOS but expanded 
along the lines of Willoughby’s recommendations. At the same time, Britain 
reconciled itself to the fact that if the individual shaikhdoms wanted to take 
steps for the maintenance of their own security arrangements in preparation of 
Britain’s exit than this was their prerogative. At any rate, as the Foreign Office 
conceded in November 1969 that ‘if the rulers are determined to purchase arms 
and have or can get the money, we cannot stop them doing so.’ All Britain felt it 
could do was to try and advise against setting up forces in excess of their 
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internal security requirements.939 Both Bahrain and Qatar would later elect to 
become independent states, leaving Britain to concentrate on a union between 
the smaller seven Trucial states of the lower Gulf.   
 
6.2 Keeping a Grip on the Steering Wheel: Britain’s Policy 
towards Militaries in Qatar and Bahrain, 1968-70  
Both Qatar and Bahrain attended discussions on forming a federation of all nine 
of the protected states throughout 1968-70. Nonetheless, soon after Britain’s 
announcement of withdrawal, they began organising their security forces as 
though they were preparing for independence. British policy in both of cases to 
steer the Al Thani and Al Khalifah rulers away from establishing expensive 
militaries and towards building up their capacity for internal control through their 
police forces and special branches. Since about the 1960s, Britain had realised 
that its ability to control the local security scene had waned. In particular, Britain 
found it increasingly difficult to control arm imports to the protected states in the 
final years before withdrawal. Accepting this reality, in April 1965 the Foreign 
Secretary, Michael Stewart, wanted the British right to control the importation of 
arms transferred to the rulers as part of modernizing Britain’s relationship with 
Bahrain and Qatar (the Trucial States were not considered ready). As he 
explained in a communiqué to the Political Resident, Sir William Luce, he did 
not want the monitoring of arms to stop.  
 
I nevertheless hope that the Political Agents, by virtue of the good 
relations which they and their staff have built up with the local 
security authorities in Bahrain and Qatar, will be kept aware of any 
proposal to import arms which might have a bearing on internal 
security or on arms smuggling into the Sultanate of Muscat and 
Oman.940  
 
When in 1968 Qatar laid out its plans to expand its military, the Political Agent, 
Boyle, thought this was a mistake. He felt that Qatar’s resources would be 
better expended by concentrating on the police, especially by developing an 
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investigatory section. After the disturbances of 1967 in Qatar, the Political 
Agent, Boyle, argued that a Special Branch system in Qatar remained an 
‘urgent’ and ‘unfulfilled necessity.’941 He told the Political Resident, Sir Stewart 
Crawford, in January 1968 that he would be pushing Mohammad Mahdi (the 
name Ronald Cochrane took after converted to Islam in 1964), the Ruler 
(Shaikh Ahmad) and the Crown Prince (Shaikh Khalifah), to come round to this 
view. ‘Cochrane, the Moslem convert,’ Boyle told Crawford later in the month, 
‘has at last been converted to this [the proposal for a Special Branch], and for 
the first time has been impressing on me the necessity for having a[n] [Ian] 
‘Henderson’ [Head of Bahrain’s Special Branch] in Qatar, as you have in 
Bahrain. He is now determined to convert Ahmad and Khalifah.’942 
 The Qatari leadership was more interested in building up military forces 
than discussing police matters. Indeed, the British decision to withdraw 
stimulated ‘much talk of security, defence, arms and armies’ in Qatar.  Although 
such talk was, according to the Political Agent, ‘high-flown and nebulous,’ it 
became more grounded in the years that followed.943 In January 1968, the 
crown prince, Shaikh Khalifah, instructed Mohammad Mahdi, Mr Lock (British 
head of Qatar Police), and Muhammad al-Attiyah (commanding the mobile 
military wing of the armed police) to together recommend the future shape of 
the security forces. Alarmed that the Al Thani would follow Abu Dhabi into what 
it described as ‘the realms of military fantasy,’ Britain took the initiative of 
sending the Deputy Commander British Land Forces Gulf, Colonel Fletcher, to 
guide the Qatar leadership on how it should expand the fledgling military.  
Fletcher outlined a plan for a headquarters, one guard and three infantry 
regiments, an artillery battery, a training depot, a logistic group, and an air wing 
– 1,850 men in total.944 Any British support to reform or expand the military had 
to take into consideration the internal politics of the Al Thani ruling family. Boyle 
explained the dynamics at play:  
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Sheikh Khalifah who is de facto ruler here in all aspects of life with 
the exception of control of the security forces, fully realises that he 
can never be de jure ruler (or oust Sheikh Ahmed) without this 
control. Any re-organisation of the security forces, therefore, depends 
on agreement between Sheikh Ahmed and Shaikh Khalifah.945  
 
While Britain would have preferred that Qatar focus on developing its police 
force, it did not deny the protected state help when it was asked for, especially if 
this assistance did not cost Britain – and better still if Britain could make a profit.  
After a British Special Forces colonel from the Special Air Service (SAS) visited 
Qatar in March 1968, Britain received a request for a small SAS team to help 
train the Qatar armed forces. The request had the support of the Political 
Resident who thought it would foster goodwill between the British and Qatar 
governments; that it would increase British knowledge about Qatari forces, 
which was sketchy; and that it would provide the SAS with an opportunity to 
gain experience of working with Arab forces.946 There was, however, a 
complication: the visiting SAS colonel had left Qatar’s British Head of Public 
Security, Mohammad Mahdi, with the impression that Qatar would only have to 
pay the local expenses for the training team. The Ministry of Defence back in 
London was adamant that Qatar should foot the whole bill – a condition that 
Qatari Government would likely reject. The Political Resident put forward a 
strong case to the Foreign Office as to why Britain should find the money for 
sending over an SAS training team. His argument is illustrative of how British 
representatives saw the broader part Britain could play in defence and security 
matters leading up to withdrawal in 1971. 
 
If (as seems likely) Qataris now reject the whole proposal, we shall 
have lost valuable opportunity to effect improvement in their Security 
Forces which is desirable in the interests of stability in the area, no 
less in Qatar than elsewhere. Secondly, our relations with Qatar 
Government will suffer; not only politically but possibly also in sales 
of military equipment. This deterioration would be particularly 
unfortunate in the period ahead when Qatar can be expected to 
continue playing an important role in the Southern Gulf in the 
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aftermath of our January [1968] announcement [about the 
withdrawal of British forces from the Gulf].947  
 
After considerable wrangling, Britain reallocated money from other budgets to 
pay for the SAS training team.948 This action shows that Britain was already 
thinking about (a) how it could best equip the protected states to cope after 
withdrawal, and (b) how it could retain involved in these states beyond 1971, 
especially in the defence sales market.  
  Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, British security policy in Bahrain had 
centred on encouraging and cajoling the Al Khalifah rulers to invest in the State 
Police and its Special Branch. Even before Britain announced its intention to 
withdraw from the Gulf, Shaikh Isa began to form his own plans to establish a 
Bedouin praetorian guard in the style of Saudi Arabia’s “White Army”. In a 
candid discussion in January 1967 with the Political Agent, Anthony Parsons, 
Shaikh Isa declared he wanted Saladin armoured vehicles, machine guns and 
rocket launchers for this private force. Parsons warned the Ruler that this would 
land him with complicated equipment he would not be unable to maintain and 
that rockets that are not stored properly become volatile. ‘Since he kept his 
armoury in his house,’ Parsons wrote to the Political Resident on 8 January 
1967, Sir Stewart Crawford, ‘he might find it a little difficult to get to sleep at 
night with a mass of deteriorating rockets in the next room.’949 Parsons simply 
could not imagine against what enemy the Ruler expected to use the rocket 
launchers. Shaikh Isa said he wanted a private armoury as an insurance policy 
against all eventualities and had already ordered Bazookas and other weapons 
from Czechoslovakia. As it was extremely undesirable to use British troops to 
maintain order, he reasoned to Parsons that the private armoury could be 
distributed to his retainers in Rifaa and to several hundred of his most loyal 
tribesmen who received a stipend. This force might make all the difference 
between Bahrain authorities holding the line without recourse to bring in British 
troops. He was not seeking to create another army; these Bedouin would not be 
in uniform, nor would they be organised in any formal structure. In an effort to 
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explain to Parsons his thinking, Shaikh Isa recounted events from 1956 when 
there were disturbances beyond the powers of the police. His father had 
‘stationed bedu – black tents and all – in the eight worst villages: peace and 
quiet immediately reigned. “If the road had been lined by bedu, not police, [Isa 
told Parsons] no one would have dared throw a stone at Selwyn Lloyd in 1956!”’ 
In the same letter to the Crawford describing his discussions with the Ruler, 
Parsons surmised that Britain should not oppose Shaikh Isa’s plans. In fact, 
Parsons wrote, 
 
[. . .] it should also give the urban and village agitators something to 
think about – they probably have a much healthier respect for bedu 
than for the Bahrain State Police. Apart from the deterrent value it is 
not inconceivable that they could play a useful part in supporting the 
police in an emergency e.g. by taking over certain rural areas, or 
taking on the whole of Rifaa and points south thus releasing the 
Rifaa and Rural Areas police for service elsewhere. I do not for a 
moment underestimate the military dangers inherent but, in the 
bizarre circumstances of Bahrain, I believe that bedu have proved 
useful in the not-too-distant past. I therefore believe that, rather than 
risk forfeiting Isa’s confidence and exciting his suspicion by openly 
opposing his ideas, we should continue to express sympathy with his 
desire to strengthen his protective shield and to counsel moderation. 
If we can maintain his confidence – it is encouraging that he has 
consulted us in the first place – we should be able to keep some kind 
of grip on the steering wheel.950 
 
Crawford agreed that, as Britain was not in a position to oppose Shaikh Isa, it 
should try to remain in a position of influence. The Political Resident understood 
that the British decision to pull out of Aden had created a great deal of 
uncertainty: ‘Although he holds tightly to us,’ Crawford summarised, ‘he is 
preoccupied with the long-term future.’ Crawford recommended that Britain 
should ‘go along with the Ruler but try to keep his plans as sensible as possible 
and within a moderate scale.’ One aspect of the ruler’s plan that did cause 
British officials concern was the possible employment of British contract officers 
to train the retainers. Any impression that the Ruler was creating a rival to the 
State Police Force might cause the British police officers to throw in their hands, 
Crawford fretted.951 For almost a year, the Ruler did not raise the matter of the 
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Bedouin force.952 But in December 1967, after Britain privately told the rulers of 
their plans to leave the Gulf by 1971, Shaikh Isa told British officials he was 
determined to have his private guard and would have his son Shaikh Hamad, 
who was expected to pass out from the British officer cadet school (Mons), run 
it. The ruler said he was still thinking of a ‘general insurance policy against any 
danger which might confront him following a British withdrawal from Bahrain.’953 
Contrary to British apprehensions, the Ruler claimed he carried the support of 
the senior British officers in State Police in his scheme. Parsons told Isa he had 
to carry his brother, Shaikh Mohammad, as well. In order to discuss the issue 
out in the open, the Ruler held a meeting on 13 December with Shaikh Khalifah, 
Shaikh Mohammad, Commandant Bell, Ian Henderson and Parsons (the 
Political Agent, an excellent Arabist, was translating to ensure there were no 
misunderstandings). Shaikh Isa assured Bell and Henderson that he considered 
them his most loyal and valuable servants and that he had complete confidence 
in the State Police. When it came to forming a Bedouin military force, Bell 
expressed his anxiety that its operational command was uncertain. The Ruler 
interrupted him: ‘Mr Bell, the guard will not move except under your command’. 
No one at the meeting actively opposed the Ruler’s plan to set up a guard. 
Summing up Britain’s limited options, Parsons wrote to the Political Resident on 
14 December: ‘We cannot prevent Shaikh Isa from raising a private army: his 
motives are understandable. His attitude of mind has been conditioned by the 
events of the past two years in South Arabia.’954 On the plus side, Parsons 
believed Shaikh Isa had abandoned his wilder ideas and was now looking at a 
more realistic force. 
After Britain’s public announcement in January 1968 that it was 
withdrawing from the Gulf by the end of 1971, Shaikh Isa’s proposal to set up 
an armed force for Bahrain’s national defence gathered impetus. Isa first 
considered bringing Jordanian or Saudi tribal Bedouin to fill the ranks of the new 
force. He then toyed with the idea of importing 2,000 Ghurkhas to form a loyal 
praetorian guard, similar to the Sultan of Brunei. Parsons, claimed that he had 
dissuaded – perhaps mistakenly, he later admitted – from implementing either 
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idea on the grounds that the presence of foreigners, especially the Ghurkhas, 
‘would be highly inflammatory on the local population and produce a greater risk 
even than having a force of Bahrainis.’955   
Whomever the Bahraini Government recruited into ranks of a new military, 
British officials still assumed that a British officer would be sought to command 
the force and that at least half a dozen other British nationals would take the 
key posts.956 For the top job, British officials searched for a British contract 
officer rather than a seconded officer because, it was thought, the Ruler would 
regard the later as being ‘the man of the British.’957  Parsons makes the further 
claim that he moved the Ruler’s thinking away from employing British officers 
altogether.      
 
When he [Shaikh Isa] eventually settled on a Bahrain Defence Force 
[it was initially called the National Guard], I talked him out of 
employing contract British officers (he would not look at the idea of 
seconded British officers) on the ground that their presence would 
also be inflammatory; that he would not get a good type of officer; 
and that, from my own experience, such British officers would be 
extremely unlikely to know if the Bahraini elements of the force were 
planning a coup d’état.  Eventually I persuaded him, if he felt that he 
had to establish a force, to go for Jordanian officers personally 
selected by King Hussein as being the safest bet.  I still think that this 
was the least of all the possible evils.958 
 
The Crown Prince, Shaikh Hamad, although only 19 and with a little military 
experience behind him, took charge of overseeing the establishment of the 
National Guard. He travelled to Jordan in March 1968 to ask King Hussein for a 
Jordanian training team for the fledgling National Guard. The King responded 
favourably, claiming that he would furnish Bahrain with the best officer he could 
find.959 Despite being British-trained, Shaikh Hamad supported using Jordanian 
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officers over British. In Jordan, Shaikh Hamad also met with the former Political 
Agent to Bahrain, Peter Tripp, who was now the British Ambassador in Amman. 
Making unfavourable references to General Glubb’s tenure as commander of 
the Arab Legion, Shaikh Hamad told Tripp that Jordanians serving as soldiers 
or in instructional posts might react poorly to serving under a British army 
officer. Tripp urged Shaikh Hamad to keep up a discreet surveillance over the 
Jordanians. If a situation arose, Tripp warned, whereby King Hussein’s authority 
was challenged in Jordan, the repercussions for the Jordanian troops serving in 
the Bahraini forces could be serious.960  Why not, Tripp suggested, place the 
nominal control of the force in the hands of one of the Al Khalifah with the 
training and administrative responsibilities delegated to a British officer? Tripp 
failed to persuade Shaikh Hamad.961 In latter half of 1968, the new Jordanian 
commander of the National Guard, Colonel Rushdi, and his training team 
arrived. They were greeted by Shaikh Hamad in the new National Guard 
uniform. He was flanked by his British advisers, Colonel St John Hammersely 
(former commandant of the Bahrain State Police) and Gerald Green (a close 
confidant of the Al Khalifah family who was one of the security experts brought 
in 1956 to reform the Bahraini security apparatus).962  
Although British officers would not be in the cockpit of this new force, 
Britain nonetheless tried to influence its shape. Brigadier Ivor Hollyer, 
Commander British Land Forces Gulf (CBLFG), authored a proposal for the size 
and structure of the National Guard. Hollyer recommended an infantry battalion 
group with small support elements of armoured cars, artillery and helicopters.963 
The Ruler agreed that this was precisely the kind of force he wanted and hoped 
it could be ready by the time British forces left in 1971.  In terms of recruitment, 
the Ruler proposed 1,000 tribesmen should arrive en masse and be moulded 
altogether into a modern force by the Jordanian training team. A triumvirate of 
the Political Agent, Brigadier Hollyer and Shaikh Hamad convinced the Ruler 
that it would be better to form a nucleus of 100 trained, experienced men and 
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then gradually build up the rifle companies around them.964  When recruitment 
began for the National Guard, British officials were surprised at the number of 
applicants. The 600 volunteers staggered Anthony Parsons who held the 
conviction that the Bahrainis were ‘scarcely a martial race’.965  Parsons relayed 
his thoughts back to London as to why the new National Guard was able to 
attract Bahraini recruits when the State Police had struggled to do so for 
decades.  
 
[T]he romantic vision of defending the fatherland against the Iranian 
hordes (bolstered by the probability of never in fact having to do 
anything so appallingly dangerous) coupled with the pay and with the 
fact that a soldier does not, like a policeman, have to go around 
arresting people and otherwise making himself unpopular, have 
combined to make the National Guard a more attractive profession 
than the Bahrain State Police.966   
 
Shaikh Hamad recalls in his military history of Bahrain, First Light, that: ‘We had 
hardly started recruiting when the youth of the country came forward in such 
large numbers that I was overwhelmed with delight. How I wished we could take 
everyone who presented himself for interview before the recruitment board.’967 
Shaikh Hamad does not mention that the British-led Special Branch weeded out 
dozens of what it considered ‘radicals’ from the first batch of volunteers, 
suspecting them of being members of the subversive National Liberation Front 
(NLF) trying to infiltrate the force.968 In addition, the Ruler dispersed his Bedouin 
retainers amongst the ranks as loyal ballast in the force. The Bahraini 
government had a firm idea about which recruits were acceptable. The number 
of Shia could not exceed more than a quarter of the force and none from this 
community could make the rank of officer. By 1969, the recruitment and training 
of Bahraini officers was under way. Most officers received their training in 
Jordan, but a handful had been instructed at the British cadet school of Mons.969  
                                            
964 TNA FCO 8/542, A.D. Parsons (Political Agent, Bahrain) to M.S. Weir (Foreign 
Office) regarding talks with the Ruler on plans for a defence force, 8 March 1968. 
965 TNA FCO 8/1014, A.D. Parsons (Political Agent, Bahrain) to D.J. McCarthy 
(Foreign Office), ‘Bahrain National Guard,’ 22 October, 1968. 
966 Ibid. 
967 Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifah, First Light (London: Kegan Paul International, 1994), 
p. 72. 
968 TNA FCO 8/1014, A.D. Parsons (Political Agent, Bahrain) to D.J. McCarthy 
(Foreign Office), ‘Bahrain National Guard,’ 22 October, 1968. 
969 Ibid. Two others were trained at the military college in Iraq.  
 
 
242 
British Headquarters Land Forces Gulf in Bahrain provided essential 
equipment to allow basic training for 150 new recruits to begin in October 1968. 
The Political Agency thought this helped Bahrain achieve ‘something of a 
miracle in getting the National Guard off the ground in 1968’. 970 However, 
Britain limited its involvement with the force. Parsons, for example, did not take 
the force seriously, believing it to be ‘rather Ruritarian’ with the officers, 
including Shaikh Hamad, ‘prancing about in expensive uniforms.’971 Even after 
the National Guard was expanded 1969 and renamed the Bahrain Defence 
Force (BDF), British officials played down its usefulness, arguing that it would, 
at any rate, eventually be absorbed into a federal military structure once 
Bahrain formed a political union with Qatar and the Trucial States.  
In pursuing its agenda to remain the chief provider of defence equipment 
to the region after withdrawal, Britain should provide Bahrain, Parsons argued, 
with arms at cut-down prices: 
 
[A]nything we provide now as either a gift or at reduced prices and on 
easy terms will be bread on the waters. It may not be a very large 
order but we should in this way be able to secure continuing exports 
to the Bahrain Defence Force and, by extension, the Bahrain State 
Police, for the foreseeable future. If we fail to come up to scratch the 
Ruler will turn immediately to the clamouring agents of West 
European arms manufacturers such as the French and Italians, and 
we shall be shouldered aside.972 
 
Supporting the BDF, and more broadly the Bahrain state as a whole, through 
this difficult period was for Anthony Parsons ‘not only a point of honour’ but was 
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crucial for Britain’s future relationship with the Al Khalifah.973 The advantages of 
providing succour were that it would ‘greatly further our political, defence, and 
commercial interests in the short, medium, and long-term.’974 Recognising that 
the loss of income associated with the British military presence would hit the 
Bahraini economy hard, Britain assisted in and partly paid for a number of 
infrastructure projects, perhaps most notably the development of an airfield 
capable of receiving commercial jet aircraft.975  
 
6.3 British Conservatives and the Formation of a Residual 
Policy for Security, 1970-1 
Whilst in opposition the Conservatives were vocal critics of the Labour 
government’s decision to withdraw from the Gulf and announced that if they 
regained power they would reverse it. Conservative leader, Edward Heath, 
orated to an audience in Inverness, Scotland, soon after the withdrawal 
announcement, that his party were ‘resolved that Britain should go on helping to 
keep the peace when her own interests require it and where her friends want 
her to stay.’976 The Foreign Office tried to convince Heath that the decision, 
whether right or wrong, had set in train political developments that could not be 
reversed. Heath refused to accept this logic and restated his commitment to 
discuss with the rulers in the area the possibility of a continued British military 
presence.977 Moreover, Heath claimed that the rulers of Dubai and Sharjah 
were still emphatically in favour of retaining British forces and that the Ruler of 
Qatar wanted a defence treaty with Britain.978  
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Despite his enthusiasm for keeping troops in the area, Heath agreed not 
to make any announcement that could destabilise the talks on unification of the 
protected states and the formation of unified armed forces. In general, British 
representatives were openly hostile to the idea of a reversal and criticised the 
uncertainty that such talk was creating. Edward Henderson, the new Political 
Agent in Qatar, offered a middle course between stationing troops and a 
complete withdrawal. He proposed in April 1969 a new defence relationship that 
entailed embedding liaison units with the local armed forces and keeping up a 
ready supply of seconded and contract British military officers and personnel. 
Because in his opinion internal threats were more pronounced in the region 
than external ones, he believed that the presence of British troops would only 
accentuate the possibility of local subversion taking root. To that end, 
Henderson recommended maintaining a quick reaction force of British troops 
stationed on the Masirah Island. Henderson argued that it would be far better 
for Britain to offer a defence commitment to the protected states beyond 1971 
that would,   
 
[. . .] retain in unwritten form important aspects of our present special 
position, and our influence: from this could come a capability to 
continue to help the local forces and influence their policies. Unless 
we can do this, these states might simply break up and anarchy 
ensues.979  
 
The Conservatives may or may not have seen Henderson’s proposals, but they 
took up the substance of his recommendations upon taking power in the 
general election in June 1970.980  
The first Conservative policy statements after victory at the 1970 general 
election stated that the government ‘would discuss with leaders in the Gulf and 
other interested countries on how Britain can best contribute to the maintenance 
of peace and stability in the area’.981 It also claimed that the new government 
would undertake an immediate re-evaluation of the previous government’s 
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decision on complete withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971.982 This put the Prime 
Minister at odds with his Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home. Douglas-
Home sympathised with Heath’s position, but was more aligned with Britain’s 
representatives in the Gulf who considered a reversal at this stage next to 
impossible. The Foreign Secretary tried to steer a course between Labour’s 
policy of cutting the protected states loose (as he saw it) and Heath’s desire to 
reverse the decision.983 Douglas-Home aimed, the historian Wm Roger Louis 
notes, ‘to move forward towards union of the seven Trucial States without 
Bahrain and Qatar, and to retain rather than break the military and economic 
links.’984 In order to guide this policy on the ground Douglas-Home appointed 
former Political Resident Sir William Luce as his special envoy.985 Luce’s role is 
best remembered in helping to force through the political logjam in forming the 
United Arab Emirates (albeit minus Bahrain, Qatar, and, for some weeks, Ras 
al-Khaimah).986 For one scholar, the appointment of Luce represented one of 
the Heath government’s ‘most important and wisest’ decisions.987 Less well 
known is Luce’s involvement in formulating Britain’s policy for a residual security 
presence in the Gulf, and in successfully convincing sceptical politicians of the 
Conservative Party’s imperialist wing to adopt it.988  
Douglas-Home believed that any future British role in the Gulf had to be 
indirect so that Britain ‘could exercise the maximum political influence with the 
minimum British presence.’989 Heath, however, still wanted to consider a direct 
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continued presence. Before Sir William Luce departed for his multiple rounds of 
discussions in the Gulf, Heath tasked him with testing the water with the rulers 
regarding stationing some British forces in the region beyond 1971. ‘For obvious 
reasons neither the local rulers nor the Shah of Iran were likely to say publicly 
that they wished us to stay,’ Heath told Luce. Confidential discussions were for 
Heath another matter.990 Thus the Prime Minister believed that one of Luce’s 
important tasks was ‘to ensure that there had been genuine consultation with 
the local rulers and others, and to elicit what they really thought.’991 During his 
shuttling to and from the Gulf over the summer and autumn of 1970, all the 
ruling families except the Al Thani told Luce that they wanted Britain to continue 
its presence beyond 1971 and sign new British defence commitments to replace 
the protective treatises. Luce did not recommend that Britain agree to these 
wishes, but he did provide a route map for Britain to remain involved in the 
security affairs of Eastern Arabia after 1971. 
Delivered in November 1970, Luce’s report questioned the utility of 
maintaining fighting units in the Gulf beyond 1971. At the heart of this critique 
was Luce’s point that there could be no realistic thought given to military 
intervention if either Iran or Saudi Arabia pressed their territorial claims by force. 
As for keeping the British defence architecture in place to defend Kuwait from 
Iraqi aggression, Luce felt that the threat was less real than that of ‘subversion 
and revolution by Arab nationalist and left-wing elements against the traditional 
regimes, and their encouragement and exploitation by Russia and possibly 
China.’992 Indeed, against Heath’s inclination to station troops beyond 1971, 
Luce argued that the ‘presence of a British battalion will not deter the threat 
[from subversive groups], indeed it could encourage it.’ Heath underlined this 
last sentence, penning his disagreement to Luce’s argument in the margin.993 
Luce’s report went on to reason that British forces could only act as ‘a stimulus 
and focus to subversive organisations who will increasingly concentrate their 
activities against the British presence and against the governments of Bahrain 
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and the Union for permitting it.’994 After the meeting of deputy rulers on 24-26 
October 1970 ended in failure, Britain assumed that Bahrain would in due 
course decide to become an independent state with Qatar likely following 
suit.995 Whatever political future the protected states took, Luce was confident 
that stationing troops after 1971 carried with it the risk of involving Britain ‘in an 
escalating and fruitless internal security role.’ With the experiences of Aden and 
South Arabia fresh in mind, he warned against potentially forcing Britain into a 
situation where it would have to choose between ‘reinforcement and 
ignominious withdrawal.’996 So how did Luce believe Britain could contribute to 
the security of the region after 1971 without stationing fighting forces? 
Though Luce opposed maintaining troops in the Gulf, he recognised that 
there was a desire among the local rulers for continuing British support, and 
proposed a string of measures by which Britain could play a residual security 
role. Britain could, he suggested, be on hand to counsel the rulers in times of 
emergency. Britain might also maintain small Royal Navy and RAF contingents 
to facilitate ship visits and service British military aircraft staging through the 
region. Furthermore, liaison teams from all three services of the British armed 
forces could provide coaching to indigenous forces and coordinate arms 
purchases. Moreover, Britain could send combat units to undertake joint training 
with their local counterparts. In Luce’s view, the means by which Britain could 
best maintain influence, and contribute most towards stability, was ‘to continue 
to loan officers and other British personnel to the forces of the Union [he 
thought at this stage there was a small chance Qatar might join as well] and of 
Bahrain’. British officers holding key positions in these local forces were for 
Luce, ‘a stronger safeguard against military revolt than the presence of British 
battalions.’997 This tallied with the thinking of the Political Agent in the Trucial 
States, Julian Bullard, who was sure that after 1971 Britain would, 
 
[. . .] retain uniquely special opportunities to influence affairs [in the 
Trucial States], even after the formal trappings have gone, by virtue 
of our long political experience and entrenched position of British 
subjects in the local security forces, in the rulers’ administrations 
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(such as they are), in the Trucial States Development Office and in 
trade, contracting and banking.998 
 
When the decision to withdrawal was announced, British loan service personnel 
were concerned that their positions would end. As early as February 1970, 
however, the British government confirmed that the position of loan personnel 
would be open-ended and not subject to termination at the end of 1971.999   
Luce’s recommendations went before the Cabinet’s Defence and 
Overseas Policy (DOP) Committee. Before the meeting, the influential Cabinet 
Secretary, Burke Trend, thought it would be useful for the Prime Minister to 
consider the main assumptions of Luce’s report. First amongst these was that 
the government would not wish to reverse their predecessor’s decision to end 
Britain’s military presence – an assumption Trend agreed with. He argued to 
Heath on 10 December 1970 (the day before the meeting) that:  
 
Sir W. Luce’s argument [. . .] appear[s] convincing. To continue to 
station committed forces in the Gulf would prolong the period when, 
to borrow the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary’s words, we 
should be in a position of responsibility without control. With Rhodesia 
and the Caribbean in mind this is an uninviting prospect.1000 
 
The Ministry of Defence believed that Army and RAF training visits and 
exercises should be encouraged, but was less keen on providing in-country 
training in liaison teams. Whilst defence officials believed that providing 
personnel loan personnel to local militaries was, and would be, ‘a very effective 
way of furthering the development of these forces and securing valuable 
influence,’ it cautioned against having its serving officers in key posts of the 
militaries of foreign states whose policies Britain had little control over. Could 
they realistically have their duties limited to exclude their employment in 
hostilities such as war between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia, the Ministry of 
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Defence pondered?1001 Douglas-Home wanted British defence officials to 
appreciate the political advantages of positioning liaison and training teams in 
the Gulf states after 1971.1002 
Despite the amendments, Luce’s broad conclusions, which taken together 
constituted a policy for ensuring a residual influence, were accepted by Heath 
and the Cabinet.  Although Heath had been strongly in favour of continuing to 
station at least a battalion in the Gulf he did not force his opinion on this 
matter.1003 As historian Wm Roger Louis, observes:  
 
Heath believed along with Julian Amery and others of the imperialist 
wing of the Conservative Party that Britain could continue to station 
battalions and hold enclaves regardless of world opinion. But in this 
respect Heath was like Churchill and did not override his military and 
political advisors.1004 
 
When Douglas-Home formally reaffirmed Britain’s commitment to withdrawal its 
forces by the end of 1971 in a speech to the House of Commons in March 
1971, he also used the occasion to extol the merits of Luce’s recommendations 
for maintaining a residual influence. Douglas-Home told the assembled 
Members of Parliament that the arrangements would ‘form a sound basis for a 
continuing and effective British contribution to the stability of the area’.1005  
With Bahrain and Qatar electing on independence, Britain expended much 
of its diplomatic energy over the course of 1971 trying to form a union of the 
seven Trucial shaikhdoms. As part of its efforts, the British government wanted 
to transfer the TOS to this new political entity. Britain asked former TOS 
commander Freddie De Butts to be the new link between the Trucial states 
rulers and the British Government in the military field. De Butts explains his role 
in his memoirs:  
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The TOS were about to become the Union Defence Force (UDF). I 
was required to recommend its shape and size on Independence 
Day (only two and a half months away) to the Rulers, and to estimate 
what it would cost as they and not HMG would be paying.1006  
 
Despite working to a close deadline, De Butts secured agreement from the 
rulers in November 1971 that the size of the UDF would be at brigade strength 
(roughly 3000 men) and would include an armoured reconnaissance squadron 
of scout cars. Though De Butts had tacit approval for this concept from the 
rulers, this did not stop them carrying on with the formation of their own 
individual forces. ‘The problem in a nutshell’, De Butts recalls,  
 
[. . .] was that though Rulers agreed that the former TOS should 
become a federal force of about brigade strength, several wanted to 
copy the Abu Dhabi example and have their own small private armies 
as well. It made them feel safer now that the British umbrella was 
removed. I could only stand on the touch line and advise on shape 
and size.1007  
 
One of Sir William Luce’s chief arguments against continuing to station regular 
troops in the region was that they would act as a lightning rod for subversive 
forces in the area. In his mind, the only effective means available to counter 
these groups, aside from sound government, was ‘efficient intelligence and 
security service.’1008 In the lead up to December 1971, Britain tried to put in 
place a Gulf-wide local system for counter-subversion efforts that would remain 
in place after its exit.  
 
6.4 Gulf-wide Local System for Counter-Subversion  
Britain’s decision to accelerate its withdrawal from the region made building up 
local capabilities to deal with subversion and internal threats more important. In 
an effort to improve the police forces in the Gulf before its departure, the 
Foreign Office sent a policing expert, Mr L.A. Hicks, to the protected states for a 
fortnight in February 1968 to audit the existing measures. Hicks found the 
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security forces to be in a varied state of readiness. He felt that the Bahrain State 
Police were well led under its British commandant, Bell, and that the Special 
Branch, comprising six experienced British police officers, and led by Ian 
Henderson, was particularly strong. He did not see, especially after the State 
Police had formed its own mobile force with a new batch of modern rifles and 
smoke grenades, an internal security problem developing in Bahrain that the 
police could not handle. The Qatari security forces, at the time of Hicks’ visit, 
consisted of a Defence Force of 1,100 men and a police force of 1,080 men. 
Both forces were under the command of Mohammad Mahdi who had 12 British 
police officers under him.1009 Once plans were enacted for creating a police 
mobile force, Hicks believed Qatar would also be in position to deal quickly with 
civil disturbances.1010 Hicks painted a less positive picture of the policing 
situation in the Trucial States.  
Out of the seven Trucial shaikhdoms, only the 430-man Dubai Police in 
Hicks’ eyes were of much value.1011 In contrast, Hicks found the 57-man 
Sharjah Police Force, commanded by J.I. Burns, starved of funds. Burns had 
plans to expand the police to 108 men but lacked resources to do so.1012 The 
slightly larger Ras al-Khaimah Police Force (three officers and 120 policemen), 
commanded by the British policeman A.T. Bevan (joined May 1967), functioned, 
according to Hicks, like little more than a palace guard. Moreover, the Ruler, 
Shaikh Saqr, had denied it funds and even had sold off some of its vehicles. 
Like Burns, Bevan had no contract, no house, and no educational allowance for 
his children. In Abu Dhabi, the de facto commander, Barham (the British 
deputy), also had to fight for even the most basic equipment for the police, 
which by 1968 had grown to 650 men. Here Hicks recognised the problem as 
being one of family politics. Because Shaikh Zayed did not trust his nephew 
(Shaikh Mubarak bin Mohammad), who was the commandant, he deliberately 
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neglected the force.1013 In turn, Shaikh Mubarak forbade Barham from speaking 
directly with Shaikh Zayed.1014 Hicks accused Barham of not fighting hard 
enough to achieve direct access to the Ruler. The Residency agreed with Hicks’ 
recommendation that a younger man – Barham was 57-years-old – should be 
appointed when the Deputy Commandant’s contract expired. Britain wanted 
Abu Dhabi to agree to increase the cadre of British officers. Unlike the regular 
police, the Abu Dhabi Special Branch was allotted its own lavish budget and 
granted its British commander private access whenever he asked for it.1015 As 
Hicks noted, the ‘success and efficiency of the police forces in the Gulf depend 
very largely on the type of personal relationship that the Commandant of Police 
enjoys with the local ruler.’1016 
One month after the British announcement that it would withdraw from 
the area by the end of 1971, Hicks concluded that Britain must get more and not 
less involved in the local police forces. In addition to recommending the 
appointment of further British Special Branch and investigation officers for Qatar 
and Dubai, Hicks recommended that Britain provide budgetary aid to the 
Sharjah Police to help it expand and to Ras al-Khaimah to forestall its 
collapse.1017 The Treasury, however, rejected Hicks’ calls to assist Sharjah and 
Ras al-khaimah police forces. In the east coast shaikhdom of Fujairah, it was 
Abu Dhabi and not Britain that was assisting the Ruler, Shaikh Mohammad, with 
establishing a police force by training recruits in al-Ain. Shaikh Mohammad did 
ask Britain for modern self-loading rifles (SLR), but because Britain suspected 
they would be for his bodyguard rather than the police it offered him old .303 
models instead.1018 Shaikh Mohammad continued to insist that he needed the 
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SLRs.1019 That Qatar and Abu Dhabi had already offered Fujairah these 
weapons – and had already delivered some – displayed Britain’s weakened 
position when it came to controlling the spread of arms. ‘In asking for our 
permission to have these weapons,’ Bullard wrote to the Residency, ‘the Ruler 
is really asking us to legitimise a fait accompli.’1020 Shaikh Mohammad also 
asked Britain for a British officer to command the police. Britain, however, 
believed the force was too small to justify this expenditure.1021       
Although the outgoing Political Resident, Sir Stewart Crawford, believed 
Britain had been able to affect considerable improvement over 1968-70 in the 
leadership of the local police forces, especially in their Special Branches, he 
was nonetheless concerned about the growing threats in the Gulf and the local 
capacity to deal with them.  In his valedictory report in July 1970, he concluded: 
 
Omens for the future are however less encouraging. The police cover 
is thin; potential subversives are growing in number, especially with 
the increased flow of Palestinians into the Trucial States; the Iraq 
Government is beginning to penetrate the area, so far mainly by 
overt methods but undoubtedly with the intent of later promoting 
activities against the rulers and perhaps against our forces; there are 
signs that the various subversive groups may now be drawing 
together under the umbrella of a single organisation with a better 
chance of producing a coordinated effort than previous such 
attempts.1022 
 
Events in 1970 seemed to change the impressions of both the local rulers and 
Britain’s representatives about the growing subversive threats in Dubai and the 
smaller Trucial States. ‘[I]f 1970 is to have a label,’ the Political Agent in Dubai, 
Julian Bullard, wrote in his survey of events over the past year, ‘it might be 
called the year in which the limitations of British power in the Lower Gulf began 
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to be exposed.’1023  The assassination attempt on the Ruler of Sharjah on the 
17 July (an explosive device detonated underneath his empty chair in the 
majlis) in particular brought the dangers home. The fact that a Sharjah Police 
constable who had served in the TOS was implicated in the attack showed the 
need for local security services with a long intelligence reach. British officials 
believed that the individual was not acting alone but was part of a subversive 
cell. The local Special Branch teams sprang into action making arrests; the TOS 
assisted by blocking roads. British officials wanted to use the ‘present 
atmosphere’ created by the assassination attempt ‘to encourage the Rulers to 
improve their security apparatus.’1024  Julian Bullard reflected on how the 
attempt on the Ruler’s life had changed thinking in the area: 
 
I once had told your predecessor, in jest but also with perfect truth, 
that our troubles with subversive elements were nothing compared to 
our troubles with the temperamental officers of the Special Branch. 
1970 changed all that.  The turning point was a single week in mid-
July, when a bomb exploded under the Ruler’s chair in Sharjah – it 
would certainly have killed him had he kept to his usual timetable that 
morning – and six suspected members of the National Democratic 
Front for the Liberation of the Arab Gulf (NDFLOAG) were 
arrested.1025 
 
For Bullard, the attack was only a sign of worse things to come. He warned that, 
‘the Rulers [of the northern states and Dubai] must either take measures for 
their own security, or perish. At the moment the second looks much the likelier 
alternative.’ After Britain’s special position in the Lower Gulf ended, Bullard 
warned the Political Resident,   
 
[. . .] the Trucial States will be exposed to the full force of subversive 
influences, native and foreign. Their only defence will be the police 
and Special Branches, including the British-controlled Northern 
Trucial States Special Branch and Bureau if these are handed over 
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to the Rulers at that time; in the background they may have a 
defence force or forces of some kind.1026 
 
The most glaring shortcomings were in Bullard’s mind in those states where the 
rulers were least likely to remedy them by themselves. He therefore 
recommended that Britain double its help to these rulers now while it still had 
influence and before they began to receive advice from less friendly sources. 
Apart from information exchanges between British police officers, there was a 
lack of cooperation between the various states. ‘Even a central office 
coordinating the work of the nine state police forces is something beyond 
reasonable expectation,’ Bullard lamented. Britain wanted to codify the practice 
of regular meetings between the various police commandants in the Trucial 
States so that it would remain in place after withdrawal.1027 Moreover, Bullard 
thought it would be ‘the height of folly’ if the intelligence bureau at Sharjah Fort 
was not kept going after 1971. He worried also about the future of the Northern 
Trucial States Special Branch (NTSSB) after Britain’s exit. Staffed by four 
expatriates, including two British officers, and also housed in the Sharjah Police 
force, the NTSSB supervised the small Special Branch sections in Sharjah and 
Ras al-Khaimah. It also operated on its own in Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, and 
Fujairah. ‘The need for this kind of work is obviously going to increase in 1971 
and after, but British withdrawal will leave the NTSSB without a political 
umbrella,’ the Political Agent continued. After speaking with all the 
commandants and heads of the intelligence bureau and NTSSB, Bullard 
proposed a range of measures, including additional staff, a new police radio 
centre, and a dedicated Special Branch adviser. In late 1970, he asked the 
Foreign Office lobby for funds for these improvements into 1972.1028 The 
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Residency gave Bullard’s report its backing and hoped that the British 
government’s claims that it would continue to assist the police forces and 
Special Branches units after 1971 would translate into action.1029  
With the impending dissolution of the NTSSB upon Britain’s exit, the 
Political Agency proposed as a replacement measure the strengthening of the 
police and Special Branches in Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah and the 
establishment of small Special Branches in the three northern shaikhdoms 
where the main weaknesses in the security system were identified. The Agency 
thought it was ‘of considerable importance that these weaknesses be remedied 
before the end of 1971 if possible.’1030 The Residency and Foreign Office 
agreed ‘that a continuing British contribution to Police and Special Branches in 
the Trucial States, and in particular the provision of British personnel, will play 
an important part in achieving our basic policy aim of maintaining the stability of 
the Gulf.’1031 British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, sent the 
Political Agency in the Trucial States a letter on 18 March 1971 in which he 
made no commitment to a continuing financial contribution from Britain to the 
Trucial States security forces after withdrawal. Instead, Douglas-Home wanted 
to see more collective action taken by the rulers and funds channelled through a 
new department of Trucial States Council to local address local security issues.  
It is worth detailing Douglas-Home’s direction in full:  
 
In putting forward this idea to the Rulers you should stress, that in 
our view, internal subversion is likely to prove the most serious 
immediate threat facing them at the end of this year.  The importance 
of adequately equipped and trained police forces and special 
branches in dealing with this threat cannot be overemphasised.  
Some of the Rulers already have made useful progress in developing 
their counter-subversion forces but others have given little thought to 
the subject. The subversion threat cannot, in our view, be adequately 
met, except on an inter-state basis.1032  
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In sum, Douglas-Home wanted the rulers to pay and wanted the Political 
Agency to enlist the support of the British police officers employed in the Gulf 
forces to push the line that cooperation and joint action was needed. Yet the 
Foreign Secretary’s own department continued its appeal to the Treasury for 
funds for the local police forces. One foreign office mandarin, A.A. Acland, put 
forward the following argument to the Treasury at the end of March 1971: 
 
The last thing any of us want to do is to spend money unnecessarily.  
We are all convinced however that improvement of the local police 
forces is vital as a British [original emphasis] interest, and that if we 
are to have a chance of making progress we must be in a position to 
offer some financial help if this proves necessary.1033 
 
Acland reminded the Treasury of Britain’s political, commercial and economic 
interests in the Gulf. It was an area important to sterling and one, because of its 
oil supplies, which was critical to the functioning of the British economy. If the 
subversive threat to the northern Trucial States, which the rulers themselves 
were unable to counter unaided, developed and spread, it could affect other 
neighbouring areas of the Gulf where British economic and commercial 
interests were very large.  Acland balanced the huge potential risks posed by 
Gulf subversion against the small sums proposed to protect these interests.1034 
The British government had, at any rate, already committed itself to a policy of 
doing all it could to help build-up, train and supply local police forces and in 
particular to their security and intelligence branches before British withdrawal. 
Douglas-Home had confirmed this position in a statement and answer to 
supplementary questions in the House of Commons on 1 March 1971.   
The Foreign Office proposed extending the existing programme of 
assistance as far as 1976 and adding a supplementary £193,000 per annum to 
be administered by the Trucial States Council. In the end, the Treasury agreed 
to over half the money.1035  The almost 500-strong Sharjah Police would receive 
£11,069 for the year 1971/2 officer salaries, the majority of which was also for 
the British commandant’s salary. As Abu Dhabi provided financial assistance to 
Ajman, Umm al-Quwain and Fujairah for their police forces, Britain need not 
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make a contribution. But Britain did agree to subsidise Ras al-Khaimah’s 220-
strong police to the sum of £9,452 per annum and pay the salary of British 
commandant and other officers. As for the putative Ras al-Khaimah Special 
Branch, the Political Agent proposed a Jordanian who was already working for 
the NTSSB. Shaikh Saqr refused, saying he wanted an Englishman, not a 
Jordanian, and suggested Anthony Ffrench Blake a young cavalry officer and 
former TOS Desert Intelligence Officer in Ras al-Khaimah. The Political Agent 
tried to dissuade him stating that the Treasury had not provided sufficient funds 
to cover the cost of an expatriate Special Branch officer, but Saqr stood his 
ground.1036 Though Ffrench Blake could not be released from his current 
military post in Britain, Saqr still insisted that he had an Englishman as head of 
the Special Branch. As he did not want ‘a Palestinian, Jordanian or any other 
foreign Arab,’ the Foreign Office recommended that, as ‘the improvement of the 
Special Branch is Ras al-Khaimah, our weak spot as far as subversives on the 
coast, is vital’, Britain should ‘fall in with Shaikh Saqr’s wishes.’1037 When the 
wisdom of giving financial aid to the smaller police forces and special branches 
in the northern Trucial shaikhdoms was again brought into question in the 
months leading up to withdrawal, A. J. Coles at the Political Agency defended 
the practice:  
 
Most of the key figures in the internal security forces are British.  
Without them the security forces would probably fall apart.  Sharjah, 
in particular, is heavily dependent on Burns and Turner.  Sharjah’s 
finances were rocky in November 1970 and are now in a very 
perilous state. If the payment of my salary were dependent on the 
Ruler of Sharjah I should be looking for another job, particularly if, 
like Turner, I were married with children at school. 
 
In Coles’ mind, the British government should pay Turner’s salary and 
allowances for the following reasons:  
 
It is in British interests that he should stay on since he makes a vital 
contribution to the security of Sharjah (the probable future home of 
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the UAE Defence Force, British military assistance team etc.) and 
thus to the security of the area in general.1038   
 
Britain resurrected the idea of collaboration amongst the police and Special 
Branches of the protected states in May 1971. The Joint Police Committee, 
which met on 22 May, agreed to set up a Public Security Liaison Department 
containing a criminal records office, a liaison function with Interpol, an explosive 
disposals team and a Special Branch adviser. There was some concern that if 
Britain paid for the Special Branch adviser the ruling families would suspect that 
the post was created in order for Britain to collect intelligence. According to 
Julian Walker at the Trucial States Political Agency, suspicion over the loyalties 
of British police officers had always been there. ‘Briggs [Dubai Police], Burns 
[Sharjah Police], Bevan [Ras al-Khaimah Police] are all of the opinion that 
whether or not they are paid for by HMG [Her Majesty’s Government], they are 
regarded as being in British employ, and that Barham [Abu Dhabi Police] and 
Clemens [Abu Dhabi Special Branch] are certain to be bracketed with them, 
however much the latter protest.’1039 Walker promised to do his best to correct 
any inaccurate suspicions of our motives over the establishment of the Special 
Branch adviser post. However, the plain fact for Walker was ‘that it is still 
difficult for the Arabs of the Coast to understand that the British are strange 
creatures, motivated by different impulses than theirs.’1040 
  To appease sensibilities, the idea was to base the headquarters 
(records, administration, and police gazette) of the Public Security Liaison 
Department (PSLD) in Abu Dhabi, but have an operational office in Dubai. 
Britain’s plan was for all the police forces of the impending union of the seven 
Trucial States to be branches of the PSLD. Shaikh Zayed wanted a British 
police expert to run the force and for Britain to begin looking for someone who 
had knowledge of police procedures and of the Arab world.1041 Zayed, however, 
went on to remark that he would not wish a British expert to remain in the office 
after the formation of the Union. He would have to leave by the time that 
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delegations set out to seek admission into the Arab League otherwise 
accusations would follow that the new union was merely an imperialist trick.1042  
Since Zayed had British officers in his army – and was intending to keep them 
beyond 1971 – his comments surprised British officials.1043 The Political Agent 
in Abu Dhabi, Treadwell, spoke to Shaikh Zayed about this on 23 September: 
 
He [Shaikh Zayed] seemed at first suspicious about British motives in 
pressing for the recruitment of these four advisers but upon being 
satisfied that they would have no executive authority, would be paid 
for in full by himself and Rashid [Ruler of Dubai] and that they would 
beholden in no way to HM representatives, agreed that the ODA 
[Overseas Development Agency] should try to find suitable 
candidates as a matter of priority.1044 
 
When the Union of Arab Emirates (UAE) formed on 2 December 1971, each of 
the seven emirates kept their own police forces and Special Branches. It would 
be many years until a federal judicial system would be created in the UAE. In 
the end, subversive groups did not exploit the uncertainty caused by Britain’s 
departure.  
 
6.5 ‘Quiet Erosion’ of the Bahrain Defence Force and Support 
for the Special Branch, 1971 
As Britain’s 1971 departure from the Gulf neared, its representatives in Bahrain 
began to look upon the Bahrain Defence Force (BDF) with some wariness. 
From inception, Britain had viewed the BDF as an unnecessary drain on 
Bahrain’s resources; by 1970 British officials considered it a potential threat to 
the ruling regime itself.1045 British representatives lodged their concerns about 
unrestrained growth of BDF with the Ruler. Alexander Stirling, who succeeded 
Parsons as Political Agent in Bahrain, took any even stronger stance against 
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the BDF, and thought that it was down to his ‘jeremiads’ that Shaikh Isa was 
considering reducing the size of the force. Stirling, warned his Whitehall 
superiors in March 1971 that ‘a handful of BDF could stage a coup at any time 
and there is precious little we could do except pray that the authorities get wind 
of it.’1046  Stirling clearly had officials in London worried.  The Foreign Office now 
agreed that the BDF was not a force for good, but – in a frank admission to 
Britain’s diminishing sway in Bahrain – concluded that there was very little that 
Britain could do about this.1047  
Suggestions on what to do were discounted as quickly as they were put 
forward. A wider spread of expatriates (Kuwaitis or Pakistanis) among the 
BDF’s officers could help, one official opined, but it may have been too late for a 
diversification effort of this kind. A British Liaison Team on the lines of that in 
Kuwait would not be met with much enthusiasm in Bahrain, the Foreign Office 
concluded.  At any rate, ‘if the rot has already set in, this might simply result in 
the [Liaison] Team’s becoming a first target for the Baathists if they decided the 
moment had come to take over.’1048   
Unable to decide how to tackle the issue of the BDF, the Foreign Office 
sought counsel from the former Political Agent, Parsons, who was in a new 
position at the Foreign Office in Whitehall. Parsons broadly agreed with Stirling: 
the BDF in his mind had ‘no positive value whatever in the Island in any 
circumstances’. Since it was composed entirely of Bahraini rank-and-file (the 
opposite of the State Police which comprised mostly non-Bahrainis) ‘it would 
never act except against the regime in an internal security situation and it is 
inconceivable to imagine it resisting an external attack,’ Parsons warned. 
Shaikh Isa would not cut the BDF nor to disband it, because Parsons judged ‘he 
regards the [BDF] in his heart of hearts as a potential private army designed to 
act as a counterbalance to the Bahrain State Police.’ Fearing his brother, 
Shaikh Muhammad bin Salman, would use his command of the State Police to 
try and oust him, the Ruler created the Defence Force, according to Parsons, as 
a counterweight. If the BDF could not practicably be disbanded, Parsons 
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recommended that the Ruler exile his brother Shaikh Muhammad. He also 
suggested as a remedy that the Ruler should build up the strength of the largely 
non-Bahraini police and move the BDF away from Rifaa town where it was 
concentrated in an ideal position to overthrow the ruling family.1049   
Parsons shared his views with the Crown Prince, Shaikh Hamad, when 
they met at London’s Dorchester Hotel in April 1971. He told Hamad straight 
that the British government feared the force under his command might attempt 
a coup in the future. In the knowledge that Shaikh Hamad would relay details of 
the conversation to his father, Parsons repeated his recommendation that, as 
reconciliation between the Ruler and his brother, Shaikh Muhammad, ‘was 
clearly impossible,’ the latter should be sent into exile, leaving command of the 
State Police to Shaikh Hamad himself.  ‘So long as Mohammed was living in the 
Island,’ Parsons warned the Crown Prince, ‘he would be a focus for discontent.’  
Parsons does not recount Shaikh Hamad’s reaction. We do know that Parsons 
thought that when it came to the BDF the Crown Prince ‘was ludicrously 
complacent,’ convinced that it was trustworthy and that ‘the maintenance of its 
loyalty was simply a matter of good man-management.’1050   
After this meeting, the Foreign Office sent the Political Agency in Bahrain 
a note essentially outlining Britain’s capitulation on the BDF issue. The Foreign 
Office admitted that there was very little chance of convincing the Ruler that the 
BDF was a danger, ‘still less of getting him to switch his insurance to the State 
Police (minus Muhammad bin Salman),’ the note read. This was because 
Shaikh Isa – and here the Foreign Office uses Parsons original phrase – ‘still 
regards the [BDF] in his heart of hearts as a potential private army providing 
counter-weight to the State Police.’1051 Stirling at the Political Agency did not 
support this analysis. The Ruler had never regarded the BDF as a 
counterweight to the State Police. ‘If anything,’ Stirling wrote back to the Foreign 
Office, ‘the reverse would be nearer the truth.’ The Ruler, Stirling replied,  
 
                                            
1049 TNA FCO 8/1639, Internal Foreign Office communication, A.D. Parsons to Mr. 
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1050 Ibid, A.D. Parsons (Foreign Office) to A.A. Acland (Foreign Office), ‘Bahrain 
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[. . .] spoke of the BDF with dubiety in 1969; he took the February 
1970 parade with gloomy resignation, wondering which of the NCOs 
would eventually hold the pistol to his head; he was alarmed by the 
February 1971 parade, when the Saladins, dipping their guns in 
salute, gave him a clear view up the barrels. He was shaken by the 
[1969] Libyan revolution and by the unveiling last year of the 
subversive cell in the BDF. He echoes my doom-laden remarks both 
back to me and to visitors and his regularly repeated line is that the 
BDF is being watched closely, that its strength is to be reduced to 
500 and that re-enlistments beyond the first three-year engagement 
are not to be permitted. This may all be a front, but I believe that he 
actually does consider the BDF to be a menace and the police to be 
trustworthy.1052   
 
Why, if Stirling’s observations are correct, did the Ruler allow the BDF to 
continue?  Stirling believed that the Ruler simply did ‘not have the heart to take 
away Shaikh Hamad’s toys.’1053  Stirling thought he could best counter this 
‘pathetic indulgence’ (i.e. the BDF) by continuing his ‘steady two-year drip’ 
against the force to the Ruler and the rest of the Bahrain government. ‘Straight 
table-thumping,’ Stirling reasoned, ‘will not work, since it is likely to bounce off 
and could be counterproductive.’ Describing his method as ‘quiet erosion of the 
BDF,’ Stirling admitted that progress had gone no further than halting its growth 
and cutting back its funds. Several key figures in the Bahraini government were 
purportedly alive to the BDF’s dangers and appalled by its cost. Yet Shaikh 
Hamad put up a ‘stout resistance’ and, though he was denied his second 
battalion and additional armour, he managed to squeeze up the strength of the 
BDF nonetheless.1054 Stirling said he would continue to work on the Ruler’s 
fears in order, 
 
[. . .] to get the armoured cars immobilised (these give the BDF a 
decisive edge over the police); to get the arms and ammunition held 
under strict security arrangements; and to get the ruler’s plan of 
reduction by wastage put into effect.1055  
 
Stirling hoped to take advantage of Shaikh Hamad’s absence at Fort 
Leavenworth (US War College where Hamad would be attending a military 
course). Deprived of its one real champion, the Political Agent hoped that a 
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policy of slowly eroding confidence in the BDF would gain traction.1056 The 
Foreign Office accepted Stirling’s line that Britain’s aim should be to bring about 
the BDF’s ‘effective containment and neutralisation.’1057 At the same time, 
Britain should give as much support as it could to the State Police, which was 
Bahrain’s best means of resisting the potentially coup-making BDF.    
Bahrain had seen the most active subversive activity in the Gulf in the 
years prior to Britain’s departure. After 1967, the Bahrain National Liberation 
Front (NLF), a mostly Shia group, was considered by British intelligence to be 
the best organised subversive movement in the Gulf. The group was believed to 
have been responsible for a succession of attacks in early 1968 – car burnings, 
demonstrations, destruction of a power sub-station – which stretched the 1000-
strong State Police and its British officers.1058 The Special Branch, under the 
direction of Henderson, disrupted the group in the autumn of 1968 by arresting 
the suspected ringleaders. 
Rising prosperity, the growing efficiency of the police and the absence of 
hostile Arab propaganda kept Bahrain tranquil in first half of 1971. Yet British 
officials did not rule out the potential for bomb outrages, kidnappings, 
assassinations and wider demonstrations in the future in Bahrain. Whilst 
subversive groups appeared to be split and ineffectual, Britain understood that 
disaffected elements in Bahraini society could be stirred into action with little 
provocation. Britain wanted to avoid its military forces, still stationed at 
Muharraq, becoming entangled in any internal action in Bahrain on the eve of 
withdrawal and did what it could to help build up the police whilst at the same 
time as working to undermine the BDF. 
  Up to 1971, Bahrain continued to look to Britain for training and 
equipment and was prepared to pay for it. Equipment for the police was mostly 
of British origin, including two Scout general-purpose light helicopters flown by 
two British contract pilots who were brothers.1059 On the eve of Britain’s 
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withdrawal, the British commandant of the police, Mr Bell, was broadly satisfied 
with the force under his command.  The policemen, he noted, were pretty poor 
material but they were doing as well as expected and perhaps better than this. 
Bell noted that he had the Bahraini government’s backing for an expansion 
programme. A hundred recruits had been brought in as the first step in 
increasing the number of policemen to nearly 2,000 (the riot squad alone 
trebled from 40 to 120 men in just one year). In addition, Bahrain hired a 
separate British officer to deal full-time with airport security. The Foreign Office 
proposed in May 1971 three more police adviser posts for British officers in 
Bahrain. Such was the support for State Police and Special Branch that the 
Foreign Office offered to pay a proportion of these officers’ salaries from its own 
global Counter-Subversion Fund.1060 This was despite the fact that a policy of 
Bahrainisation – which included, but was not limited to, the police – had been 
under way 1969.  (G. Smith, Secretary to the Government, and Dr R.H.B. Snow, 
the Director of Medical Services, both were retired early in 1970 as part of this 
Bahrainisation policy which affected most governmental departments.)1061 The 
State Police promoted a large number of Bahraini and Arab officers, transferring 
them to the headquarters to fill posts left by retiring British officers.1062 Yet 
Commandant Bell also had a policy, in the words of the Political Agent, ‘of 
keeping white faces in the background’ and of doing all he could ‘to train 
efficient understudies for the British officers.’ Stirling believed, however, that this 
was nearly impossible for a Special Branch that was dependent on its British 
personnel.1063 The replacement of expatriates by Bahrainis would in practice 
mean ‘the eclipse of the Branch.’ At any rate, Bahrain Government considered 
Henderson irreplaceable.1064 Indeed, Henderson remained head of the security 
services in Bahrain until the early 1990s.  
                                                                                                                                
The American gyrocopters were ordered and were a much better bet.  There was no 
comparable British machine. 
1060 TNA FCO 8/1639, D.G. Allen (Foreign Office) to A.J.D. Stirling (Political Agency, 
Bahrain), ‘Bahrain Internal Security’, 20 May 1971. 
1061 AWDU, ‘Annual Report for year 1970,’ Bahrain Government Annual Reports 
1924-1970: Volume VII 1967-70. 
1062 Shaikh Muhammad bin Salman remained nominally Head of Public Security but 
his influence had become increasingly peripheral. TNA FCO 8/1639, Memorandum, by 
A.J.D. Stirling, ‘Bahrain State Police,’ 20 March 1971. 
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6.6 Indirect Assistance in Independent Kuwait: From Defence 
Guarantee to Arms Sales, 1968-71 
Luce’s recommendations for a residual security policy in the Gulf had, in a 
fashion, already been implemented and tested in Kuwait since the emirate 
elected for independence in 1961. The key difference being, of course, that 
Kuwait continued to enjoy the protection of a British defence guarantee, albeit 
one based on air power alone after 1966. Perhaps partly playing to the Arab 
nationalist gallery, Kuwait publicly gave Britain notice to on 13 May 1968 to 
terminate this defence agreement. Yet the Kuwaiti government was careful to 
stipulate that it would not take effect for three years.1065 So although the Kuwaiti 
Prime Minister announced in July 1968 that Kuwait would neither need nor 
accept any foreign military presence, British or otherwise, in the country, the 
Kuwaiti government had invited a British Military Advisory Mission (MAM) to visit 
the emirate in May-June and examine its defence needs. Led by Major General 
E.N. Hall, the MAM advised Kuwait to improve the level of training in its military 
before buying more equipment.1066 
Provided that Iraq did not achieve air superiority and Kuwaiti troops were 
not tied down in internal security functions, British defence officials assessed in 
October 1968 that ‘the Kuwaiti Army should be able to delay an Iraqi force 
committed to an opportunistic attack.’1067 They believed that Kuwait’s military 
had made great strides since 1961 and accredited these improvements to the 
work of the Kuwait Liaison Team. The KLT also provided other commercial 
benefits for Britain. Writing to the Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, in 
January 1969, British Ambassador Graham in Kuwait observed that the KLT,  
 
[. . .] has continued to expand modestly and forms a valued and 
almost irreplaceable prop to the Kuwait Armed Forces. Apart from the 
fact that the Team’s full expense are paid by the Kuwait Government, 
we have continued to reap from its existence a considerable harvest 
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to our balance of payments, new defence orders placed in Britain by 
Kuwait during 1968 amounting to some £10 million in value.1068 
 
For the British defence chiefs in 1970, the Kuwait Armed Forces (KAF) 
was a crucial means to ‘ensure the maintenance of conditions for the continued 
supply of Kuwaiti oil to the free world on reasonable terms, to the profit of a 
British oil company and the benefit of the United Kingdom’s balance of 
payments.’1069 For this reason, Britain wanted to assist as far as possible in 
building up the KAF’s capabilities. At any rate, the Kuwait armed forces were 
judged to only be able to function by continuing to seek foreign – mostly British 
– assistance. In the eyes of British observers, the Kuwaiti armed forces would 
still be dependent on external help, especially foreign experts, for some time. 
‘Without foreign help [which included in addition to the KLT, Pakistani Air Force 
instructors and maintenance crews],’ the new ambassador, Sam Falle, wrote to 
the British Foreign Secretary in April 1970, ‘they could fight a battle with 
motorised infantry; but their Air Force would quickly be grounded and their tanks 
would soon grind to a halt.’1070 General Mubarak (Chief of Staff of the KAF) was 
especially worried about the expiry on 13 May 1971 of Britain’s defence 
guarantee. He told Lt. Colonel Sanders (the officer commanding KLT) that after 
May 1971 ‘the food on the table will no longer be screened from the flies and he 
will need a new cloth [i.e. to keep out the flies].’1071 The British wanted this ‘new 
cloth’ to be a capable Kuwaiti military that looked to Britain for its weapons.  
As British military plans to defend Kuwait were dependent on the 
deployment of the Kuwait Army in significant strength, it was, according to the 
British ambassador, in Britain’s interests to ‘support the Kuwait Government in 
military matters with discreet advice and any other help which our forces and 
factories can provide.’1072 Militaries in the Arab world had, however, shown a 
propensity for seizing political power. Did Britain not then fear that expanding 
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1070 TNA FCO 8/1406, S. Falle (British Ambassador, Kuwait) to Michael Stewart 
(Foreign Secretary), ‘The Military and Security Forces in Kuwait,’ 5 April 1970.  
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the Kuwaiti armed forces could expose the political leadership to similar internal 
threats?1073 It was thought, after all, that the 1969 coup d’état in Libya 
presented temptations to potential revolutionaries as there were amongst the 
officers in Kuwait.1074 According to Ambassador Graham, the Kuwait Armed 
Forces were the exception in the Middle East in that they take no part in politics. 
‘Their whole organisation is designed to secure their loyalty to and support for 
the existing regime,’ he told the British Foreign Secretary in June 1968.1075 
Getting this judgement right was important as British planning for the defence of 
Kuwait depended on the armed forces remaining loyal.1076 The Kuwaiti Secret 
Security Service (KSSS) was established in the late 1960s to keep an eye on 
potential opponents within and without the military. Moreover, British officials 
were confident that the presence of Bedouin personnel, who were without 
revolutionary inclinations, was the best insurance policy. ‘The Bedu who are by 
tradition patriarchal, are conservatives and great snobs’, Ambassador Falle 
explained to the British Foreign Secretary. ‘They despise the born Kuwait 
citizens (the Ruling Family excepted) as spineless and worthless parvenus, 
while the Kuwaitis regard the Bedu as uncouth and frightening barbarians.’1077  
 As Britain’s exit from the region approached, the new Ambassador, A.J. 
Wilton, voiced his fears about Kuwait’s future. If Iran moved to annex the 
islands of Abu Musa and the Two Tunbs and Saudi Arabia took the territory in 
dispute with Abu Dhabi, then Iraq might make a bid for Kuwait. ‘If grabs become 
the order of the day, Kuwait is certainly wide open,’ Wilton warned. Without 
British air cover, the Kuwaiti military would not be able to resist such a move. 
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Unlike his predecessor, Wilson thought the Kuwait military could pose a future 
threat to the Al-Sabah:  
 
[. . .] it can only be a question of time before some young officers 
who are now passing through the Military College in substantial 
numbers feel that their own superior attainments are insufficiently 
recognised and that old-fashioned incompetence should make way 
for modernity, progress and similar undefined and fashionable 
concepts.1078   
 
Major General Mubarak was less worried about the loyalty of men and more 
about the future naval threat from Iran in light of Britain’s impending departure. 
He renewed his interest in a Kuwaiti navy. The first time Kuwait considered 
establishing a naval force in 1966, it brought in a retired Royal Navy 
Commander, Peton-Jones, who was a specialist in setting up the navies of 
newly independent countries. Peton-Jones recommended a force of six patrol 
boats with accompanying manpower of 30 officers, 190 men and 10 civilians, 
together with six ex-Royal Navy officers and six ex-Royal Navy petty officers.  
Britain provided a quote from the British manufacturer Thorneycroft for patrol 
boats which appalled the Kuwaitis.1079 Aside from the cost of the boats, Major 
General Mubarak thought the manpower challenges were formidable. If a navy 
had been started in 1950, Mubarak thought, it may have been possible to get 
recruits from the old sea-faring families. But now these families were rich and 
their sons would not want to join the navy. You could not take Bedu from the 
middle of the desert and put him on a ship, Mubarak told the British 
Ambassador in 1968. If he did set up a navy, Kuwait would need British officers 
and recruits from the lower Gulf.1080 Though the ambassador thought it would 
be wiser for Kuwait to focus on its air force and not put to sea at all, he did not 
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press his views to the Kuwaiti authorities. ‘The important thing is that if the 
Kuwaitis do start a navy, they should buy British boats.’1081  
Towards the end of the decade, Britain began to place greater store by 
the commercial benefits of its military assistance to Kuwait. When Kuwait turned 
to Britain for more combat aircraft after the May 1967 border incident with Iraq, 
the Foreign Office felt that the British government should do all it could to help 
provide aircraft. This was firstly because the ‘air alone’ concept put ‘much stress 
on the effectiveness of Kuwait’s own forces in an emergency.’ But Foreign 
Office Minister, George Thomson revealed that there was also a second 
motivation at play. ‘Kuwait is a lucrative market for British arms and aircraft 
sales; the less she has to turn to others the better,’ he noted to the Ministry of 
Defence.1082 Arms sales to Kuwait began to take a paramount place in British 
defence interests in the emirate as withdrawal approached. Whilst the 
Americans regarded Kuwait as being essentially British territory as far as arms 
sales were concerned, and did not wish ‘to come in to queer our pitch,’1083 the 
French began showing an interest in selling equipment.1084  Major General 
Mubarak and Brigadier Saleh, the Deputy Chief of General Staff, stressed to 
Mike Sanders (the officer commanding the KLT) their ‘strong wish to stay British 
in the arms purchase plans for the future.’ Mubarak expressed his hope that 
Britain would continue to give Kuwait support in military matters after 1971.1085 
After British withdrawal from the Gulf, Britain continued to help Kuwait 
modernise its armed forces through the KLT.1086  
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6.7 Deepening British Commitment in Oman, 1970-71: Training 
Irregulars and Assisting the SAF 
Britain’s announced its decision to relinquish its formal military role ‘east of 
Suez’ at a time when the insurgency in Oman was worsening. The 
establishment of a Marxist-Leninist regime in the newly unified independent 
People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in 1967 led to greater direct 
support to the rebels. Sultan Said was losing the backing of his own people and, 
perhaps just as important, the backing of the British. He was criticised by both 
groups for his parsimony and his myopic view of the role of government.1087 The 
Consul-General, however, thought the Sultan was beginning to take concrete 
steps to improve his military and might be able to turn the tide against the 
rebels. He increased pay in the SAF, making it easier to recruit Omanis and 
good British contract officers, which reduced his dependency on 
secondments.1088 In early 1968 the Sultan did authorise the purchase of several 
transport aircraft, but this was largely to compensate for the decrease in RAF 
flights between Muscat and Salalah that resulted from the drawdown of Britain’s 
military presence in the Arabian Peninsula, especially the reduction in frequency 
of RAF transport flights. Though heartened by these incremental improvements, 
the rebels were using the cover of the monsoon to infiltrate from PDRY in 
greater and greater numbers.  
Nearly all British officials were gloomy about the situation in Muscat and 
Oman. A rebel success in Dhofar would have severe consequences for the rest 
of the Sultanate. Indeed, the rebels believed that once the backdoor to Oman 
was breached, the rest of the Gulf would be open. Reflecting this wider strategy, 
the Dhofar Liberation Front had changed its name in 1968 to the Peoples’ Front 
for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). In August 1969, the 
rebels captured the coastal town of Raikhut in Dhofar, detaining and killing the 
Sultan’s askars. In the Dhofar stakes, the new Consul-General in November 
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1969 said his money was on the rebels.1089 In spite of these setbacks, the 
British Commander of the SAF was unwilling to commit more troops from 
central Oman. He feared exposing the oil facilities to an outbreak of subversion 
in the interior. Money from oil – Sultanate oil revenues were £40 million in 1969 
– provided the Sultan with the means to purchase more helicopters and combat 
aircraft without a British subsidy. Largely free from British financial assistance, 
the Sultan could choose to ignore Britain’s advice. He did not feel the need to 
give in to British pressure in 1969 to establish a fourth battalion to pinch off the 
enemy’s supply routes in the west. ‘Mustering another battalion is a possibility,’ 
the Consul-General, D.G. Crawford, wrote,  
 
[. . .] but that depends on the Sultan and he is yet to match his 
“Churchillian” tones with “Churchillian” deeds. Extra soldiers cost 
extra money – a lot of money to a “babu” mind – and there are not 
that many able-bodied Omanis and Baluchis around keen enough to 
go to Dhofar.1090   
 
Moreover, he paid no heed to Britain’s calls for him to adopt a hearts and minds 
strategy. The Sultan, according to Crawford, ‘refused to accept any idea that the 
war could not be won by military means alone,’ preferring to ‘starve the people 
of the Dhofari hill and jungle areas (Jebelis) rather than attempt to deal with the 
root causes of their rebellion.’1091 British officials believed that by refusing to 
raise more ground forces and adopt a different counterinsurgency strategy the 
Sultan had written himself a prescription for ultimate defeat. They could do little 
to persuade the Sultan to change course. The situation deteriorated throughout 
1969-70, as the government forces, outgunned by the better armed adoo, 
effectively surrendered the jebel to the PFLOAG.1092 
The key factor in safeguarding British interests in the wider Gulf was thus 
the ability of the SAF to remain a credible force for the preservation of law and 
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order in the Sultanate.1093  British officials were angered that because of the 
Sultan’s parsimony the SAF consisted of only 3,000 men and were equipped 
with antiquated weapons. The Consul-General, for example, thought it was 
difficult to conceive that anywhere else a military force of SAF’s size and make-
up would go into action in a theatre like Dhofar without a military hospital. (The 
RAF flew SAF casualties to the hospital in Bahrain.)1094 To make matters worse, 
a separate guerrilla front opened up in northern Oman where the National 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (NDFLOAG) 
began attacking the SAF and its bases.1095 
The British government moved closer and closer to the conclusion that 
the price for using the facilities at Masriah – defending the Salalah airbase in 
Dhofar – outweighed any benefits. In short, the game was no longer worth the 
candle.1096 Multiple rebel mortar attacks on RAF Salalah in 1970 gave Britain 
even greater cause to reconsider its policy towards Muscat and Oman. The 
upshot of this re-evaluation was that its involvement in the SAF would have to 
continue if its oil interests in central Oman were to be protected. British support 
to the force was still the critical factor in its effectiveness. British military 
planners were fully behind plans of the Sultan’s new privately employed British 
Defence Secretary, Hugh Oldman, to increase the size of the SAF by a fourth 
battalion,1097 even though this meant that Britain would have to raise the ceiling 
placed on the number of seconded officers it provided from 38 to 55 officers, 
which they were hard-pressed to provide.1098  
Whilst they supported the plan for the strengthened SAF to dominate the 
western sector of Dhofar near the border, British officials were clear in their own 
minds that ‘military operations no matter how successful will not achieve their 
                                            
1093 TNA FO 1016/791, D. Crawford (Consulate-General, Muscat) to Stewart 
Crawford (Political Resident), ‘Annual Review for 1969,’ 30 December 1969. 
1094 TNA FCO 8/1072, D. Crawford (Consul-General, Muscat) to M.S. Weir (Bahrain 
Residency), ‘Current Situation in Dhofar,’ 1 November 1969. 
1095 Kelly (1980), pp. 136-9. 
1096 TNA FCO 8/1072, D.J. McCarthy (Foreign Office) to Stewart Crawford (Political 
Resident), 6 November 1969.  
1097 Oldman was the former CSAF between March 1961 and March 1964. He also 
had been a serving British officer in the Sudan Defence Force (1950) and the APLs 
(1957-60). He replaced Pat Waterfield in February 1970. 
1098 Before Jebel Regiment: 38 Seconded British officers, 50+ Contract British 
officers, 40 Arab/Pakistani officers 7 British NCOs, 90 Pakistani NCOs. Excluding 
SOAF and Oman Gendarmerie , 2,500 men.  
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aim without corresponding political progress.’1099 The British Government and 
its representatives in the Gulf encouraged the Sultan to begin a civil 
development project to win over his Dhofari subjects. Britain would even 
countenance deploying British troops if they could see evidence that Sultan was 
prepared to take significant measures to improve the situation in Dhofar both 
militarily and in the field of civilian development.  
Dismayed at the lack of progress in Oman, Britain helped the Sultan’s son 
(Qaboos) seize power in a near-bloodless palace coup in July 1970. The details 
remain somewhat unclear, but it is beyond doubt that British officers in Oman, 
the Foreign Office and its Gulf representatives were complicit in the plan to 
replace Sultan Said with his Sandhurst-educated son, Qaboos bin Said.1100 
Indeed, British defence chiefs back in London concluded a week before the 
event that that it was in Britain’s interests ‘that a successful coup d’état take 
place.’1101 Two British officers and Shaikh Braik bin Hamud led a group of six 
Omani soldiers into the Sultan’s palace at Salalah. After a brief exchange of 
gunfire, the Sultan agreed to abdicate, living out his final days in London’s 
Dorchester Hotel.   
Historians have been quick to seize upon Qaboos’ coming to a power as a 
turning point in the Dhofar campaign and in Oman’s fortunes more generally.1102 
Less attention has been placed on the change in the level of support Britain 
gave to the Omani military at this time. Soon after the coup, Britain ramped up 
its support to the Sultan’s forces. In August 1970 Brigadier Roderick Semple, 
Director of the Special Air Service (SAS), led a British military team to Oman to 
explore the possibility of using special forces to train the SAF and irregular 
forces.1103 Semple believed that a 40-strong training team would give the SAS 
considerable experience in the role of raising and training indigenous forces. 
The proposal had the backing of the Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home, as well 
as the Prime Minister Edward Heath, who wrote, by way of reply to the 
                                            
1099 TNA WO 321/21131, Chief of Staff Committee, Defence Operational Planning 
Staff, ‘The Situation in Muscat and Oman,’ 30 July 1970.  
1100 Though Hugh Oldman was a contract officer he was in constant contact with the 
Ministry of Defence. 
1101 TNA FCO 46/609, Ministry of Defence, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Confidential 
Annex to COS 21st Meeting/70, 15 July 1970. 
1102 Peterson (2007), p. 183. 
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proposal, that ‘I strongly support – and the Sultan has plenty of money to pay us 
for all this.’1104 The plan to train bands (sing. firqa in Arabic, but usually 
pronounced as firqat on account of the ta marbuta at the end of the word) of 
tribesmen marked a step change in British involvement.  
The rebellion dragged on into 1971. Before the monsoon broke, the rebels 
took a firmer grip on the areas under their control. Slow delivery of helicopters 
and aircraft made full-scale operations against the rebellion impossible before 
monsoon. Afterwards the SAF, with the SAS-trained bands of irregulars, 
launched a series of operations against the rebels to interrupt supplies of food 
and ammunition. Each firqa force was drawn from a common tribe and usually 
put twenty or thirty men in the field at a time. They were trained by the SAS 
Squadron on rotation in Dhofar known as the BATT (British Army Training 
Team).1105 
In the months before its withdrawal from the Gulf, Britain wrestled with 
whether or not it should give more or less support to the Sultan in military 
matters. The Political Resident authored the following argument to the Douglas-
Home in April 1971: 
 
We want our facilities on Masirah; we are under obligation to second 
officers to the Sultan’s Armed Forces; we cannot afford to see the 
Sultan lose. We should therefore not shrink, particularly during the 
rest of 1971, from providing the fullest possible aid, short of overt 
involvement by British force, to the effort to win the war in Dhofar.1106 
 
Britain hoped that by training and directing the indigenous irregular firqats that it 
could assist Oman in making progress against the rebels without direct military 
intervention with its own forces. Though difficult to motivate, the firqats were 
starting to show signs of performing well. The Sultan’s Defence Secretary, Hugh 
Oldman, was one convert: 
 
The Firqat operating in the overall operational and logistical 
framework provided by the SAF must be the most important and 
hopeful factor in defeating the hard-core communists. Only by 
                                            
1104 TNA DEFE 25/186, C.W. Roberts (Prime Minister’s office) to J.Graham (Foreign 
Office), 7 September 1970. 
1105 Bryan Ray, Dangerous Frontiers: Campaigning in Somaliland & Oman 
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support of the non-communist element among the Jebalis [mountain 
folk] can progress be made. Only success by the Firqat supported, 
organised and controlled by SAF through the SAS can a true 
counter-revolution against Communism be created.1107 
 
On the 4 August, the British Cabinet approved the proposal for a second 
squadron of SAS to expand the number of firqats. Though difficult to train, and 
sometimes volatile to command, the firqats played an important part in the ‘clear 
and hold’ strategy the SAF conducted from 1971 onwards to recapture the 
jebel.1108 In October 1971, the SAS-led firqat force established a permanent 
base on the jebel at Jibjat.  
The provision of special operations forces to train irregular fighters was not 
the only British military support: Britain had mortar teams and fire control 
elements directing artillery barrages on the Salalah Plain.1109  Furthermore, like 
his father before him, Qaboos relied heavily on his British Defence Secretary, 
Hugh Oldman, and on the 200-odd British officers serving in his forces.1110 The 
Political Resident explained to Douglas Home the closeness of the relationship 
between Sultan Qaboos and the Britons working in the Sultanate:  
 
[Sultan Qaboos] rose to power on the backs of his army, and he does 
not forget this.  His army means his British officers and British 
Defence Secretary, and these are the people he really trusts, 
together with his British bank manager and some of the senior staff 
of the oil company.1111 
 
Through building up the firqats and supporting the SAF, Britain hoped that most 
of the rebel areas would be pacified by mid-1972 and that British forces could 
be withdrawn. The first phase (Operation Jaguar), lasting from October to 
December, was to drive the rebels from the eastern region (east of Salalah); 
then to attack enemy supply routes in the central region (roughly the hinterland 
                                            
1107 TNA FCO 8/1668, Col. Hugh Oldman (Defence Secretary, Sultanate of Oman), 
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around Salalah); and to finally harass their training areas near the border with 
PDRY to the west. Yet the PFLOAG remained on the offensive, establishing full 
control over the road between Salalah and the military base of Thumrait to the 
north. The commander of British military in the Gulf reported back to London in 
March 1971 that: 
 
This war has reached a most interesting stage. The recent 
improvements in the capabilities of the Sultan’s forces (e.g. a fourth 
infantry battalion, concentrated training during the Autumn and 
Winter, light helicopter and increased air transport support) have 
been matched by better leadership, tactics and weapons by the 
enemy.1112 
 
On 1 October 1971, 350 men from the SAF forces and five of the SAS-trained 
firqats began Operation Jaguar.  The Sultan’s forces seized a number of towns 
in eastern Dhofar and set up a defensive line (code-named Leopard) to cut off 
enemy resupply. The British Chief of the General Staff, Michael Carver, offered 
his assessment to the Chief of Defence Staff after visiting Oman in October.  
‘There is now good reason to hope,’ he wrote, ‘that the present campaign may 
achieve its aim before the next monsoon in mid-summer 1972.’1113 In this 
context, British military planners in the Gulf vociferously fought back against 
attempts to end the SAS role. Major-General Roland Gibbs argued that: ‘A 
withdrawal of BATT will lead to a rapid loss of effectiveness by the Firqats and 
probably their disintegration as a fighting force.’ He went on to conclude that it 
was ‘not only essential to SAF plans that the present level of British participation 
continues to the end of March 72, but that it will be very difficult for SAF if this 
support is withdrawn before the middle of June 1972’.1114 Even after the last 
fighting units left Bahrain and Sharjah, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) 
recommended to the British Defence Secretary that two squadrons of SAS 
remain in Dhofar until March 1972.  Moreover, after this date, he advised that 
one squadron should remain along with the artillery and mortar troops on 
                                            
1112 TNA DEFE 11/687, Maj. Gen. Roland Gibbs (Commander British Forces Gulf 
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Salalah Plain until at least the beginning of the monsoon (i.e. June 1972).  The 
CDS backed up his recommendation with the follow remark:  
 
If the maximum possible progress is to be made, the contribution of 
the SAS remains essential.  The essence of the plan is the absolute 
necessity of carrying out successful operations in the Western 
Dhofar, near the PDRY border, before the monsoon breaks. Unless 
these operations are completed the enemy will be able to reinforce 
and resupply their forces in Central and Eastern Jebel during the 
monsoon, which could lead to an almost indefinite continuation of the 
campaign.1115  
 
Intelligence reports at the end of 1971 noted that enemy morale was low and 
that the local population was more convinced of the SAF’s ability to remain on 
the jebel and protect them from rebel reprisals.1116 
 The Dhofar insurgency rumbled on until the mid-1970s. Britain remained 
heavily involved in supporting Sultan, especially by continuing to provide 
seconded military personnel to Oman. All three Omani armed services were 
reliant on the provision of British loaned personnel and the 200 contracted 
Britons.1117 Oman depended on this British contingent for military effectiveness 
during the war.1118 Indeed, loan service officers and soldiers continued occupy 
key positions in Oman’s military for decades after the insurgency ended. Much 
has been made of the role of the SAS in Oman, but British support to the 
Sultan’s land forces and from air support was more critical.1119 
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EPILOGUE: THE BRITISH RESIDUAL ROLE AFTER 1971  
 
 
In the summer of 1968, the Cabinet of Labour Prime Minster, Harold Wilson, 
formed a sub-committee to avoid tackling the challenges of withdrawal in an ‘ad 
hoc and piecemeal’ fashion.1120 The sub-committee proposed a programme of 
financial assistance to the Gulf states to help prepare them for 
independence.1121 As part of the subcommittee’s agenda, the Foreign Secretary 
presented a paper in July 1968 on non-military methods of preserving British 
influence east of Suez after 1971, which one cabinet member described in his 
memoirs as ‘utterly futile’.1122 Sir William Luce’s 1970 recommendations on the 
measures that Britain could take to remain engaged in security affairs after 
withdrawal met a more receptive audience. The thrust of British security role 
after 1971 would be training assistance, equipment sales, after sales services 
and advisory support to friends. The Defence Secretary at the time, Lord (Peter) 
Carrington, recalls in his memoirs that this proposed residual role ‘might be less 
exciting than the ability to launch expeditions beyond palm and pine but it could 
be self-financing; and it didn’t require carrier-borne air support!’1123  
On the other side of the Atlantic, the United States was encouraging 
Britain to maintain as much of their special role in the Gulf as they could.1124 
The American reaction to the decision to withdrawal, according to the British 
Ambassador in Washington, was  
                                            
1120 TNA CAB 165/813, P.H. Gore-Booth (Foreign Office) to Burke Trend (Cabinet 
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[. . .] one of astonishment that we should contemplate withdrawing 
from an area where our economic stake (and incidentally their own), 
was so large, our political relations with the rulers apparently 
peaceful and the military costs so relatively modest.1125 
 
It is no surprise, then, that British attempts to maintain influence in the Gulf after 
1971 had American blessing; Washington saw a clear advantage in Britain’s 
continued involvement in the area.1126 Douglas-Home set out to convince his 
US counterpart, Secretary of State William Rogers, that Britain would establish 
an indirect presence in the area beyond 1971 in order to ‘exercise the maximum 
political influence with the minimum British presence.’1127 
Did Luce’s recommendations – concretised into official government policy 
by the Cabinet’s approval – manifest into action? A number of scholars have 
observed that Britain’s engagement with the region did not evaporate with the 
dismantling of its military architecture at the end of 1971. Historian James Onley 
observes that:  
 
the word “handover” is slightly misleading, for hundreds of Britons 
remained behind, as officers and civil servants seconded to, or in the 
private employ of, the Gulf governments, running the police, airports, 
hospitals, and newly formed militaries.’1128  
 
Publishing a survey of the post-independence Gulf shaikhdoms in 1975, John 
Duke Anthony made the observation that, in the fledgling UAE, the British 
withdrawal was more illusory than real. British nationals dominated the 
commercial life and banking sector while Britons ran the armed forces.1129 Uzi 
Rabi, another scholar who has written extensively on the Gulf, contends that:  
 
The ruling families of the Gulf states retained extensive links with 
their onetime protector, both practical and personal. Britons 
continued to play a role in the process of state building among the 
                                            
1125 TNA 25/265, Sir Patrick Dean (British Ambassador, U.S.) to George Brown 
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newly independent states of the Gulf, especially the UAE, Bahrain, 
Qatar and Oman.  The Gulf states have become liberal patrons of 
British universities and medical institutions.  In short, the practical 
content of the interchange between Britain and the Gulf in all fields 
exceeds everything that could have been predicted by previous 
generations.1130 
 
James H. Noyes, a US Department of Defense official who worked in the Gulf in 
the 1970s, wrote in 1979 that, after withdrawal, ‘the British made careful efforts 
to assure at least temporary continuity of the intelligence and counter 
subversion units that had been developed over many years under their special 
treaty relationships. British-led special branch units,’ he writes, ‘were left 
functioning in Bahrain, Qatar, and in the Shaikhdoms.’1131  
British engagement in security, it seems, was not simply a tap that could 
be turned off. Robert W. Winks makes the useful point that for historians 
studying decolonisation and informal empire: ‘the process must seem even less 
clearly defined than in the case of evolutionary independence from a formal 
condition of ‘tutelage.’’1132 Winks argument is apposite when applied to the 
British exit in the Gulf, for Britain’s interests did not disappear when the last 
Royal Navy vessel weighed anchor in Bahrain, and Britain remained engaged in 
security affairs to protect these economic and strategic interests after its official 
role ended.1133 Little more than six months after the British pull-out, officials at 
the Foreign Office felt sufficiently confident in Britain’s continued relevance in 
the Gulf that it informed the US State Department that, ‘instead of the low profile 
usually adopted by Britain in such post-independence or post-colonial 
situations,’ British influence throughout the Gulf remained ‘strong and 
visible’.1134 The US State Department concurred, judging that Britain had 
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managed its withdrawal in such a way as to afford a continuing British role in 
support of the security of the region and that this was providing an important 
adjunct to its wider policy of building up Iran and Saudi Arabia as the tandem 
guardians of the Gulf.1135   
Although the Gulf rulers had their offers to financially underwrite a 
continued British military presence turned down in 1968, they still looked to 
Britain in the first instance for security-related assistance. Britain’s ability to 
remain influential after 1971, Jeffrey Macris has observed, rested to a large 
degree on the rulers’ dependence upon Britons to fulfil critical positions related 
to defence matters.1136 This supports the argument made by Marshall R. Singer 
back in 1972 that after independence most former protégés choose their 
erstwhile metrepoles as the source of their security assistance.1137 This is 
certainly what the British Ambassador in Qatar, Edward Henderson, believed. 
He wrote in a valedictory communique to the Foreign Secretary in 1974 after 
five years in Qatar that:  
 
At a personal level at all points in the Government and in the 
business community I think we have even better relations after 
independence than we had before. The Qataris welcome British 
experts and engineers in positions in the Government and armed 
forces and seem to want more of them.1138 
 
Whilst a number of commentators have recognised that British influence had a 
lifespan outlasting its protective role in Eastern Arabia, only a few attempts have 
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been made to study this phenomenon systematically. In her 1988 doctoral 
thesis, Rosemary Hollis compares Britain’s role in the Gulf in 1965 with that of 
1985. Hollis argues that in security affairs after the withdrawal, ‘direct use of 
force by Britain in the Gulf states themselves had given way to more indirect 
use, through training, assisting and supplying indigenous forces’.1139 Britain did, 
it must be noted, retain a formal role in Gulf security after 1971. Most notably, 
Britain continued to mastermind the counterinsurgency in Oman until 1975 and 
kept air bases in Masirah and Salalah up to 1977.1140  In addition, Britain jointly 
developed the base at Diego Garcia with the United States in the mid-1970s to 
maintain a naval presence in the Western Indian Ocean to counter Soviet 
encroachment.1141 This is not to mention the later direct British involvement in 
the form of the Armilla patrol (a Royal Navy presence instigated at the start of 
the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War to protect shipping), as well as the British military 
contributions to the 1990/1 Gulf War and the invasion and occupation of Iraq 
(2003-09). Nevertheless, it was the indirect role in security matters that perhaps 
left a deeper mark. Clive Jones and John Stone in their 1997 joint article argue 
that previous interpretations assume wrongly that Britain’s military role ended in 
1971 because they ‘equate strategic influence with a continued physical military 
presence in the region.’1142 They posit that the provision of service personnel on 
secondment and on extended contracts from the British armed forces helped to 
ensure the stability of the small Gulf Arab states against internal threats.1143 
 Recent initiatives by the British government to rejuvenate its defence 
relations with its form protégés has led to important recent research on the 
nature of Britain’s security role in the area. Efforts to understand Britain’s 
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enduring role in the security affairs of the Gulf need to pay more attention to the 
continuities than the changes.1144  
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CONCLUSIONS  
 
 
Any study that explores one state’s half-century involvement in the security affairs of 
a region will find it difficult to deduce a theory that holds valid across different cases 
and across time. Anomalies inevitably emerge. To be sure, British policy toward, and 
British involvement in, establishing, developing, and sometimes running local 
professional forces – namely: salaried, uniformed and centrally controlled state 
instruments of coercion – varied considerably. Whilst formulating a ‘general rule’ is 
problematic, this study has nevertheless shown that the build-up of indigenous 
coercive forces of its protégés was an important part of Britain’s repertoire for 
managing regional security. By pursuing this broad policy, Britain was behaving like 
other imperial powers.  
Before the twentieth century, the authority of the ruling shaikhs in the Gulf 
rarely extended much beyond the towns they governed – they lacked the coercive 
means to enforce their will over outlying areas of their emirates. So long as peace 
was kept at sea, this lack of control over the interior did not bother Britain. In the 
years following the First World War, however, the British Government of India began 
to take a greater interest in the fate of certain rulers who faced internal challenges. 
Apart from the small detachments of sepoys in Manama and Muscat, Britain did not 
have land forces stationed in the area to prevent plots against rulers by their families 
or defend against unexpected tribal attacks from the desert. There were very few 
incentives for Britain to fill this power gap by garrisoning troops, but plenty of 
disincentives: hostile inhabitants, an unforgiving climate in summer and malaria in 
winter. In keeping with its hands-off approach, Britain wanted its protégé rulers in the 
Gulf to secure their own positions by developing their own military resources. In 
Muscat, the British actively encouraged the Sultan to develop a force that could 
dominate the land approaches to Muscat, alleviating the obligation on Britain to 
intervene if the capital was threatened by amassed tribes from the Omani interior. 
The reason why Britain supported the establishment of the Bahrain Levy Corps in 
1924, in contrast, was to provide the Regent, who was in a weak position vis-à-vis his 
own family (the Al Khalifah), and who was at the mercy of powerful tribal clans, with 
an independent means of coercion. In Kuwait, the threat was external. Raids by the 
Ikhwan (religiously inspired tribal fighters) into Kuwaiti territory led Britain in the 
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1920s to supply the Ruler with armoured cars and training for their crews. In all three 
cases, the British Government of India wanted the local rulers to take greater 
responsibility for securing their own territories rather than continually seeking British 
military assistance in a crisis. This aspiration was not fully realised, for the early lives 
of these fledgling forces were beset with difficulties.  
Made up of imported soldiery – Baluchis from Muscat – the Bahrain Levy 
Corps proved a disaster and was disbanded after just two years. The Bahrain State 
Police, which emerged out of the ashes of the Levy Corps, struggled to cope with 
many of the breakdowns in civil order in Bahrain. In Oman, the Sultan starved the 
Muscat Levy Corps of funds and whittled it down in size.  As a result, it was unable to 
rein in recalcitrant tribes to the northwest and southeast of Muscat in the 1920s and 
1930s. Thus the creation of a professional force for Muscat did not change the fact 
that the Sultan’s very position remained dependent on British military support, as did 
any pretence that his writ extended beyond Muscat. The fledgling Kuwaiti military 
was never put to the test against an Ikhwan raid, let alone a full-scale assault.  
Beyond making judgements on whether these early forces served their 
intended purposes, this study has made a number of additional observations about 
the types of institutions that were created. Although the formation of state coercive 
instruments in the 1920s were a collaborative effort between the Government of India 
and the local rulers, the forces that were formed were based on a British Indian 
model, even down to the rank structure and uniforms – especially in Muscat and 
Bahrain. Another distinguishing feature of the forces in Muscat and Bahrain at this 
time was the importation of soldiers and policemen from abroad. Those British Indian 
officials in the Gulf charged with organising these forces believed that local coastal 
Arabs did not make suitable recruits. Using outsiders for protection was not a 
practice foreign to the rulers. For centuries, ruling shaikhs had used men from out-of-
kin groups, especially manumitted slaves, as their personal bodyguards. Indeed, 
there was a belief on both sides (British officials and local elites) that the loyalty of 
personnel from abroad could be depended on to a greater extent than local 
tribesmen who might intrigue against the state. 
 The establishment of landing sites for the Britain-to-Asia air route and 
burgeoning British oil production and exploration activities in the 1930s made the 
domestic stability of Britain’s protected states in the Gulf a far more pressing concern 
for Britain than before. Thus, as Second World War approached, Britain was spurred 
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to review its security arrangements in Eastern Arabia. Lacking confidence in the 
ability of the Bahraini and Kuwaiti forces to protect their growing hydrocarbon 
infrastructure from sabotage, British and American oil workers were organised into 
volunteer forces in those two early oil producers. In Muscat, Britain paid the Sultan a 
wartime subsidy to expand his military, calculating that in its present state it would be 
too weak to repel an Axis-incited tribal advance on the capital. The Second World 
War brought into sharp relief the fact that Britain’s interests in the area – primarily the 
burgeoning oil sector and the strategic air route – were starting to outgrow the naval-
centric presence that had undergirded Britain’s position in the area for 120 years. Yet 
Britain remained reluctant to commit more military resources to the region, especially 
for internal security duties. To bridge this gap, Britain ramped up its pressure on the 
local rulers to enhance their indigenous capabilities to maintain order over their 
territories.  
Indian independence in 1947 profoundly affected British involvement in the 
small Gulf Arab states. Britain turned away from its previous hands-off approach to 
the internal affairs of the protected states as well as Muscat and Oman. Yet Britain 
still wanted to avoid, where possible, intervening with its own military whenever its 
interests or those of its protégés were threatened. In the Trucial States, the need to 
protect oil prospecting parties and put an end to slave trading led Britain to set up a 
British-officered, locally recruited levy force. In 1951, the British Government 
established the Trucial Oman Levies (TOL) by transferring a small team from the 
Arab Legion to form a nucleus around which the new force would grow. The force 
was set apart from other local forces insomuch that it was paid for by the British 
Government and was under the local control of the Political Resident.  
The prospect that local governments might take on greater responsibility for 
their own security became increasingly attractive to Britain at a time when its ability to 
project military power abroad was diminishing. Yet, by the end of the 1950s, the 
question of whether indigenous forces would enable Britain to reduce its cost of 
protecting the region remained unanswered. At times during the tumultuous mid-
1950s, British defence planners and Foreign Office mandarins had such little faith in 
the ability of the Bahraini police to keep order in the midst of social and labour unrest 
that they believed no other avenue was open but to rely on the British Army. Whilst 
instability around the time of the Suez crisis reduced British confidence in the ability 
of local forces to maintain order, Britain still wanted to reduce the size of its garrison 
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stationed in the Gulf. Indeed, the garrisoning of additional British Army infantry 
companies in Bahrain and Sharjah was only ever intended as a covering force, giving 
Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar time to make improvements to their own security forces. 
Even when local forces were judged to have performed well operationally – 
such as the Trucial Oman Levies against Saudi-backed forces at Buraimi in 1955 – 
British observers were quick to point out that they still depended on British military 
support, usually in the shape of RAF transport and combat aircraft and Royal Navy 
frigates. Moreover, it was British assistance to these forces that was held up as the 
most important factor in their efficacy. In this way, local forces should be thought of 
as complementing Britain’s military architecture rather than replacing it. When 
money-sensitive civil servants questioned British expenditure on local forces, 
supporters of this spending argued that it was less costly in the long-run as greater 
indigenous capabilities would reduce the likelihood of Britain having to intervene 
directly and could reduce defence expenditure in the long-term. Ironically, Britain’s 
commitments in Muscat and Oman actually sped up the growth of the Sultan’s Armed 
Forces. The failure of the Sultan’s military to defeat rebels operating in the Omani 
interior in the late 1950s led Britain to take de facto control of the Sultan’s Armed 
Forces in 1958 and to largely bankroll it.  
The exponential growth of British involvement in the security scene during the 
1950s was not all driven by direct state-to-state assistance; the number of British 
police and military advisers and experts privately employed by the local rulers 
increased steadily over this decade. T.E. Lawrence’s earlier plea that men should not 
‘for the glamour of strangeness, go out to prostitute themselves and their talents in 
serving another race,’ went ignored.1145 Charles Belgrave, who for over 30 years was 
employed as an adviser to two successive rulers of Bahrain, was just one of a well-
entrenched group of Britons who played a central role in the development of the Gulf 
states outside of British officialdom. Indeed, by the end of the 1950s, there were 
dozens if not hundreds of former British military officers, policemen, civil servants, 
and diplomats holding influential posts in the nascent governments of the Gulf Arab 
states. Some Britons became éminence grise figures to the rulers they served. While 
the influence that private military and security advisers were able to exert was not 
officially sanctioned by the British Government, their role in helping to maintain 
                                            
1145 T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (London: Penguin Books, 2000) p. 29. 
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internal stability did, at most points, conflate with the agenda of the British 
Government. At other times, however, British officials in the Gulf considered a 
number of the privately employed British security advisors as liabilities, complaining 
that their actions ran counter to British interests. The loyalties of many of these 
British advisors and contract officers were first and foremost to their Arab masters; 
even though their rapport with British officials might provide access for the latter, it 
could be just as likely that they would eventually present an obstacle to British official 
policy. As a reaction to this, British officials in Muscat and Oman worked to replace 
contract officers with regular loan service officers, over whom they would have a 
greater measure of control. In Bahrain in the mid-1950s, the British Government put 
pressure on the Ruler to retire Belgrave, who was seen as ignorant of modern police 
work and a lightening rod for the Bahraini opposition. The friction between British 
officials and privately employed Britons only increased in the 1960s as the rulers 
began displaying greater independence from Britain in their decision-making and 
their British servants refused to work in the interests of Britain.   
British involvement in the Kuwaiti security forces was light compared to 
Britain’s other protected states in the Gulf. It is striking to observe, therefore, that 
after the country received independence from Britain in 1961, British participation in 
the Kuwaiti military grew. For Britain, an expanded and effective Kuwaiti military took 
on more and more significance for its plans to defend Kuwait from an Iraqi attack. 
This became especially relevant after 1966 when Britain reduced its defence 
commitment to air support only. Some policy-makers in Britain were hesitant in 
building up the Kuwaiti military lest it follow the path of other Arab states (most 
notably Libya at the time) and seize political power. Yet this never occurred – not in 
any of the Gulf Arab states. Why the militaries of the Gulf Arab states never 
attempted to seize political control – as they did in Egypt, Iraq, and Libya – is a 
question that deserves greater exploration, although the monopolisation of the 
militaries’ key leadership positions by ruling family members is the likely reason.  
Unlike Kuwait, the build-up of military capacity in the Trucial States and 
Bahrain was not seen as a security gain for Britain. When Abu Dhabi set out on a 
course to establish its own military, British officials tried but failed to quash the idea. 
From Britain’s perspective, the development of a defence force in Abu Dhabi would 
serve to undermine the role of the Trucial Oman Scouts (TOS) and would motivate 
the other Trucial rulers to set up their own private armies, increasing the chance of 
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military rivalry and conflict in the Trucial States instead of unification. But it was 
Bahrain’s plan to form a Defence Force that worried British officials most. The British 
Government feared that a Bahrain Defence Force would pose a threat to the Ruler, 
that it could easily overthrow him.  When it came to establishing new police forces 
and special branches in the Gulf, however, British officials gave these schemes their 
unreserved support. Indeed, Britain’s financial contribution to counter-subversion 
units in the lower Gulf continued beyond the end of 1971.  
Accepting its reduced ability to shape events in the Gulf, Britain reasoned that 
if it could not stop the rulers from setting up their own armed forces – or prevent them 
from expanding too rapidly – then it might as well try to steer them in the right 
direction. The right direction for Britain meant, if possible, that these force should be 
commanded and trained by British officers (contract or loan service) and that they 
should use weaponry produced by British manufacturers.  
As the end of 1971 approached, British planners began to think more carefully 
about Britain’s post-withdrawal role in the Gulf.  They calculated that Britain’s ability 
to remain influential would rest to a large degree on the rulers’ continued 
dependence on Britons to fill critical advisory and leadership positions related to 
security matters. After all, the presence of British nationals, whether loaned out by 
Britain or privately employed, was a critical component in the development of 
indigenous security forces prior 1971 and one of the central planks of the British 
relationship with the Gulf ruling families. Because the influence of Britons in key 
positions in the security apparatus was not dependent on the formal aspects of 
Britain’s political and military position in the Gulf, it is perhaps not surprising that it 
continued long after Britain’s formal military withdrawal – right up to the present day. 
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